State v. Tabor ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    ANDREE TABOR, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 15-0280
    FILED 3-3-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2013-446571-001
    The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
    By Joseph T. Maziarz
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix
    By Tennie B. Martin
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. TABOR
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.
    J O H N S E N, Judge:
    ¶1            This appeal was timely filed in accordance with Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and State v. Leon, 
    104 Ariz. 297
     (1969),
    following Andree Tabor's convictions of six counts of organized retail theft,
    Class 4 felonies. Tabor's counsel has searched the record on appeal and
    found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. See Smith v. Robbins,
    
    528 U.S. 259
     (2000); Anders, 
    386 U.S. 738
    ; State v. Clark, 
    196 Ariz. 530
     (App.
    1999). Tabor was given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief but did
    not do so. Counsel now asks this court to search the record for fundamental
    error. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm Tabor's convictions and
    sentences.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             On six separate occasions in September 2013, Tabor entered a
    convenience store, took beer from the shelf and left without paying.1 Tabor
    later admitted to detectives she stole the beer for resale. After Tabor failed
    to appear for a December 18, 2013, pretrial conference, a bench warrant was
    issued for her arrest. Tabor eventually was tried in absentia. A jury
    convicted her of six counts of organized retail theft under Arizona Revised
    Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-1819(A)(1) (2016).2 The superior court
    sentenced her to two terms of 1.5 years' incarceration and four terms of
    three years' incarceration, all running concurrently, with 161 days of credit
    for presentence incarceration.
    1      Upon review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
    sustaining the jury's verdicts and resolve all inferences against Tabor. State
    v. Fontes, 
    195 Ariz. 229
    , 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
    2      Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite
    a statute's current version.
    2
    STATE v. TABOR
    Decision of the Court
    ¶3           Tabor timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§
    12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), 13-4031 (2016) and -4033 (2016).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶4           The record reflects Tabor received a fair trial. She was
    represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings against her.
    ¶5             Tabor was tried in absentia. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 9.1, "a defendant may waive the right to be present at any
    proceeding by voluntarily absenting himself or herself from it," and "[t]he
    court may infer that an absence is voluntary if the defendant had personal
    notice of the time of the proceeding, the right to be present at it, and a
    warning that the proceeding would go forward in his or her absence should
    he or she fail to appear." See also State v. Hall, 
    136 Ariz. 219
    , 222-23 (App.
    1983) (defendant informed of trial date at arraignment was voluntarily
    absent by failure to appear at subsequent proceedings). The court told
    Tabor at her arraignment and initial pretrial conference that she could be
    tried in absentia if she failed to appear. Tabor did not appear for the first
    comprehensive pretrial conference on December 18, 2013, and was absent
    from all subsequent proceedings until sentencing on January 28, 2015. See
    State v. Muniz-Caudillo, 
    185 Ariz. 261
    , 262 (App. 1996) (defendant was found
    to be voluntarily absent, even without actual notice of trial date, when
    informed that failure to attend pretrial conference could result in a trial in
    absentia). After Tabor absconded, her counsel did not object to her trial in
    absentia and informed the court during sentencing that her absence had
    been voluntary. The prosecutor did not comment on Tabor's failure to
    appear during trial, and the jury was instructed not to speculate about her
    absence in determining guilt.
    ¶6            The court held appropriate pretrial hearings. It did not
    conduct a voluntariness hearing; however, the record does not suggest a
    question about the voluntariness of Tabor's statements to police. See State
    v. Smith, 
    114 Ariz. 415
    , 419 (1977); State v. Finn, 
    111 Ariz. 271
    , 275 (1974).
    ¶7            The State presented both direct and circumstantial evidence
    on each of the six counts sufficient to allow the jury to convict. The jury
    was properly comprised of 12 members. The court properly instructed the
    jury on the elements of the charges, the State's burden of proof and the
    necessity of a unanimous verdict. The jury returned a unanimous verdict,
    which was confirmed by juror polling.
    3
    STATE v. TABOR
    Decision of the Court
    ¶8             The court received and considered a presentence report,
    addressed its contents during the sentencing hearing and imposed legal
    sentences for the crimes of which Tabor was convicted. See A.R.S. § 13-
    703(A), (I) (2016).3
    CONCLUSION
    ¶9            We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and
    find none, and therefore affirm the convictions and resulting sentences. See
    Leon, 
    104 Ariz. at 300
    .
    ¶10            After the filing of this decision, defense counsel's obligations
    pertaining to Tabor's representation in this appeal have ended. Defense
    counsel need do no more than inform Tabor of the outcome of this appeal
    and her future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds "an issue
    appropriate for submission" to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for
    review. See State v. Shattuck, 
    140 Ariz. 582
    , 584-85 (1984). On the court's
    own motion, Tabor has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if
    she wishes, with a pro per motion for reconsideration. Tabor has 30 days
    from the date of this decision to proceed, if she wishes, with a pro per
    petition for review.
    :ama
    3      The record does not allow us to ascertain the number of days of
    presentence incarceration credit to which Tabor was entitled, but neither
    party has raised any objections to the award of 161 days' presentence
    incarceration credit.
    4