Bonna D. v. Chelsea M., P.D. ( 2022 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    BONNA D., Appellant,
    v.
    CHELSEA M., P.D., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 22-0079
    FILED 8-30-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JS519713
    The Honorable Cynthia L. Gialketsis, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Janet S. Story, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
    By Janet S. Story
    Co-Counsel for Appellant
    De La Ossa and Ramos, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Edwin Ramos
    Co-Counsel for Appellant
    Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley
    By Steven Czop
    Counsel for Appellee Chelsea M.
    BONNA D. v. CHELSEA M., P.D.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding
    Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
    S W A N N, Judge:
    ¶1            Bonna D. (“Grandmother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s
    order denying her petition to terminate Chelsea M.’s (“Mother’s”) parental
    rights to P.D. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2          P.D. was born to Mother and Todd D. (“Father”) in December
    2009. In June 2012, Grandmother took temporary custody of P.D. after
    Mother and Father were served an eviction notice and their electricity was
    shut off. Mother and Father consented for Grandmother to be P.D.’s
    permanent guardian in 2013. In May 2018, Grandmother and P.D. moved
    to Arizona while Mother remained in Ohio.
    ¶3           During P.D.’s permanent guardianship, Mother did not
    provide any financial support, went long periods of time without
    contacting P.D. and failed to send P.D. cards, gifts, or letters, aside from one
    gift in December 2021.
    ¶4            In September 2020, Grandmother petitioned to terminate
    Mother and Father’s parental rights to P.D. As to Mother, the petition
    alleged that she abandoned P.D. pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and that
    termination of Mother’s parental rights was in P.D.’s best interests. Father
    consented to termination.1 After a hearing, the court denied the petition,
    leaving the permanent guardianship intact. Although the court found that
    Grandmother proved by clear and convincing evidence Mother had
    abandoned P.D., the court found termination was not in P.D.’s best
    interests.
    ¶5            Grandmother appeals.
    1      Father died shortly after he consented to termination.
    2
    BONNA D. v. CHELSEA M., P.D.
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6              Parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of
    their children. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 284, ¶ 24 (2005). But these
    rights are not absolute, and the court may terminate parental rights if it
    finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for
    termination, and finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
    is in the best interests of the child. A.R.S. §§ 8–533(B), –537(B); Kent K., 
    210 Ariz. at
    281–82, 288, ¶¶ 7, 41.
    ¶7            On appeal, Grandmother challenges the court’s finding that
    termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in P.D.’s best interests. We
    review the court’s decision on a petition to terminate parental rights for an
    abuse of discretion. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47,
    ¶ 8 (App. 2004). Because the juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh
    the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
    resolve disputed facts,” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 
    209 Ariz. 332
    ,
    334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004), we will affirm the court’s decision unless there is no
    reasonable evidence to support it. Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 
    230 Ariz. 96
    , 100,
    ¶ 11 (App. 2012).
    ¶8             The court considers the totality of the circumstances when
    conducting the best-interests inquiry. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    245 Ariz. 146
    , 150, ¶ 1 (2018). The court balances the parent’s interests against
    the child’s interests, but the child’s best interests are paramount. Timothy
    B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    252 Ariz. 470
    , 478, ¶¶ 30–31 (2022). The court’s
    “primary concern in the best-interests inquiry is the ‘child’s interest in
    stability and security.’” Id. at ¶ 31 (quotation omitted). Termination of
    parental rights is in the child’s best interests if the child would benefit from
    the termination or would be harmed if the relationship continued. Alma S.,
    245 Ariz. at 150–51, ¶ 13.
    ¶9             Factors that weigh in favor of whether termination is in the
    child’s best interests include whether: 1) an adoptive placement is
    immediately available, 2) the existing placement is meeting the needs of the
    child, and 3) the child is adoptable. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 
    239 Ariz. 1
    ,
    3–4, ¶ 12 (2016). Adoptability alone, however, does not automatically mean
    termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 4, ¶ 14.
    ¶10           Grandmother contends that she met her burden of proving
    termination of Mother’s parental rights was in P.D.’s best interests because
    P.D. is adoptable. The court heard testimony that Grandmother sought to
    terminate Mother’s parental rights because she was interested in and
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    BONNA D. v. CHELSEA M., P.D.
    Decision of the Court
    immediately available to adopt P.D., and P.D. wanted Grandmother to
    adopt him. Grandmother also wanted to ensure P.D. went to her daughter
    and son-in-law, if she became unable to care for him, rather than to Mother.
    Grandmother testified that P.D.’s life was stable, and the social study
    specialist opined that Grandmother was meeting P.D.’s needs.
    Grandmother also testified that she would continue to allow Mother to
    have contact with P.D. if her parental rights were terminated. Mother
    testified that her relationship with P.D. was estranged and she had
    difficulty working with Grandmother to schedule visitation.
    ¶11           Mother, Grandmother, the social study specialist, and P.D. all
    agreed that P.D. would benefit from continuing his relationship with
    Mother. The court found that P.D. would benefit from a continued
    relationship with Mother but was concerned that Grandmother would not
    continue the relationship if it terminated Mother’s parental rights. The
    court did not err in determining that the adoptability of P.D. was not
    dispositive in denying Grandmother’s petition.
    ¶12            Grandmother next argues that the court’s denial of her
    petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights could harm P.D. According
    to Grandmother, she wanted to adopt P.D. because he expressed fears that
    Mother could take him from Grandmother’s care at any time. Mother
    testified that she was not going to remove P.D. from Grandmother’s care,
    she just wanted to foster a relationship with him. Although Mother filed a
    motion to modify child custody in 2017 when Grandmother sought to move
    P.D. from Ohio to Arizona, Mother voluntarily dismissed her petition
    because she was unable to afford her attorney. Mother has not otherwise
    interfered with P.D.’s permanent guardianship. The court acted within its
    discretion in finding that continuing P.D.’s relationship with Mother did
    not present a threat to his stability and security.
    ¶13             Grandmother asks us to reweigh the evidence on appeal
    because the court credited Mother’s testimony that she would not remove
    P.D. from Grandmother’s care, but rejected evidence that Grandmother
    would allow P.D. to continue his relationship with Mother after
    termination. The juvenile court was in the best position to assess the
    credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence, and we will not disturb
    its findings on appeal. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 336, ¶ 14 (“We are mindful that
    our function on review is not to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile
    court or supersede its assessment of the evidence with our own.”).
    ¶14           Grandmother contends that because Mother provided
    conflicting evidence on the types of drugs she used in the past, she was not
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    BONNA D. v. CHELSEA M., P.D.
    Decision of the Court
    credible and could harm P.D. by exposing him to drugs. But Mother
    testified that she had been sober since December 2015, apart from marijuana
    use eight months prior to the termination hearing. The court acted within
    its discretion in crediting that testimony and finding that P.D. would not be
    harmed by a continuation of his relationship with Mother.
    ¶15            Finally, Grandmother argues that Mother has not made
    sufficient efforts to repair her relationship with P.D. during his permanent
    guardianship; therefore, termination was in his best interests. See Maricopa
    Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 
    177 Ariz. 571
    , 577–78 (App. 1994). Although
    the court found that Mother’s minimal efforts to support and contact P.D.
    constituted abandonment, see A.R.S. §§ 8-531(A)(1), -533(B)(1), it found that
    P.D. would benefit from continuing his relationship with Mother. The court
    cannot “assume that a child will benefit from a termination simply because
    he has been abandoned.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 14. We discern no
    abuse of discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16            The record contains reasonable evidence to support the
    court’s decision that termination of Mother’s parental rights was not in
    P.D.’s best interests. We affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5