Armenta v. City of Casa Grande ( 2003 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF ARIZONA
DIVISION TWO
SYLVIA ARMENTA, for herself and on )
behalf of her minor son, JOSEPH ARIAS, )
) 2 CA-CV 2000-0138
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) DEPARTMENT A
)
v. ) OPINION
)
CITY OF CASA GRANDE, a governmental )
entity, )
)
Defendant/Appellee. )
)
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PINAL COUNTY
Cause No. CV99046853
Honorable William J. O’Neil, Judge
AFFIRMED
Goldberg & Osborne
By Joel T. Ireland Tucson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
By Mark D. Zukowski and David C. Lewis Phoenix
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
B R A M M E R, Presiding Judge.
¶1 On her own behalf and that of her minor son, Joseph Arias, Sylvia Armenta appeals
from the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Casa Grande on her
personal injury lawsuit against the City seeking damages for injuries Joseph suffered while playing
in one of the City’s parks. Armenta first argues that the recreational use immunity statute, A.R.S.
§ 33-1551, upon which the City relied in moving for summary judgment and upon which the trial
court presumably based its decision, either does not apply to this case or is unconstitutional as
applied and, thus, does not bar the cause of action for negligence. Alternatively, Armenta argues
that, even if the statute is constitutional and applies to this case, genuine issues of material fact
preclude summary judgment against her on the causes of action based on attractive nuisance and
gross negligence, two exceptions to the immunity granted by the statute. We conclude that the
statute applies to this case and that it is constitutional as applied. We also find that no genuine
issues of material fact precluded the trial court from granting summary judgment in the City’s
favor on the attractive nuisance and gross negligence theories of liability.
Facts and Procedural History
¶2 We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to Armenta, the party opposing summary judgment. See Hill-Shafer Partnership v.
Chilson Family Trust, 165 Ariz. 469, 799 P.2d 810 (1990). In May 1998, Joseph, then fourteen
years old, rode with his friend Brian on their bicycles to the City’s Dave White Regional Park.
Brian’s mother, Beatrice, and other relatives were already at the park at a gathering.
¶3 At Brian’s suggestion, Joseph rode his bicycle under a soccer goal on a field at the
park trying to touch the goal’s top crossbar and “see how tall it was.” As he rode under the
crossbar, Joseph stood on the bicycle pedals and reached his hands up to touch the bar. He was
planning to hit the crossbar with both hands and then quickly reach back down to grab the
handlebars. As he was preparing to do so, however, the bicycle hit something and “was jerked
out from underneath” him, causing him to hit the crossbar “real hard” with both hands as he “was
falling back.” The crossbar broke and both he and the bar fell to the ground. Joseph suffered
severe injuries to his right arm and hand when he was pinned beneath the bar.
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¶4 His mother sued the City on Joseph’s behalf, alleging that it was responsible for
his injuries under negligence, attractive nuisance, and gross negligence theories of liability. The
City subsequently moved for summary judgment, claiming that it was entitled to qualified
immunity from liability under the recreational use immunity statute. Stating merely that there
were “no issues of fact” precluding summary judgment, and without addressing the
constitutionality of the statute, the court granted the City’s motion. This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
¶5 Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 16 A.R.S., Pt. 2.
Summary judgment should be granted “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense
have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people
could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme
School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). We determine de novo
whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in applying the
law. Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, 965 P.2d 47 (App. 1998). We also review
de novo whether the recreational use immunity statute applies to this case and, if so, whether it
is constitutional. Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430, 4 P.3d 973 (App. 1999). Because
the statute appears to limit common-law liability, “we must construe it strictly to avoid any
overbroad statutory interpretation that would give unintended immunity and take away a right of
action.” Smith v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 195 Ariz. 214, ¶9, 986 P.2d 247, ¶9 (App. 1999); see
also Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 200 Ariz. 174, 24 P.3d 1269 (2001); Herman.
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Discussion
¶6 The recreational use immunity statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A. A public or private owner . . . of premises is not liable
to a recreational or educational user except upon a showing that the
owner . . . was guilty of wilful, malicious or grossly negligent
conduct which was a direct cause of the injury to the recreational or
educational user.
B. This section does not limit the liability which otherwise
exists for maintaining an attractive nuisance . . . .
C. As used in this section:
....
2. “Grossly negligent” means a knowing or reckless
indifference to the health and safety of others.
3. “Premises” means agricultural, range, open space,
park, . . . and any other similar lands, wherever located, which are
available to a recreational or educational user, including, but not
limited to, . . . any building, improvement, fixture, . . . or structure
on such lands.
§ 33-1551.
a. Applicability of recreational use immunity statute
¶7 Because we need not address Armenta’s challenge to the constitutionality of the
statute if we determine that it is inapplicable, see Herman, we first address her argument, based
on Smith, that the statute does not apply because the goal that injured Joseph is a type of apparatus
that is excluded from the statutory definition of “premises.” In Smith, Division One of this court
held that the definition did not encompass a “jumping apparatus consisting of a combination of a
trampoline and bungee cord” temporarily placed on a college campus during a carnival-like event.
195 Ariz. 214, ¶3, 986 P.2d 247, ¶3. The court stated that the legislature’s intent in enacting the
statute “appears to be to encourage accessibility and use of outdoor, open spaces for recreation”
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and that the types of structures the statute encompasses seem to “have some relation to the usual
use of the property.” Id. at ¶17.
¶8 But the nature of the injury-causing object in Smith and the circumstances
surrounding that object’s presence were different from those here. The trampoline-type apparatus
in Smith had been on the campus for a specific, short-term event, whereas the goals here had been
on the soccer field “most of the time” in the years before Joseph’s injury, although the City moved
them off the field occasionally to clear the area for a public event. In Miller v. City of Dayton,
537 N.E.2d 1294 (Ohio 1989), the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a similar recreational
use immunity statute applied to a municipal park softball field where the plaintiff injured himself
when he slid into a base. We find that decision instructive and agree with the court’s reasoning
that the critical issue is whether improvements to recreational premises such as a softball field,
which there included human-made structures such as bases and fences, “change the character of
the premises and[, thus,] put the property outside the protection” of the statute. Id. at 1296.
Concluding that the “essential character” of the premises remained recreational when a softball
tournament was played in its park, the Ohio court concluded that the city was immune from
liability under the statute. Id.
¶9 Section 33-1551(C)(3) specifically includes parks in its definition of premises.
Adopting the reasoning of Miller, we conclude that installing soccer fields, including goals, in a
park does not change the park’s recreational character. Moreover, our conclusion is consistent
with the express language of the statute, which includes “fixture[s]” and “structure[s]” on the
specified lands in defining “premises” and which defines “recreational user” as one who “enter[s]
upon premises to . . . ride, exercise, . . . or engage in similar pursuits.” § 33-1551(C)(3) and (4).
Finally, unlike the trampoline-type apparatus in Smith, soccer goals are the type of apparatus one
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would expect to find on a park field, and are directly related to a typical use of the property.
Accordingly, the statute applies to this case.
b. Constitutionality of the recreational use immunity statute
¶10 We need not address Armenta’s next argument, that the statute unconstitutionally
abrogates the right to pursue a general negligence claim in violation of article XVIII, § 6 of the
Arizona Constitution, the anti-abrogation clause. Our supreme court has just rejected a similar
argument. Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, No. CV-99-0273-PR, 2003 WL 1793372 (Ariz. Apr. 7,
2003).
¶11 We next address Armenta’s arguments that, even if the statute is constitutional and
applies to Joseph, genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the causes of
action for attractive nuisance and gross negligence, two exceptions in the statute.
c. Attractive nuisance
¶12 Section 33-1551(B) provides that the statute “does not limit the liability which
otherwise exists for maintaining an attractive nuisance.” Armenta argues that the soccer goal that
injured Joseph was an attractive nuisance. The City contends the doctrine does not apply here,
insisting that Armenta did not establish sufficient facts on the requisite elements of the doctrine
to withstand its motion for summary judgment. The City further contends that, even assuming
Armenta can prove the elements, the doctrine is inapplicable because of what it characterizes as
“a more fundamental policy reason[:] . . . the presence of an adult supervisor [Beatrice] at the
park.”
¶13 Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, a possessor of land is, under certain
circumstances, “subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an
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artificial condition upon the land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965). Those
circumstances include the following:
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which
the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely
to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has
reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve
an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition
and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared
with the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to
eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
Id.
¶14 Arizona adopted the predecessor to Restatement § 339 in Buckeye Irrigation Co.
v. Askren, 45 Ariz. 566, 46 P.2d 1068 (1935). See also Spur Feeding Co. v. Fernandez, 106
Ariz. 143, 472 P.2d 12 (1970). The doctrine initially was limited to those cases in which a child
was attracted to the place of injury by the same condition that ultimately injured him or her. See,
e.g., Lee v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 73 Ariz. 122, 238 P.2d 945 (1951). That
requirement, however, has since been abandoned. Brown v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 164 Ariz.
4, 790 P.2d 290 (App. 1990). In the most recent case in which our supreme court applied the
doctrine, Barnhizer v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. #69, 123 Ariz. 253, 599 P.2d 209(1979), the court confined its analysis to determining whether the conditions of Restatement § 339
had been met. Accordingly, we analyze whether Armenta presented sufficient evidence to create
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a material issue of fact on whether the doctrine may apply under present requirements. If we
determine, however, that Armenta has failed as a matter of law to raise a genuine issue of fact as
to any one of the conditions set forth in Restatement § 339, then summary judgment for the City
was appropriate. See Barnhizer.
¶15 The key inquiries here are (1) whether the City knew or should have known about
the condition of the soccer goal and (2) whether the City realized or should have realized that it
posed an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury to children. The record contains
insufficient evidence to support Armenta’s contention that she established this second element.
¶16 Armenta attached to her response to the City’s motion for summary judgment a
transcript of the deposition testimony of Ron Wood, the City’s park superintendent, and Jerry
Sullivan, the City’s parks and recreations director. Wood testified that the City had moved the
goals from a school to the park at the request of a soccer league. The City modified the crossbars
of the goals by lengthening them. Wood stated that, in late 1995 or 1996, two to three years
before Joseph’s accident, Wood had modified the crossbars in the City’s workshop by welding
together pieces of galvanized pipe he had found in the shop to make each crossbar a total length
of twenty-four feet and later installed the modified goals on the field. Wood said he did not know
if the goals were regularly inspected and agreed that the City’s inspection reports did not indicate
whether they had ever been inspected. He also testified that the goals were occasionally removed
from the park and were not on the field year-round, stating that the last time the City had moved
the goals, “everything seemed to be solid.” He also testified that he had not heard any reports or
complaints from his employees or the public about any problems with the goals. Wood further
testified that, after the accident, when he had looked at the crossbar that had fallen on Joseph, he
had seen that it was broken “at the weld that [he] did.” Wood agreed that, if the crossbar had
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been properly welded, he would not have expected the weld to fail “[u]nder the condition of one
kid hanging on it.”
¶17 Sullivan testified that the goal was treated “just like any other apparatus or park
equipment” that a city employee was responsible for regularly inspecting. Sullivan agreed that
the City takes safety precautions because it knows and anticipates that “kids do not always . . .
use equipment the way it’s intended to be used.” He acknowledged he was aware that “kids are
going to be climbing” on equipment on the premises, because “kids climb everywhere,” and that
the City tries “to have the equipment in such shape that it’s not a danger to kids who use it in an
unanticipated way.” He also conceded that the goals are the type of park equipment on which
children are expected to climb. He stated, however, that he had never seen anyone hang from the
top crossbar of the goals, nor had he ever heard a report of anyone doing so. In summary,
Sullivan testified that the City was responsible for regularly inspecting and maintaining equipment
like the soccer goals in its parks.
¶18 It can reasonably be inferred from Wood’s testimony that the City did not regularly
inspect the goals’ crossbars after he modified them. But Armenta presented no evidence that, even
if the goals had been regularly inspected, the problem with the welded crossbar would have been
found. Cf. State v. Juengel, 15 Ariz. App. 495, 489 P.2d 869 (1971) (plaintiff presented expert
testimony that trained maintenance crews would have realized danger posed by unstable rock
formation that injured plaintiff). Accordingly, Armenta did not present sufficient evidence to
create a material issue of fact on whether the City knew or should have known, even by regular
inspections, about the goal’s allegedly defective condition and, thus, knew or should have known
that the goal posed an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury to children in the park.
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¶19 Because we have found that, as a matter of law, Armenta failed to establish one of
the conditions necessary for application of the doctrine, we need not address the City’s alternative
arguments that Armenta was too old to have the attractive nuisance doctrine apply, or that
Beatrice’s presence at the park rendered the doctrine inapplicable. Barnhizer. The City was
therefore entitled to summary judgment in its favor on the cause of action for attractive nuisance.
d. Gross negligence
¶20 Armenta nonetheless contends the recreational use immunity statute does not apply
because she presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment that Joseph’s injury was
caused by the City’s gross negligence in maintaining the goal. The statute excepts such
negligence, which is defined as “a knowing or reckless indifference to the health and safety of
others.” § 33-1551(A) and (C)(2). The definition comports with that announced by Division One
of this court in Williams v. Thude, 180 Ariz. 531, 539, 885 P.2d 1096, 1104 (App. 1994), aff’d,
188 Ariz. 257, 934 P.2d 1349 (1997):
Gross, willful, or wanton conduct is action or inaction with reckless
indifference to the result or the rights or safety of others. A person
is recklessly indifferent if he or she knows, or a reasonable person
in his or her position ought to know: (1) that his action or inaction
creates an unreasonable risk of harm; and (2) the risk is so great that
it is highly probable that harm will result.
See also Walls v. Arizona Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 826 P.2d 1217 (App. 1991).
¶21 Gross negligence is generally a question of fact that is determined by a jury. Badia
v. City of Casa Grande, 195 Ariz. 349, 988 P.2d 134 (App. 1999). We may resolve this issue
as a matter of law, however, if the plaintiff fails to produce evidence that is “more than slight and
[that does] not border on conjecture” such that a reasonable trier of fact could find gross
negligence. Walls, 170 Ariz. at 595, 826 P.2d at 1221; see also Badia; Kemp v. Pinal Co., 13
Ariz. App. 121, 474 P.2d 840 (1970). By granting the City’s motion for summary judgment, the
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trial court implicitly concluded that Armenta had failed to present the required quantum of
evidence that the City’s conduct was grossly negligent. We agree.
¶22 Armenta relies primarily on the fact that, when Sullivan was asked during his
deposition whether “[i]t would be a pretty gross breach of your duties to not make the parks safe,”
he responded, “Yes.” But, such “conjectural and conclusory” testimony is, without more,
insufficient to “render a plaintiff’s allegations of gross negligence triable issues of fact.” Badia,
195 Ariz. 349, ¶30, 988 P.2d 134, ¶30. In apparent recognition of this, Armenta also points to
additional testimony, which we have previously described in ¶¶16 and 17, that she contends
creates an issue of material fact on this theory of liability.
¶23 Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Armenta, see Hill-Shafer,
on the record before us, we conclude that she did not present sufficient evidence to withstand
summary judgment on the cause of action for gross negligence. Although Sullivan testified that
he could anticipate that children might climb on the goals, he had never seen anyone do so, nor
had he heard a report of anyone doing so, much less a report of previous injuries sustained by a
child engaging in that activity. As stated above in ¶18, there was no evidence that the City knew
or should have known the weld was deficient because there was no testimony that regular
inspections, had they occurred, would necessarily have revealed a problem. Accordingly,
Armenta failed to present evidence that the City’s actions would have led it to realize that its
conduct “not only create[d] an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others but also involve[d] a
high probability that substantial harm [would] result.” Walls, 170 Ariz. at 595, 826 P.2d at 1221;
see also Williams. Because no reasonable trier of fact could find that the City acted with gross
negligence, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the City’s favor on the gross negligence
cause of action was proper. See Badia; Walls.
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Conclusion
¶24 We conclude that the recreational use immunity statute applies to this case and is
constitutional as applied. We therefore affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the
City on Armenta’s cause of action for negligence. We further conclude that Armenta failed to
raise material issues of fact to preclude summary judgment on the attractive nuisance and gross
negligence causes of action and affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City on
those theories as well. Because Armenta did not prevail on appeal, and because her reliance on
A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is misplaced, her request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal is denied.
________________________________________
J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
______________________________________
JOHN PELANDER, Judge
______________________________________
WILLIAM E. DRUKE, Judge (Retired)
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