State v. Williamson ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    PAUL CURTIS WILLIAMSON, JR., Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 19-0421
    FILED 8-4-2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR 2017-143919-001
    The Honorable Annielaurie Van Wie, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By, Joseph T. Maziarz, Michael T. O’Toole, Alice M. Jones
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Cory Engle
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. WILLIAMSON
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge David B. Gass and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
    P E R K I N S, Judge:
    ¶1           Paul Curtis Williamson, Jr. appeals his conviction for
    possession of drug paraphernalia. For the following reasons, we affirm as
    modified.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Mid-morning in late March 2017, a Mesa law enforcement
    officer knocked on a hotel room door attempting to serve an arrest warrant.
    A woman—not the subject of the warrant—answered the door. From the
    doorway, the officer saw a long counter to the left with a bag containing a
    white crystalline substance. He also saw Williamson asleep on a bed to the
    right.
    ¶3             The woman who answered the door invited the officer into
    the hotel room and claimed she was only there visiting a friend. The officer
    then identified a straw and a glass pipe located near the bag of the
    crystalline substance. The officer woke Williamson and questioned him.
    Williamson said that the bag of the crystalline substance and the straw was
    his for ingesting methamphetamine, and a forensic scientist later confirmed
    the substance was methamphetamine. Williamson claimed that the glass
    pipe belonged to a friend who used it to ingest methamphetamine, though
    he did not identify that friend. Williamson also stated that a friend had
    registered for him to use the room. Police then arrested Williamson.
    ¶4           The State charged Williamson with one count of possession of
    dangerous drugs and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia (one
    count for possession of the straw and another count for the pipe). At the
    close of evidence, Williamson moved for judgment of acquittal under
    Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, which the court denied. A jury
    found Williamson guilty on all three counts.
    ¶5          Williamson timely appealed his conviction of possession of
    drug paraphernalia pertaining to the pipe.
    2
    STATE v. WILLIAMSON
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6           Williamson argues the trial court erred in denying his Rule 20
    motion for acquittal because it lacked sufficient evidence at trial that he
    possessed the pipe. We review sufficiency of evidence for a Rule 20 motion
    for judgment of acquittal de novo. State v. West, 
    226 Ariz. 559
    , 562, ¶ 15
    (2011).
    ¶7               “[T]he court must enter a judgment of acquittal on any offense
    charged . . . if there is no substantial evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz.
    R. Crim. P. 20(a). “Substantial evidence . . . is such proof that reasonable
    persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16
    (quoting State v. Mathers, 
    165 Ariz. 64
    , 67 (1990)). “[T]he relevant question
    is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Mathers, 
    165 Ariz. at 66
    ). “Both direct and circumstantial evidence should be considered”
    to determine whether substantial evidence supports a conviction when
    reviewing a ruling on a Rule 20 motion. 
    Id.
    ¶8             Williamson claims insufficient evidence showed that he
    possessed, with intent to use, the glass pipe. See A.R.S. § 13-3415(A). In
    support, Williamson says that he did not use the pipe and it belonged to a
    friend. To “possess” is to “knowingly . . . exercise dominion or control over
    property.” A.R.S. § 13-105(34). “Possession may be actual or constructive.”
    State v. Gonsalves, 
    231 Ariz. 521
    , 523, ¶ 9 (App. 2013). Constructive
    possession means the possessor either exercised dominion and control over
    the object or the “location in which the substance was found.” State v. Teagle,
    
    217 Ariz. 17
    , 27, ¶ 41 (App. 2007). Constructive possession need not be
    exclusive. Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 9.
    ¶9             In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable toward
    affirming the conviction, West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 15, a reasonable fact finder
    could determine Williamson guilty of possession of the pipe. We reject
    Williamson’s suggestion that he did not possess the pipe because it
    belonged to his friend. Williamson occupied the hotel room when the
    officer found him. While Williamson did not register the room in his name,
    he admitted that someone else registered the room for his use. Given that
    the officer found the pipe in the hotel room, a reasonable fact finder could
    have concluded that Williamson constructively possessed the pipe through
    his dominion and control over the room.
    3
    STATE v. WILLIAMSON
    Decision of the Court
    ¶10            Williamson also claims that he did not use the pipe and
    therefore should not have been convicted of possession of the pipe. But
    Williamson need not have used the pipe to have possessed the pipe for a
    conviction under A.R.S. § 13-3415(A). State v. Gill, 
    248 Ariz. 274
    , 278, ¶ 11
    (App. 2020) (upholding a conviction for possession with intent to use a
    measuring scale). Williamson’s knowledge of the pipe’s existence and use
    combined with his constructive control of the room was sufficient evidence
    for the jury to find him guilty of possession with intent to use the pipe. See
    A.R.S. § 13-3415(A); Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 27, ¶ 41.
    ¶11             The State charged Williamson separately for both the pipe
    and the straw. In State v. Soza, we held “that the act of possessing drug
    paraphernalia best reflects the unit of prosecution under A.R.S. § 13-
    3415(A) . . . .” 
    249 Ariz. 13
    , 18, ¶ 23 (App. 2020). We invited supplemental
    briefing on the application of Soza to this case, but the State did not timely
    file a supplemental brief. After the deadline, the State filed a notice of
    concession of error in lieu of a supplemental brief, which we now accept.
    Under Soza, the State may not charge an individual with separate counts of
    possession of drug paraphernalia for simultaneously possessed objects. 
    Id.
    This ruling applies retroactively. State v. Slemmer, 
    170 Ariz. 174
    , 181–82
    (1991) (Arizona applies federal retroactivity jurisprudence); Schriro v.
    Summerlin, 
    542 U.S. 348
    , 351 (2004) (applying a “new rule” interpreting a
    criminal statute retroactively). Williamson’s two paraphernalia convictions
    arose from his possession of both a pipe and a straw, but Williamson only
    committed one “act” of possession, by possessing both objects at the same
    time. Under Soza, Williamson cannot be convicted on two separate counts
    for the straw and pipe. The appropriate remedy for a duplicative sentence
    is merger. Merlina v. Jejna, 
    208 Ariz. 1
    , 4, ¶ 14 n.4 (App. 2004). Accordingly,
    we vacate Williamson’s conviction on count three for possession of drug
    paraphernalia and merge that sentence into count two to reflect a single
    sentence.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12          The evidence at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to
    find Williamson guilty of one count of possession of dangerous drugs and
    one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm Williamson’s
    convictions on count one and two, but vacate his conviction on count three
    4
    STATE v. WILLIAMSON
    Decision of the Court
    ¶13   and merge the two sentences into one.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 19-0421

Filed Date: 8/4/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/4/2020