State v. Urosevic ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    MILOVAN RAJKO UROSEVIC, Petitioner.
    No. CR 13-0787 PRPC
    FILED 4-21-2016
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR 2006-007094-001
    The Honorable Carolyn K. Passamonte, Commissioner
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By E. Catherine Leisch
    Counsel for Respondent
    Milovan Rajko Urosevic, Eloy
    Pro Se Petitioner
    STATE v. UROSEVIC
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
    N O R R I S, Judge:
    ¶1            Milovan Rajko Urosevic seeks review of the superior court’s
    summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant
    to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, arguing the superior court
    should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because it improperly
    sentenced him in a different case and because his trial counsel was
    ineffective. We have considered his petition for review and grant review,
    but deny relief.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            In this case (“drug possession case”), Urosevic pleaded guilty
    to possession or use of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine), a Class 4
    felony, in exchange for dismissal of two other counts and sentence
    enhancement allegations pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea
    agreement provided that he would be placed on supervised probation,
    consecutive to a four-month prison term for aggravated DUI in another case
    (“DUI case”), in which he had also entered into a plea agreement. 1
    ¶3            Accordingly, on December 20, 2010, the superior court
    suspended Urosevic’s sentence in the drug possession case and placed him
    on supervised probation for three years to begin upon discharge from
    prison in the DUI case and concurrent to a term of probation for a separate
    aggravated domestic violence conviction. 2 The superior court, however,
    imposed a 2.5-year prison term in the DUI case rather than the four-month
    1Maricopa County Superior Court Cause No. CR 2005-123523-
    001.
    2Maricopa County Superior Court Cause No. CR 2005-141996-
    001.
    2
    STATE v. UROSEVIC
    Decision of the Court
    term. At sentencing, neither Urosevic nor his counsel objected to the
    sentences imposed by the superior court.
    ¶4             On December 12, 2012, Urosevic petitioned pro per for post-
    conviction relief in the drug possession case, 3 arguing the superior court
    failed to follow the terms of his plea agreement in the DUI case regarding
    the prison sentence imposed in the DUI case and thus he should be
    permitted to withdraw both guilty pleas. In response, the State argued the
    superior court should summarily dismiss the petition. Conceding that
    Urosevic had been incorrectly sentenced in the DUI case, the State argued,
    however, that this mistake did not entitle him to relief in the drug
    possession case, especially since it had agreed that he should be resentenced
    in the DUI case.
    ¶5             On May 20, 2013, while his first petition for post-conviction
    relief was still pending a decision, Urosevic filed a second notice of post-
    conviction relief/amendment to the first petition and claimed ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel based on his lawyer’s alleged failure to advise
    him that his guilty plea to possession of dangerous drugs would result in a
    deportation order. He alleged that if he had been aware of this
    consequence, he would never have agreed to plead guilty.
    ¶6             On July 8, 2013, the superior court summarily dismissed
    Urosevic’s petition for post-conviction relief, ruling that he had failed to
    state a colorable claim for relief with respect to either his erroneous sentence
    claim or his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. After the superior court
    denied his motion for reconsideration, Urosevic petitioned for review.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
    ¶7           The sentence imposed by the superior court in the DUI case
    does not provide a basis for withdrawal of the guilty plea entered in the
    drug possession case. Any relief for the sentencing error in the DUI case is
    properly obtained in that case rather than here. Indeed, the superior court
    in the DUI case has resentenced Urosevic in accordance with the terms of
    3On June 13, 2012, Urosevic’s appointed counsel in the post-
    conviction proceeding filed a notice stating that after completing her
    review, she could not find any claims for relief to raise on Urosevic’s behalf.
    The superior court thereafter granted Urosevic leave to file a pro per
    petition.
    3
    STATE v. UROSEVIC
    Decision of the Court
    the plea agreement. Thus, the sentencing error he raises here has now been
    corrected.
    ¶8            Moreover, Urosevic’s reliance on the terms of the plea
    agreements in claiming that the sentencing error in the DUI case entitles
    him to withdraw his guilty plea in this case is misplaced. Even if we accept
    the two plea agreements were part of a “global resolution,” they provided
    for withdrawal only if the superior court rejected the plea agreements. See
    Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.4(e); State v. Hawkins, 
    134 Ariz. 403
    , 405, 
    656 P.2d 1264
    ,
    1266 (App. 1982) (“Where a plea agreement or a provision of the agreement
    is rejected by the trial court, it is obliged to give the defendant an
    opportunity to withdraw the plea.”) Here, the superior court did not reject
    the plea agreements or any of their terms. The superior court simply made
    a mistake as to the sentence permitted under the plea agreement in the DUI
    case. Thus, we cannot say the superior court abused its discretion in
    denying Urosevic’s request that he be allowed to withdraw from his plea
    agreement in the drug possession case. State v. Schrock, 
    149 Ariz. 433
    , 441,
    
    719 P.2d 1049
    , 1057 (1986) (superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-
    conviction relief reviewed for abuse of discretion).
    II.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    ¶9           Urosevic is not entitled to relief for ineffective assistance of
    counsel, even if we were to accept his unsworn allegations as true.
    ¶10            A counsel’s failure to inform a client whether the guilty plea
    carries a risk of deportation constitutes deficient performance under
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984).
    Padilla v. Kentucky, 
    559 U.S. 356
    , 374, 
    130 S. Ct. 1473
    , 1486-87, 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 284
     (2010). To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    however, a defendant must show both deficient performance and
    prejudice. Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 687
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 2064
    ; State v. Nash, 
    143 Ariz. 392
    , 397, 
    694 P.2d 222
    , 227 (1985). If a defendant fails to make a
    sufficient showing on either prong of the Strickland test, the court need not
    determine whether the other prong was satisfied. State v. Salazar, 
    146 Ariz. 540
    , 541, 
    707 P.2d 944
    , 945 (1985).
    ¶11            Here, regardless of whether his lawyer informed him about
    the risk of deportation, before accepting his guilty plea, the superior court
    specifically informed Urosevic at the sentencing hearing that admitting
    guilt could result in his deportation or removal. See State v. Lemieux, 
    137 Ariz. 143
    , 146, 
    699 P.2d 121
    , 124 (App. 1983) (court views allegations in
    petition in light of the entire record to determine if a claim is colorable).
    4
    STATE v. UROSEVIC
    Decision of the Court
    And, Urosevic told the superior court he understood the risk and was
    “ready to proceed [] anyway.” Accordingly, Urosevic cannot satisfy the
    prejudice prong for establishing a colorable claim of ineffective assistance
    of counsel.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12          For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.
    :ama
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 13-0787-PRPC

Filed Date: 4/21/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021