Cohen v. Cohen ( 2014 )


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  •                           NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
    LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Matter of:
    TRACY L. COHEN, Petitioner/Appellee,
    v.
    JOSHUA D. COHEN, Respondent/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 13-0297
    FILED 07-22-2014
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-004097
    The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Fromm Smith & Gadow, PC, Phoenix
    By Stephen R. Smith and Jennifer G. Gadow
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
    Burt & Feldman, Scottsdale
    By Elizabeth L. Feldman
    Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.
    COHEN v. COHEN
    Decision of the Court
    G E M M I L L, Judge:
    ¶1            Respondent/Appellant Joshua D. Cohen (Father) appeals
    that portion of the family court’s decree of dissolution awarding
    Petitioner/Appellee Tracy L. Cohen (Mother) spousal maintenance and
    attorneys’ fees. We affirm the family court’s determination that Mother is
    entitled to spousal maintenance under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
    section 25-319(A), but we remand for a new determination, in accordance
    with A.R.S. § 25-319(B), of the amount of spousal maintenance. We also
    affirm the family court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Mother.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding
    the court’s decree. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 
    193 Ariz. 343
    , 346, ¶ 5, 
    972 P.2d 676
    , 679 (App. 1998).
    ¶3            The parties were married in September 1998. During the
    first six years of the marriage, Mother worked as an attorney, making
    approximately $120,000 per year. After Father completed his medical
    training and the parties’ first child was born, Mother ceased employment
    outside the home to become a stay-at-home mother.
    ¶4            In June 2011, Mother petitioned for dissolution. As relevant,
    she asked the court to award her $18,000 per month as spousal
    maintenance for a period of six years. Father opposed the request,
    arguing Mother could be self-sufficient through employment and would
    receive sufficient property from the division of the community assets to
    provide for her reasonable needs. After conducting an evidentiary
    hearing, the court awarded Mother spousal maintenance of $17,000 per
    month for a period of four years. The court also ordered Father to pay
    $10,000 toward Mother’s attorneys’ fees. The family court denied Father’s
    motion for new trial, and he timely appealed.
    ¶5           We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) &
    (5)(a). 1
    1 Husband’s notice of appeal only identifies the order denying the motion
    for new trial. Mother, however, received adequate notice that Father
    intended to appeal both the decree and the order, and she has neither
    2
    COHEN v. COHEN
    Decision of the Court
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6            Father argues the family court erred in determining Mother
    is entitled to an award of spousal maintenance and by awarding her
    $17,000 per month. He also contends the court erred by ordering him to
    pay $10,000 toward Mother’s attorneys’ fees.
    I.    Spousal Maintenance
    ¶7            We review the family court’s award of spousal maintenance
    for an abuse of discretion and will affirm the judgment if there is
    reasonable evidence to support it. Cullum v. Cullum, 
    215 Ariz. 352
    , 354, ¶
    9, 
    160 P.3d 231
    , 233 (App. 2007); 
    Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348
    , ¶ 
    14, 972 P.2d at 681
    .
    A.     Entitlement to Spousal Maintenance
    ¶8           As a threshold matter, A.R.S. § 25-319(A) provides that the
    family court may award spousal maintenance if it finds that a spouse:
    1.    Lacks sufficient property, including property
    apportioned to the spouse, to provide for that spouse’s
    reasonable needs.
    2.      Is unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate
    employment or is the custodian of a child whose age or
    condition is such that the custodian should not be required
    to seek employment outside the home or lacks earning
    ability in the labor market adequate to be self-sufficient.
    3.     Contributed to the educational opportunities of the
    other spouse.
    objected to nor argued she is prejudiced by the notice of appeal. Under
    these circumstances, we determine Father substantially complied with
    Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c). See Hill v. City of Phoenix, 
    193 Ariz. 570
    , 572-73, ¶ 10, 
    975 P.2d 700
    , 702-03 (1999) (holding a defective notice of
    appeal should be construed as sufficient so long as the defect has neither
    misled nor prejudiced an opposing party); McKillip v. Smitty's Super Valu,
    Inc., 
    190 Ariz. 61
    , 62, 
    945 P.2d 372
    , 373 (App. 1997) (stating court reviews
    notices of appeal liberally, disregarding harmless technical errors in favor
    of disposition on the merits).
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    COHEN v. COHEN
    Decision of the Court
    4.    Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that
    may preclude the possibility of gaining employment
    adequate to be self-sufficient.
    ¶9             The family court found Mother was entitled to an award of
    spousal maintenance because she lacks sufficient property to provide for
    her reasonable needs. During trial, Mother testified that she worked as an
    attorney for the first six years of her marriage while Father pursued
    medical school. After the birth of parties’ first daughter, Mother stopped
    working outside the home to concentrate on raising their children. The
    family court found that, because of this decision, Mother is not currently
    in a position to provide for her reasonable needs despite obtaining part-
    time employment after dissolution. According to the court, Mother is
    capable of re-entering the workforce and gaining experience to
    independently meet her reasonable needs, but is not yet in a position to do
    so because she lacks an Arizona bar license and the experience necessary
    to re-enter the workforce.
    ¶10           In ruling that Mother was entitled to spousal maintenance,
    the family court found that she lacks sufficient property to provide for her
    reasonable needs, noting those needs must be “viewed from the vantage
    point of the parties’ marriage.” It is also apparent that Mother contributed
    to the educational opportunities of Father by providing the primary
    financial support for the family while Father finished medical school and
    post-graduate training.
    ¶11          Therefore, on this record, we find no abuse of discretion in
    the trial court’s decision that Mother is entitled to an award of
    maintenance.
    B. Amount of Spousal Maintenance
    ¶12           The question of entitlement to spousal maintenance under §
    25-319(A) is distinct from the determination of the amount of maintenance
    under § 25-319(B). If the family court determines a spouse is entitled to an
    award of spousal maintenance, it must then consider the thirteen factors
    set forth in § 25-319(B) to determine the amount and duration of the
    award. At trial, Mother explained that her monthly needs equaled
    $21,956. Father argued that amount was unreasonable, noting that
    Mother’s budget allocated $600 per month for her hair care, $1,000 for her
    clothing expenses, and $1,000 for gifts. But Mother testified that these
    amounts were typical for the family’s lifestyle for the past 7 years and the
    family court awarded her $17,000 per month in maintenance.
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    COHEN v. COHEN
    Decision of the Court
    ¶13           On appeal, Father contends the family court erred in
    awarding Mother $17,000 per month. We agree. In considering the
    statutory factors relevant to the amount of spousal maintenance, the court
    acknowledged the testimony of Mother’s expert that Mother needs
    $21,956 per month but concluded that amount was “excessive.”
    Nevertheless, when the court calculated the amount of Mother’s spousal
    maintenance, it identified Mother’s needs as $21,956.          Given this
    seemingly conflicting information, we are uncertain what amount the
    family court determined Mother needed for her reasonable monthly
    needs. See Elliott v. Elliott, 
    165 Ariz. 128
    , 135, 
    796 P.2d 930
    , 937 (App.
    1990) (appellate court may not infer additional findings necessary to
    support the judgment if they are contradicted by the ruling). We agree
    with the family court’s “excessive” characterization but conclude that the
    court must determine Mother’s reasonable monthly needs and then decide
    an appropriate amount of maintenance. And although the prior lifestyle
    of the spouses should be taken into consideration, the law does not and
    cannot guarantee every spouse the amount of maintenance necessary to
    match the standard of living during the marriage. See Rainwater v.
    Rainwater, 
    177 Ariz. 500
    , 504, 
    869 P.2d 176
    , 180 (App. 1993) (holding that
    the party of lesser earning capacity will not necessarily receive spousal
    support to maintain the standard of living achieved during the marriage).
    For these reasons, we vacate the spousal maintenance award of $17,000
    and remand for a new determination in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-
    319(B).
    II.   Attorneys’ Fees
    ¶14           Finally, Father argues the family court erred by ordering him
    to pay $10,000 of the attorneys’ fees Mother incurred in the dissolution
    proceeding. He contends the court erred because Mother received
    significant property in the dissolution and Father already contributed to
    Mother’s attorneys’ fees when the parties paid their attorneys’ fees from
    community funds. 2
    2  Father asserts the court erred by requiring him to pay an “exorbitant
    and unreasonable” amount toward Mother’s fees, noting that Mother’s
    fees totaled more than twice the amount Father incurred. However,
    Father did not present specific objections to the reasonableness of
    Mother’s fees in the superior court and we therefore do not address his
    argument. See Napier v. Bertram, 
    191 Ariz. 238
    , 239, ¶ 6, 
    954 P.2d 1389
    ,
    1390 (1998) (appellate court will not consider new arguments raised for
    5
    COHEN v. COHEN
    Decision of the Court
    ¶15           In a dissolution case, the court may award fees “after
    considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness
    of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” A.R.S.
    § 25-324(A). The trial court has broad discretion when awarding
    attorneys’ fees and we will not disturb its award absent an abuse of
    discretion. 
    Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 351
    , ¶ 
    32, 972 P.2d at 684
    . The family
    court’s decree reflects that it considered the relevant factors and Father
    does not challenge its findings that both parties acted unreasonably
    during the pendency of the dissolution and Father has superior financial
    resources. The court’s observation that Mother was to receive a
    “significant amount” of community property is not inconsistent with its
    award of $10,000 toward Mother’s attorneys’ fees, her share of which
    exceeded $27,000. We find no abuse of discretion. See MacMillan v.
    Schwartz, 
    226 Ariz. 584
    , 592, ¶ 38, 
    250 P.3d 1213
    , 1221 (App. 2011)
    (affirming partial award of attorneys’ fees to husband under A.R.S. § 25-
    324 and stating trial court was in the best position to observe and assess
    the conduct of the parties). Finally, because the family court’s award of
    fees was based on the considerations set forth in § 25-324 and not the
    outcome of the proceedings, our decision to vacate the spousal
    maintenance amount under § 25-319(B) and remand for further
    proceedings does not affect the validity of the family court’s award of fees
    to Mother.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16          For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the family court’s
    award of spousal maintenance and remand for further proceedings on
    that issue consistent with this decision. We affirm the family court’s
    award of attorneys’ fees to Mother.
    ¶17         Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal
    pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, we deny
    the first time on appeal); cf. Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass'n, 
    216 Ariz. 482
    , 491, ¶ 38, 
    167 P.3d 1277
    , 1286 (App. 2007) (discussing
    discretionary award of fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and stating that the
    party opposing the fee award must demonstrate the impropriety or
    unreasonableness of the requested fees; “It is not enough ... simply to
    state, for example, that the hours claimed are excessive and the rates
    submitted too high.”) (citation omitted).
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    COHEN v. COHEN
    Decision of the Court
    both requests. Father is entitled to an award of taxable costs incurred on
    appeal upon his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
    Procedure 21.
    :gsh
    7