State v. Sullivan ( 2017 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    IVE SULLIVAN, Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 15-0817 PRPC
    FILED 5-11-2017
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2013-455906-001
    The Honorable Warren J. Granville, Judge
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Diane Meloche
    Counsel for Respondent
    Ive Sullivan, Tucson
    Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge James P. Beene joined.
    STATE v. SULLIVAN
    Decision of the Court
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1             Petitioner Ive Sullivan seeks review of the superior court’s
    order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to
    Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (2017).1 Absent an abuse of
    discretion or error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling
    on a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Gutierrez, 
    229 Ariz. 573
    , 577
    ¶ 19 (2012). Finding no such error, this court grants review but denies relief.
    ¶2           In 2014, Sullivan pled guilty to one charge of misconduct
    involving weapons, a Class 4 felony.2 After a priors trial, the superior court
    found that Sullivan had two prior historical felony convictions and
    sentenced him to 10 years in prison, a presumptive sentence.
    ¶3            Sullivan filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief,
    claiming trial counsel was deficient in four respects: (1) failing to challenge
    the grand jury proceeding in a timely manner; (2) failing to seek an appeal
    after the superior court denied a suppression motion, which Sullivan
    believes to have forced him to enter a plea; (3) providing erroneous and
    incomplete advice, which Sullivan asserts caused him to reject a more
    favorable plea; and (4) misleading Sullivan into entering a plea, the terms
    of which he claims were unknown to him and unfavorable. The superior
    court dismissed the petition. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 32.6(c). It is from this
    dismissal that Sullivan seeks relief.
    ¶4             On review, Sullivan re-argues the same four claims. Sullivan
    provides no new law or fact to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant must show that there is a
    “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the
    result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
    1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
    refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    2 The State originally indicted Sullivan on two additional drug-related
    counts that were dismissed following a suppression hearing. After a
    settlement conference, Sullivan pled guilty to the remaining charge.
    Although the resulting minute entry states the offense was non-repetitive,
    the transcript shows the plea was to the offense, leaving to the priors trial
    whether it was repetitive or non-repetitive. See State v. James, 
    239 Ariz. 367
    ,
    368 ¶ 7 (App. 2012) (“When there is a discrepancy between the trial court's
    oral statements at a sentencing hearing and its written minute entry, the
    oral statements control.”).
    2
    STATE v. SULLIVAN
    Decision of the Court
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694, 695 (1984). Sullivan does not establish both that trial
    counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable professional
    standard and that the deficient performance caused prejudice to the
    defense. Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 687
    ; State v. Nash, 
    143 Ariz. 392
    , 397 (1985).
    ¶5             A review of the record details the procedural history of the
    case and is not supportive of Sullivan’s claims. After substantial motion
    practice and an advisement pursuant to State v. Donald, 
    198 Ariz. 406
     (App.
    2000) on a prior plea that Sullivan rejected, before accepting Sullivan’s
    guilty plea, the superior court engaged in a lengthy settlement conference
    with Sullivan. This included a discussion regarding the State’s anticipated
    sentencing recommendation. The State, unequivocally, agreed that if
    Sullivan pled guilty, the recommendation would be that Sullivan serve 10
    years in prison. The court assured Sullivan that if the State proved that he
    had two historical prior felony convictions and was on supervised release
    at the time of the offense, it still would sentence him to 10 years in prison.
    If Sullivan were convicted at trial, the superior court explained, he would
    face up to 15 years in prison.
    ¶6             Sullivan subsequently pled guilty to the charge. While
    Sullivan had no constitutional right to a settlement conference, he also had
    no need for one once he decided to plead guilty. There would also have
    been no purpose for trial counsel to appeal any superior court ruling. At the
    change of plea hearing, Sullivan indicated he understood that the State
    would attempt to prove that Sullivan had two historical priors and that
    Sullivan was on release at the time of the offense. The court accepted
    Sullivan’s admission. Then the State proved Sullivan had two historical
    prior felony convictions. A discussion was held again to explain the plea
    history, Sullivan’s rejection of the initial plea offer, the suppression hearing
    results, and the State’s decision not to allege an aggravator which would
    require a sentence in excess of 10 years. The superior court sentenced
    Sullivan to the statutory presumptive term of 10 years in prison. Claims
    regarding the voluntariness of a plea are meritless if the record shows the
    superior court questioned the defendant in accordance with Boykin v.
    Alabama, 
    395 U.S. 238
     (1969), and the defendant’s responses to those
    questions indicate the defendant entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily
    and intelligently. State v. Hamilton, 
    142 Ariz. 91
    , 93 (1984). On this record,
    this standard was met.
    ¶7            Similarly, Sullivan has not shown trial counsel’s performance
    was deficient and that but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been
    different. See Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 687
    . Accordingly, the superior court
    properly dismissed Sullivan’s petition.
    3
    STATE v. SULLIVAN
    Decision of the Court
    ¶8   For these reasons, this court grants review but denies relief.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 15-0817-PRPC

Filed Date: 5/11/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021