Razdan v. Razdan ( 2017 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    ANSHUMAN RAZDAN, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
    v.
    GINA M. RAZDAN, Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 16-0004 FC
    FILED 4-6-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-094268
    The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge
    The Honorable Bethany G. Hicks, Retired Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Ober & Pekas, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Kevin Koelbel
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
    The Murray Law Offices, Scottsdale
    By Stanley D. Murray
    Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
    Jole E. Milburn, PLLC, Mesa
    By Jole E. Milburn
    Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
    J O N E S, Judge:
    ¶1            Gina Razdan (Wife) appeals the family court’s order denying
    her motion for relief from judgment and her request for an award of
    attorneys’ fees. Anshuman Razdan (Husband) cross-appeals the court’s
    order granting Wife’s petition to enforce the consent decree. For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           Husband petitioned for dissolution of his marriage to Wife in
    September 2011. Thereafter, Wife petitioned for temporary orders seeking,
    among other things, the exclusive possession of the marital residence (the
    1st Street Home). At an evidentiary hearing in February 2012, the parties
    agreed to grant exclusive use of the 1st Street Home to Wife, subject to her
    paying the mortgage, property taxes, insurance, homeowners’ association
    fees, and other financial obligations continuing to accrue thereon. The
    family court entered formal temporary orders consistent with the parties’
    agreement two months later.
    ¶3           In March 2012 and January 2013, Husband filed petitions for
    contempt, both alleging Wife had failed to pay the mortgage and related
    expenses on the 1st Street Home, thereby requiring Husband to cover those
    expenses in contravention of the parties’ stipulation and the family court’s
    temporary orders. The court denied Husband’s request for a hearing to
    address the petitions and advised that any violation of the temporary
    orders would be addressed at the dissolution hearing.
    ¶4           In March 2013, the parties submitted an Arizona Rule of
    Family Law Procedure (ARFLP) 69 agreement (the Agreement) that
    “vacate[d] any contempt petitions, custody evaluation[s], or any other
    1      We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the family
    court’s ruling. Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 
    216 Ariz. 521
    , 522 n.1, ¶ 1 (App.
    2007) (citing Kohler v. Kohler, 
    211 Ariz. 106
    , 107, ¶ 2 (App. 2005)).
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    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    items currently in front of the court.” Under the Agreement, Husband was
    awarded the 1st Street Home. The Agreement did not contain any
    provision requiring Wife to reimburse Husband for the expenses he had
    incurred because of her failure to maintain the payments on the 1st Street
    Home. Additionally, the Agreement required Husband to transfer $375,000
    of retirement funds to Wife.
    ¶5           In May 2013, the family court incorporated the terms of the
    Agreement into a decree of dissolution. Regarding the 1st Street Home,
    Husband became responsible for the mortgage, insurance, property taxes,
    and homeowners’ association dues “owing on the home effective April 1,
    2013.” Wife was awarded the parties’ second residence (the Hidden View
    Home) and thereby became responsible for all financial obligations
    associated with the Hidden View Home as of April 1, 2013. The parties
    were instructed to execute quitclaim deeds necessary to transfer ownership
    of the two homes.
    ¶6            In June 2013, Husband filed a third petition for contempt
    alleging Wife had failed to maintain her financial obligations connected
    with the Hidden Valley Home in violation of the decree. Wife also moved
    to enforce the decree, alleging Husband had failed to transfer the $375,000
    in retirement funds to her. In September 2013, the parties jointly moved,
    pursuant to ARFLP 72, for a family law master to resolve their disputes.
    The family court appointed a family law master (the Special Master).
    ¶7           The Special Master submitted a report to the family court that
    concluded “Husband should be awarded . . . reimbursement for all
    expenses he paid and incurred on Wife’s behalf after entry of the
    Temporary Orders.” Because he also found “any failure to bring Wife’s
    retirement account balances to $375,000.00 . . . [wa]s directly attributable to
    her own conduct,” the Special Master recommended Husband be relieved
    of his obligation to transfer the funds “if Wife’s failure [to cooperate]
    continues beyond January 31, 2014.” In an order signed and entered by the
    clerk on March 25, 2014, the court adopted the Special Master’s
    recommendations regarding the retirement funds (the Retirement Order),
    and entered judgment in favor of Husband for $61,297.21 in expenses
    Husband paid on Wife’s behalf after entry of the temporary orders (the
    Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment).
    ¶8          Fourteen months later, in May 2015, Wife moved, pursuant to
    ARFLP 85(C), for relief from the entire March 2014 judgment. Wife argued
    the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment was void because it sought to
    enforce temporary orders that terminated when the decree was entered.
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    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    Wife also asserted Husband was obstructing the transfer of the retirement
    funds, and included this latter assertion in a separate petition to enforce the
    decree as well. The family court denied Wife’s motion for relief as to the
    Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment but scheduled an evidentiary hearing
    to decide whether either party was deliberately obstructing the transfer of
    the retirement funds.
    ¶9            At the October 2015 evidentiary hearing, Wife argued that,
    because the family court did not enter judgment on all her claims in her
    May 2015 motion for relief and did not include ARFLP 78(B) language in
    the order partially denying that motion, the issues regarding the Mortgage
    Reimbursement Judgment were preserved for the evidentiary hearing. The
    court ordered Wife to file a brief “outlining the reasons why the [Mortgage
    Reimbursement] [J]udgment should be set aside.” The court then took the
    pending petitions under advisement.
    ¶10            In its under advisement ruling, the family court found the
    March 2014 judgment was not void because “the basis for the [Mortgage
    Reimbursement] [J]udgment, even if it was based on temporary orders, was
    renewed by the parties in attempting to resolve matters post-decree.” And
    because Wife did not file her motion for relief from the March 2014
    judgment until May 2015, the court held her motion was untimely. As to
    the transfer of retirement funds, the court found the Retirement Order
    required Wife to assist with the funds transfer by January 31, 2014, a date
    which had already passed when the judgment was entered, and thereby
    created an impossible deadline for Wife to meet. The court therefore
    granted Wife’s petition to enforce and ordered that Wife had until January
    2016 to assist in the transfer of funds. Finally, even though the court found
    Husband had more financial resources than Wife, the court denied both
    parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees.
    ¶11            Wife timely appealed the family court’s denial of her motion
    for relief and request for attorneys’ fees. Husband timely cross-appealed
    the court’s order extending the deadline for Wife to comply with the
    transfer of retirement funds. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
    Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1)2 and -2101(A)(2).
    See In re Marriage of Dougall, 
    234 Ariz. 2
    , 5, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (holding an order
    denying a motion for relief is appealable as a special order after final
    judgment) (citations omitted); Merrill v. Merrill, 
    230 Ariz. 369
    , 371-72, ¶¶ 5-
    6 (App. 2012) (considering an appeal from a ruling on a petition to enforce
    2     Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s
    current version.
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    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    a dissolution decree’s allocation of retirement benefits appealable under
    A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2)).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Because the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment is Not Void for
    Lack of Jurisdiction, the Court Properly Denied Wife’s Rule 85
    Motion as Untimely.
    ¶12           Wife first argues the family court’s Mortgage Reimbursement
    Judgment is void because the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
    to enforce provisions contained in temporary orders that terminated upon
    entry of the decree. And, if the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment is void,
    Wife contends, her motion for relief from that judgment was not untimely
    and should have been granted. Although we generally review the denial
    of a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion, we review
    the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and decisions on claims of void
    judgments de novo. See Duckstein v. Wolf, 
    230 Ariz. 227
    , 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012)
    (citations omitted).
    ¶13            “[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment,
    order or proceeding [if] . . . the judgment is void.” ARFLP 85(C)(1)(d).
    There is no time limit in which to challenge a void judgment. See Ruiz v.
    Lopez, 
    225 Ariz. 217
    , 222, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (citing Martin v. Martin, 
    182 Ariz. 11
    , 14 (App. 1994)). A judgment or order is void if the court entering it
    lacked jurisdiction to render the particular judgment or order entered.
    
    Martin, 182 Ariz. at 15
    (citing In re Adoption of Hadtrath, 
    121 Ariz. 606
    , 608
    (1979)). “The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to
    enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right
    or wrong.” Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. S. Union Gas Co., 
    76 Ariz. 373
    , 381 (1954)
    (quoting Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 
    16 Ariz. 305
    , 311 (1914)).
    In other words, jurisdiction and void judgments relate to a court’s authority
    to perform or hear a certain action. See Cockerham v. Zikratch, 
    127 Ariz. 230
    ,
    234 (1980) (citing Wahl v. Round Valley Bank, 
    38 Ariz. 411
    , 417 (1931); Tube
    
    City, 16 Ariz. at 311
    ; and then Milliken v. Meyer, 
    311 U.S. 457
    , 462 (1940)).
    ¶14           In dissolution proceedings, the family court’s jurisdiction
    derives solely from statute.3 See Thomas v. Thomas, 
    220 Ariz. 290
    , 292, ¶ 8
    3      The “family court” referenced within this decision is an
    administrative designation for one department of the Arizona superior
    court. See Rinegar v. Rinegar, 
    231 Ariz. 85
    , 88, ¶ 13 (App. 2012) (noting the
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    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    (App. 2009) (citations omitted). The court is vested with subject matter
    jurisdiction over domestic relations matters, A.R.S. § 25-311(A), and
    “[u]nlike other types of court orders, . . . decrees of dissolution generally
    remain subject to the court’s continuing jurisdiction to modify” provisions
    for maintenance, support, and property disposition, In re Marriage of
    Waldren, 
    217 Ariz. 173
    , 175, ¶ 8 (2007) (citing A.R.S. §§ 25-327 and -319(D)).
    Moreover, the court exercises continuing jurisdiction to enforce divorce
    decrees through its equitable powers “to do full and complete justice
    between the parties.” Jensen v. Beirne, 
    241 Ariz. 225
    , 229, ¶ 14 (App. 2016)
    (quoting Genda v. Superior Court, 
    103 Ariz. 240
    , 244 (1968)).
    ¶15            Wife is correct that temporary orders terminate when the final
    divorce decree is entered, see A.R.S. § 25-315(F)(4); ARFLP 47(M), and
    neither the Agreement nor the decree contained any provisions allowing
    Husband to enforce any portion of the temporary orders. Husband was,
    however, entitled to initiate contempt proceedings and enforce the
    provisions for property disposition as set forth within the decree. See A.R.S.
    § 25-317(E); ARFLP 91(A)(1), (J), 92. When Husband initiated those
    proceedings to obtain reimbursement for post-decree expenses he was
    forced to incur by virtue of Wife’s breach of the consent decree, the parties
    stipulated to the appointment of the Special Master to resolve their
    conflicting claims. As a result, the family court, which retained continuing
    jurisdiction over post-decree matters, accepted the stipulation of the parties
    and appointed the Special Master, who was thereby empowered to address
    the parties’ issues by virtue of the court’s continuing jurisdiction. See
    ARFLP 72(B).
    ¶16          The Special Master proposed Husband be reimbursed for
    housing expenses incurred by him as a result of Wife’s nonpayment.
    Without question, these expenses derived both from those sums originally
    addressed in the pre-decree temporary orders concerning the 1st Street
    Home and the Hidden View Home expenses in the decree itself. The
    Special Master’s recommendation and the family court’s later adoption of
    that recommendation into the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment, which
    may or may not have improperly drawn upon previously vacated
    temporary orders, did not divest the court or the Special Master of
    continuing jurisdiction over the parties’ post-decree matters generally. The
    administrative organization of Arizona’s superior court into departments
    “does not partition the court’s general subject matter jurisdiction”) (citing
    State v. Marks, 
    186 Ariz. 139
    , 142 (App. 1996), and Marvin Johnson, P.C. v.
    Myers, 
    184 Ariz. 98
    , 100 (1995)).
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    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment was therefore not void, and the court
    properly denied Wife’s motion for relief pursuant to ARFLP 85(C)(1)(d).
    ¶17            Wife also argues the family court should have granted her
    motion for relief from the Mortgage Reimbursement Judgment under
    ARFLP 85(C)(1)(e), which permits relief from judgment where “a prior
    judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated.” A
    motion under subsection (e) “shall be filed within a reasonable time.”
    ARFLP 85(C)(2). “[W]hat constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ is dependent in
    large measure on the underlying facts presented and the absence (or
    presence) of prejudice” to the other party. Green Acres Tr. v. London, 
    142 Ariz. 12
    , 16-17 (App. 1983). We review the court’s ruling on whether a
    motion for relief was timely filed for an abuse of discretion. See Maher v.
    Urman, 
    211 Ariz. 543
    , 550, ¶ 21 (App. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Elson, 
    192 Ariz. 486
    , 488, ¶ 9 (App. 1998), and Copeland v. Ariz. Veterans Mem’l Coliseum, 
    176 Ariz. 86
    , 89 (App. 1993)).
    ¶18           Here, the Special Master first entered his findings and
    recommendations in December 2013, and, one month later, the family court
    notified the parties it was adopting those recommendations. The court then
    entered a formal, written judgment consistent with the Special Master’s
    recommendations in March 2014. At no point did Wife object to the Special
    Master’s findings; nor did she appeal, either directly or by special action,
    the resulting orders. It was not until fourteen months later, without
    explanation or justification for the delay, that Wife filed her ARFLP 85(C)
    motion. On appeal, she has again failed to provide justification for the
    delay. An unexplained delay cannot be reasonable. See Richas v. Superior
    Court, 
    133 Ariz. 512
    , 515 (1982) (“Since the delay [in filing the motion for
    relief from judgment] is not explained, there is no basis on which the court
    could exercise its discretion to find it reasonable.”) (citing Marquez v. Rapid
    Harvest Co., 
    99 Ariz. 363
    , 366 (1965)). Under these circumstances, the court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s ARFLP 85(C)(1)(e) motion as
    untimely.4
    4      Although the family court mistakenly found Wife’s motion untimely
    under ARFLP 83 and 84, we will affirm the court’s ruling if it is correct for
    any reason supported by the record. See KCI Rest. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Holm
    Wright Hyde & Hays P.L.C., 
    236 Ariz. 485
    , 488 n.2, ¶ 12 (App. 2014) (citing
    Phelps Dodge Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 
    213 Ariz. 400
    , 404 n.7, ¶ 17 (App. 2006),
    and then Dube v. Likins, 
    216 Ariz. 406
    , 417 n.3, ¶ 36 (App. 2007)).
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    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    II.    The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to
    Award Wife Attorneys’ Fees.
    ¶19           Wife next argues that, because the family court found
    Husband had greater financial resources, the court abused its discretion by
    declining to award her attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A). We
    review the court’s ruling on an attorneys’ fees request under A.R.S. § 25-
    324(A) for an abuse of discretion. Myrick v. Maloney, 
    235 Ariz. 491
    , 494, ¶ 6
    (App. 2014) (citing Mangan v. Mangan, 
    227 Ariz. 346
    , 352, ¶ 26 (App. 2011)).
    ¶20           Section 25-324(A) provides:
    The court from time to time, after considering the financial
    resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the
    positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings,
    may order a party to pay a reasonable amount to the other
    party for the costs and expenses of maintaining or defending
    any [domestic relations] proceeding.
    (Emphasis added). Thus, the family court has discretion to award or deny
    fees so long as it considers both the financial resources and reasonableness
    of the legal positions of both parties. See 
    Mangan, 227 Ariz. at 352-53
    , ¶ 27
    (citing Gerow v. Covill, 
    192 Ariz. 9
    , 19, ¶ 46 (App. 1998), and A.R.S. § 25-
    324(A)). However, “as the plain language of [A.R.S.] § 25-324(A) makes
    clear, a trial court has the discretion to deny a fee request even after
    considering both statutory factors.” 
    Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 494
    , ¶ 9 (citing
    A.R.S. § 25-324(A), and Alley v. Stevens, 
    209 Ariz. 426
    , 429, ¶ 12 (App. 2004)).
    A financial disparity between the parties “does not mandate an award of
    fees.” 
    Id. ¶21 Although
    the family court found Husband had greater
    financial resources, the court also found both parties took unreasonable
    legal positions. On this record, we cannot say the court abused its
    discretion by declining to award either party attorneys’ fees.
    III.   The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to
    Enforce the March 2014 Sanction Against Wife.
    ¶22            In his cross-appeal, Husband argues the family court abused
    its discretion by not enforcing the Retirement Order requiring Wife to assist
    Husband in transferring retirement funds to her in January 2014. We
    review a court’s ruling on a post-decree petition filed pursuant to ARFLP
    91 for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of Priessman, 
    228 Ariz. 336
    ,
    338, ¶ 7 (App. 2011) (citing Van Dyke v. Steinle, 
    183 Ariz. 268
    , 273 (App.
    8
    RAZDAN v. RAZDAN
    Decision of the Court
    1995)); Strait v. Strait, 
    223 Ariz. 500
    , 502, ¶ 8 (App. 2010) (citing Jenkins v.
    Jenkins, 
    215 Ariz. 35
    , 37, ¶ 8 (App. 2007)).
    ¶23           Here, the family court found the Retirement Order required
    Wife to assist in the transfer of her retirement funds by January 31, 2014.
    Because January 31, 2014, occurred approximately two months before the
    Retirement Order even issued, the court found the deadline was impossible
    for Wife to meet, notwithstanding any deliberate obstruction on her behalf.
    We defer to that finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Danielson v. Evans,
    
    201 Ariz. 401
    , 406, ¶ 13 (App. 2001) (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and In re
    Marriage of Yuro, 
    192 Ariz. 568
    , 570, ¶ 3 (App. 1998)).
    ¶24            Husband argues Wife in fact had at least one week of notice
    that she had to comply with the transfer of retirement funds or she would
    forfeit her right to receive them. The record does reflect that on January 23,
    2014, the family court adopted the recommended deadline in an unsigned
    minute entry. However, the minute entry was not entered by the clerk of
    the court until January 31, 2014 — the day of the deadline. And the order
    did not become final until the signed judgment entered in March 2014. The
    court’s factual finding is supported by the evidence, and we find no abuse
    of discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶25           The family court’s orders are affirmed.
    ¶26           Both parties request their attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant
    to A.R.S. § 25-324(A). In our discretion, we decline to award fees to either
    party.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    9