State v. Ales ( 2014 )


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  •                           NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
    LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    LEVI ALES, Appellant.
    Nos. CR13-0658 and CR13-0808
    Consolidated
    FILED 09-23-2014
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    Nos. CR2011-153545-001 and CR2012-141400-001
    The Honorable Virginia L. Richter, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Joseph T. Maziarz
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Kathryn L. Petroff
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. ALES
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
    G O U L D, Judge:
    ¶1            Levi Shane Ales (“Defendant”) appeals from his conviction
    and sentence for one count of misconduct involving weapons in case
    number CR2012-141400-001 and from the determination that he violated his
    probation and disposition in case number CR2011-153545-001. The trial
    court sentenced Defendant to twelve years’ incarceration in case CR2012-
    141400-001, and to a consecutive term of one-and-one-half years’
    incarceration for violating probation in case number CR2011-153545-001.
    ¶2              Defendant’s counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and State v. Leon, 
    104 Ariz. 297
    , 
    451 P.2d 878
    (1969), advising this Court that after a search of the entire appellate record,
    no arguable ground exists for reversal. Defendant was granted leave to file
    a supplemental brief in propria persona, and he has not done so.
    ¶3            Our obligation in this appeal is to review “the entire record
    for reversible error.” State v. Clark, 
    196 Ariz. 530
    , 537, ¶ 30, 
    2 P.3d 89
    , 96
    (App. 1999). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
    Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-
    120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1) (West 2014).1
    ¶4            Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶5          On July 30, 2012, Defendant was sentenced to a term of
    probation in Maricopa County Case No. CR2011-153545-001 (the
    “Probation Case”). Three days later, on August 2, 2012, Defendant was
    arrested in Maricopa County Case No. CR2012-141400-001 (the “New
    1      Unless otherwise specified, we cite to the current version of the
    applicable statutes because no revisions material to this decision have
    occurred.
    2
    STATE v. ALES
    Decision of the Court
    Case”). Defendant was charged in the New Case with one count of
    misconduct involving weapons and one count of possession or use of
    dangerous drugs. Based on the charges in the New Case, a petition to
    revoke Defendant’s probation was filed in the Probation Case.
    ¶6          The trial court continued the violation hearing in the
    Probation Case while Defendant was awaiting trial in the New Case. The
    New Case eventually went to trial in August 2013.
    ¶7            At the close of the evidence in the New Case, the jury was
    initially unable to reach a verdict for the charge of misconduct involving
    weapons. The trial court gave the jury an impasse instruction and asked
    the jury to further deliberate. The jury then returned a verdict finding
    Defendant guilty.
    ¶8             Following the guilty verdict in the New Case, a jury
    determined Defendant had two historical prior felony convictions, one non-
    historical felony conviction, and was on probation for a felony conviction
    at the time of the offense.2
    ¶9            Based on Defendant’s conviction in the New Case, the trial
    court determined that Defendant was in automatic violation of his
    probation in the Probation Case. Both the New Case and the Probation Case
    were set for sentencing and disposition in September 2013.
    ¶10           In the New Case, the trial court sentenced Defendant to
    twelve years’ incarceration and awarded him 409 days of pre-sentence
    incarceration credit. In the Probation case, the trial court revoked
    Defendant’s probation and sentenced him to one-and-one-half years’
    incarceration with credit for 258 days’ time-served. The court ordered the
    sentence in the Probation Case to be served consecutively to the sentence in
    the New Case.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶11            We review the record for fundamental error. Clark, 
    196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30
    , 
    2 P.3d at 96
    . We view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to sustaining the convictions and resulting sentences, and any reasonable
    inferences are resolved against the defendant. State v. Guerra, 
    161 Ariz. 289
    ,
    2     Prior to trial for the alleged prior felony convictions, the State moved
    to dismiss count two, possession or use of dangerous drugs, without
    prejudice.
    3
    STATE v. ALES
    Decision of the Court
    293, 
    778 P.2d 1185
    , 1189 (1989); State v. Tison, 
    129 Ariz. 546
    , 552, 
    633 P.2d 355
    , 361 (1981).
    I.     Conviction in New Case and Revocation in Probation Case
    ¶12            The evidence presented at trial in the New Case showed that
    on August 2, 2012, Mesa Police Department (“MPD”) Detective C. received
    a tip that criminal activity was taking place inside a vehicle; the tip included
    a description of the vehicle, its occupants, and its location. Detective C. and
    other police officers located the vehicle and followed it. After watching the
    vehicle make several traffic violations, Detective C. stopped the vehicle at a
    gas station.
    ¶13              As Detective C. approached the vehicle, he observed a
    camping chair bag lying next to the “driver’s left leg.” The driver, who was
    later identified as Defendant, provided his name and date of birth, but was
    unable to produce any form of identification.
    ¶14           During the course of the traffic stop, Detective C. learned that
    Defendant’s license was suspended; as a result, he arrested Defendant.
    During a subsequent search of the vehicle, another officer removed the
    camping chair bag and discovered a loaded twelve-gauge shotgun (“the
    shotgun”) inside. Detective C. also found a tan bag containing eleven
    twelve-gauge shotgun shells and a black backpack containing a socket
    wrench, a folding knife, and a wallet with two of Defendant’s state
    identification cards.
    ¶15           Detective C. transported Defendant to jail where he was
    Mirandized and questioned. Defendant claimed that he recently purchased
    the vehicle, and that the camping bag was already inside the car when he
    purchased it. However, Defendant could not remember from whom he
    purchased the car or how much he paid for the car. Defendant also
    admitted to Detective C. that he was a prohibited possessor and currently
    on probation.
    ¶16           Accordingly, based on our review of the evidence presented
    at trial, we conclude there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s
    guilty verdict as to the crime of misconduct involving weapons.
    ¶17           We also find no error in the trial court decision to read an
    impasse instruction to the jury. Whether a jury is at an impasse is an
    important determination to be made by the trial court because prematurely
    giving an impasse instruction may also be a form of coercion. See State v.
    Huerstel, 
    206 Ariz. 93
    , 99, ¶ 17, 101, ¶ 25, 
    75 P.3d 698
    , 704, 706 (2003)
    4
    STATE v. ALES
    Decision of the Court
    (reversing on the basis of coercion, in part because the trial court erred in
    giving an impasse instruction before the jury indicated it had reached an
    impasse). Arizona Rule 22.4 of Criminal Procedure permits the trial court
    when advised by the jury that it has reached an impasse in its deliberations,
    “to inquire how it can assist the jury in its deliberations.” State v. Andriano,
    
    215 Ariz. 497
    , 509, ¶ 55, 
    161 P.3d 540
    , 552 (2007).
    ¶18            In this case, the jury notified the trial court the deliberations
    were at a deadlock, thus requiring an impasse instruction to further assist
    the jury in its deliberations. Neither party objected. The jury returned a
    verdict after the impasse instruction was given. We find no error.
    II.    Violation of Probation
    ¶19          The trial court also was correct in determining that Defendant
    violated his probation in the Probation Case. This determination was
    properly based on Defendant’s conviction in the New Case. See Rule 27.8(e)
    Ariz. R. Crim. P. (providing for automatic violation of probation based on
    a determination of guilt in a new case); State v. Taylor, 
    187 Ariz. 567
    , 569,
    
    931 P.2d 1077
    , 1079 (App. 1996).
    III.   Sentencing
    ¶20            The trial court did not impose a flat-time sentence in
    Defendant’s New Case. Rather, the court ordered Defendant to serve a
    term of community supervision pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603(I). Pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 13-708(C), a defendant sentenced for a felony while on probation
    for another felony must serve a flat-time sentence; he is not for eligible for
    release after serving eighty-five percent of a prison sentence. See A.R.S. §
    41-1604.07(A).
    ¶21           Thus, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-708(C), the court’s failure to
    sentence Defendant to flat-time in the New Case constituted an illegally
    lenient sentence. “Courts have [the] power to impose sentences only as
    authorized by statutes and within the limits set down by the legislature.”
    State v. Rosario, 
    195 Ariz. 264
    , 268, ¶ 27, 
    987 P.2d 226
    , 230 (App. 1999)
    (quoting State v. Harris, 
    133 Ariz. 30
    , 31, 
    648 P.2d 145
    , 146 (App. 1982)).
    However, because the State has not filed an appeal or a cross-appeal on this
    issue, we do not have jurisdiction to address it. State v. Dawson, 
    164 Ariz. 278
    , 286, 
    792 P.2d 741
    , 749 (1990).
    ¶22          Additionally, the trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence in
    the Probation Case to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in
    the New Case, and awarded Defendant credit for 258 days served prior to
    5
    STATE v. ALES
    Decision of the Court
    sentencing. Again, this was error. Given the consecutive sentences
    imposed, Defendant could not receive credit for time served on both the
    Probation case and the New Case. State v. Cuen, 
    158 Ariz. 86
    , 87-88, 
    761 P.2d 160
    , 161-62 (App. 1988). Nonetheless, because the State has not filed an
    appeal or cross-appeal on this issue, we do not have jurisdiction to address
    it. Dawson, 
    164 Ariz. at 286
    , 
    792 P.2d at 749
    .
    CONCLUSION
    ¶23            We have read and considered counsel’s brief, carefully
    searched the entire record for reversible error and found none. Clark, 
    196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 49
    , 
    2 P.3d at 100
    . All of the proceedings were conducted in
    compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and substantial
    evidence supported the finding of guilt. Defendant was present and
    represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings. At
    sentencing, Defendant and his counsel were given an opportunity to speak.
    ¶24           Accordingly, Defendant’s convictions and sentences are
    affirmed. Counsel’s obligations pertaining to Defendant’s representation
    in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do nothing more than inform
    Defendant of the status of the appeal and his future options, unless
    counsel’s review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona
    Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 
    140 Ariz. 582
    , 584-
    85, 
    684 P.2d 154
    , 156-57 (1984). Defendant shall have thirty days from the
    date of this decision to proceed, if he so desires, with an in propria persona
    motion for reconsideration or petition for review.
    :gsh
    6