Song He v. Coles Properties ( 2018 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    SONG HE, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,
    v.
    COLES PROPERTIES LLC, a Tennessee limited liability company,
    Defendant/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 17-0774
    FILED 10-23-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2017-004316
    The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge
    VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
    COUNSEL
    The Kozub Law Group, PLC, Scottsdale
    By William A. Kozub, Richard W. Hundley
    Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees
    Evans Dove Nelson Fish & Grier, PLC, Mesa
    By Douglas N. Nelson, Trevor J. Fish, Thomas J. Grier
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
    M O R S E, Judge:
    ¶1            Appellant Coles Properties LLC ("Coles") and Appellee Song
    He assert competing equitable claims against certain real property
    ("Property") as a result of misdeeds by Imagine Enterprises LLC
    ("Imagine"), who is not a party to this appeal. The superior court granted
    Song He's motion for summary judgment and judicially foreclosed two of
    Song He's mortgages in the Property. Because there is a material issue of
    fact as to the priority of one of Song He's mortgages, we vacate the
    foreclosure of that mortgage, but affirm the remainder of the court's
    judgment.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2              In January 2016, Coles entered into a joint venture agreement
    with Imagine. The purpose of the agreement was to purchase the Property
    and sell it at a profit. Imagine purchased the Property on February 16, 2016.
    Pursuant to the joint venture agreement, from January 2016 to August 2016,
    Coles sent sums of money to Imagine for the earnest money, purchase,
    insurance, and improvement of the Property. However, Imagine did not
    perform according to their agreement.
    ¶3            On February 10, 2016, Song He agreed to loan money to
    Imagine. The funds were disbursed on February 24 and 25, 2016. Imagine
    soon defaulted, and on September 28, 2016, Song He brought a lawsuit
    against Imagine seeking damages from Imagine and an equitable mortgage
    or constructive trust on the Property. Song He recorded a lis pendens on
    the Property on September 30, 2016.
    ¶4             Upon learning of the lis pendens, and to protect its claimed
    interest in the Property, Coles convinced Imagine to quitclaim the Property
    to it. On December 8, 2016, Coles recorded the quitclaim deed transferring
    the property from Imagine to Coles. On January 4, 2017, Song He obtained
    a default judgment granting him an equitable mortgage in the Property. At
    that time, a trustee's sale was scheduled for February 3, 2017. In order to
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    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    stop that trustee's sale, Song He paid off the mortgage on the property, and
    by subrogation obtained a first priority mortgage on the property.
    ¶5             Song He then filed this action, making various claims against
    Coles and Imagine, and requesting foreclosure of its payoff mortgage and
    equitable mortgage. Coles crossclaimed and counterclaimed, arguing that
    it had an equitable mortgage on the Property due to the funds paid into it
    and Imagine's malfeasance. Coles also asserted a claim for damages and to
    clear title under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 33-420. Song
    He moved for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss Coles' § 33-
    420 claims and to grant him a foreclosure for his payoff mortgage and
    equitable mortgage. The court granted Song He's motion and entered final
    judgment of judicial foreclosure pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil
    Procedure 54(b). Coles timely appealed the judgment and we have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
    A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6             We review de novo a grant of summary judgment and view
    the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary
    judgment was entered. United Dairymen of Ariz. v. Schugg, 
    212 Ariz. 133
    ,
    140, ¶ 26 (App. 2006).
    ¶7              Summary judgment is appropriate when "the moving party
    shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P.
    56(a). "If the evidence would allow a jury to resolve a material issue in favor
    of either party, summary judgment is improper." Comerica Bank v.
    Mahmoodi, 
    224 Ariz. 289
    , 291, ¶ 12 (App. 2010). However, "the mere absence
    of a genuine dispute of material fact does not automatically entitle a
    plaintiff to judgment—the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the evidence
    entitles it to judgment as a matter of law." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen,
    
    231 Ariz. 209
    , 213, ¶ 16 (App. 2012).
    I.     Foreclosure
    ¶8             Coles acknowledges that part of the foreclosure was proper:
    the superior court did not err in foreclosing the payoff mortgage, which
    Song He obtained by subrogation. However, Coles argues that foreclosure
    of Song He's equitable mortgage, obtained by default, was error because
    there is an issue of disputed material fact as to whether Song He's equitable
    mortgage has priority over Coles' claimed equitable mortgage. We agree.
    By granting foreclosure on Song He's equitable mortgage, the superior
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    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    court implicitly held either that Coles did not have a valid equitable
    mortgage claim or that any equitable mortgage it had was inferior to Song
    He's equitable mortgage.
    ¶9              Coles has made a prima facie showing of a constructive trust
    or equitable mortgage. It presented evidence that, pursuant to an
    agreement which Imagine did not keep, Coles gave sums of money to
    Imagine towards the purchase of the Property, for insurance on the
    Property, and for the improvement of the Property. This evidence supports
    a prima facie showing that Coles has an equitable interest in the property,
    and precludes summary judgment. See Gorney v. Meaney, 
    214 Ariz. 226
    , 232,
    ¶ 17 (App. 2007) ("Summary judgment is also appropriate when a plaintiff
    fails to establish a prima facie case."); Turley v. Ethington, 
    213 Ariz. 640
    , 643,
    ¶ 9 (App. 2006) ("A court may impose a constructive trust whenever title to
    property has been obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentation,
    concealment, undue influence, duress or through any other means which
    render it unconscionable for the holder of legal title to continue to retain
    and enjoy its beneficial interest." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    ¶10             In addition, Song He has not shown as a matter of law that his
    equitable mortgage is in a position superior to Coles' claimed equitable
    mortgage. First, Song He argues that Coles' equitable claims merged with
    its legal title when Coles became the legal title holder of the Property. In
    making this argument, Song He ignores that merger only applies when the
    parties so intended, and when merger would not be inequitable. See
    Hathaway v. Neal, 
    31 Ariz. 155
    , 159 (1926) (holding there is no merger if it
    "would work injury or violate well-established principles of equity, or be
    contrary to the intentions of the parties, and, primarily, of the mortgagee,
    who purchases the equity of redemption"); Mid Kansas Fed. Sav. & Loan
    Ass'n of Wichita v. Dynamic Dev. Corp., 
    167 Ariz. 122
    , 129 (1991) ("[E]ven if a
    merger would otherwise occur at law, contrary intent or equitable
    considerations may preclude this result under appropriate
    circumstances."); Bowman v. Cook, 
    101 Ariz. 366
    , 368 (1966) ("It is also the
    law that a mortgagee has an Election in equity to prevent a merger and keep
    the mortgage alive . . . ."). Song He has not shown as a matter of law that
    Coles' intent or principles of equity necessitate a merger in this case. In fact,
    this lawsuit is evidence that Coles did not intend for there to be a merger.
    Also, it would be inequitable to hold that Coles, in its attempt to protect any
    interest it had in the Property, inadvertently extinguished any claimed
    interest by accepting the quitclaim deed.
    ¶11            Second, Song He argues that the recording of the lis pendens
    set the priority of Song He's equitable mortgage claim. As Song He notes,
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    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    a lis pendens serves to provide notice, and anyone who acquires an interest
    in the property after the recording of the lis pendens is charged with notice
    of the rights of the prior owner of the property and stands in the same
    position as the prior vendor with respect to the outcome of the litigation.
    Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Gross, 
    141 Ariz. 389
    , 391 (App. 1984).
    However, a lis pendens does not grant priority—or any substantive right—
    to the person who files it. BT Capital, LLC v. TD Serv. Co. of Ariz., 
    229 Ariz. 299
    , 301, ¶ 14 (2012); Kelly v. Perry, 
    111 Ariz. 382
    , 385 (1975). Therefore, the
    lis pendens recorded by Song He does not affect the priority of his equitable
    mortgage.
    ¶12             Because there are material questions of fact as to whether
    Coles has an equitable interest in the Property and the priority of the parties'
    claimed interests,1 we cannot say that Song He was entitled to a judicial
    foreclosure on the equitable mortgage as a matter of law. However, the
    parties agree, and the record indicates, that Song He was entitled to a
    judicial foreclosure on the payoff mortgage because there is no question as
    to its priority.
    II.    A.R.S. § 33-420
    ¶13            On Appeal, Coles argues that the superior court erred in
    dismissing its A.R.S. § 33-420 claims. However, the dismissal of these
    claims was not included in the court's final Rule 54(b) judgment. Because
    the dismissal of those claims was not part of a final judgment, we have no
    jurisdiction to consider it. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A) (describing when appeal
    may be taken).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14           For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the superior court's
    grant of foreclosure on Song He's equitable mortgage obtained by default
    judgment and affirm the remainder of the court's final judgment. As the
    successful party, Coles is entitled to costs on appeal. We defer Coles'
    1       As stated earlier, Song He's equitable mortgage in the Property arose
    as a result of the default judgment it obtained. Coles sought relief from that
    judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but the superior
    court in that case ruled that it did not have standing. Coles appealed in
    Case No. 1 CA-CV 17-0561. In that case, we ruled that Coles does have
    standing to seek relief from that judgment and remanded for the superior
    court to determine the merits of Coles' motion. The validity of Song He's
    claimed equitable mortgage depends on the outcome in that case.
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    SONG HE, et al. v. COLES PROPERTIES
    Decision of the Court
    request for attorney fees on appeal to the superior court's discretion
    pending resolution of the matter on the merits. See Tierra Ranchos
    Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 
    216 Ariz. 195
    , 204, ¶ 37 (App. 2007).
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6