State v. Estevez ( 2020 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    MARTIN QUEZADA ESTEVEZ, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 19-0037
    FILED 2-13-2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
    No. S1400CR200801584
    The Honorable Brandon S. Kinsey, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Terry M. Crist
    Counsel for Appellee
    Yuma County Public Defender’s Office, Yuma
    By Eugene Marquez
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. ESTEVEZ
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.
    H O W E, Judge:
    ¶1             Martin Estevez appeals his conviction of second-degree
    murder and the trial court’s award of extradition costs to the Yuma County
    Sheriff’s Office. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In 2004, Estevez was living with his girlfriend C.G., and his
    two children, K.E., then 6, and M.E., then 3. C.G. also had a third child, J.M.,
    then 13, who lived with them. One afternoon in February 2004, while the
    children were with a sitter, Estevez was at his neighbor’s house when he
    saw C.G. return home from work. Estevez went home, took C.G.’s phone
    and then returned to his neighbor’s house. C.G. followed him to the
    neighbor’s and threatened to call the police if Estevez did not give her back
    the phone. She then took her phone from Estevez and returned home.
    Estevez followed her. In the meantime, the sitter had left with all three
    children to take J.M. to her soccer game.
    ¶3             When the sitter returned with K.E and M.E, Estevez met them
    at the front door and asked the sitter to take the children to the neighbor’s
    house. Before the sitter could do so, K.E. slipped inside the door and saw
    C.G. lying on the back patio with blood on the side of her mouth. Estevez
    told K.E. that C.G. must have hurt herself in the bathroom. He then brought
    K.E. back to the front of the house, and the sitter took the children to the
    neighbor’s house. K.E. told the sitter about seeing C.G.’s body, then,
    accompanied by the neighbor, they went to pick up J.M. from soccer.
    ¶4           After the sitter brought J.M. back to the neighbor’s house, J.M.
    went home to look for C.G., but no one was home. J.M. found C.G.’s wallet
    and keys, which J.M. later told police she always carried with her. J.M.
    called Estevez, who said that he was out buying beer and claimed that he
    did not know where C.G. was. After 45 minutes, J.M. called Estevez again,
    and Estevez said that he was almost home. Estevez did not arrive, however,
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    STATE v. ESTEVEZ
    Decision of the Court
    for another 30 minutes. Once he returned home, Estevez called the police
    after J.M. told him that if he did not do so, she would.
    ¶5             When police arrived, Estevez said C.G. had left after an
    argument over her cell phone. Police brought in a cadaver dog, which
    alerted on Estevez’s truck. When police interviewed Estevez again, he
    admitted that he had lied when he told K.E. that C.G. had hurt herself in
    the bathroom and admitted that K.E. was telling the truth when she said
    she had seen C.G.’s body on the patio. When asked if he was being truthful
    about having nothing to do with C.G.’s disappearance, Estevez shook his
    head no, but said he was being truthful. Estevez was not charged with any
    crime at that time. Two months later, Estevez sold the house and moved to
    Mexico. C.G.’s body was found more than a year later on a farm in Dome
    Valley; she was wearing blue jeans and a red shirt, the same clothes the
    children last saw her wearing.
    ¶6            Police contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (“ICE”), which sent a summons to Verizon seeking Estevez’s cell phone
    subscriber information. Police also issued a separate grand jury subpoena
    to Verizon seeking the same information, as well as Estevez’s historical Cell
    Site Location Information (“CSLI”). After Verizon produced only limited
    information about the account, police obtained and served a court order
    directing Verizon to produce the CSLI. The CSLI information that Verizon
    provided showed that after Estevez left the house the night C.G.
    disappeared, his phone was used in Dome Valley, where C.G.’s body was
    later found. In December 2008, a grand jury returned a second-degree
    murder indictment for Estevez. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and he
    was extradited to Yuma County from San Diego.
    ¶7             Before trial, Estevez moved to suppress the CSLI, arguing the
    CSLI was obtained without a warrant and in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (d).
    The trial court summarily denied the motion without taking evidence. After
    an eight-day trial, the jury found Estevez guilty of second-degree murder
    and found emotional harm to C.G. and her three children as aggravating
    factors. The trial court sentenced Estevez to an aggravated term of 22 years’
    imprisonment with 297 days’ presentence incarceration credit. The trial
    court also ordered Estevez to pay $2,000 in restitution to the Yuma County
    Attorney’s Office and imposed a $414.08 fine to reimburse the Yuma
    County Sheriff’s Office for its extradition costs. Estevez timely appealed.
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    STATE v. ESTEVEZ
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8             Estevez argues that the trial court abused its discretion when
    it denied his motion to suppress the CSLI based on the “good faith
    exception” to the Exclusionary Rule. We review the denial of a motion to
    suppress for an abuse of discretion and “view the facts in the light most
    favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling.” State v. Cornman, 
    237 Ariz. 350
    , 354 ¶ 10 (App. 2015). When no evidentiary suppression hearing is held,
    we draw our facts from the uncontested material appended to the
    suppression motion as well as the evidence presented at trial. State v.
    Navarro, 
    241 Ariz. 19
    , 20 ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2016).
    ¶9           When the evidence involves a search or seizure, the State’s
    burden of proving the lawfulness of its acquisition of evidence arises when
    “the defendant alleges specific circumstances and establishes a prima facie
    case supporting the suppression of the evidence at issue.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
    16.2(b). A defendant meets this burden by making allegations that, if
    proved, would entitle him to suppression. State v. Peterson, 
    228 Ariz. 405
    ,
    408 ¶ 9 (App. 2011).
    ¶10            Estevez failed to meet his burden. In his suppression motion,
    Estevez argued that the CSLI was obtained without a warrant and in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (d). In 2004, a request for CSLI was not
    considered a search subject to the Fourth Amendment and therefore was
    not subject to a warrant requirement; the warrant requirement did not arise
    until recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 2018. See Carpenter
    v. U.S., 
    138 S.Ct. 2206
    , 2220 (2018). When the CSLI records here were
    obtained, 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (c)(1)(A)–(B) permitted a governmental entity to
    compel a cell phone provider to disclose information pertaining to a
    subscriber by serving either a warrant or a court order. Here, the State
    complied with the statute when it served a court order on Verizon for the
    information.
    ¶11            In his suppression motion, Estevez argued that the summons
    ICE sent to Verizon did not satisfy 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (d). However, he never
    asserted that the court order directing Verizon to comply with the subpoena
    by turning over Estevez’s CSLI information violated 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (d).
    Further, even if the court order did not satisfy 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (d), the
    suppression of evidence was not an available remedy. U.S. v. Smith, 
    155 F.3d 1051
    , 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
    18 U.S.C. § 2708
    , entitled
    “Exclusivity of Remedies,” expressly rules out exclusion as a remedy).
    Thus, Estevez was not entitled to suppression of the CSLI even if he proved
    the CSLI was obtained in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (d).
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    STATE v. ESTEVEZ
    Decision of the Court
    ¶12          Estevez argues on appeal that the CSLI records were not
    obtained in good faith because law enforcement caused ICE to issue the
    summons to Verizon under false pretenses. Verizon did not produce the
    CSLI pursuant to the ICE summons but produced it pursuant to a court
    order, which Estevez never challenged in the trial court and does not
    challenge on appeal.
    ¶13           Estevez further argues that the State never met its burden of
    establishing that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement
    applied. Reliance on binding precedent, however, is a per se application of
    the good faith exception. Davis v. U.S., 
    564 U.S. 229
    , 231 (2011). When the
    CSLI was obtained from Verizon, binding precedent held that the Fourth
    Amendment did not prohibit the State from obtaining information that the
    suspect of an investigation has revealed to a third party. See U.S. v. Miller,
    
    425 U.S. 435
    , 443 (1976). Because Estevez’s CSLI was revealed to Verizon,
    which then conveyed the information to the State pursuant to a court order,
    the State established that the good faith exception applied.
    ¶14           Additionally, 
    18 U.S.C. § 2703
    (c)(1)(B) allowed the State to
    obtain the CSLI records with a court order, rather than a warrant, which
    Estevez did not challenge with the trial court. In sum, Estevez simply did
    not make allegations in his motion to suppress that, if true, would have
    entitled him to suppression of the CSLI. See Peterson, 228 Ariz. at 408 ¶ 9.
    Therefore, the trial court properly denied Estevez’s motion to suppress. 1
    ¶15           Estevez also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
    award the Yuma County Sheriff’s Office its extradition costs. This Court
    reviews issues of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Flores, 
    218 Ariz. 407
    , 410 ¶ 6 (App. 2008). Contrary to Estevez’s argument, the trial
    court had jurisdiction to award extradition costs. “On conviction of the
    crime that caused a person to be extradited to this state, the state or political
    subdivision . . . may recover from the convicted person the actual expenses
    incurred by the extraditing agency.” A.R.S. § 13–3870.02. Estevez was
    extradited to Yuma County from San Diego to stand trial. After he was
    1     Estevez also argues that the State sought to expand the record on
    appeal with items not in evidence. This Court, however, granted the State’s
    request to expand the record and the court order requiring Verizon to
    produce the CSLI was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 56.
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    STATE v. ESTEVEZ
    Decision of the Court
    convicted, the Yuma County Sheriff’s Office was thus entitled to recover
    the costs of extraditing him. See § 13–3870.02.
    ¶16            Estevez relies on State v. Gelden, 
    126 Ariz. 232
     (App. 1980), for
    the proposition that a trial court has no jurisdiction to order the recovery of
    costs for extraditing a defendant. Gelden, however, no longer controls
    whether a trial court may impose the costs of extradition as part of a
    sentence; it has been superseded by A.R.S. § 13–3870.02. See State v. Maupin,
    
    166 Ariz. 250
    , 251 (App. 1990). As a result, the trial court properly awarded
    the Yuma County Sheriff’s Office its extradition costs.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6