Betts v. Carr ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    SHANE T. BETTS,
    Defendant/Appellant,
    v.
    SAMUEL E. CARR, D.C., P.C., et al.
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 21-0008
    FILED 11-30-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2019-000419
    The Honorable Joseph P. Mikitish, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Shane T. Betts, Phoenix
    Defendant/Appellant
    Jeffrey L. Bradford, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Jeffrey L. Bradford
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Samuel E. Carr, D.C., P.C.
    Law Office of Lawrence K. Lynde, Phoenix
    By Lawrence K. Lynde
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Joseph A. Silence
    BETTS v. CARR, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
    W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:
    ¶1           Shane Betts appeals the superior court’s judgment in favor of
    Dr. Samuel Carr and Joseph Silence on their claims of breach of contract
    and unjust enrichment. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
    ¶2             This appeal arises from two contracts for professional
    services—legal services and chiropractic services—entered by Betts after he
    was injured in a car accident in December 2015. Betts retained Silence to
    pursue his personal injury claim against the other driver. Betts and Silence
    entered a contingent fee agreement, which promised that Silence would
    receive either 30% or 33% “of any settlement offers or gross recovery,”
    depending on whether a lawsuit was filed. For seven months, Silence
    performed legal services for Betts, culminating in a settlement demand
    letter to the other driver’s insurance carrier for $42,500. The insurer
    counteroffered $30,000. Just three days later, Betts fired Silence and he
    represented himself moving forward. Silence later asserted a charging lien
    for $9,000 in attorney fees, representing 30% of the insurer’s counteroffer.
    ¶3             Betts also entered a contract with Dr. Carr to receive
    chiropractic treatment, which acknowledged that Betts was personally
    responsible for payment and Dr. Carr would defer payment until
    settlement of the negligence claim. After making 54 visits to Dr. Carr over
    four months, and accruing $8,574 in medical bills, Betts asked Dr. Carr to
    bill his insurance carrier. Dr. Carr declined, explaining that any insurance
    claims needed to be submitted within 90 days of treatment. Betts refused
    to pay. Dr. Carr asserted a medical lien.
    1      We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the
    superior court’s judgment after a bench trial. Vanessa H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
    Econ. Sec., 
    215 Ariz. 252
    , 256, ¶ 20 (App. 2007).
    2
    BETTS v. CARR, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4           Around two years after he fired Silence, Betts settled his
    negligence claim with the insurance company for $34,244.10. The
    settlement agreement addressed the charging and medical liens. Betts
    promised to satisfy all liens “by payment from the settlement funds,” and
    he agreed the liens “are [his] sole responsibility.” The agreement also
    required the settlement proceeds to remain in trust until the liens were
    resolved.
    ¶5            Betts later demanded all settlement proceeds from the
    insurer. The insurer paid $16,670.10 to Betts, representing the undisputed
    portion of the settlement, but filed an interpleader action in the superior
    court to allocate the remainder. The insurer deposited the funds with the
    court and was dismissed from the action. Silence and Dr. Carr asserted
    crossclaims against Betts for breach of contract. Silence also requested the
    reasonable value of his services under quantum meruit. Betts moved to
    dismiss the crossclaims, which the superior court denied.
    ¶6            The lawsuit went to mandatory arbitration. An arbitrator
    ruled against Betts, who appealed to the superior court, and the case went
    to trial. The bench trial lasted two days and the court received over 50
    exhibits. Five witnesses testified, including Betts, Silence and Dr. Carr.
    Betts was given one-half of the trial time, while Silence and Dr. Carr shared
    the remainder. The court also extended the trial to a second day to allow
    for closing arguments. After the trial, the court entered judgment for
    Silence and Dr. Carr. Betts moved for a new trial and for relief from
    judgment, which the court denied. The court awarded Silence and Carr
    attorney fees and entered final judgment. We have jurisdiction over Betts’s
    timely appeal. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (A)(2), and (A)(5)(a).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            We uphold findings of fact unless “clearly erroneous or
    unsupported by any credible evidence,” Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Tr. Co. of
    Ariz., 
    166 Ariz. 383
    , 388 (1990), but review de novo all questions of law,
    Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 
    197 Ariz. 144
    , 148, ¶ 11 (App. 1999).
    We review the denial of a motion for new trial or motion for relief from
    judgment for abuse of discretion. Spring v. Bradford, 
    243 Ariz. 167
    , 170, ¶ 11
    (2017); Norwest Bank (Minnesota), N.A. v. Symington, 
    197 Ariz. 181
    , 184, ¶ 11
    (App. 2000).
    I.     Professional Liens
    ¶8           Betts first contends the professional liens were invalid and
    offered no basis for the judgment. But the court’s judgment was not based
    3
    BETTS v. CARR, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    on the liens. Rather, the court awarded damages to Carr for breach of
    contract, and awarded Silence the reasonable value of his legal services. We
    affirm because the record has ample supporting evidence that (1) Betts
    entered and breached a contract with Carr, and (2) Betts was unjustly
    enriched by failing to pay Silence for the reasonable value of his legal
    services.
    II.    Health Insurance
    ¶9            Betts next argues the judgment was error because Betts had
    health insurance through UnitedHealthcare, Dr. Carr had a contract with
    UnitedHealthcare, and that contract prohibited Dr. Carr from billing Betts
    directly. This argument is meritless. Betts promised to pay Carr for
    treatment under the contract “REGARDLESS OF MY INSURANCE
    STATUS.” Betts did not even provide his health insurance information to
    Carr when entering the contract, and Betts only raised the health insurance
    issue after Carr completed the chiropractic services. Nor did Carr ever bill
    or receive payment from UnitedHealthcare for these services.2
    III.   Quantum Meruit Award
    ¶10           Betts next contends the judgment was error because Silence’s
    contingency fee agreement was unethical and invalid. He argues Silence
    was only entitled to damages under quantum meruit. But the superior
    court awarded Silence the reasonable value of his legal services under
    quantum meruit, not for breach of contract. A quantum meruit award is
    permissible under Arizona law unless the parties agreed that services
    would be provided for free, or it would not be unfair to receive the benefit
    of services without payment. Dey v. Quinin, 
    21 Ariz. 265
    , 266 (1920) (“It is
    well settled that when one is employed in the services of another for any
    period of time the law implies a promise to pay what such services are
    reasonably worth, unless it is understood that the services were to be
    rendered gratuitously, or unless they were rendered under circumstances
    which repel the presumption.”); see also Blue Ridge Sewer Imp. Dist. v. Lowry
    & Assocs., Inc., 
    149 Ariz. 373
    , 376 (App. 1986). Betts does not make these
    arguments, and we find no evidence in the record that Silence agreed to
    perform his services for free or that it would be unfair for Betts to pay
    Silence.
    2     Betts also argues that Dr. Carr’s contract claim was preempted under
    the Employee Retirement Income Services Act (“ERISA”), but he never
    develops the argument or provides supporting authority.
    4
    BETTS v. CARR, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    IV.    Interpleader and Assignment
    ¶11           Betts argues the judgment was error because Arizona
    prohibits an assignment of personal injury claims, and this court should
    “extrapolate[] that to fictional charging lien claims.” We are unpersuaded.
    Betts never assigned his personal injury claim.3 The insurance company
    settled his claim, paid him the uncontested amount and filed an
    interpleader action for Betts, Silence and Carr to litigate their rights to the
    remaining settlement proceeds. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 22. Silence and Carr
    answered and filed crossclaims against Betts for breach of contract. These
    claims were appropriate. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 13(f).
    V.     Fundamental Error
    ¶12           Betts contends the superior court committed fundamental
    errors so “numerous I cannot list [them] all.” His argument fails.
    Fundamental error is “error going to the foundation of the case . . . of such
    magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.”
    State v. Hunter, 
    142 Ariz. 88
    , 90 (1984); see also Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
    
    143 Ariz. 205
    , 212 (App. 1984). Betts received a full and fair trial. He was
    given one-half of the trial time; Silence and Carr shared the rest. The court
    often reminded Betts of his time limitations, encouraged him to focus his
    questions, gave him more time and extended the trial to a second day for
    closing arguments.
    VI.    Attorney Fees
    ¶13           Last, Betts challenges the superior court’s award of attorney
    fees to Silence and Carr. The superior court awarded fees under A.R.S. §
    12-341.01 because Silence’s and Carr’s claims arose out of contracts for
    3      An assignment is a “transfer of rights or property” from one party to
    another. Assignment, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An
    assignment occurs in personal injury cases when an injured party gives
    away his right to sue and recover to a third party. See Karp v. Speizer, 
    132 Ariz. 599
    , 600-01 (App. 1982) (assignment of personal injury claim and
    proceeds from recovery both unenforceable). These assignments are
    prohibited because of “the dangers of maintenance and champerty,” where
    “unscrupulous people would purchase causes of action and thereby traffic
    in lawsuits for pain and suffering.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). A lien, by
    contrast, is a “legal right or interest that a creditor has in another’s property,
    lasting [] until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied.” Lien, Black’s Law
    Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
    5
    BETTS v. CARR, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    services and Betts refused to provide payment. We review the superior
    court’s decision to award attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12–341.01 for abuse
    of discretion. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 
    143 Ariz. 567
    , 570–71 (1985).
    Betts entered two contracts for professional services, refused payment and
    litigated the claims from arbitration to the superior court to the court of
    appeals. Because the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the
    attorney fee award.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14          We affirm the judgment in favor of Dr. Carr and Silence. We
    award Dr. Carr and Silence their attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal
    under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, contingent on compliance with ARCAP 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6