Gavaldon v. Gavaldon ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    SANDRA R. GAVALDON, Petitioner/Appellee,
    v.
    JOSE G. GAVALDON, JR., Respondent/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 22-0302 FC
    FILED 11-8-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-090133
    The Honorable David E. McDowell, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Popp Law Firm, P.L.C., Tempe
    By James S. Osborn Popp
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
    Raymond S. Dietrich, PLC, Phoenix
    By Raymond S. Dietrich
    Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
    GAVALDON v. GAVALDON
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    C R U Z, Judge:
    ¶1            Jose G. Gavaldon, Jr. (“Husband”) appeals the superior
    court’s post-dissolution order in favor of Sandra R. Gavaldon (“Wife”) that
    Husband’s undisclosed defined contribution savings plan be divided via a
    qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”). For the following reasons,
    we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             Husband and Wife divorced in 2012. In 2020, Wife petitioned
    for entry of a QDRO against Husband’s Arizona Pipe Trades Pension Trust
    Fund pension plan. The superior court ruled in favor of Wife and in early
    2021 entered a QDRO against the pension plan.
    ¶3           Later that year, Wife contacted the administrator of the
    pension plan about the QDRO and discovered that Husband also had an
    Arizona Pipe Trades Defined Contribution savings plan (“savings plan”)
    that she had been unaware of. Wife petitioned for division of the savings
    plan as an omitted asset.
    ¶4             The superior court held an evidentiary hearing. The court
    found Husband’s testimony that he had disclosed the savings plan to Wife
    unpersuasive, found that the savings plan was an omitted asset, and
    awarded Wife one-half of the community’s interest in the savings plan. The
    court ordered the savings plan to be divided by a QDRO. It awarded Wife
    attorneys’ fees and costs based on disparity of financial resources and the
    unreasonableness of Husband’s position in the litigation. See Ariz. Rev.
    Stat. (“A.R.S.”) section 25-324. Husband appealed, and after entry of a final
    judgment, we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5           Husband argues the savings plan was not an omitted asset
    under A.R.S. § 25-318(D) because the 2012 divorce decree awarded the plan
    2
    GAVALDON v. GAVALDON
    Decision of the Court
    to Husband. Husband argues the savings plan was his sole and separate
    property because of a catchall clause in the decree, which provided:
    Each party shall retain as his or her sole and separate property
    any disclosed savings, checking or other financial account
    held in that party’s name.
    (Emphasis added.) The decree contained no express reference to the
    savings plan. Nor was the savings plan mentioned in the superior court’s
    pre-decree minute entry ruling, wherein the court ordered Husband’s
    pension plan to be divided by a QDRO.
    ¶6            We review the superior court’s interpretation of a dissolution
    decree de novo. Cohen v. Frey, 
    215 Ariz. 62
    , 66, ¶ 10 (App. 2007). We review
    the superior court’s factual findings for clear error. Ahwatukee Custom Ests.
    Mgmt. Ass’n v. Turner, 
    196 Ariz. 631
    , 634, ¶ 5 (App. 2000). The
    determination of witness credibility and the resolution of conflicting
    evidence are functions of the superior court. Lee v. Lee, 
    133 Ariz. 118
    , 123
    (App. 1982).
    ¶7            The superior court may divide an asset omitted from a decree
    of dissolution under A.R.S. § 25-318(D), which provides:
    The community, joint tenancy and other property held in
    common for which no provision is made in the decree shall
    be from the date of the decree held by the parties as tenants in
    common, each possessed of an undivided one-half interest.
    ¶8            Here, the superior court found that the savings plan was
    omitted from the decree, and even if it was a “financial account” that could
    be subject to the catchall provision, that provision did not apply because
    the savings plan had not been disclosed to Wife. In making its
    determination, the court accepted Wife’s testimony that Husband did not
    disclose the savings plan and rejected Husband’s testimony that he did so.
    We will not reweigh the conflicting evidence, and we defer to the superior
    court’s credibility determination. See Hurd v. Hurd, 
    223 Ariz. 48
    , 52, ¶ 16
    (App. 2009). We find no error in the superior court’s determination that the
    savings plan was an omitted asset subject to post-decree division.
    ¶9             Husband argues the decree was unmodifiable because under
    A.R.S. § 25-327(A), “[t]he provisions as to property disposition may not be
    revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that
    justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of [Arizona].” Husband
    suggests that because the superior court did not find “evidence of fraud,
    3
    GAVALDON v. GAVALDON
    Decision of the Court
    misrepresentation, or misconduct,” or “mistake or newly discovered
    evidence,” the decree was unmodifiable. See Arizona Rule of Family Law
    Procedure (“ARFLP”) 85(b). We disagree. Under ARFLP 85(b)(6), the
    superior court may grant relief from final judgment for “any other reason
    justifying relief.” And, as noted above, A.R.S. § 25-318(D) allows the
    superior court to divide an asset omitted from a decree of dissolution. We
    find no error.
    ¶10           Husband acknowledges that “A.R.S. § 25-318(D) does not
    mandate a standard of proof,” but nevertheless argues the superior court
    erred by applying a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof rather
    than a preponderance of the evidence standard, noting “the superior court
    required documentary evidence to prove disclosure of the annuity.” Even
    if Husband did not waive this argument by failing to raise it in the superior
    court, the record does not reflect that the superior court applied a higher
    standard of proof or required documentary proof of disclosure. The
    superior court properly reviewed the record for evidence of disclosure of
    the savings plan and noted there was none other than Husband’s testimony,
    which the court found “unpersuasive.” We find no error.
    ¶11           Finally, Husband argues Wife’s petition for division of the
    savings plan is barred by laches. The superior court noted in its order that
    Husband “cites no . . . equitable limitations arguments against division of
    [the savings plan],” and “makes no argument that he has been prejudiced
    by the late division of this omitted asset.” The record supports this
    determination. Accordingly, Husband has waived his laches argument on
    appeal. See Regal Homes, Inc. v. CNA Ins., 
    217 Ariz. 159
    , 171, ¶ 52 (App.
    2007).
    ¶12           Wife requests attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. We
    have considered the relative financial resources of the parties and the
    reasonableness of the positions asserted on appeal. In the exercise of our
    discretion, we grant Wife reasonable attorneys’ fees in addition to her costs
    on appeal, upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
    4
    GAVALDON v. GAVALDON
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0302-FC

Filed Date: 11/8/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2022