State v. Hall ( 2023 )

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY CHARLES HALL, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 22-0181
FILED 3-30-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202100382
The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Kathryn A. Damstra
Counsel for Appellee
Jill L. Evans, Attorney at Law, Flagstaff
By Jill L. Evans
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. HALL
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
C A M P B E L L, Judge:
¶1 Anthony Charles Hall appeals his sentences for manslaughter
by domestic violence and theft of means of transportation. He claims the
superior court failed to properly consider mitigating evidence before
meting out his sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND1
¶2 Shortly after meeting, the victim invited a homeless Hall to
move into a two-bedroom house he shared with a family friend (the
roommate). Hall accepted the invitation. Approximately three months after
Hall moved in, the roommate moved out.
¶3 A few weeks later, the roommate returned to the victim’s
home to collect her mail and check on the victim. When she approached the
front door, she noticed broken glass on the ground. Concerned, she walked
around the house and entered through a back door. Once she stepped
inside, the roommate saw blood on a nearby washing machine and noticed
a blanket covering what appeared to be a body in the living room. The
roommate immediately “backed out” of the house and called the police.
¶4 When responding officers arrived at the scene, they
conducted a protective sweep of the residence and found the deceased
victim wrapped in a blanket and blood throughout the house. During the
ensuing investigation, law enforcement personnel collected finger and
hand prints, blood samples, and surveillance camera footage from the
victim’s home.
¶5 Reviewing the camera footage, officers observed that only
Hall and the victim entered the residence during the three days before the
1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
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STATE v. HALL
Decision of the Court
discovery of the victim’s body. Thereafter, only Hall left the house, driving
away in the victim’s car.
¶6 By “pinging” his cellular phone, law enforcement officers
located Hall in Texas. In coordination with local officers, Texas authorities
apprehended Hall and took possession of the victim’s vehicle. At the time
of his arrest, Hall had multiple hand injuries, knee abrasions, and a black
eye. When the officers took possession of the victim’s car, the vehicle’s
Arizona license plate was missing and a California license plate was
attached.
¶7 An autopsy revealed the victim sustained cuts and bruises to
his face, a broken nose, displaced teeth, torn lips, bite marks on his back,
cuts to his hands, eye hemorrhaging, and neck and scalp injuries. The
medical examiner concluded that the victim died from numerous injuries,
including blunt force trauma and ligature strangulation.
¶8 After comparing Hall’s DNA profile and exemplar prints to
evidence collected from the victim’s home, law enforcement confirmed
Hall’s blood at the scene, along with his bloody palm print on the victim’s
washing machine. Hall’s social media account revealed an acrimonious
relationship between Hall and the victim. In their social media posts, the
victim accused Hall of physical assault and Hall accused the victim of
physical and sexual assault.
¶9 The State charged Hall with one count of second-degree
murder by domestic violence and one count of theft of means of
transportation. The State also alleged aggravating circumstances and that
Hall had three prior felony convictions.
¶10 At trial, Hall testified that soon after he moved in, the victim
began making unwanted sexual advances. Hall recounted that he initially
rebuffed the victim’s advances, but the victim responded violently, so Hall
“submit[ted]” to maintain “peace.” According to Hall, the victim assaulted
him the day he left the residence and took the victim’s car. But Hall denied
killing the victim and maintained that the victim was alive the last time he
saw him. On cross-examination, Hall admitted switching the car’s license
plate, but testified that he “full[y] inten[ded]” to return the victim’s car.
¶11 After the presentation of evidence, the superior court granted
defense counsel’s request to include a manslaughter by sudden quarrel
instruction in the final jury instructions. The jury found Hall guilty of the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter by domestic violence and theft of
means of transportation. The jury also found two aggravating factors
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STATE v. HALL
Decision of the Court
related to the manslaughter count (dangerous offense and harm to the
victim or the victim’s immediate family). At sentencing, based on Hall’s
testimonial admission, the superior court found that Hall had been
convicted of a prior felony, and sentenced him to an aggravated term of 20
years’ imprisonment for the count of manslaughter and a consecutive,
presumptive term of 6.5 years’ imprisonment for the count of theft of means
of transportation. Hall timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶12 Hall challenges the sentences imposed for both counts. He
contends the superior court failed to consider mitigation evidence of
impaired capacity before sentencing him to presumptive and aggravated
sentences.
¶13 The superior court “has broad discretion to determine the
appropriate penalty to impose upon conviction.” State v. Cazares, 205 Ariz.
425, 427, ¶ 6 (App. 2003). When a sentence falls within statutory limits, we
will uphold it unless the superior court acted arbitrarily or capriciously or
failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the facts relevant to
sentencing. Id.; State v. Fillmore, 187 Ariz. 174, 184 (App. 1996). While the
superior court must consider relevant evidence offered in mitigation, it “is
not obligated to find mitigating factors just because evidence is presented.”
State v. Carbajal, 177 Ariz. 461, 463 (App. 1994); State v. Webb, 164 Ariz. 348,
355 (App. 1990) (“The consideration of mitigating circumstances is solely
within the discretion of the court.”). The superior court “is in the best
position to determine the evidence surrounding the aggravating and
mitigating factors[,]” including “which factors should be given credence,”
Carbajal, 177 Ariz. at 463, and “the weight to be given that evidence,” State
v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 515 (1995).
¶14 After the jury rendered its verdicts, the superior court granted
Hall’s requests to appoint a mental health expert and order a mental
examination and evaluation. Before sentencing, defense counsel submitted
the evaluation as mitigating evidence. In her report, the evaluator noted
that Hall was an “unreliable historian,” gave conflicting statements, and
had “significant memory problems.” The evaluator recounted Hall’s claims
that the victim sexually assaulted him and engaged in controlling
behaviors. Ultimately, the evaluator opined that she was unable to diagnose
Hall with post-traumatic stress disorder or any other condition but
“recognize[d]” that he “potential[ly]” endured “physical and psychological
trauma.”
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STATE v. HALL
Decision of the Court
¶15 At the sentencing hearing, the superior court expressly stated
that it had considered the mitigation and aggravation evidence presented
and the entire record. Having both heard directly from the victim’s family
members and observed them at trial, the superior court found the harm
Hall inflicted on the family “a significant aggravating circumstance.” While
acknowledging that impaired mental health can be a mitigating factor, the
superior court noted that the evaluator did not diagnose Hall with any
condition and emphasized that the evidence Hall suffered trauma was
primarily self-reported.2 Given these considerations, the superior court
found that “any mental health challenge[]” Hall experienced did not
“deserve[] much, if any, weight” as a mitigating factor. With respect to
Hall’s specific claim that the victim had committed “atrocities” against him,
the superior court stated: “[I]f that is something that the jury believed, then
that would have been taken into account when the jury found the defendant
guilty of the manslaughter offense rather than . . . the second degree murder
offense. At any rate, I don’t find that it warrants any -- that it is a mitigating
circumstance in any way. I find that the aggravating circumstance controls
in this matter.”
¶16 Contrary to Hall’s contention, the record reflects that the
superior court thoroughly considered the mitigation evidence, found it
unavailing, and determined the jury’s verdict for the lesser-included
offense accounted for any provocation from the victim. Having carefully
reviewed the mitigation evidence, the superior court “was required to do
no more.” Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 515. Put simply, the superior court acted
within its discretion by evaluating the evidence, finding it did not mitigate
the offenses for which Hall was convicted, and balancing in favor of
presumptive and aggravated sentences.
2 Pointing to the superior court’s observation that his claim of
impairment conflicted with his trial testimony, Hall asserts the superior
court arbitrarily dismissed his mitigation evidence because he denied
killing the victim at trial. Although the superior court made a cursory
reference to the claim of impairment being incompatible with Hall’s trial
defense, read in context, it is clear the superior court rejected Hall’s claim―
that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct―first and
foremost because the mental health evaluator did not diagnose him with
any impairing condition and the mitigation evidence essentially consisted
of “statements that were made by the defendant himself.”
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STATE v. HALL
Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
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