Mothershead v. Dulara ( 2019 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    KAREN MOTHERSHEAD, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    ASLAM DULARA, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
    __________________________________
    WELLS FARGO BANK, et al., Garnishees/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 19-0111
    FILED 12-26-2019
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2015-053526
    The Honorable Rodger E. Brodman, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Karen Mothershead, Scottsdale
    Plaintiff/Appellant
    Gaona Law Firm, Phoenix
    By David F. Gaona
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Iqbal Dulara and Dulara Enterprises, LLC
    MOTHERSHEAD v. DULARA, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Chief Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which
    Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Vice Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani
    joined.
    S W A N N, Chief Judge:
    ¶1           Karen Mothershead appeals the superior court’s order
    quashing writs of garnishment against Iqbal Dulara and Dulara Enterprises
    LLC, arguing that she was denied due process and that the superior court
    provided no legal reason for its ruling. The record does not support
    Mothershead’s contentions. We therefore affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In 2015, Mothershead filed a breach of contract claim against
    Aslam and Areen Dulara, Dulara Automotive Group LLC, and Big Bell
    Auto Superstore. In June 2017, the parties entered into a settlement
    agreement whereby Aslam and Areen Dulara were dismissed from the
    action and Mothershead obtained a $194,000 judgment against Dulara
    Automotive Group, LLC, and Big Bell Auto Superstore. In December 2018,
    in an attempt to collect on the June 2017 judgment, Mothershead filed writs
    of garnishment for bank accounts in the names of Dulara Automotive
    Group, Aslam Dulara, and various non-parties including Iqbal Dulara and
    Dulara Enterprises.
    ¶3            Iqbal Dulara and Dulara Enterprises (collectively,
    “Appellees”) filed a motion to quash the writs of garnishment as to their
    accounts and requested an immediate hearing, arguing that the writs were
    improper because they were not parties to the complaint or judgment.
    Mothershead responded to the motion arguing that the accounts were
    subject to garnishment because they held funds fraudulently transferred
    from a judgment debtor. Mothershead did not, however, offer evidence to
    prove the alleged transfers.
    ¶4         After holding a hearing, the court granted the motion to
    quash. Mothershead appeals.
    2
    MOTHERSHEAD v. DULARA, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5             As an initial matter, Appellees request that we dismiss
    Mothershead’s opening brief because it fails to comport with the Arizona
    Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. ARCAP 13(a) provides that an opening
    brief must set forth a “‘statement of facts’ that are relevant to the issues
    presented for review, with appropriate references to the record,” a
    “‘statement of the issues’ presented for review,” and a section setting forth
    the appellant’s arguments “concerning each issue presented for review,
    with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal
    authorities and appropriate references to the parts of the record on which
    the appellant relies.” Mothershead’s opening brief lacks a clear statement
    of facts relevant to the case and does not provide any citation to the record.
    It does not provide a clear statement of the issues presented for review, and
    the arguments lack reasoning or clear citations to legal authority. But
    though we may dismiss an appeal when the appellant fails to comply with
    Arizona’s procedural rules, we prefer to decide cases on their merits. Adams
    v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 
    139 Ariz. 340
    , 342–43 (App. 1984). We therefore
    address the arguments briefly listed in Mothershead’s opening brief.
    ¶6              We review the superior court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.
    See Cota v. S. Ariz. Bank & Trust Co., 
    17 Ariz. App. 326
    , 327 (1972). “An abuse
    of discretion occurs when there is no evidence to support a holding or the
    court commits an error of law when reaching a discretionary decision.”
    Dowling v. Stapley, 
    221 Ariz. 251
    , 266, ¶ 45 (App. 2009).
    I.     MOTHERSHEAD WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS.
    ¶7             Mothershead first contends that she was denied due process
    because the court did not admit any evidence or take witness testimony.
    “Procedural due process means that a party had the opportunity to be
    heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Comeau v. Ariz.
    State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 
    196 Ariz. 102
    , 106–07, ¶ 20 (App. 1999) (quoting
    Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 333 (1976)) (quotation marks omitted).
    “Due process is not a static concept; it must account for ‘the practicalities
    and peculiarities of the case.’” Id. at 107 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
    Bank & Trust Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 314 (1950)). Arizona law requires that “[i]f a
    timely objection to the [writ of garnishment] is filed the court, after hearing
    evidence and argument, shall determine whether the writ is valid . . . and
    enter judgment on the writ.” A.R.S. § 12-1584(B).
    ¶8           Here, Mothershead submitted exhibits with her response and
    offered argument at a nearly one-hour hearing. Though the court did not
    3
    MOTHERSHEAD v. DULARA, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    allow for any witness testimony during the hearing, testimony was not
    necessary to enable the court to decide the legal issue presented.
    Mothershead had the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in
    a meaningful manner, and her due process rights therefore were not
    violated.
    II.    THE SUPERIOR COURT PROVIDED A LEGAL REASON FOR ITS
    RULING.
    ¶9             Mothershead next contends that the superior court abused its
    discretion because the motion to quash failed to state any legal reason to
    support the objection to the writs, and the court failed to state any legal
    reason for approving the motion to quash. This argument lacks merit and
    is unsupported by the record. Appellees’ motion to quash provided a
    written, legal reason for the objection to the writs—specifically, that
    “fundamental precepts of fairness and due process have completely been
    missed.” Further, the superior court specifically provided a legal reason for
    its ruling, holding that “the actions of the Plaintiff . . . taken here do not
    comport with Arizona law or due process.” And in view of Mothershead’s
    failure to provide evidence to support her claim that the Appellees’
    accounts held a judgment debtor’s funds, the court’s conclusion was not an
    abuse of discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶10           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
    order quashing the writs of garnishment. Appellees request attorney’s fees
    under A.R.S. §§ 12-1580(E) and 12-341.01. Because Appellees are the
    prevailing party on garnishment objections, we award them costs and
    attorney’s fees in a reasonable amount under § 12-1580(E), subject to their
    compliance with ARCAP 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 19-0111

Filed Date: 12/26/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/26/2019