Obiekea v. Obiekea ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Matter of:
    UDOAMAKA OBIEKEA,
    Petitioner/Appellant,
    v.
    KELLY OBIEKEA,
    Respondent/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 21-0051 FC
    FILED 12-16-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2018-097002
    The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Udoamaka E. Obiekea, Phoenix
    Petitioner/Appellant
    Sobampo Law Firm, PLLC
    By F. Javier Sobampo
    Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
    OBIEKEA v. OBIEKEA
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Maurice Portley joined.1
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1             Udoamaka Obiekea challenges the denial of his January 2020
    post-decree petition, which sought to modify spousal maintenance and
    child support. Because Udoamaka has shown no error, the order denying
    his petition is affirmed.
    FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Udoamaka and Kelly Obiekea were married in 2000 and share
    three children. Udoamaka petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in
    December 2018, alleging domestic violence. After a contested trial, the court
    entered the decree of dissolution in September 2019, finding Udoamaka had
    engaged in significant acts of domestic violence against Kelly and the
    children. The decree awarded Kelly sole legal decision-making authority
    with the children to live with her, limiting Udoamaka’s parenting time to
    limited supervised contact, which was later expanded. The court ordered
    Udoamaka to pay Kelly spousal maintenance of $2,000 per month for 60
    months and, as later corrected, $1,014 per month in child support.
    1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court of Appeals,
    Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article
    6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
    2This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the
    superior court’s factual findings. Powers v. Taser Int’l Inc., 
    217 Ariz. 398
    , 399
    ¶ 4 n.1 (App. 2007).
    2
    OBIEKEA v. OBIEKEA
    Decision of the Court
    ¶3            In January 2020, four months after entry of the decree,
    Udoamaka filed a petition to modify spousal maintenance and child
    support. Udoamaka claimed his spousal maintenance payments should be
    “stopped,” and his child support payments changed, because his “court
    assessed income has decreased by over 50%. This is because my former
    employer went out of business and I am currently working for Lyft as a
    driver.” Kelly countered that Udoamaka was hiding assets, had transferred
    his business to his brother and was “blatantly lying to the Court and
    attempting to mislead the Court to believe that he does not make any
    money and that he is ‘unemployed.’”
    ¶4             After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Udoamaka’s
    petition in December 2020. In doing so, the court found Udoamaka’s
    testimony was not credible, adding “[t]here is no documentation that [his]
    business . . . is no longer operating” and he had provided no financial
    records after March 2020. Concluding Udoamaka “has not met his burden
    of proof to demonstrate [a] substantial and continuing change of
    circumstances from the” September 2019 decree, the court denied the
    petition. The court also found Udoamaka had failed to pay child support
    and spousal maintenance of nearly $30,000 and ordered him to pay those
    arrearages “immediately.”
    ¶5            This court has jurisdiction over Udoamaka’s timely appeal of
    the order denying his petition pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
    Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-
    120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(2) (2021).3 See also Yee v. Yee, 
    251 Ariz. 71
    , 72 ¶ 1
    (App. 2021).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     The Superior Court Did Not Err In Denying Udoamaka’s Petition.
    ¶6           Udoamaka argues the superior court abused its discretion in
    denying his petition because he showed a substantial and continuing
    change both in his and in Kelly’s circumstances, also arguing the awards in
    the decree were excessive.4 Absent a clearly erroneous finding, this court
    3Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
    refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    4Udoamaka did not timely appeal from the decree, the time to do so has
    passed and, as a result, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over any
    3
    OBIEKEA v. OBIEKEA
    Decision of the Court
    accepts the superior court’s findings of fact, Engstrom v. McCarthy, 
    243 Ariz. 469
    , 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018), also deferring to that court for its credibility
    assessments, Fermiano v. Maust, 
    248 Ariz. 613
    , 615 ¶ 9 (App. 2020).
    A.     Udoamaka Did Not Show a Substantial and Continuing
    Change in His Circumstances.
    ¶7           As applicable here, “the provisions of any decree respecting
    maintenance or support may be modified or terminated only on a showing
    of changed circumstances that are substantial and continuing.” A.R.S. § 25-
    327(A); accord A.R.S. § 25-503(E). As the party seeking modification,
    Udoamaka had the burden of proving the substantial and continuing
    changed circumstances. McClendon v. McClendon, 
    243 Ariz. 399
    , 401 ¶ 8
    (App. 2017).
    ¶8            Udoamaka argues that the superior court erred in not finding
    that the closure of his business, Maricopa Transportation Services (MTS),
    was a significant and continuing change. Udoamaka maintains that MTS
    suffered extreme losses due to several factors and closed in January 2020.
    He points to evidence received by the court that MTS lost the ability to
    operate as a non-emergency medical transporter; that only two of its seven
    vehicles remained operational; that those two vehicles did not have the
    necessary insurance required to comply with government-sanctioned
    contracts and that MTS was, in substance, no longer operational. The
    superior court, however, also received conflicting evidence. Among other
    things, Kelly introduced evidence that after the entry of the decree,
    Udoamaka had shifted MTS into a different business (Allstate
    Transportation) under his brother’s name.
    ¶9            After considering the conflicting evidence, the court found
    Udoamaka’s testimony was not credible. Udoamaka presented evidence
    that showed MTS was operating at a loss, but the court found that “[t]his
    claim is not credible given the large sums of money that were deposited
    each month prior to the dissolution.” The court also found that Udoamaka
    “was still running the business although it was in [his] brother’s name . . .
    [h]e admitted that Maricopa and Allstate were the same company.” The
    court also found that Udoamaka had failed to provide necessary
    documentation for several of his claims. On this trial record, and
    recognizing the deference this court appropriately owes to credibility
    challenges to the decree. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1); ARCAP 9(a); Yee,
    251 Ariz. at 75-76 ¶¶ 8-11 (citing authority).
    4
    OBIEKEA v. OBIEKEA
    Decision of the Court
    determinations by the superior court, Udoamaka has not shown that court
    abused its discretion in concluding he failed to show a substantial and
    continuing change in his circumstances. McClendon, 243 Ariz. at 401 ¶ 8.
    ¶10           Nor has Udoamaka shown that the superior court improperly
    weighed the conflicting evidence. Udoamaka offered evidence that he
    received unemployment compensation and drove for Lyft from December
    2019 to March 2020. The court cited to this evidence, but further noted that
    “the only records relating to Allstate’s finances end in March, 2020,” a
    particularly significant gap given that the evidentiary hearing was held in
    December 2020. Accordingly, Udoamaka has not shown that the court erred
    in concluding he failed to meet his burden to show a substantial and
    continuing change in his circumstances. In re Marriage of Yuro, 
    192 Ariz. 568
    ,
    570 (App. 1998) (noting, on appeal, the evidence is viewed “in the light most
    favorable to sustaining the trial court’s findings”).
    ¶11           Udoamaka cites Chaney v. Chaney, 
    145 Ariz. 23
     (App. 1985), as
    support for his modification argument, arguing that his “cessation of
    business” equates to the husband’s retirement in Chaney, which was found
    to be a change in circumstance warranting a modification of spousal
    maintenance. Not so. Here, the superior court found that Udoamaka
    transferred his business into his brother’s name, which refutes his claim of
    “involuntary retirement of the affairs of the operation.” Cf. Chaney, 
    145 Ariz. at 28
     (“under the circumstances of this case [husband’s] petition for
    modification cannot be denied on the ground that his retirement was
    ‘voluntary,’” noting husband was 65 years old, with “numerous health
    conditions affecting his ability to work,” the parties had contemplated his
    retirement “for at least three years” before and it “was not taken in bad faith
    for the purpose of reducing the husband’s obligation to pay spousal
    maintenance”).
    ¶12           In sum, Udoamaka has not shown that the superior court
    failed to properly consider the evidence, erred in assessing that evidence or
    erred in concluding that he had not met his burden of proof to show a
    substantial and continuing change of his circumstances. Thus, the court did
    not err in denying his petition on that ground.
    5
    OBIEKEA v. OBIEKEA
    Decision of the Court
    B.     Udoamaka Did Not Show a Substantial and Continuing
    Change In Kelly’s Circumstances.
    ¶13           Udoamaka argues that Kelly’s increase in monthly income
    from her two part-time jobs properly demonstrated a substantial and
    continuing change in circumstances supporting his petition. Relying on
    Scott v. Scott, 
    121 Ariz. 492
    , 495-96 (1979), Udoamaka asserts that the
    changed circumstances of a former spouse who is not paying maintenance
    or support are material in determining whether a substantial and
    continuing change in circumstances is shown. Scott repeated, however, that
    a determination as to the sufficiency of changed circumstances is a matter
    within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
    Id. at 495
    .
    ¶14           Udoamaka’s petition did not claim a substantial and
    continuing change in Kelly’s circumstances; the only change he claimed
    was an allegation that his own income decreased. By failing to allege such
    a change, he cannot now assert on appeal that the superior court
    improperly failed to find such a change. See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 
    179 Ariz. 299
    , 300 (1994).
    ¶15            Apart from waiver, although the superior court found that, at
    the time of the December 2020 evidentiary hearing, Kelly was working two
    part-time jobs and earning between $2,500 and $2,700 per month, that fact
    did not mean Udoamaka’s payment obligations would end. Udoamaka has
    not shown that the court was compelled to find the income increase was
    substantial and continuing, especially given Udoamaka’s failure to pay
    spousal maintenance and child support. See Scott, 
    121 Ariz. at 496
     (“We hold
    that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find, for whichever
    reason, that [wife’s] lower monthly expenses were not tantamount to a
    substantial change in circumstances, which merited a reduction of the
    support payments that she receives from” husband).
    II.    Kelly is Awarded Her Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
    Incurred on Appeal.
    ¶16           Kelly requests taxable costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees
    incurred on appeal. By statute, this court may award “a reasonable
    amount” of attorneys’ fees “after considering the financial resources of both
    parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken.” A.R.S.
    § 25-324(A). In December 2020, the superior court found a disparity of
    income, with Udoamaka earning more than Kelly, but the court added it
    “would not characterize this disparity as substantial.” That finding is not
    challenged by either party on appeal. Having considered the positions the
    6
    OBIEKEA v. OBIEKEA
    Decision of the Court
    parties have taken on appeal and in the court’s discretion, Kelly’s request
    for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal is granted,
    contingent upon her compliance with ARCAP 21. Kelly also is awarded her
    taxable costs on appeal, contingent upon her compliance with ARCAP 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17          The denial of Udoamaka’s petition is affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 21-0051-FC

Filed Date: 12/16/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/16/2021