State v. Thompson ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    KYLE MATTHEW THOMPSON, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 14-0445
    FILED 10-01-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
    No. S8015CR201100601
    The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Colby Mills
    Counsel for Appellee
    Christian C. Ackerley, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
    By Christian C. Ackerley
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.
    K E S S L E R, Presiding Judge:
    ¶1              Kyle Matthew Thompson (“Thompson”) appeals from the
    trial court’s judgment finding him guilty of violating his probation. For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             In June 2011, Thompson was indicted on ten counts of sexual
    exploitation of a minor, each a class 2 felony and a dangerous crime against
    children. In November 2013, he entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina
    v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
     (1970), to one count of attempted sexual exploitation
    of a minor, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children. In
    exchange for his plea, Thompson was placed on five years of supervised
    probation, which began in December 2013.
    ¶3            As part of the special conditions of probation, Term 14
    provided that Thompson could not “possess, use, or have personal access
    to any computer or similar equipment that has internet capability without
    prior written permission of [his] Probation Officer.” In January 2014, the
    State filed a Petition to Revoke Probation, alleging that Thompson
    “accessed the internet via Facebook on at least seven (7) occasions soliciting
    friends, including a 13 year [old] female.”
    ¶4           At the contested probation violation hearing, the State
    presented evidence that Thompson’s Facebook account—which can only be
    accessed with a username and password—showed activity on multiple
    dates in January 2014. Thompson’s probation officer testified that when
    asked about the activity, Thompson acknowledged that it was his account
    but denied accessing it himself. He claimed “he had given his identifiers to
    a friend and he was watching his friend access the internet.” Thompson,
    however, refused to provide his friend’s name.
    ¶5           The trial court ultimately found that the State proved by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Thompson had “personal access to a
    computer or other equipment that had internet capability,” and as a result,
    2
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    violated Term 14 of his conditions of probation. The court further noted,
    that regardless of whether or not it believed Thompson’s story, he had and
    controlled access to his account.
    The Court believes that if the defendant is directing
    somebody else to access his Facebook account and to send out
    these friend requests which is basically what he admitted
    doing or whether he’s doing it himself, he is still having
    personal access to a computer or other equipment that has
    internet capability.
    Moreover, the court reasoned that directing another person to access the
    account on Thompson’s behalf is contrary to the term’s “goal of monitoring
    what somebody [who is] convicted of a sex offense does with respect to the
    internet.”
    ¶6            Thompson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
    to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, as well as Arizona
    Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003) and 13-
    4033(A)(3) (2010).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7             “We will uphold a trial court’s finding that a probationer has
    violated probation unless the finding is arbitrary or unsupported by any
    theory of evidence.” State v. Thomas, 
    196 Ariz. 312
    , 313, ¶ 3, 
    996 P.2d 113
    ,
    114 (App. 1999). Probation violations “must be established by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3). “Revocation
    hearings are flexible and not subject to the same rules of evidence and
    procedure as govern criminal trials. It is enough for the trial court to have a
    reason to believe that the individual is violating the conditions of his
    probation or engaging in criminal practices to revoke his probation.” State
    v. Smith, 
    112 Ariz. 416
    , 419, 
    542 P.2d 1115
    , 1118 (1975) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). “We view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to sustaining the court’s finding.” State v. Tatlow, 
    231 Ariz. 34
    , 39-
    40, ¶ 15, 
    290 P.3d 228
    , 233-34 (App. 2012).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8            Thompson argues the trial court abused its discretion in
    finding that he violated his probation by accessing the internet. Thompson
    specifically argues that the State provided no evidence that he had
    “personal access” to a computer, and it failed to refute his statement that
    another person accessed it on his behalf. We disagree.
    3
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    ¶9             There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
    Thompson personally accessed the internet. Thompson admitted to his
    probation officer that the password-protected Facebook account in question
    was his, and that “he had given his identifiers to [an unnamed] friend and
    he was watching his friend access the internet.” The State presented
    evidence that the account showed activity on several dates at the end of
    January 2014. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
    inherent nature of the activity was equivalent to Thompson having
    personal access to the internet. We do not see how Thompson giving his
    username and password to a friend to access his account, under his
    direction, for his benefit, while he watched, is different from him physically
    touching the computer keyboard. Therefore, we agree with the trial court,
    that even under this version of the facts, Thompson’s actions still constitute
    having personal access to a computer with internet capability.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶10           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    :ama
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 14-0445

Filed Date: 10/1/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021