State v. Culver ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. MARK BRNOVICH, Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    FRANK LEE CULVER, Defendant/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 15-0150
    FILED 4-5-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2013-014946
    The Honorable James R. Morrow, Judge Pro Tempore
    APPEAL DISMISSED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Eric S. Rothblum, Kenneth R. Hughes
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
    Frank Lee Culver, Douglas
    Defendant/Appellant
    STATE v. CULVER
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
    Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.
    K E S S L E R, Judge:
    ¶1            Frank Lee Culver appeals from the trial court’s order denying
    his motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil
    Procedure (“Rule”) 60(c). Because Culver was not a party, and thus lacked
    standing to file for such relief, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate
    jurisdiction.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            On November 5, 2013, the State filed a joint Notice of Pending
    Forfeiture (“NOPF”) and Notice of Seizure for Forfeiture (“NOSF”) for
    currency in the amount of $40,333.1 The State sent a copy of the notice to
    Culver at his California address via certified mail on November 13, 2013.
    When it was discovered that Culver was in Apache County Jail, the State
    personally served him on December 23, 2013. The State filed its Application
    for Order of Forfeiture and mailed a copy to Culver on February 3, 2014.
    On February 5, 2014, the trial court entered an order of forfeiture against
    the property and awarded it to the State.
    ¶3            Culver filed several documents with the trial court2 before
    filing an untimely Notice of Appeal with this Court on March 18, 2014. This
    Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Culver then filed a
    Motion to Set Aside the Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c). The trial court
    1 The currency was seized during a traffic stop on September 27, 2013.
    2 Culver filed the following documents with the trial court: (1) a Motion to
    Return Property, filed February 11, 2014; (2) a letter dated January 7, 2014,
    filed February 13, 2014; (3) a Motion for an Order to Renew Motion to
    Release Illegally Seized Property, filed March 10, 2014; (4) a Motion to Set
    Aside Illegal De Facto Forfeiture Proceedings Initiated Without Probable
    Cause with Fabricated Information and False Charges, filed March 11, 2014;
    and (5) a Motion to Set Aside Order of Judgment of an Illegal De Facto
    Forfeiture, filed March 11, 2014.
    2
    STATE v. CULVER
    Decision of the Court
    denied the motion, finding no basis to set aside the judgment because
    Culver did not file a claim meeting the substantive requirements of Arizona
    Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-4311(E) (2010) within the timeframe
    required in A.R.S. § 13-4311(D).
    ¶4            Culver timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-
    120.21(A)(1) (2003) and -2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2015).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5          Culver appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Rule 60(c)
    motion, which we will analyze under Rule 60(c)(6).3 We review a trial
    3 Culver’s original Motion to Set Aside the Judgement cites generally to
    Rule 60(c) and argues that (1) the State’s NOSF was invalid, and (2) Apache
    County Jail personnel obstructed Culver’s access to the mail system
    resulting in a judgment by default. If Culver’s motion was predicated on
    Rule 60(c)(1)-(3), it would be untimely because a motion for relief from
    judgment pursuant to those subsections must be filed within six months of
    the entry of judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (“The motion shall be filed
    within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than six
    months after the judgment or order was entered or proceeding was
    taken.”). We also find the motion would fail if made pursuant to Rule 60(c)
    subsection 4, as the judgment was not void. “Compliance with the notice
    requirements of the statutes is necessary to both give the court jurisdiction
    over a property and to give an owner of record an opportunity to protect
    his interests.” State ex rel. Horne v. Rivas, 
    226 Ariz. 567
    , 571, ¶ 16 (App. 2011).
    Here, the State complied with the requirements of A.R.S. §§ 13-4311, -4308
    (2010), -4307 (2010), and -4306 (2010). The property was not “seiz[ed] for
    forfeiture” until the State filed the NOSF. See A.R.S. § 13-4301(9) (2010)
    (“‘Seizure for forfeiture’ means seizure of property by a peace officer with
    an assertion by the seizing agency or by an attorney for the state that the
    property is subject to forfeiture.”). Thus the State had sixty days from the
    date it filed its NOSF to file the NOPF. Because the State filed the NOSF
    and NOPF on the same day, it complied with the statutory requirements of
    A.R.S. § 13-4308(B), thus giving the court jurisdiction over the property
    seized. Culver was also provided notice of the NOSF and NOPF within
    twenty days of the filing, further complying with the notice requirements
    of A.R.S. §§ 13-4311, -4307, and -4306(C). Giving Culver the benefit of the
    doubt, we analyze the trial court’s denial of his Rule 60(c) motion under
    Rule 60(c)(6).
    3
    STATE v. CULVER
    Decision of the Court
    court’s ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(c) for an
    abuse of discretion. City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 
    144 Ariz. 323
    , 329 (1985). We
    find no error because Culver either did not timely file a claim or the claim
    was substantively insufficient.4
    ¶6             One must be a party to an action and have standing to contest
    a forfeiture action. In re $70,269.91 in U.S. Currency, 
    172 Ariz. 15
    , 19 (App.
    1991). Standing is acquired in a civil forfeiture action by alleging an interest
    in the property. 
    Id.
     An owner or interest holder in property subject to
    forfeiture asserts their interest by timely filing a claim against the property.
    A.R.S. § 13-4311(D) (2010) (providing that a claim must be filed within thirty
    days after receiving notice of the NOPF); see also In re $70,269.91 in U.S.
    Currency, 172 Ariz. at 19. The claim must also include the substantive
    elements listed in A.R.S. § 13-4311(E). See In re $70,269.91 in U.S. Currency,
    172 Ariz. at 19-20. Once the owner timely “files a proper claim, he becomes
    a ’claimant’ and is entitled to a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his
    interest” in the property. Id.; see also A.R.S. § 13-4311(D). “No extension of
    time for the filing of a claim may be granted.” A.R.S. § 13-4311(F).
    ¶7             The State personally served Culver with the NOSF and NOPF
    on December 23, 2013. Thus to be timely, Culver needed to file his notice
    of claim by January 22, 2014. See A.R.S. § 13-4311(D) (“An owner of or
    interest holder in the property may file a claim against the property, within
    thirty days after the notice, for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his
    claimed interest in the property.” (emphasis added)). Culver, however, did
    not file anything with the superior court until February 11, 2014. See supra
    n.2, ¶ 3. “If the claim is not timely filed, the person does not become a
    claimant and lacks standing to contest the forfeiture.” In re Forty-Seven
    Thousand Six Hundred Eleven Dollars & Thirty-One Cents (47,611.31) U.S.
    Currency, 
    196 Ariz. 1
    , 2, ¶ 4 (App. 1999). Because Culver did not file a timely
    claim in compliance with the statute, he was not a party to the forfeiture
    action. Because he was not a party, Culver could not make a claim for relief
    from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c). See United States v. 8136 S. Dobson
    4 Our colleagues on the motions panel summarily denied the State’s motion
    to dismiss the appeal, which argued that Culver was not a party to the
    judgment and lacked standing to pursue the appeal. We are not bound by
    the decisions of the motions panel. See Tripati v. Forwith, 
    223 Ariz. 81
    , 84
    (App. 2009) (disagreeing with motions panel); In re Stagecoach Utils., Inc., 
    86 B.R. 229
    , 230 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (“Motion Panel decisions are not binding
    on the Panel assigned the case.”).
    4
    STATE v. CULVER
    Decision of the Court
    Street, Chicago, Ill., 
    125 F.3d 1076
    , 1082 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that non-party
    in a forfeiture action cannot make a Rule 60 claim for relief from judgment).
    ¶8              Furthermore, even if we give Culver the benefit of the doubt
    and assume that his claim was timely filed,5 he failed to comply with the
    substantive statutory requirements of A.R.S. § 13-4311(E). Again, because
    Culver did not file a claim in compliance with statutory requirements, he
    was not a party to the forfeiture action, and cannot make a claim for relief
    from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c). See 8136 S. Dobson Street, Chicago,
    Ill., 
    125 F.3d at 1082
    .
    CONCLUSION
    ¶9            For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Culver lacked
    standing in the forfeiture proceedings and continued to lack standing in his
    Rule 60(c) motion for relief from judgment. We therefore dismiss this
    appeal challenging the forfeiture judgment for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
    :ama
    5 Culver’s Motion to Return Property, although filed February 11, 2014, is
    dated January 14, 2014, and letters from the Office of the Sheriff note that in
    January and February 2014 there might have been a delay in sending mail
    out. According to the inmate mail log report, Culver’s first piece of mail
    addressed to the Clerk of the Superior Court in the relevant time frame was
    sent on February 8, 2014. Applying the mailbox rule, that Motion to Return
    Property would be deemed mailed on February 8. See State v. Goracke, 
    210 Ariz. 20
    , 22, ¶ 5 (App. 2005) (stating that pursuant to the prisoner mailbox
    rule, a pro se prisoner is deemed to have filed a properly addressed
    pleading at the time it is delivered to the proper prison authorities for
    filing). But because he allegedly gave it to jail personnel who might have
    delayed mailing it, we will assume it was deemed mailed January 14.
    5