Justin M. v. April M. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    JUSTIN M., Appellant,
    v.
    APRIL M., T.M., N.M., D.M., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 16-0523
    FILED 5-23-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JS518028
    The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
    By Robert D. Rosanelli
    Counsel for Appellant
    April M., Mesa
    Appellee
    JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop
    joined.
    B E E N E, Judge:
    ¶1            Justin M. (“Father”) appeals an order terminating his parental
    rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Father is the biological parent of T.M., N.M., and D.M.
    (“Children”). In 2010, Father married April M. (“Mother”), and soon after,
    they had two children, T.M. and N.M. In 2013, Father was arrested for
    domestic violence after assaulting Mother. Father was sentenced to one
    year incarceration for charges stemming from the event. Following his
    release, Father and Mother had another child together, D.M.
    ¶3            In 2015, Father was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
    seven years’ incarceration. During Father’s incarceration, he tested positive
    for drugs on multiple occasions. Following Father’s positive drug tests,
    Mother filed for divorce, which was finalized in September 2016. Mother
    obtained sole legal decision-making authority regarding the Children and
    Father’s parenting time with the Children was at Mother’s discretion.
    ¶4            On June 1, 2016, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s
    parental rights on several grounds, including the length of incarceration for
    a felony conviction that would deprive the Children of a normal home for
    a period of years.1 Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(4) (2017).2
    1      We need only address one of the statutory grounds for termination
    found by the superior court. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 282, ¶ 9
    (2005) (only one statutory ground necessary to satisfy § 8-533).
    2     Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s
    current version.
    2
    JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5             After a contested termination hearing, the superior court
    found by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s conviction and
    incarceration for seven years was a valid basis for termination, and found
    by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the Children’s best
    interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father timely appealed the
    termination. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12–120.21(A)(1)
    (2017) and 8–235(A) (2017).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6             The fundamental right to parent one’s child is not absolute.
    Kent K., at 284, ¶ 24. The superior court may terminate parental rights if it
    finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory
    grounds set out in section 8–533,”and by a preponderance of the evidence
    that termination is in the best interest of the child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't
    of Econ. Sec., 
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 248–49, ¶ 12 (2000). We review an order
    terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse
    unless “there is no reasonable evidence to support” the order. Mary Lou C.
    v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).
    Father’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to A.R.S. §
    8-533(B)(4) because his term of imprisonment was of such length that the
    Children would be deprived of a normal home for a period of years. There
    is no “bright line” defining how long a sentence must be to deprive a child
    of a normal home for a “period of years,” and each case must be determined
    based on its “particular facts.” Michael 
    J., 196 Ariz. at 251
    , ¶ 29. The
    superior court may look to all relevant factors, including:
    (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship
    existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
    the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured
    during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
    relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
    incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
    length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to
    provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the
    deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.
    
    Id. at 251-52,
    ¶ 29.
    3
    JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶7            Father was incarcerated in 2015, and the earliest date he could
    be released is December 2020. Because of Father’s domestic violence and
    burglary convictions, he has been incarcerated for the majority of the
    Children’s lives.
    ¶8              Due to Father’s continued drug use, the superior court found
    that Father was not willing to take steps necessary to maintain a healthy
    relationship with the Children. We defer to a trial court’s findings because
    it is “in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the
    parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings.” In re
    Pima Cty. Dependency Action No. 93511, 
    154 Ariz. 543
    , 546 (App. 1987). We
    find no error in the superior court’s finding that clear and convincing
    evidence demonstrates a valid basis for termination under § 8-533(B)(4).
    ¶9             The superior court also determined by a preponderance of the
    evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s
    best interests. “[I]n a private proceeding to sever parental rights, just as in
    state-initiated proceedings, a juvenile court may conclude that a proposed
    adoption benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the
    child’s best interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 
    239 Ariz. 1
    , 2, ¶ 1 (2016).
    In considering a child's best interests, the superior court is tasked with
    balancing “the unfit parent’s diluted interest against the independent and
    often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.” 
    Id. at 4,
    ¶ 15.
    ¶10           The superior court found by a preponderance of the evidence
    that termination of Father’s parental rights would benefit the Children by
    allowing Mother to care for the Children without Father’s highly disruptive
    influence. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the superior
    court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the
    Children’s best interests.
    4
    JUSTIN M. v. APRIL M., et al.
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order terminating
    Father’s parental rights.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 16-0523

Filed Date: 5/23/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021