Daniel L. v. Dcs ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    DANIEL L., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.L. S.L., A.L., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 16-0488
    FILED 4-27-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
    No. S0300JD201600034
    The Honorable Margaret A. McCullough, Judge
    JURSIDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Coconino County Public Defender’s Office, Flagstaff
    By Sandra L.J. Diehl
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
    By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek
    Counsel for Appellees
    DANIEL L. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia A. Orozco1 joined.
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1             Daniel L. (Father) challenges the superior court’s order that
    continued out of home custody of his children D.L., S.L. and A.L.
    (collectively Children) was clearly necessary to prevent abuse or neglect.2
    This court accepts special action jurisdiction over Father’s challenge but
    denies relief because Father has not shown the court erred.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             D.L. was born in 2011; S.L. in 2013 and A.L. in 2016. At birth,
    A.L. tested positive for amphetamine and the Department of Child Safety
    (DCS) intervened, but did not remove the Children from parents’ care at
    that time. DCS did, though, direct Father to “submit to urine and hair-
    follicle drug tests by the end of the week.” Father, however, was arrested
    the same day for possession of prescription medication and theft.
    ¶3            After learning A.L.’s meconium tested positive for
    methamphetamine and marijuana, DCS attempted to locate the family.
    DCS, however, was unable to locate the family for eight days. Kristen M.
    (Mother) was in jail for domestic violence committed with the paternal
    grandmother in the presence of the Children. Father then assumed care of
    the Children, but returned them to Mother’s care immediately after she was
    released from jail.
    ¶4           After DCS finally contacted the family at a pediatrician’s
    office, DCS took custody of the Children. DCS offered Father services,
    including drug testing, but he “refused to do anything.” DCS then filed a
    1The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals,
    Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article
    6, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
    2   Mother is also subject to the order but she is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    DANIEL L. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    dependency petition, alleging the Children were dependent as to Father
    because he neglected them by failing to protect them from Mother, given
    her drug use and unstable living situation.
    ¶5            Father requested a review of temporary custody hearing. See
    Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 51 (2017).3 At a three-day evidentiary hearing, Father
    testified. During questioning by the State, Father was argumentative and
    evasive, with the court reminding him numerous times to properly answer
    the questions. At the close of the hearing, the court took the matter under
    advisement and later found by a preponderance of the evidence the State
    “met its burden that continued custody of the [C]hildren is clearly
    necessary to prevent abuse or neglect.” The court based its decision in part
    on Father’s refusal to cooperate, causing “serious concerns whether [F]ather
    will comply with the court’s direction and orders.” The court expressed
    concerns that Father returned the Children to Mother immediately after her
    release from jail for domestic violence. Father timely seeks review of that
    decision by this court.4
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6             Father argues this court can exercise appellate review while
    the State argues this court lacks appellate jurisdiction. As noted by the
    parties, whether the temporary custody order was appealable is the subject
    of decisions that at least facially appear difficult to reconcile. Compare
    Yavapai Cty. Juv. Action No. J-8545, 
    140 Ariz. 10
    , 14 (1984) (“very narrow,
    technical conception of what constitutes a final order” should not apply “in
    cases involving the important and fundamental right to raise one’s
    children;” “A parent denied and redenied control over his or her children
    must have the right to appeal the initial and subsequent denials.”) with
    Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JT-295004, 
    126 Ariz. 409
    , 411 (App. 1980)
    (noting, to be appealable, a final order “must dispose of all of the issues”).
    This court need not attempt to finally reconcile that issue here. Even if
    appellate jurisdiction is lacking, this court has the “discretion to consider
    the matter as a special action.” State v. Perez, 
    172 Ariz. 290
    , 292 (App. 1992);
    see also Danielson v. Evans, 
    201 Ariz. 401
    , 411 ¶ 35, 36 (App. 2001) (sua sponte
    3Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
    refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    4 In November 2016, in an unsigned minute entry, the Children were found
    dependent. Father did not appear at the hearing and that ruling is not at
    issue here.
    3
    DANIEL L. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    accepting special action jurisdiction). Accordingly, the court in its discretion
    will entertain Father’s challenge to the temporary custody order by
    accepting special action jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 12–120.21(A)(4); Ariz. R.P.
    Spec. Act. 1(a).
    ¶7            Father argues the superior court abused its discretion because
    “the record lacks evidence to support its ruling,” citing various factors he
    asserts militate against temporary custody.5 The record, however, reflects
    adequate record evidence to support the ruling. For example, Father
    admitted he refused to cooperate with DCS, returned the Children to
    Mother despite her domestic violence in their presence and allowed the
    Children to remain in Mother’s care despite her drug use. The superior
    court properly considered this evidence when making its decision. This
    court will not re-weigh the evidence on appeal and “will not disturb the
    juvenile court’s order unless no reasonable evidence supports its factual
    findings.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    240 Ariz. 282
    , 287 ¶ 16 (App.
    2016).
    ¶8            As to Father’s argument that DCS did not offer services to
    prevent removal, the record is to the contrary. DCS did not immediately
    remove the Children when A.L. was born substance-exposed. DCS then
    made multiple attempts to contact the family and DCS offered random
    drug testing. DCS’ inability to locate Father is due to his own actions and
    Father then refused to participate in numerous drug tests. Father explicitly
    told DCS that he would not do anything until after they returned his
    Children to his care. Father has not shown that DCS failed to make
    reasonable efforts to prevent removal.
    ¶9             Finally, Father argues that because the court did not make
    explicit findings that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal of
    the Children, such efforts were not made. Not so. To hold that failure to
    make explicit findings of reasonable efforts “mandates release of a child
    from temporary custody regardless of the child’s welfare would elevate
    form over substance. Such a reading of the statute would subordinate the
    welfare of the Child[ren] to the very procedures established to protect the
    Child[ren’s] health and safety.” Arizona Dept. of Econ. Sec. v. Lee ex rel. Cty of
    Maricopa, 
    228 Ariz. 150
    , 154 ¶ 16 (App. 2011). There is ample evidence in the
    record to support the court’s order and its implicit findings that DCS made
    5 Father argues that “[c]oncerns about [Father’s] future involvement with
    criminal activities” should not be grounds for removal. However, there is
    no indication that the court relied on these concerns as a basis for ordering
    temporary custody.
    4
    DANIEL L. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    reasonable efforts to offer services to Father. And after removal, as Father
    concedes, DCS offered Father numerous services, but he refused to
    participate.
    ¶10            Father asserts that, although services were offered after
    removal, they “would not facilitate reunification of the family when the
    concerns voiced by DCS were father’s willingness to participate in services,
    parenting skills, domestic violence in the past and his criminal history or
    involvement in criminal activities.” Contrary to Father’s argument, DCS “is
    not required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent
    participates in each service it offers.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904,
    
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 353 (App. 1994). Given that the concerns regarding Father
    were his inability or unwillingness to recognize when his children are in
    danger, his evasive behavior and refusal to cooperate, services such as
    parenting skills and drug testing were appropriate. Father has not shown
    the court abused its discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11         Accepting special action jurisdiction, because Father has not
    shown the temporary custody order was in error, this court denies relief.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5