Knutson v. trader/indemnity ( 2023 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    LYNN KNUTSON,
    Petitioner Employee,
    v.
    THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA,
    Respondent,
    TRADER JOES,
    Respondent Employer,
    INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA,
    Respondent Insurance Carrier.
    No. 1 CA-IC 22-0010
    FILED 4-11-2023
    Special Action - Industrial Commission
    ICA Claim No. 20191920010
    Carrier Claim No. 1903142384WC
    The Honorable Kenneth Joseph Hill, Administrative Law Judge
    AFFIRMED
    APPEARANCES
    Lynn Knutson, Scottsdale
    Petitioner Employee
    Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
    By Gaetano J. Testini
    Counsel for Respondent
    Lundmark, Barberich, La Mont & Slavin, P.C., Phoenix
    By Javier A. Puig
    Counsel for Respondent Employer and Respondent Insurance Carrier
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which
    Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
    W I L L I A M S, Judge:
    ¶1            Lynn Knutson appeals the Industrial Commission of
    Arizona’s (“ICA”) award/decision to close her workers’ compensation
    claim for lack of permanent impairment. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Knutson worked for Trader Joe’s. In March 2019, while
    loading groceries into a customer’s SUV, Knutson sustained a head injury
    when the rear hatch door came down on her head. Knutson continued
    working, although she had a headache, and shortly after that dropped a
    case of bottled water. Trader Joe’s sent Knutson to urgent care, where she
    was diagnosed with a head contusion and concussion.
    ¶3           In the following weeks, Knutson developed speech problems,
    vision problems, light sensitivity, and other problems symptomatic of
    possible neurological impairment. She had an acquaintance who was a
    retired emergency room physician and medical educator, Mark Olsky,
    M.D., who became concerned about her condition a few weeks after the
    incident. Dr. Olsky conducted a medical examination and found that
    Knutson had sustained a significant brain injury. He referred her for further
    medical treatment. Knutson’s workers’ compensation claim was accepted.
    ¶4            In July 2019, Dr. Jody Reiser, M.D., a neurologist, conducted
    an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”). Dr. Reiser concluded that
    Knutson had reached maximum medical improvement “in regard to her
    neurological state” and did not have a permanent neurological impairment.
    The following month, Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America issued a
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    notice closing Knutson’s claim. Knutson requested a hearing to challenge
    that conclusion.
    ¶5             An ICA administrative law judge (“ALJ”) conducted a
    hearing in which he reviewed Knutson’s post-incident medical records as
    well as evaluations from several medical and psychological specialists,
    including three IMEs. To testify on her behalf, Knutson called Dr. Olsky,
    rehabilitation    optometrist    Roberto    Esposito,    O.D.,    clinical
    neuropsychologist Amy Knapp, Ph.D., and speech pathologist Teresa
    Brobeck, Ph.D.
    ¶6            Dr. Olsky testified about his relationship with Knutson and
    contrasted her condition before and after the head injury. He also described
    his medical examination of her that led to his conclusion that she had
    suffered a significant brain injury. He testified that she needed ongoing
    active medical care.
    ¶7            Dr. Esposito performed tests on Knutson and found ocular
    conditions consistent with post-traumatic head injury visual syndrome. Dr.
    Esposito attributed those conditions to the March 2019 workplace incident.
    He provided Knutson with vision therapy and released her from treatment
    in September 2020.
    ¶8           Dr. Brobeck assessed Knutson’s speech issues and diagnosed
    her with “acquired/adult-onset dysfluency.” Dr. Brobeck declined to offer
    an opinion as to the cause of that condition.
    ¶9            Finally, Dr. Knapp performed neuropsychological
    evaluations of Knutson in 2019 and 2021. In 2019, Dr. Knapp noted that
    Knutson’s symptoms were consistent with post-concussion syndrome. In
    2021, Dr. Knapp believed Knutson had improved, and that any cognitive
    injury had resolved. In Dr. Knapp’s opinion, Knutson’s injuries were a
    result of the workplace incident. Dr. Knapp could not identify a
    neuropsychological explanation for the ongoing problems Knutson
    described, but thought other medical professionals should consider a
    diagnosis of somatoform disorder.
    ¶10         Trader Joes/Indemnity called several specialists to testify: J.
    Michael Powers, M.D., a neurologist; James Youngjohn, Ph.D., a
    neuropsychologist; John Walker, Psy.D., a neuropsychologist who had
    provided supportive treatment to Knutson in 2019, and Dr. Reiser.
    ¶11         Dr. Powers performed an IME in October 2020. He testified
    there was no evidence that the head injury Knutson sustained from the
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    incident caused any physical damage that would account for her ongoing
    complaints. He found no organic basis for her reported symptoms.
    ¶12          Dr. Youngjohn also performed an IME in October 2020. He
    diagnosed Knutson with a somatoform disorder – specifically conversion
    disorder with neurological manifestations. He did not relate her condition
    to the workplace injury.
    ¶13           Dr. Reiser performed an IME in 2019 and wrote addendums
    for that examination in both 2019 and 2020. Dr. Reiser stated that Knutson’s
    presentation was nonorganic and possibly psychiatric. Dr. Reiser denied
    any continuing neurological injury from the workplace incident. She also
    suspected a somatoform disorder.
    ¶14           Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Walker did not test Knutson
    but assessed her so that he could provide supportive care. The ALJ found
    that Dr. Walker concluded Knutson suffered from a somatoform disorder
    and that her symptoms were psychological.
    ¶15           The ALJ weighed the evidence and found the opinions of
    Trader Joe’s/Indemnity’s specialists “more probably correct and well
    founded.” He concluded that Knutson “did not sustain a
    psychological/neuropsychological injury as a result of the industrial
    incident,” and that by August 2019, Knutson was medically stationary and
    the claim was properly closed with no permanent impairment. Knutson
    requested administrative review, which was denied without further
    comment. This statutory special action review followed.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶16          In her briefs, Knutson primarily argues the ALJ improperly
    weighed the testimony and evidence. She also argues the ALJ erred by
    denying her requested rebuttal evidence. Finally, she argues the ALJ failed
    to make adequate findings of fact. We address each argument in turn.
    I.    Competing Witness Testimony
    ¶17           In reviewing findings and awards of the ICA, we defer to the
    factual findings of the ALJ but review questions of law de novo. Young v.
    Indus. Comm’n, 
    204 Ariz. 267
    , 270, ¶ 14 (App. 2003) (as amended). We
    consider the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the ALJ’s
    award, Lovitch v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    202 Ariz. 102
    , 105, ¶ 16 (App. 2002), and
    will not disturb the ALJ's findings unless the conclusions cannot be
    “supported on any reasonable theory of evidence.” Phelps v. Indus. Comm’n,
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    155 Ariz. 501
    , 506 (1987). To prevail on appeal, Knutson must show that no
    reasonable evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ’s findings and
    that the ALJ’s choice between possible inferences was wholly unreasonable.
    She has not done so.
    ¶18           Knutson’s arguments about the weight to give the evidence,
    including her attempts to impeach certain witnesses and argue the
    superiority of other witnesses’ credentials, are essentially requests for us to
    re-weigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Simpson v. Indus. Comm’n,
    
    189 Ariz. 340
    , 342 (App. 1997) (appellate courts do not re-weigh the
    evidence). We also will not consider on appeal evidence that the ALJ did
    not have as part of the record. At the end of her amended opening brief,
    Knutson recites a multi-page statement from Dr. Olsky, intended to rebut
    the testimony of Dr. Youngjohn. But that multi-page statement was not part
    of the record before the ALJ. Our task is to determine whether the record
    supports the ALJ’s award. We conclude that it does.
    II.    Rebuttal Testimony
    ¶19           At the last hearing session, which included the continuation
    of Dr. Youngjohn’s testimony, Knutson’s counsel requested that Dr. Olsky
    attend the session and submit rebuttal testimony afterward. Counsel stated
    that rebuttal was necessary because Knutson bore the burden of proof and
    because Dr. Youngjohn was testifying beyond his expertise, making
    unwarranted conclusions. The ALJ denied rebuttal, but Dr. Olsky was
    allowed to listen to Dr. Youngjohn’s testimony. Knutson argues on appeal
    that the ALJ erred by denying her request for rebuttal testimony from Dr.
    Olsky. We disagree.
    ¶20            Knutson’s argument is based on an alleged procedural error.
    Section 23-941(F) provides that the ALJ “is not bound by common law or
    statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure and
    may conduct the hearing in any manner that will achieve substantial
    justice.” A.R.S. § 23-941(F). Thus, the procedural standard is substantial
    justice. See Ohlmaier v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    161 Ariz. 113
    , 117 (1989) (noting that
    the objective of an ICA hearing is substantial justice). We cannot conclude
    that Knutson was denied substantial justice by being denied admission of
    Dr. Olsky’s rebuttal testimony. As the ALJ noted to Knutson’s counsel, the
    ALJ can determine whether an expert witness is opining beyond their area
    of expertise and consider that when weighing the evidence. Knutson has
    shown no error.
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    III.   Lack of Factual Findings
    ¶21            Finally, Knutson argues the ALJ did not make the required
    findings of fact to support his award. But an ALJ’s lack of findings does not
    necessarily invalidate an award, so long as this court can determine the
    factual basis for the ALJ’s legal conclusions. See Post v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    160 Ariz. 4
    , 7 (1989). Regardless, because Knutson’s argument was first raised
    in her reply brief, she has waived it on appeal. Wasserman v. Low, 
    143 Ariz. 4
    , 9 n. 4 (App. 1984) (considering issue first raised in a reply brief to be
    abandoned on appeal).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶22         The record contains substantial evidence to support the ICA’s
    award/decision. The award is affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-IC 22-0010

Filed Date: 4/11/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/11/2023