McCormick v. Aroc ( 2014 )


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  •                                NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
    AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    TIM MCCORMICK, Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    SONORAN FAMILY COMMUNITIES, LLC, Defendant; ARIZONA
    REGISTRAR OF CONTRACTORS, an Arizona governmental agency,
    Defendant/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 13-0039
    FILED 4-8-2014
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. LC2011-000565-001
    The Honorable Crane McClennen, Judge
    VACATED
    COUNSEL
    Schern Richardson Finter Decker PLC, Phoenix
    By Aaron M. Finter
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Montgomery Lee
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Arizona Registrar of Contractors
    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1            This dispute arises out of Sonoran Family Communities,
    LLC’s commitment in early 2005 to build a single family residence on a
    parcel of land (Lot 4) in Gold Canyon, Arizona. Sonoran went out of
    business, lost its contractor’s license, never finished building the home
    and appellee Tim McCormick claims he lost a down payment of more
    than $35,000. McCormick made a claim against the Arizona Registrar of
    Contractor’s (ROC) Residential Contractors Recovery Fund (Fund), which
    allows an eligible person injured by a licensed residential contractor’s
    violation of applicable law to receive up to $30,000 for such a loss. See
    Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 32-1132(A) (2014). 1
    ¶2            To be eligible for recovery from the Fund, McCormick had to
    show he was a “person injured,” which includes a requirement that
    McCormick intended to occupy Lot 4 as his residence. A.R.S. § 32-1131(3). 2
    After an evidentiary hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
    recommended the ROC find McCormick eligible for recovery. The ROC
    modified and rejected the ALJ’s recommendations, finding McCormick
    failed to show he was eligible. On appeal, the superior court reversed the
    ROC’s order, “[b]ased on the authorities and arguments presented by
    McCormick” and awarded McCormick attorneys’ fees and costs. The ROC
    then timely appealed to this court.
    ¶3          The narrow issue on appeal is whether the ROC properly
    modified and rejected the ALJ’s recommendations. Finding the ROC did
    1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes cited refer to
    the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    2 The “person injured” definition also requires that the property be
    “classified as class three property under [A.R.S.] § 42-12003.” A.R.S. § 32-
    1131(3). Given the resolution below, it is not necessary to address the
    classification of Lot 4.
    2
    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    not err, the judgment and award of attorneys’ fees and costs is vacated
    and the ROC’s order is affirmed.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶4            On January 29, 2005, Sonoran entered into a Purchase
    Agreement and Receipt for Deposit in which Calypso Investments LLC
    agreed to buy and Sonoran agreed to build and sell a home on Lot 4.
    McCormick signed on behalf of Calypso. McCormick testified he was the
    sole member of Calypso, which apparently held some rental properties,
    and he “set [Calypso] up for liability protection if somebody got hurt at
    the rental properties and things like that.”
    ¶5            In the following months, Calypso made an escrow payment
    to Chicago Title Insurance Company and Calypso (by McCormick) and
    Sonoran signed a Final Purchase Price Addendum. A June 7, 2005
    Addendum for Lot 4 states “buyer to be Tim McCormick.” A Special
    Warranty Deed, dated July 8, 2005, and recorded on July 28, 2005 with the
    Pinal County Recorder and signed by Sonoran, lists McCormick as the
    sole grantee for Lot 4.
    ¶6            An Affidavit of Property Value signed by McCormick and
    notarized on July 21, 2005, and recorded with the Pinal County Recorder
    on July 28, 2005, lists McCormick as the purchaser of Lot 4. Section 7 of
    this Affidavit states that Lot 4 was “[t]o be rented to someone other than a
    ‘family member’” (as opposed to checking an alternative box indicating
    “[t]o be occupied by Owner or ‘family member’”). The keystone to the
    resolution of this appeal is the proper force to be given this Affidavit by
    McCormick stating that the home on Lot 4 was to be rented to someone
    other than a family member, given McCormick’s claim to the contrary
    years later.
    ¶7          There are some significant gaps in the record about what
    happened next. A February 2007 letter from Sonoran to McCormick states
    the home on Lot 4 “is nearing completion. This is a courtesy 60 day notice
    of your Target Close Date.” In April 2007, however, McCormick filed a
    Consumer Complaint with the Arizona Attorney General, alleging
    Sonoran had “not finished both houses” that he purchased from Sonoran. 3
    3Although Calypso purchased Lot 38 in the same development as Lot 4,
    McCormick did not make a claim against the Fund for losses regarding
    Lot 38.
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    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    This Consumer Complaint alleged a January 16, 2005 “Date of
    Transaction” and noted that it was supposed to have taken six to eight
    months to build the home. The record does not reveal the resolution of
    this Consumer Complaint.
    ¶8           A May 2007 letter from Sonoran to McCormick states
    Sonoran had lost its contractor’s license, was out of business and was
    unable to complete the home on Lot 4. Noting the “difficult construction
    and real estate economic time,” the letter adds that Sonoran’s parent
    company was in bankruptcy and “[y]ou are free to contract with
    whomever you chose to complete your home.” The ROC later notified
    McCormick that Sonoran’s contractor’s license was revoked in August
    2007.
    ¶9            In May 2009, McCormick filed a verified Complaint against
    Sonoran with the ROC. That Complaint listed July 22, 2005 as the date of
    contract for the purchase of Lot 4; lists August 2005 as the completion,
    close of escrow and move-in date and states the last work was performed
    on June 10, 2007. McCormick alleged abandonment by Sonoran and
    sought recovery of $35,305.85. McCormick added that he had “signed over
    the . . . house” to an investor “in a ‘deed in lieu’” a year after work
    stopped at the property (i.e. mid-2008) and he “no longer owe[d] any $ on
    the house” but “never got my down payment back.” In January 2010, the
    ROC issued a Decision and Order finding Sonoran abandoned the
    construction contract in violation of A.R.S. § 32-1154(A)(1) and taking
    further discipline against Sonoran’s contractor’s license.
    ¶10         McCormick also filed a timely claim against the Fund
    regarding Lot 4. 4 In February 2011, “[a]fter a review of the claim and all
    supporting documentation,” the ROC issued a Notice to Claimant of
    Recovery Fund Ineligibility. The ROC found McCormick was ineligible for
    payment from the Fund because, among other things, McCormick did not
    intend Lot 4 to be owner-occupied under A.R.S. § 42-12004. The ROC
    noted:
    4To the extent the claim against the Fund was separate from McCormick’s
    May 2009 Complaint, it is not in the record on appeal. The ROC, however,
    does not dispute that McCormick filed a timely claim against the Fund
    regarding Lot 4.
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    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    Research at the Pinal County Assessor’s office
    and the Arizona Department of Revenue
    support the conclusion that Mr. McCormick
    held this property as investment property. The
    [ROC] has a copy of a signed and notarized
    [Affidavit of Property Value] executed by
    Complainant McCormick, dated 7/21/2005,
    which states the Complainant’s intended use
    for this property was to rent it as a commercial
    property to someone other than [a] “family
    member.”
    Complainant cannot therefore be classified as a
    ‘person injured’ under § 32-1131 as it was not
    intended     to   be    owner-occupied      by
    Complainant's own sworn statement.
    McCormick timely challenged this determination, including requesting an
    evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH),
    which was held in June 2011. Between the February 2011 ineligibility
    finding and the June 2011 administrative hearing, McCormick took
    various actions of note.
    ¶11             In an April 25, 2011 letter to the ROC, McCormick claimed
    the July 21, 2005 Affidavit of Property Value stating Lot 4 “[t]o be rented
    to someone other than [a] ‘family member’” was a mistake. McCormick
    attached a notarized letter, with a handwritten “4/20/2011” date, from
    the Sonoran sales agent stating McCormick “wrote a contract to purchase
    Lot 4 on February 18, 2005. Mr. McCormick’s intent was to occupy this
    home. He put in many upgrades to make it his own special home.”
    McCormick also attached an unsigned, unverified April 20, 2011 email
    from a Chicago Title representative who wrote the title insurance policy
    for Lot 4, stating:
    Chicago Title only issues the Homeowner’s
    Title Policy when the purchaser is going to
    reside in the property as their principal
    residence. We do not issue this policy to
    landlords as it gives a great deal of extra
    coverage that is afforded to the insured since
    this would be their own home.
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    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    To address the issue of the Affidavit of
    Property Value that was recorded with your
    deed, at the time of this closing in 2005, Escrow
    was marking the box in Section 7 in our
    computer system. The Escrow Officer who did
    this – or the assistant who prepared the
    document made an assumption that this was to
    be an investment property and they were
    incorrect. This clearly should have been
    marked “To be occupied by Owner. . . . We
    apologize for this error.”
    On May 23, 2011, McCormick also recorded a Special Warranty Deed for
    Lot 4 stating, with reference to the July 21, 2005 Affidavit: “THIS
    DOCUMENT IS BEING RE-RECORDED TO CHANGE THE INTENDED
    USE ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF PROPERTY VALUE TO OWNER
    OCCUPIED.”
    ¶12          At the June 2011 administrative hearing, the ALJ received in
    evidence various documents (including those identified above) and heard
    testimony from McCormick and ROC representative Doug Ulmer. Along
    with going through many of the exhibits, Ulmer testified the ROC was
    “concerned” about McCormick’s intent to be an owner-occupier because
    Lot 4 was “owned initially by Calypso.” Ulmer also expressed concern
    about the July 21, 2005 Affidavit, stating that Lot 4 was “[t]o be rented to
    someone other than [a] family member.” Ulmer testified that McCormick’s
    May 2009 Complaint was the first documentation of any kind where
    McCormick expressed an intent to personally occupy Lot 4.
    ¶13            McCormick testified that the purchase contract for Lot 4
    initially referenced Calypso as the buyer because the agent insisted
    “everything . . . has to be as it appears on the check” and he had the
    Calypso “checkbook with me.” A later addendum “Buyer to be changed
    to Tim McCormick” was designed to correct that issue. McCormick
    testified that Section 7 of the Affidavit “was marked in error. And
    although my responsibility, as I read over all these, I’m supposed to read
    over all the documents as you buy a house, but as we all know, it’s kind of
    a blur, and yes, it was signed, but it was, it was done in error.”
    McCormick testified that he never occupied any home on Lot 4 because it
    was never completed.
    ¶14           In July 2011, the ALJ issued a decision including proposed
    findings that McCormick obtained ownership of the property in July 2005
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    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    and, at that time, signed the Affidavit of Property Value stating the
    intended use of Lot 4 “was for rental use and not to be occupied by the
    owner.” The ALJ’s proposed findings continued:
    At hearing, [McCormick] submitted
    credible evidence showing that the Affidavit
    was erroneous with respect to the intended use
    of the property. This evidence includes a
    notarized letter from the sales agent stating
    that [McCormick] intended to live in the home
    and an e-mail from [McCormick’s] title
    insurance carrier showing that the policy that
    was issued for the home was for an owner-
    occupier and not an owner-renter. It also
    includes a recorded document from a title
    company stating that the Affidavit should have
    shown the property to be owner-occupied.
    The ALJ concluded that “[t]he evidence shows that [McCormick] intended
    to occupy the property for which he is seeking recovery” and
    recommended that the ROC “find that Tim McCormick is eligible for
    recovery from the Fund.”
    ¶15           Although adopting many of the ALJ’s recommendations, in
    an August 12, 2011 Order, the ROC found McCormick had not submitted
    credible evidence showing that the Affidavit of Property Value was in
    error; rejected the ALJ’s finding that the evidence showed McCormick
    intended to occupy Lot 4 and, instead, found “that the evidence presented
    and the record of the [ROC] shows that [McCormick] did not carry his
    burden to establish that he intended to occupy” Lot 4. The ROC provided
    the following rationale for these conclusions:
    Justification: The [ROC] does not find
    the evidence presented by [McCormick],
    including the Affidavit, notarized letter from
    the sales agent and an email from
    [McCormick’s] title insurance carrier, to be
    credible. This evidence was only created and
    presented by [McCormick] after [McCormick]
    found out that he would be deemed ineligible
    for recovery from the . . . Fund. As such, the
    [ROC] does not give weight to these
    documents. Further, [McCormick] is no longer
    7
    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    the “owner” of [Lot 4] and the [ROC] finds
    Complainant’s attempt to re-write the history
    of his previous ownership of [Lot 4] property
    suspect.
    It is significant that the contract
    executed as a basis of this claim was entered
    into between [Sonoran] and [McCormick’s]
    business entity, Calypso Investments LLC.
    Payments on this contract were rendered by
    Calypso Investments LLC, not by [McCormick]
    individually. [McCormick] also used Calypso
    Investments LLC to buy at least one other
    property, in the same subdivision as the subject
    property, that was admitted to be a commercial
    venture by [McCormick].
    Intent to occupy, as with all eligibility
    hurdles that must be overcome by
    [McCormick], must be evaluated at the time of
    the contract and/or at the time of if injury. The
    weight of the evidence in the record over the
    relevant time frame does not support that
    [McCormick’s] intent was to occupy the subject
    property.
    Accordingly, the ROC found that McCormick “is ineligible for recovery
    from the” Fund.
    ¶16           McCormick filed a timely complaint for judicial review in
    superior court arguing the ROC’s decision was not based on substantial
    evidence and sought attorneys’ fees. See A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to -914, 32-
    1154(F). “Based on the authorities and arguments presented by
    McCormick,” the superior court found the record supported the ALJ’s
    findings and conclusions that McCormick was eligible for recovery from
    the Fund, reversed the ROC’s decision to the contrary and remanded for
    the ROC to determine the proper award amount. The superior court also
    granted McCormick’s request for attorneys’ fees. This court has
    jurisdiction over the ROC’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9,
    of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-913, -2101(A)(1).
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    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶17            The standard of review on appeal is “whether the agency’s
    action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Gaveck v. Ariz.
    State Bd. of Podiatry Exam'rs, 
    222 Ariz. 433
    , 436, ¶ 11, 
    215 P.3d 1114
    , 1117
    (App. 2009) (citation omitted). Arbitrary and capricious agency action has
    been described as “unreason[ed] action, without consideration and in
    disregard for facts and circumstances.” Petras v. Ariz. State Liquor Bd., 
    129 Ariz. 449
    , 452, 
    631 P.2d 1107
    , 1110 (App. 1981) (quoting Tucson Pub. Sch.,
    Dist. No. 1 of Pima Cnty. v. Green, 
    17 Ariz. App. 91
    , 94, 
    495 P.2d 861
    , 864
    (App. 1972)). “The court must defer to the agency’s factual findings and
    affirm them if supported by substantial evidence. If an agency’s decision
    is supported by the record, substantial evidence exists to support the
    decision even if the record also supports a different conclusion.” Gaveck,
    222 Ariz. at 436, ¶ 11, 
    215 P.3d at 1117
     (citations omitted).
    ¶18          Whether McCormick intended to occupy Lot 4 “as a
    residence” under A.R.S. § 32-1131(3) is determined by looking at his intent
    (1) when the contract was entered into or (2) when the claim accrued.
    McMurren v. JMC Builders, Inc., 
    204 Ariz. 345
    , 347, ¶ 1, 
    63 P.3d 1082
    , 1084
    (App. 2003). The evidence considered by the ROC admittedly was in
    conflict. The contract was entered into either when McCormick was
    designated the buyer in an Addendum dated June 7, 2005, or when the
    property transferred pursuant to the Special Warranty Deed dated July 21,
    2005 and recorded July 28, 2005. Viewed most favorably to McCormick,
    his claim accrued at some point prior to when he filed his May 2009
    Complaint with the ROC. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry focuses on
    McCormick’s intent in June/July 2005 and in or before May 2009.
    ¶19            In July 2005, McCormick filed a notarized Affidavit of
    Property Value with Pinal County stating that Lot 4 was to be rental
    property and “[t]o be rented to someone other than [a] ‘family member.’”
    That Affidavit was not changed or withdrawn prior to McCormick filing
    his ROC Complaint in May 2009. That Affidavit is consistent with the
    ROC’s finding that McCormick did not show he intended to occupy Lot 4
    as a residence. McCormick did not attempt to alter this recorded Affidavit
    until after the ROC relied on the filing in finding him ineligible to recover
    from the Fund in February 2011. The ROC was not required to ignore the
    representation by McCormick in this Affidavit or this substantial passage
    of time.
    ¶20        McCormick’s May 2009 Complaint with the ROC alleges that
    Sonoran “was to build me a house to move into.” This allegation is
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    MCCORMICK v. AROC
    Decision of the Court
    consistent with McCormick’s argument that he intended to occupy Lot 4
    as a residence at some point, as the ROC acknowledged. McCormick,
    however, “signed over the . . . house” to an investor “in a ‘deed in lieu’”
    sometime in mid-2008, meaning he had not owned Lot 4 for nearly a year
    before filing his ROC Complaint. The ROC was not required to accept
    without question the allegations in McCormick’s Complaint.
    ¶21           McCormick’s efforts to show his earlier intent after the ROC
    found he was ineligible for Fund recovery in February 2011 warrant close
    examination. Although providing an April 2011 notarized letter from the
    Sonoran sales agent stating McCormick’s “intent was to occupy the home”
    when he “wrote a contract to purchase Lot 4 on February 18, 2005,” the
    record reveals no February 18, 2005 purchase contract (although there is
    an escrow receipt using that date), and McCormick was not a party to the
    contract to purchase Lot 4 until June 2005. Moreover, although admissible
    in the administrative hearing, McCormick has not shown that the ROC
    was compelled to accept at face value this statement by a sales agent
    purporting to describe McCormick’s intent six years earlier. Cf. Ariz. State
    Liquor Bd. v. Jacobs, 
    20 Ariz. App. 166
    , 169, 
    511 P.2d 179
    , 182 (App. 1973)
    (noting administrative agency “is the sole judge of the weight to be given
    each item of evidence”). Similarly, the ROC was not compelled to accept
    the statements in the unsigned, unverified email from a Chicago Title
    representative, particularly when compared to a contrary declaration in
    the July 2005 notarized Affidavit. Id. at 169, 
    511 P.2d at 182
    .
    ¶22           Finally, although McCormick purported to amend the July
    2005 Affidavit by recording a Special Warranty Deed in May 2011, he did
    so after the ROC found him ineligible for Fund recovery based on his
    statements in the July 2005 Affidavit. Even then, the May 2011 Special
    Warranty Deed stated that he was re-recording the July 2005 Affidavit
    “TO CHANGE THE INTENDED USE ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF
    PROPERTY VALUE TO OWNER OCCUPIED,” not that the July 2005
    Affidavit was in error when filed. Moreover, the May 2011 recording came
    approximately three years after he “signed over the . . . house” to an
    investor “in a ‘deed in lieu’” in mid-2008. In short, the May 2011 recording
    (1) did not purport to claim that the July 2005 Affidavit was in error; (2)
    changed the stated intent long after the relevant time period and (3)
    changed the stated intent years after McCormick had signed away his
    ownership interest in Lot 4.
    ¶23           It is true that McCormick testified at the administrative
    hearing that his July 2005 Affidavit “was marked in error.” Given the
    conflicting evidence, however, the ROC was not compelled to accept
    10
    MCCORMICK v. AROC
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    McCormick’s testimony. See Jacobs, 
    20 Ariz. App. at 169
    , 
    511 P.2d at 182
    . If
    the record supports two inconsistent factual conclusions, substantial
    evidence supports the ROC’s selection of either. Siler v. Ariz. Dep’t of Real
    Estate, 
    193 Ariz. 374
    , 384, ¶ 56, 
    972 P.2d 1010
    , 1020 (App. 1998) (citing
    authority). On this record, that is precisely what occurred, meaning the
    ROC’s rejecting of McCormick’s view on his intent was supported by
    substantial evidence.
    ¶24            The ROC’s actions also were consistent with Ritland v. Ariz.
    State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 
    213 Ariz. 187
    , 
    140 P.3d 970
     (App. 2006). The ROC
    found record evidence for rejecting the ALJ’s credibility findings and
    specified the bases for such action, including the substantial time the
    recorded July 2005 Affidavit stood without change and that evidence of
    the claimed error post-dated the ROC’s initial determination that
    McCormick was not eligible for reimbursement. In doing so, the ROC
    found and specified factual record support for rejecting the ALJ’s
    credibility findings. Nothing more was required. Id. at 191, ¶ 14, 140 P.3d
    at 974 (noting agency may reject ALJ credibility findings if the agency (1)
    “finds evidence in the record for so doing” and (2) specifies the “factual
    support for rejecting the ALJ’s credibility findings”).
    ¶25            Finding no error in the ROC’s factual determinations based
    on disputed evidence of record, and because the ROC correctly applied
    the applicable law, the ROC properly determined McCormick failed to
    show intent to occupy Lot 4 “as a residence.” A.R.S. § 32-1131(3).
    Accordingly, the ROC properly found that McCormick did not qualify for
    reimbursement from the Fund. Finally, because McCormick did not
    prevail, his request for attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-
    348(A) is denied.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶26           The superior court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees
    and costs is vacated and the ROC’s August 12, 2011 Order is affirmed.
    :MJT
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