Maestas v. nackard/scf Western ( 2014 )


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  •                           NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
    LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    DEAN L. MAESTAS, Petitioner,
    v.
    THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent.
    NACKARD BOTTLING CO., Respondent Employer
    SCF WESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent Carrier.
    No. 1 CA-IC 13-0056
    FILED 5-15-2014
    ________________________________
    Special Action – Industrial Commission
    ICA Claim No. 20120-820377
    Carrier Claim No. 12W00494
    The Honorable Layna Taylor, Administrative Law Judge
    AWARD AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Dean L. Maestas, Holbrook
    Petitioner
    Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
    Counsel for Respondent ICA
    State Compensation Fund, Phoenix
    By Deborah E. Mittelman
    Counsel for Respondent Employer/Carrier
    MAESTAS v. NACKARD/SCF WESTERN
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop
    joined.
    J O N E S, Judge:
    ¶1            Dean Maestas (Maestas) petitions this Court for special
    action review of his Industrial Commission award finding him entitled to
    two months compensation for a hernia injury pursuant to Arizona
    Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 23-1043 (2014). 1 For the following
    reasons, we affirm the award.
    FACTS 2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           On January 14, 2012, while employed by Nackard Bottling,
    Maestas sustained an industrial injury causing a hernia. Although Maestas
    reported the injury to the store manager that same day, he did not file a
    workers’ compensation claim at that time, seeking instead to have his
    private insurance carrier cover the surgery. In July 2012, Maestas
    underwent surgery to correct the hernia.
    ¶3            On March 19, 2012, Maestas completed an ICA worker’s
    report of injury form. The Respondent insurance carrier, SCF Western
    Insurance Company (SCF), ultimately accepted the claim by a Notice of
    Claim Status issued June 29, 2012, which also informed Maestas that
    compensation benefits for his claim were limited to two months as
    provided by A.R.S. § 23-1043(2). The Notice of Claim further indicated
    Maestas had received benefits for the two month period as SCF issued the
    second month payment on April 18, 2012. Although Maestas did not
    initially protest the Notice of Claim Status, he later filed a request for
    1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, we cite the current
    version of the statutes and rules unless otherwise indicated.
    2 We examine the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the
    administrative law judge’s (ALJ) award. Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz.,
    
    202 Ariz. 102
    , 105, ¶ 16, 
    41 P.3d 640
    , 643 (App. 2002).
    2
    MAESTAS v. NACKARD/SCF WESTERN
    Decision of the Court
    additional disability compensation pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1061(J), and a
    formal hearing was held on May 14, 2013.
    ¶4           At that hearing, Maestas argued he was entitled to more
    than two months of benefits as he did not work for approximately six
    months before his private insurance carrier “even decided to take care of
    the surgery.” The ALJ found Maestas was not entitled to additional
    temporary disability benefits as A.R.S. § 23-1043(2) limited the amount of
    benefit compensation for non-traumatic hernia to two months regardless
    of when injury related surgery was performed or issues related to claim
    administration occurred. Maestas then filed a Request for Review.
    ¶5           The Decision Upon Review affirmed the earlier ruling,
    finding A.R.S. § 23-1043 did not provide an exception permitting
    additional payments of compensation benefits in cases where the
    applicant encounters financial difficulties due to delay in private
    insurance carrier approval of surgery. Maestas timely appealed to this
    Court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2) (2014),
    23-951(A) (2014), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶6           In reviewing findings and awards of the ICA, we defer to the
    factual findings made by the ALJ, but review legal conclusions
    independently. Young v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
    204 Ariz. 267
    , 270, ¶ 14, 
    63 P.3d 298
    , 301 (App. 2003). We will not reverse the award unless it is
    “unsupportable by any reasonable theory of the evidence.” Wal-Mart v.
    Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
    183 Ariz. 145
    , 147, 
    901 P.2d 1175
    , 1177 (App. 1995).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            As an initial matter, Maestas’ opening brief fails to comply
    with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 13(a) as it does not
    contain a table of contents, table of citations, statement of the case,
    statement of issues, argument including citations to relevant authority, or
    conclusion stating the precise relief sought. As a self-represented litigant,
    Maestas is held to the same standard of familiarity with required
    procedures and the same notice of statutes and rules attributed to
    qualified attorneys. Smith v. Rabb, 
    95 Ariz. 49
    , 53, 
    386 P.2d 649
    , 652 (1963).
    Although we may consider Maestas’ failure to develop his argument
    according to procedural rules as a waiver of those issues, we exercise our
    discretion and address the issue raised within Maestas’ opening brief
    upon its merits. Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
    214 Ariz. 489
    , 491 n.2, ¶
    6, 
    154 P.3d 391
    , 393 n.2 (App. 2007); Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 139
    3
    MAESTAS v. NACKARD/SCF WESTERN
    Decision of the Court
    Ariz. 340, 342, 
    678 P.2d 525
    , 527 (App. 1984) (“[C]ourts prefer to decide
    each case upon its merits rather than to dismiss summarily on procedural
    grounds.”).
    ¶8             As Maestas’ opening brief does not contain a prayer for
    relief, we construe his argument to assert he was due additional
    compensation benefits for the six month period Maestas awaited his
    private insurance carrier’s approval of the surgery. We disagree with that
    assertion. A.R.S. § 23-1043(2) 3 provides compensation “not to exceed two
    months” to claimants who have suffered a non-traumatic hernia. As such,
    the Respondent carrier awarded Maestas the maximum compensation
    benefits allowed by statute. Furthermore, as the language of the statute
    indicates, claimants are compensated for “time lost,” presumably due to
    the work-related injury, and not for time away from work caused by the
    claimant’s delay in filing his worker’s report of injury or by any pre-claim
    delay by a private insurance carrier in approving corrective surgery. See
    Raban v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 
    25 Ariz.App. 159
    , 161, 
    541 P.2d 950
    , 952
    (1975) (“The purpose of Workmen’s [sic] Compensation legislation is not
    to compensate for difficulty and pain, but for lost earning capacity.”).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶9             As A.R.S. § 23-1043(2) limits the award for a non-traumatic
    hernia to two months’ compensation, we affirm the ALJ’s application of
    that statute in this case, and also affirm the ALJ’s denial of Maestas’ § 23-
    1061(J) claim.
    :MJT
    3  A.R.S. § 23-1043(2) specifically provides in relevant part: “[Non-
    traumatic] hernias are considered to be aggravations of previous ailments
    or diseases, and will be compensated as such for time lost only to a limited
    extent . . . but for [sic] not to exceed two months.”
    4