Van Zilen v. Bouse ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    JENNIFER MAY VAN ZILEN, Petitioner/Appellee,
    v.
    JEFFREY ROBERT BOUSE, Respondent/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 20-0344 FC
    FILED 11-16-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
    No. P1300DO201200859
    The Honorable Joseph P. Goldstein, Judge pro tempore
    VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Margaret Perlmeter, Phoenix
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
    Jeffrey R. Bouse
    Respondent/Appellant
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
    Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
    VAN ZILEN v. BOUSE
    Decision of the Court
    M c M U R D I E, Judge:
    ¶1             Respondent Jeffrey Bouse (“Father”) appeals from the
    superior court’s order modifying his parenting time. Father argues that
    (1) the court failed to make the specific findings required under A.R.S.
    § 25-403, (2) he was prejudiced by Petitioner Jennifer Van Zilen’s
    (“Mother”) late filing of her pretrial statement and exhibits, and (3) the
    court’s requirement that he exercise his parenting time with the children in
    Cottonwood one weekend per month to retain his parenting time in Mesa
    one weekend per month presents a financial burden and causes him undue
    hardship. We vacate the superior court’s order because the geographical
    restrictions are not supported and remand for proceedings consistent with
    this decision.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            The parties were married in 2006 and had two children
    together. The marriage was dissolved in 2012. The dissolution decree
    included a finding that Father committed an act of domestic violence, and
    Mother was awarded sole legal decision-making. The court designated
    Mother as the primary residential parent and granted Father parenting time
    every other weekend and one weekday per week. From the dissolution of
    the marriage through 2015, both parties lived in the Cottonwood area. In
    2015, Father moved away from the area, eventually residing in Mesa, while
    Mother and the children remained in Cottonwood.
    ¶3            In 2016, Father petitioned for legal decision-making and
    parenting-time modification. The court ordered mediation, and the parties
    agreed to joint legal decision-making and parenting time for Father every
    other weekend. There were no geographical restrictions in the parenting
    plan for Father’s parenting time.
    ¶4            In 2019, Mother petitioned to modify legal decision-making
    and parenting time and requested temporary orders. She asked for sole
    legal decision-making and that Father’s parenting time be restricted to only
    supervised parenting time. She asserted that Father was awaiting trial on
    charges for driving under the influence, a crime for which he had been
    convicted on two prior occasions. She also stated that one of the children
    had gotten sick during the night during a recent visit, and the children
    could not wake Father, who was sleeping in his locked bedroom. She
    claimed that the child developed recurrent severe abdominal pain and
    vomiting because of anxiety caused by Father’s parenting time. In July 2019,
    the court issued temporary orders allowing Father parenting time only on
    2
    VAN ZILEN v. BOUSE
    Decision of the Court
    occasions agreed to by Mother and restricting Father’s parenting time to
    Cottonwood.
    ¶5             At a trial in January 2020, Mother presented evidence
    supporting her allegations, including evidence that Father had recently
    refused to speak with a family court advisor and shouted profanities at the
    advisor over the phone. Mother also offered text messages Father had sent
    to one of the children telling her that if she did not want him in her life, she
    should have her stepfather adopt her and would never have to hear from
    him again. Mother presented the family court advisor’s report, which stated
    that the children did not feel safe at Father’s home and wanted to spend
    time with him in Cottonwood.
    ¶6            Following the trial, the court made best-interests findings as
    required by A.R.S. § 25-403. Relevant to this appeal, the court found that:
    (1) Father had been accused of felony DUI and was awaiting trial,1 (2) the
    children had been unable to get Father’s attention through his locked
    bedroom door one night when one of the children was ill, (3) Father
    shouted profanities at the family court advisor, (4) the children had not
    been to Father’s home since June 2019, and (5) the children, then ages 10
    and 12, wished to reside mainly with Mother.
    ¶7            The court ordered that Mother and Father continue to share
    joint legal decision-making authority of the children, finding that Mother
    had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that legal
    decision-making should be modified. The court found, however, that
    Mother established Father’s parenting time should be modified. As a result,
    the court ordered Father’s future parenting time to occur on particular
    holidays and every other weekend, with weekend parenting time
    alternating in Cottonwood and Mesa. And the court ordered that if Father
    did not exercise at least one day of parenting time during a
    Cottonwood-designated weekend, he would not be entitled to the next
    weekend of parenting time in Mesa.
    ¶8           Father appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
    § 12-2101(A)(1).
    1     We note that Father was acquitted of the charges. See City of Phoenix
    v. Superior Court, 
    110 Ariz. 155
    , 157 (1973) (We take judicial notice of
    superior court records.).
    3
    VAN ZILEN v. BOUSE
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶9             We review an award of legal decision-making and parenting
    time for an abuse of discretion. Olesen v. Daniel, 
    251 Ariz. 25
    , 29, ¶ 14 (App.
    2021); DeLuna v. Petitto, 
    247 Ariz. 420
    , 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019). An abuse of
    discretion occurs when the court commits an error of law that underlies its
    exercise of discretion, Birnstihl v. Birnstihl, 
    243 Ariz. 588
    , 590, ¶ 8 (App.
    2018), or “when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding
    the trial court’s decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the
    decision.” Little v. Little, 
    193 Ariz. 518
    , 520, ¶ 5 (1999) (quotation omitted).
    ¶10           Under A.R.S. § 25-411(J), “[t]he court may modify an order
    granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would
    serve the best interest of the child, but the court shall not restrict a parent’s
    parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would
    endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”
    This subsection applies when the court places conditions or limitations on
    the way a parent exercises his or her parenting time, for example, by
    imposing supervision requirements or geographical restrictions.
    Gonzalez-Gunter v. Gunter, 
    249 Ariz. 489
    , 492, ¶ 13 (App. 2020); Cruz v.
    Garcia, 
    240 Ariz. 233
    , 238, ¶ 18 (App. 2016). A restriction imposed after a
    finding of endangerment must relate to the danger found to exist. See Paul
    E. v. Courtney F., 
    246 Ariz. 388
    , 394, ¶ 20 (2019).
    ¶11          The geographical restriction imposed here falls within the
    purview of A.R.S. § 25-411(J). The court restricted Father’s rights by
    affording Father one parenting-time weekend a month that must be
    exercised in Cottonwood and allowing the following parenting-time
    weekend in Mesa only if Father exercised at least one day of parenting time
    in Cottonwood. Neither the parenting time in Cottonwood nor Mesa is
    supervised.
    ¶12            The court made no express finding that the children were
    endangered by Father’s unsupervised parenting time in Mesa and
    Cottonwood. And we recognize that findings under A.R.S. § 25-411(J) need
    not be expressed. Hart v. Hart, 
    220 Ariz. 183
    , 187, ¶ 16 (App. 2009); See also
    Boyle v. Boyle, 
    231 Ariz. 63
    , 67, ¶ 15 (App. 2012) (We may infer additional
    findings necessary to sustain a judgment when the evidence reasonably
    supports such conclusions and the inferred finding does not conflict with
    an express finding.). But the geographical restriction imposed is unrelated
    to an endangerment determination supported by the record and is
    otherwise inconsistent with the court’s order. It is, therefore, prohibited
    under A.R.S. § 25-411(J).
    4
    VAN ZILEN v. BOUSE
    Decision of the Court
    ¶13            The record demonstrates that the children were fearful of
    Father’s temper, and the children had once been unable to wake Father,
    who was sleeping with his bedroom door locked. At the time of the court’s
    order, the children had not visited Father at his Mesa home for almost ten
    months and expressed that they were afraid of staying at Father’s home in
    the future. When viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the
    superior court’s judgment, these facts may support a finding of
    endangerment under A.R.S. § 25-411(J). But the court’s restrictions lack a
    sufficient nexus with these concerns. Although the record might support
    conditions that help ease the children back into Father’s parenting time and
    alleviate their fears about spending the night in Mesa, there is insufficient
    evidence to support a permanent geographical restriction without a date to
    return to unrestricted parenting time. Moreover, allowing Father
    unsupervised parenting time in Mesa would undercut any attempt to
    address endangerment with a geographical restriction.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14            We vacate the portion of the superior court’s order imposing
    geographical restrictions on Father’s parenting time and remand for a
    redetermination of parenting time.2 As a result, upon request by either
    party, the court must conduct a hearing to determine the appropriate
    parenting time under A.R.S. §§ 25-403 and -411. See Olesen v. Daniel, 251
    Ariz. at 31, ¶ 25.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    2      Because we remand for a new hearing, we decline to address
    Father’s remaining arguments.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 20-0344-FC

Filed Date: 11/16/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/16/2021