State v. Haver ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    TERRY LEE HAVER, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0419
    FILED 12-19-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2011-005364-001
    The Honorable George H. Foster, Jr., Judge
    AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART
    COUNSEL
    The Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Gracynthia Claw
    Counsel for Appellee
    The Maricopa Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Tennie B. Martin, Christopher Johns
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. HAVER
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Retired Judge Thomas C.
    Kleinschmidt1 joined.
    T H O M P S O N, Judge:
    ¶1             Terry Lee Haver (appellant) appeals from his convictions on
    six counts of theft and five counts of forgery. Finding no error, we affirm
    in part, and remand in part.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Appellant was the owner of a general contracting company
    hired to build an additional wing onto a hotel project for client World
    Travel Inns (client). In order to be paid, appellant had to submit monthly
    fee applications and lien waivers from various subcontractors. Each pay
    application required certification that appellant’s company would, and
    did, use the disbursed money to pay the subcontractors in a full and
    timely manner.
    ¶3            Over time, the bank that was processing the applications
    became suspicious that the work being billed for was either not done
    and/or the subcontractors invoices and waivers were being forged.
    Subcontractors were complaining to the client and the building
    superintendent that they were not being paid or were being underpaid.
    The architect noticed discrepancies between the work that was billed as
    completed and work that was actually completed. The bank ultimately
    instituted a dual-check system to insure subcontractors got paid.
    ¶4           Not long thereafter, appellant approached the client asking
    for additional retainage funds to be released to him, even though the
    project was not done. Appellant advised the client that without the
    1     The Honorable Thomas C. Kleinshmidt, Retired Judge of the Court
    of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter
    pursuant to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
    2
    STATE v. HAVER
    Decision of the Court
    additional monies he would have to file bankruptcy. Appellant next
    demanded $100,000 from the client or told the client he could not finish
    the building. Within a couple of days of the client’s denial of that request,
    appellant walked off the job. Neither the client or most of the
    subcontractors heard from him again. Appellant moved to Indiana.
    ¶5            Appellant received thirteen disbursements totaling in excess
    of two million dollars. An investigation put the amount of unaccounted
    for money, between what appellant said he paid the contractors and what
    he actually paid, at $528,595.18. Appellant later admitted to the police
    that he had used some of the money to pay subcontractors on other jobs
    and that he had signed some of the lien waivers. In testifying, he again
    admitted he had used some of the disbursed money to pay subcontractors
    on other jobs, but indicated those payments would have been out of his
    profits on the hotel job.
    ¶6          This matter was designated a complex case. Over one
    hundred exhibits were introduced into evidence and testimony was taken
    from over a dozen witnesses. Appellant testified, for four days, in his
    own defense.2
    ¶7           After a fourteen-day jury trial, appellant was convicted of
    theft against the client, and theft and forgery as to each of the five
    impacted subcontractors. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent
    sentences of: five years for Counts 1 (theft) and 2 (theft), 7.5 years for
    Counts 3 (theft) and 4 (theft), 6.5 years for Count 6 (theft), 1.75 years for
    Count 7 (theft), and 4.5 years each on the remaining 5 forgery counts.
    Appellant was given 65 days’ presentence incarceration credit. Appellant
    timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8            On appeal, appellant asserts two claims. First, appellant
    claims that the trial court erred in giving a flight or concealment
    instruction over his objection. Appellant argues that he merely closed the
    business and returned to Indiana where he retained a residence and
    where there was an opportunity for construction work. He maintains that
    there was insufficient evidence in the record to warrant a flight or
    concealment instruction, that such an instruction was unfairly prejudicial,
    and that it permitted the jury to wrongly consider his move as
    2   Five additional counts had been dismissed.
    3
    STATE v. HAVER
    Decision of the Court
    consciousness of guilt. We review the trial court’s decision to give a jury
    instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Parker, 
    231 Ariz. 391
    , 409, ¶
    44 (2013).
    ¶9            The jury instruction read:
    In determining whether the State has proved the defendant
    guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider any
    evidence of the defendant’s running away, hiding, or
    concealing evidence, together with all the other evidence in
    the case . . . Running away, hiding, or concealing evidence
    after a crime [] does not by itself prove guilt.
    ¶10             It was undisputed that appellant left the jurisdiction,
    despite being the general contractor in a project underway. He left the job
    without giving notice to the client or the subcontractors. It was
    undisputed that after failing to obtain additional funds from the client, he
    never again had contact with the client or most of the subcontractors. He
    did not leave them additional contact information.
    ¶11           The trial court gave appellant’s counsel the opportunity to
    address the instruction before the jury. He said:
    this instruction is really completely inapplicable in this case.
    You heard testimony that because of what happened with
    the Sahuaro Group project, or I'm sorry, the SpringHill
    Suites project, the Sahuaro Group had to close their doors,
    they closed business, Lee moved back to Indiana where he
    was from. He didn't take off and move to Mexico. He didn't
    just turn off all his phones and leave. He had forwarding
    addresses, he still had the same phone number or
    presumably an easy enough phone number to find.
    Detective Bermudez called him up. He did not run away,
    hide, or conceal evidence in this case. This instruction is just
    completely inapplicable to the facts of this case.
    We agree with the state that the evidence of guilt was such that even had
    the instruction been erroneous, that the convictions could be maintained
    as the error was harmless. State v. Solis, 
    236 Ariz. 285
    , 287-88, ¶¶ 13-14
    (App. 2014) (citing State v. Valverde, 
    220 Ariz. 582
    , 586, ¶ 16 (2009) (flight
    instruction did not contribute to or affect the verdict)). For these reasons,
    the trial court is affirmed.
    4
    STATE v. HAVER
    Decision of the Court
    ¶12           As to the second issue, presentence incarceration credit, the
    state concedes that appellant should have received credit at least for the
    time he spent in jail in Indiana and that the trial court failed to give him
    that credit. This matter is remanded to the trial court for a recalculation of
    presentence incarceration credit.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13           For the above stated reasons, appellant’s convictions and
    sentences are affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for
    recalculation of appellant’s presentence incarceration credit.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 16-0419

Filed Date: 12/19/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021