Pedco v. Under the Tent ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    PRIME EARTH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    UNDER THE TENT, LLC, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 15-0084
    FILED 3-24-16
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2014-053898
    The Honorable Thomas L. LeClaire, Judge (Retired)
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Theobald Law, PLC, Phoenix
    By Scott M. Theobald, Mark A. Nickel
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Polsinelli PC, Phoenix
    By Paul J. Roshka, Jr., Craig M. Waugh
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    PEDCO v. UNDER THE TENT
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Donn Kessler joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Judge:
    ¶1            Prime Earth Development Company, LLC (“PEDCO”)
    appeals the trial court’s order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss by
    Under the Tent, LLC (“UTT”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           PEDCO is a limited liability investment company that raises
    capital and buys raw land for investment purposes. It manages three
    companies: Hidden Valley Ranch I, LLC; Hidden Valley Ranch II, LLC; and
    Phoenix-Tucson Ranch, LLC (collectively “Managed Companies”).
    ¶3            This appeal arises out of one of several civil actions PEDCO
    brought against five of its investor members (the “Five Members”) in
    response to their arbitration demand to compel PEDCO to produce its
    financial records.
    ¶4            After repeated refusals by PEDCO to share the financial
    records, the Five Members filed a demand for arbitration with the American
    Arbitration Association, pursuant to PEDCO’s and the Managed
    Companies’ operating agreements. The Five Members formed UTT to
    collect funds to cover the cost of the arbitration proceedings and protect
    their investments in PEDCO and the Managed Companies.
    ¶5            The Five Members obtained from PEDCO the names and
    addresses of members of PEDCO and the Managed Companies. On June
    16, 2014, the Five Members sent a letter (the “June 16 Letter”) to other
    members of PEDCO and the Managed Companies, expressing their
    concerns regarding PEDCO’s reluctance to allow them to inspect PEDCO’s
    financial records, and asking the members to contribute and support their
    efforts to access this information. PEDCO then sought to amend its
    operating agreement to disallow arbitration in any action seeking
    declaratory relief. The Five Members sent another letter on July 1, 2014 to
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    PEDCO v. UNDER THE TENT
    Decision of the Court
    other members (the “July 1 Letter”), urging rejection of the proposed
    amendment.1
    ¶6             Approximately two weeks later, PEDCO filed the present
    action against UTT, alleging that UTT had intentionally interfered with
    PEDCO’s economic relations, performance of a contract, and prospective
    economic advantage; and seeking injunctive relief to stop UTT’s further
    improper acts, and a declaratory judgment that UTT was not a member of
    PEDCO. UTT moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the trial court
    granted the motion. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A final judgment to this effect
    was entered, and PEDCO timely appealed.2 We have appellate jurisdiction
    pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).3
    ANALYSIS
    ¶7           On appeal, PEDCO contends the trial court erred in not
    converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment since it
    considered material extraneous to PEDCO’s pleading, and in granting the
    motion to dismiss.4
    1      For the balance of this decision, we refer to the June 16 and July 1
    Letters collectively as “the Letters.”
    2      PEDCO originally appealed from an unsigned minute entry. We
    stayed the appeal to allow PEDCO to obtain a final signed judgment below;
    after such a judgment was entered, we reinstated the appeal.
    3      We cite to a statute’s current version absent material revisions since
    the relevant date.
    4      In its briefing to this court, PEDCO has failed to include any citation
    to the record on appeal. An appellant must cite to the record in the
    statement of facts or in the argument section of the opening brief. ARCAP
    13(a)(4) & 13(a)(7). Failure to do so may constitute waiver of the issues
    raised in the brief. Delmastro & Eells v. Taco Bell Corp., 
    228 Ariz. 134
    , 137 n.2,
    ¶ 7, 
    263 P.3d 683
    , 686 n.2 (App. 2011). In the exercise of our discretion,
    however, we will consider the merits of PEDCO’s arguments. See 
    id.
    (stating the appellate court may entertain deficient briefs on merits).
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    PEDCO v. UNDER THE TENT
    Decision of the Court
    I.     Converting to Motion for Summary Judgment
    ¶8             We review the court’s decision whether to convert a Rule
    12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment for abuse of discretion.
    Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, LLC, 
    224 Ariz. 60
    , 61–
    62, ¶ 1, 
    226 P.3d 1046
    , 1047–48 (App. 2010).
    ¶9            “If ‘matters outside the pleading’ are considered, the motion
    must be treated as one for summary judgment.” Coleman v. City of Mesa,
    
    230 Ariz. 352
    , 356, ¶ 9, 
    284 P.3d 863
    , 867 (2012); accord Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
    The complaint’s exhibits, or public records regarding matters referenced in
    the complaint, are not considered to be “outside the pleadings.” Coleman,
    230 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d at 867. Similarly, documents that are not
    attached but are considered central to the complaint are not considered
    outside of the subject pleadings, nor is extraneous material that does not
    add to or subtract from the sufficiency of the pleadings. Strategic, 224 Ariz.
    at 63–64, ¶¶ 8, 14, 
    226 P.3d at
    1049–50.
    ¶10           In examining the sufficiency of the pleadings, the trial court
    appears to have considered the June 16 Letter, the July 1 Letter, and the
    operating agreements of PEDCO and the Managed Companies. PEDCO
    did not attach those documents to the complaint, but specifically referenced
    them, and based its cause of action on statements in the Letters, the alleged
    breach of those operating agreements, and the alleged increased cost for
    enforcing those agreements. These documents are therefore central to the
    complaint. And, PEDCO may not turn its decision to not attach those
    central documents as exhibits into a defense, or argue the court should not
    have considered them in determining the sufficiency of its complaint.
    ¶11           PEDCO also contends the trial court should not have
    examined the merits of the arbitration demand and its motivation for filing
    the present lawsuit. Though the court acknowledged its existence, nothing
    in the record suggests that it relied on or otherwise addressed the merits of
    the arbitration demand. And the court’s comment as to PEDCO’s
    motivation had no bearing on whether the complaint states a claim upon
    which relief can be granted; accordingly, the trial court did not err in not
    converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment.
    II.    Motion to Dismiss
    ¶12           We review a trial court’s ruling granting a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion to dismiss de novo. Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d at 866. A
    Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint fails to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In
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    PEDCO v. UNDER THE TENT
    Decision of the Court
    determining the motion, “the court must assume the truth of all of the
    complaint’s material allegations, accord the plaintiffs the benefit of all
    inferences [that] the complaint can reasonably support, and deny the
    motion unless certain that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts [that] will
    entitle them to relief upon their stated claims.” Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life
    Ins. Co., 
    154 Ariz. 502
    , 508, 
    744 P.2d 29
    , 35 (App. 1987). The court does not
    “accept as true allegations consisting of conclusions of law, inferences or
    deductions that are not necessarily implied by well-pleaded facts,
    unreasonable inferences or unsupported conclusions from such facts, or
    legal conclusions alleged as facts.” Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 
    211 Ariz. 386
    ,
    389, ¶ 4, 
    121 P.3d 1256
    , 1259 (App. 2005).
    ¶13           In count 1 of the complaint, PEDCO alleged UTT tortiously
    interfered with PEDCO’s economic relations, performance of a contract,
    and prospective economic advantage. To establish tortious interference
    with contractual relations, a plaintiff must prove: (1) existence of a valid
    contractual relationship, (2) the interferor’s knowledge of the relationship,
    (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach, (4) resultant
    damage to the party whose relations have been disrupted, and (5) that the
    defendant acted improperly. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Guerrero, 
    210 Ariz. 5
    , 10,
    ¶ 14, 
    106 P.3d 1020
    , 1025 (2005). Here, PEDCO alleged UTT wrongfully
    obtained the list of PEDCO members’ names and addresses, disseminated
    false or misleading information about PEDCO and its managers, solicited
    money from other members of PEDCO and the Managed Companies
    allegedly in violation of security laws, disrupted PEDCO’s relations with
    its members and the Managed Companies, and caused at least one of the
    members to breach the operating agreements and made the performance of
    those agreements more burdensome and expensive.
    ¶14            We do not accept legal conclusions or unreasonable
    inferences alleged in the complaint as true. Here, PEDCO failed to allege
    facts amounting to any improper act on the part of UTT. On this record,
    PEDCO did not point out any statement in the Letters or elsewhere that was
    false or misleading. And PEDCO did not allege any facts to suggest that
    UTT breached the PEDCO operating agreement or violated any law. UTT
    did not wrongfully obtain the list of members as PEDCO itself sent the list
    to UTT and, more importantly, as members themselves, the Five Members
    have a right to the list under A.R.S. § 29-607 and the terms of the operating
    agreement. See A.R.S. § 29-607(A)(1) & (B)(1) (requiring an LLC to maintain
    record of a current list of members and their mailing addresses, and to allow
    each member to inspect and copy its records). Under the same provisions
    in the statute and the operating agreement, the Five Members also have the
    right to examine financial records. See § 29-607(A)(1) & (B)(1) (requiring an
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    PEDCO v. UNDER THE TENT
    Decision of the Court
    LLC to allow its members to inspect its financial records). Moreover, asking
    other members to help cover the anticipated cost of the arbitration
    proceedings does not, as a matter of law, constitute issuance of securities,
    and was not improper. See A.R.S. § 44-1801(26) (defining security as any
    note, stock, bond, or any other similar instrument indicating such an
    interest). Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that PEDCO is not
    entitled to relief under count 1.5
    ¶15         As for count 2, PEDCO sought injunctive relief to enjoin UTT
    from committing further improper acts, such as sending letters like the June
    16 and July 1 Letters. Because the trial court correctly concluded that
    PEDCO had not asserted a cognizable claim against UTT, it correctly
    concluded that PEDCO is not entitled to relief under this count, either.
    ¶16          Lastly, as for count 3, PEDCO sought a declaratory judgment,
    declaring UTT is not a member of PEDCO. Whether UTT is a member of
    PEDCO is not a contested issue as UTT does not purport to be a member of
    PEDCO. Although the Letters bore the UTT letterhead, the Five Members
    always referred to themselves as members of PEDCO in the Letters.
    Therefore, count 3 also fails.
    ¶17        Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing
    PEDCO’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
    granted.
    III.   Attorneys’ Fees
    ¶18            UTT requests attorneys’ fees on appeal, arguing PEDCO’s
    appeal lacks substantial justification under A.R.S. § 12-349 and fails to
    comply with the appellate rules on citing the record and obtaining
    transcripts of relevant hearings.6 The statute provides:
    A. Except as otherwise provided by and not inconsistent with
    another statute, in any civil action commenced or appealed in
    a court of record in this state, the court shall assess reasonable
    attorney[s’] fees, expenses and, at the court's discretion,
    5    As we find PEDCO has failed to demonstrate any improper conduct
    by UTT, we need not further analyze other elements of Count 1.
    6       PEDCO failed to obtain the transcript of the hearing on the motion
    and to include it in the record. Although eventually having attached the
    transcript to its reply brief, PEDCO maintains the transcript is unnecessary
    for us to consider its appeal.
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    PEDCO v. UNDER THE TENT
    Decision of the Court
    double damages of not to exceed five thousand dollars
    against an attorney or party, including this state and political
    subdivisions of this state, if the attorney or party does any of
    the following:
    1. Brings or defends a claim without substantial justification.
    2. Brings or defends a claim solely or primarily for delay or
    harassment.
    3. Unreasonably expands or delays the proceeding.
    4. Engages in abuse of discovery.
    ...
    F. For the purposes of this section, “without substantial
    justification” means that the claim or defense is groundless
    and is not made in good faith.
    A.R.S. § 12-349(A) & (F).
    ¶19           As the trial court correctly observed, PEDCO filed various
    lawsuits, including the present one, to silence the Five Members. The
    appeal lacked substantial justification, and in the exercise of our discretion
    we therefore award UTT its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal,
    subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶20           The trial court’s order granting UTT’s Motion to Dismiss is
    affirmed.
    :jt
    7