State v. Tracey ( 2019 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    PATRICK COREY TRACEY, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 18-0225
    FILED 6-25-2019
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2016-133540-001
    The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Grace M. Guisewite
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Eric Knobloch
    Counsel for Appellee
    STATE v. TRACEY
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Acting
    Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Vice Chief Judge Peter B. Swann
    joined.
    J O N E S, Judge:
    ¶1            Patrick Tracey appeals his convictions and sentences for
    possession of dangerous drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
    shoplifting. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            On July 14, 2016, Tracey was captured on Kmart surveillance
    video putting on a new pair of boots, placing his old boots in the new-boot
    box, and exiting the store without paying for the boots on his feet.1 Tracey
    was also filmed on surveillance video blowing his nose into a tissue and
    using the tissue to conceal a baggie, later determined to contain 1.27 grams
    of methamphetamine, in a store trash can. After a store loss prevention
    officer pulled the drugs from the trash can, Tracey admitted throwing them
    into the trash before law enforcement arrived. Tracey was charged with
    possession of a dangerous drug, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
    shoplifting.
    ¶3             After the State provided notice of its intent to attack Tracey’s
    credibility through the introduction of seven prior felony convictions if he
    chose to testify at trial, the trial court held a hearing to determine their
    admissibility. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court found “in
    part the probative value [of the prior convictions] does outweigh the
    prejudicial effect,” limited the State to using three prior convictions, and
    ordered the nature of the offenses be sanitized.
    ¶4           At trial, Tracey admitted he left the store without paying for
    the new boots and, after finding methamphetamine in his pocket he
    believed belonged to his brother, “threw them out . . . [b]ecause [he] didn’t
    1      We view the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the
    verdict[s].” State v. Payne, 
    233 Ariz. 484
    , 509, ¶ 93 (2013) (citing State v.
    Stroud, 
    209 Ariz. 410
    , 412, ¶ 6 (2005)).
    2
    STATE v. TRACEY
    Decision of the Court
    want to get anyone else into trouble.” Tracey also admitted to three
    unspecified felony convictions, one each in the years 2004, 2005, and 2007.
    ¶5             The jury found Tracey guilty as charged, and the trial court
    sentenced him as a non-dangerous, repetitive offender to concurrent,
    presumptive terms of 10 years’ imprisonment for possession of a dangerous
    drug, 3.75 years’ imprisonment for possession of drug paraphernalia, and
    6 months’ jail time for shoplifting. The court also credited Tracey with forty
    days of presentence incarceration. Tracey timely appealed, and we have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-
    120.21(A)(1),2 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6             Tracey argues the trial court erred in admitting his 2004, 2005,
    and 2007 convictions for impeachment purposes. Even assuming error,
    however, we will still affirm a decision to allow prior convictions as
    impeachment evidence if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    State v. Beasley, 
    205 Ariz. 334
    , 340, ¶ 27 (App. 2003) (citing State v. Dunlap,
    
    187 Ariz. 441
    , 456 (App. 1996)). Error is harmless when “the guilty verdict
    actually rendered . . . was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Green,
    
    200 Ariz. 496
    , 501, ¶ 21 (2001) (quoting State v. Bible, 
    175 Ariz. 549
    , 588
    (1993)). Such is the case here.
    ¶7             Tracey relies on State v. Green to argue the error was not
    harmless because “his credibility was the crux of his defense.” See 
    id. at ¶
    22. Although the degree a defendant’s credibility impacts his defense is
    a consideration in the harmless-error analysis, we do not believe it warrants
    reversal in light of the overwhelming evidence against Tracey presented in
    this record. See State v. Reese, 
    26 Ariz. App. 251
    , 253 (App. 1976) (“In
    determining whether the use of a prior invalid conviction for impeachment
    purposes is harmless in the circumstances of a given case, the courts have
    looked principally to the strength of the evidence against the defendant
    independent of the prior conviction.”) (collecting cases). Unlike the
    defendant in Green, the State’s case against Tracey was not circumstantial.
    See 
    Green, 200 Ariz. at 501
    , ¶ 22. Rather, the State presented uncontroverted
    video evidence such that the jury was able to watch Tracey commit the
    offenses. See State v. Ennis, 
    142 Ariz. 311
    , 318 (App. 1984) (concluding error
    in admitting prior conviction as impeachment evidence was harmless in
    2      Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current
    version of rules and statutes.
    3
    STATE v. TRACEY
    Decision of the Court
    part because “[t]he state’s case was not circumstantial in nature and there
    is substantial evidence in the record to support the verdict”).
    ¶8             Moreover, unlike the defendant in Green, Tracey did not deny
    participating in the events giving rise to the criminal charges. See 
    Green, 200 Ariz. at 501
    , ¶ 22. To the contrary, Tracey confessed to taking the boots and
    disposing of the methamphetamine shortly after he was apprehended.
    During his trial testimony, Tracey acknowledged the facts underlying the
    offenses, seeking only to negate the element of intent through his testimony
    that he only left the store to get money from his girlfriend to pay for the
    boots and did not know there was methamphetamine in his pocket until
    immediately before attempting to dispose of it. But the objective evidence
    — leaving the old boots in the new-boot box and disposing of the drugs
    immediately upon apprehension — strongly negate Tracey’s suggestion
    that he lacked intent, notwithstanding the impeachment evidence. See State
    v. Hatch, 
    225 Ariz. 409
    , 413, ¶ 15 (App. 2010) (concluding error in admitting
    prior convictions as impeachment evidence was harmless where the
    evidence showed the defendant was interrupted in the course of the crime
    and later admitted the elements of the crimes of which he was convicted);
    State v. Bolton, 
    182 Ariz. 290
    , 303 (1995) (concluding error in admitting prior
    convictions as impeachment evidence was harmless when the defendant’s
    testimony “was wholly independent of his prior convictions and was at
    least as damaging to him as evidence of those convictions”)
    ¶9            Finally, unlike the defendant in Green, the record does not
    suggest the jury gave any particular thought to the prior convictions. See
    
    Green, 200 Ariz. at 501
    , ¶ 22. Jurors here did ask questions suggesting they
    were considering Tracey’s version of events. However, the inquiries
    focused entirely upon his actions — specifically, what else he did or could
    have done to get his girlfriend’s attention and the circumstances
    surrounding his “discovery” of the methamphetamine in his pocket. For
    example, jurors wanted to know if Tracey had a cell phone, why he left the
    store wearing the boots instead of leaving them at the checkout to get his
    girlfriend, and whether he had had reason to reach into the pocket with the
    methamphetamine earlier in the day. Unlike Green, the jurors’ questions
    were not focused on the nature or existence of Tracey’s prior convictions.
    Thus, the questions did not suggest the jurors were considering Tracey’s
    credibility generally or outside the practicalities of his nonsensical
    explanation, or otherwise indicate the jurors gave any significant weight to
    the prior convictions. Contra 
    id. at 498,
    501, ¶¶ 5, 22 (considering jurors’
    questions regarding the nature of the defendant’s prior convictions as
    indicative that “knowledge of the defendant’s past convictions may have
    had some effect” on their verdicts).
    4
    STATE v. TRACEY
    Decision of the Court
    ¶10           The record contains overwhelming evidence of guilt such that
    we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdicts were not
    affected by the evidence of Tracey’s prior convictions for unspecified felony
    offenses. See 
    Beasley, 205 Ariz. at 340
    , ¶ 27 (concluding error in admitting
    prior convictions as impeachment evidence was harmless when “[t]he
    defendant was literally caught with a smoking gun,” eyewitnesses
    observed the events, and the defendant steadfastly refused to implicate
    other participants); contra 
    Green, 200 Ariz. at 501
    , ¶ 22 (concluding error in
    admission of prior convictions as impeachment evidence was not harmless
    where the evidence was entirely testimonial, the defendant denied the
    charge, and the juror questions suggested the existence of defendant’s past
    convictions affected their verdict); State v. Malloy, 
    131 Ariz. 125
    , 129 (1981)
    (concluding error in admission of prior convictions as impeachment
    evidence was not harmless where the defendant “intended to present his
    defense through his own testimony, denying that he had committed the
    [charged offense] and explaining his presence at the scene of the crime. . . .
    [but] [b]ecause of the trial court’s erroneous ruling, . . . decided not to take
    the stand. . . . [and] was, therefore, unable to present this defense”).
    Therefore, Tracey fails to prove reversible error.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11           Tracey’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED:    JT
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 18-0225

Filed Date: 6/25/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/25/2019