Atlantic v. Lopez ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    ATLANTIC CREDIT & FINANCE SPECIAL FINANCE UNIT, LLC,
    a Virginia limited liability company,
    Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    KIMBERLY D. LOPEZ and RICHARD DEAN LOPEZ,
    wife and husband and each of them,
    Defendants/Appellants.
    No. 1 CA-CV 15-0515
    FILED 3-29-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
    No. P1300CV201400940
    The Honorable Jeffrey G. Paupore, Judge Pro Tempore
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Hammerman & Hultgren, PC, Phoenix
    By Jon R. Hultgren, Stephanie A. Webb
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
    Kimberly D. Lopez, Richard Dean Lopez, Prescott Valley
    Defendants/Appellants
    ATLANTIC v. LOPEZ
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.
    O R O Z C O, Judge:
    ¶1           Appellants Kimberly and Richard Lopez (collectively the
    Lopez’) appeal the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against them.
    For the following reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court for
    further proceedings consistent with this decision.
    FACTS AND BACKGROUND
    ¶2             On September 4, 2014, Atlantic Credit & Finance Special
    Finance Unit, LLC (Appellee) filed a complaint alleging that in June 2006,
    Kimberly took out a personal line of credit on behalf of her marital
    community in the amount of $15,000 from HSBC Consumer Lending Inc.
    According to the complaint, the loan was later assigned to Appellee, and
    subsequently the Lopez’ defaulted. Kimberly was served in September
    2014 and filed a timely verified response, claiming she had no knowledge
    of the debt and “if this loan was in 2006 it has been 8 (eight) years and I
    believe that the statute of limitations in Arizona has been met.”
    ¶3             In November 2014, Appellee filed an application for default
    judgment as to Richard. In December 2014, Richard filed a verified
    response. On February 13, 2015, Appellee filed a Motion and Sum Certain
    Affidavit for Entry of Judgment by Default without Hearing as to Richard.
    The Lopez’ responded, claiming that Richard had answered the complaint
    via the filing of his response.
    ¶4           Appellee then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to
    Kimberly, alleging there were no issues of material fact. For the first time,
    Appellee attached a copy of the contract in dispute, dated June 2006, which
    purportedly contained Kimberly’s signature and the words “loan made by
    mail” on the witness line of the loan document. The loan amount did not
    appear on this document. Appellee also attached another undated
    document reflecting a “total advance” of $15,000, also purportedly signed
    by Kimberly. Appellee later amended this motion to include Richard.
    2
    ATLANTIC v. LOPEZ
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5            The Lopez’ filed a response to the motion for default
    judgment, again denying knowledge of the loan and requesting the court
    to order arbitration to determine whether they had entered into the
    contract. Before ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial
    court denied Appellee’s request for default judgment against Richard,
    finding that he had answered before entry of default.
    ¶6            Thereafter, the court entered an order granting Appellee’s
    Motion for Summary Judgment. The Lopez’ then filed a late response to
    the motion, again denying any knowledge of the loan. The court entered
    its final judgment, finding the Lopez’ had not timely responded to
    Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and there was no genuine issue
    of material fact in dispute. The Lopez’ timely appealed. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution,
    and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12–120.A.1 and -2101.A.1
    (West 2016).1
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            On appeal, the Lopez’ argue Kimberly did not enter into the
    contract in question, attaching supportive evidence not timely presented to
    the trial court. Appellee contends that because this is an appeal from a
    “summary adjudication[] after a nonmoving party fail[ed] to respond,” our
    review on appeal is limited to a determination of whether the trial court
    abused its discretion. We disagree.
    ¶8             A court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely
    because the opposing party has not responded to it; it must consider the
    entire available record. See Schwab v. Ames Constr., 
    207 Ariz. 56
    , 59-60, ¶ 15
    (App. 2004). After reviewing the record, the court may grant summary
    judgment only if the moving party has “demonstrate[d] both the absence of
    any factual conflict and his or her right to judgment.” United Bank of Ariz.
    v. Allyn, 
    167 Ariz. 191
    , 195 (App. 1990). Summary judgment is proper only
    when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    ¶9            On appeal, this court reviews a grant of summary judgment
    de novo. 
    Schwab, 207 Ariz. at 60
    , ¶ 17. We view the facts in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party, Hourani v. Benson Hosp., 
    211 Ariz. 427
    ,
    1     We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions
    material to this decision have since occurred.
    3
    ATLANTIC v. LOPEZ
    Decision of the Court
    432, ¶ 13 (App. 2005), considering the “evidence that was in the record
    before the trial court during its summary judgment deliberations.”
    Menendez v. Paddock Pool Constr. Co., 
    172 Ariz. 258
    , 261 (App. 1991). In
    granting Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court stated
    that after its review of “the contents of the Motion, documentary evidence,
    affidavits and argument presented . . . there are no genuine issues of
    material fact in dispute.”
    ¶10             We note that in the trial court, the Lopez’ asserted that the
    statute of limitations had passed and they had “never received a loan from
    [Appellee] other than for my [vehicle] which is paid for free and clear and
    I have a clear title and a paid if [sic] full payment notice.” In the Motion for
    Summary Judgment, Appellee alleged the contract was entered into in June
    2006 and last payment received from the Lopez’ was in January 2010.
    Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-548.A, the statute of limitations for a claim for
    breach of a written contract is six years. 
    Id. (“An action
    for debt shall be
    commenced and prosecuted within six years after the cause of action
    accrues . . . .”). In our review of the record, we find no genuine issues of
    material fact as to whether the statute of limitations barred Appellee’s claim
    because the alleged breach of the contract occurred four years and nine
    months before the complaint was filed.
    ¶11            However, the Lopez’ denied having entered into the contract
    in their verified answers to the complaint. In support of this defense, the
    Lopez’ claimed the only loan they may have had with Appellee was for a
    vehicle that had been repaid in full. The verified answer by the Lopez’
    denying having entered into the loan contract was sufficient evidence to
    create a disputed issue of material fact, preventing entry of summary
    judgment in Appellee’s favor.
    4
    ATLANTIC v. LOPEZ
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12            For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order
    granting summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with
    this decision.
    :ama
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 15-0515

Filed Date: 3/29/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021