State v. Gooch ( 2023 )

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
MARK DANIEL GOOCH, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 22-0075
FILED 4-13-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
No. S0300CR202000444
The Honorable Cathleen Brown Nichols, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael O’Toole
Counsel for Appellee
Coconino County Legal Defender’s Office, Flagstaff
By Joseph A. Carver
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. GOOCH
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
B A I L E Y, Judge:
¶1 Mark Daniel Gooch appeals his convictions and sentences for
first-degree murder, kidnapping, and misdemeanor theft. Because Gooch
has shown no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Sarah1 lived in a Mennonite community in Farmington, New
Mexico. She shared a house with other women in the community, working
in the church’s publishing house and acting as a substitute Sunday school
teacher. Sarah strictly adhered to the tenets of her Mennonite faith,
consistently wearing a head covering to demonstrate modesty and
obedience to God.
¶3 On the evening of January 18, 2020, Sarah drove to the nearby
church to retrieve Sunday school materials. After several hours, Sarah’s
roommates noticed she had not returned home, and she was not answering
her phone. When the women found Sarah’s abandoned car in the church
parking lot, they contacted their church leader and eventually reported her
missing. When investigators arrived, they found Sarah’s keys in her
unlocked car and observed no signs of a struggle. A search for Sarah
ensued, with investigators releasing a missing person bulletin on their
social media account.
¶4 Over a month later, a camper discovered Sarah’s body in the
Coconino National Forest near Flagstaff, Arizona. When investigators
arrived, they found Sarah lying face down, fully clothed with her hands
bound in duct tape. Investigators never located Sarah’s underwear or head
covering. A medical examiner would later determine that Sarah suffered
blunt force trauma and a single gunshot wound to the back of her head.
The medical examiner located the bullet near the back of Sarah’s jawline.
1 We use a pseudonym to protect the victim’s privacy. See Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 31.10(f).
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¶5 With no lead suspects, investigators reviewed data from the
three cellular phone sites (“cell sites”) positioned between Farmington and
the location of Sarah’s body on the relevant dates. The only phone that
connected to all three cell sites belonged to Gooch. The data showed that
Gooch traveled to Farmington near the Mennonite church, left around the
time of Sarah’s abduction, and stopped for over two hours near the location
of her body. In comparing data from Sarah’s phone, investigators found
that she traveled the same route as Gooch until her phone stopped
connecting to cell sites near the New Mexico/Arizona border. After leaving
the area near Sarah’s body, Gooch traveled back to a military base near
Phoenix, Arizona. The data also revealed that, days later, Gooch returned
to the location of Sarah’s body before driving back to the military base.
¶6 Investigators learned that Gooch, an aircraft mechanic, lived
at the military base in January and February 2020. Raised and educated in
a Mennonite community, Gooch and his older brother, Samuel, refused to
be baptized and eventually stopped participating in church services.
Contrary to Mennonite doctrine, which requires pacifism, after Gooch
received his GED, he joined the military. Those close to Gooch knew he
harbored resentment for the Mennonite church.
¶7 In the week before Sarah’s abduction, phone records revealed
that Gooch spoke with Samuel about conducting “surveillance” of
Mennonite communities in the area. He noted that surveillance of
communities in the Phoenix area had been “another disappointment” and
“taking risks [was] back at zero.” Cell-site data from this day confirmed
that Gooch visited multiple Mennonite communities in the Phoenix area.
In a later conversation, Gooch and Samuel exchanged text messages with
their brother. Their brother, a police officer, joked that he gave a Mennonite
driver a ticket and he “coughed on him so he would spread Corona.”
Responding with excitement, Gooch said he found it “fucking hilarious”
and hoped he “treated ‘em like shit.”
¶8 On the day of Sarah’s abduction, video and gate entry data
from the military base confirmed that Gooch left the base that morning and
returned the following morning. When Gooch returned, video showed him
carrying a plastic bag inside his residence and later discarding a similar-
looking bag in a dumpster. As Sarah’s abduction became public, phone
records showed that Gooch repeatedly visited her missing person bulletin
on social media.
¶9 Days after investigators located Sarah’s body, Gooch had his
car professionally detailed and paid extra for “complete interior” cleaning.
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Gooch exchanged text messages with Samuel, who suggested that he have
them spray down the car with disinfectant. The same day, Gooch bought a
bottle of bleach from the military base commissary and asked if a co-worker
could store his .22 caliber rifle. Gooch stored the rifle, along with .22-caliber
ammunition, in the co-worker’s safe. Gooch also submitted multiple
requests to delete his location history in January and February 2020.
¶10 In an interview with the lead investigator, Gooch gave several
inconsistent statements, ultimately claiming he traveled to Farmington to
attend a church service because he knew members from that community.
Investigators found no evidence Gooch knew anyone in that community or
still attended Mennonite church services. He denied stopping anywhere
near the Coconino National Forest on his return to the military base. The
evidence contradicted much of law enforcement’s data-driven timeline of
Gooch’s movements.
¶11 After Gooch’s arrest, his co-worker provided the rifle and
ammunition to investigators. A ballistics expert concluded that Gooch’s
rifle fired the bullet used to kill Sarah. Gooch’s expert would later disagree,
claiming an analysis yielded inconclusive results. Investigators searched
Gooch’s car, which was “exceptionally clean,” and located a pair of
binoculars and a box of nitrile gloves. They also learned that video from
the Farmington Mennonite community on the day of Sarah’s abduction
captured what appeared to be Gooch’s car. While in custody awaiting trial,
Gooch contacted Samuel and asked him to remotely wipe his phone.
¶12 The State charged Gooch with one count each of first-degree
murder, kidnapping, and misdemeanor theft, alleging alternate theories of
premeditated and felony murder. During the twelve-day jury trial, Gooch
moved for a judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure Rule 20 for the misdemeanor theft offense, arguing the State
failed to show Sarah was wearing a head covering and underwear at the
time of her abduction. The superior court denied the motion, finding the
State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of theft.
¶13 The jury found Gooch guilty of first-degree murder and
kidnapping. Eleven jurors found both premeditated and felony murder,
and one juror found only felony murder. At Gooch’s request, the superior
court rendered the verdict as to misdemeanor theft and found him guilty of
the offense. The court sentenced Gooch to natural life for first-degree
murder, a consecutive term of five years’ imprisonment for kidnapping,
and time-served for misdemeanor theft. Gooch timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
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Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -
4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. The Cumulative Effect of the Alleged Prosecutorial Error Did Not
Render the Trial Unfair.
¶14 Gooch argues the cumulative effect of multiple alleged
instances of prosecutorial error deprived him of his right to a fair trial. See
In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458, 470, ¶ 47 (2020) (distinguishing between
prosecutorial error and prosecutorial misconduct). Specifically, Gooch
contends that the prosecutor improperly (1) emphasized a “stark moral
contrast” between him and the victim; (2) commented on his veracity and
vouched for the truth of the State’s evidence; and (3) impugned the role of
defense counsel in a criminal case. We assess each instance individually
and, as here, review unobjected-to claims for fundamental error. State v.
Hulsey, 243 Ariz. 367, 388, ¶ 88 (2018). We then determine whether the total
impact of any errors we find rendered the trial unfair. Id.¶15 In general, we give prosecutors wide latitude in rigorously
cross-examining adverse witnesses, State v. Holden, 88 Ariz. 43, 54–55 (1960),
providing impassioned remarks in closing argument, State v. Gonzales, 105
Ariz. 434, 437 (1970), and criticizing defense theories, State v. Amaya–Ruiz,
166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990). While prosecutors may not vouch for the State’s
evidence, appeal to the jury’s emotions, or impugn the integrity of opposing
counsel, State v. Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 217–22, ¶¶ 75, 93, 109
(2018), they may present fair rebuttal to any areas “opened by the defense,”
State v. Alvarez, 145 Ariz. 370, 373 (1985). To determine whether a
prosecutor’s remarks are improper, we consider whether the remarks call
to the jury’s attention matters they would not be justified in considering,
and the probability, under the circumstances, that the jury was influenced
by the remarks. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 305, ¶ 37 (2000) (citation
omitted).
A. Emphasis on “Moral Contrast” Between Gooch and Sarah
¶16 From the outset of trial, both the prosecutor and defense
counsel referred to relevant tenets of the Mennonite faith. As early as
opening statements, the prosecutor and defense counsel used Mennonite
customs to present their theories of the case. The prosecutor used the
Mennonite way of life to provide narrative context for Sarah’s abduction,
presenting Gooch’s resentment for the church as a likely motive. In
contrast, defense counsel stated that Gooch’s values were rooted in his
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upbringing in the Mennonite faith and the evidence would reveal him to be
“a peaceful, nonviolent person.”
¶17 Both sides examined these topics throughout the trial with
permissible rationales. The prosecutor elicited testimony to explain why
there was no sign of a struggle: Sarah’s adherence to a doctrine of
nonresistance. He also elicited testimony about customary dress under
Mennonite teachings of modesty to show that Sarah was most likely
wearing items that were taken by Gooch to support the theft charge. The
prosecutor also elicited testimony about Mennonite doctrine to rebut
defense counsel’s inference that someone in the Mennonite community
committed the offenses.
¶18 Defense counsel called Gooch’s father to testify about his
son’s upbringing in the Mennonite faith and Gooch’s exposure to its
emphasis on pacifism, as evidence of Gooch’s peaceful, nonviolent
character. While Gooch’s father conceded that his son ultimately refused
baptism in the church, he testified that Gooch was raised to be nonviolent.
When expressly asked about Gooch’s “reputation for being a peaceful,
nonviolent person,” his father avowed that he never observed his son
engage in violent behavior.
¶19 On direct examination, Gooch’s father also testified that, in
his opinion, Gooch “wasn’t of a converted heart” and therefore did not feel
a need to keep attending services. In cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked Gooch’s father to expand on the meaning of “a converted heart” and
he responded that his son “had not yet turned from darkness to light.”
¶20 Drawing on the metaphor of dark and light, the prosecutor
began his closing argument: “Yesterday, I asked the defendant’s father if
the defendant had not yet turned from the darkness; he said correct. And
in this case, the defendant did a lot of things in the darkness.”
¶21 He argued that Gooch harbored “dark feelings” for the
church and Sarah’s adherence to Mennonite custom provided context for
her abduction. In defense counsel’s closing argument, he asserted that
Gooch’s “character matters,” repeatedly claiming that the evidence proved
“that he was a nonviolent person” and he did not hold a grudge against the
Mennonite church. In rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed this claim,
arguing the evidence showed Gooch rejected the “peaceful environment”
he was raised in, and the principles of nonviolence held by his parents.
¶22 Even assuming the prosecutor’s reference to Gooch’s father’s
testimony was error, it does not rise to the level of reversible error. With
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Decision of the Court
defense counsel placing Gooch’s nonviolent character and Mennonite
upbringing at issue, the prosecutor’s use of evidence that he no longer held
to tenets of nonviolence, rejected his upbringing, and committed violent
acts constituted fair rebuttal. See Alvarez, 145 Ariz. at 373.
¶23 To the extent that Gooch did not open the door to evidence of
Sarah’s adherence to the Mennonite faith, the prosecutor used this evidence
to explain the nature of her abduction, her modest style of dress and head
covering, and the improbability that someone from her community
committed the offenses. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (relevancy test); State v.
Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52 (1993) (“[N]ot all harmful evidence is unfairly
prejudicial. After all, evidence which is relevant and material will generally
be adverse to the opponent.”).
¶24 That said, we caution prosecutors against remarking on the
potentially “dark” or “evil” aspects of a case, especially in cases where
irrelevant religious doctrine evidence is inadvertently introduced. See State
v. Robles, 135 Ariz. 92, 94 (1983) (reversible error to call attention to
irrelevant matters that probably affect the jury verdict). But a prosecutor’s
mere use of “excessive and emotional language is the bread and butter
weapon of counsel’s forensic arsenal” in closing argument. See Gonzales,
105 Ariz. at 437. When viewed in light of all testimony and evidence,
including the brevity and obliqueness of the reference to Gooch’s father’s
testimony, we do not find reversible error on this basis.
B. Comment on Gooch’s Veracity and Vouching for the State’s
Evidence
¶25 During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the lead
investigator to walk the jury through Gooch’s interview and break down
each time he provided an inconsistent or inaccurate fact. The prosecutor
employed a pattern of describing what Gooch said, then asking what the
evidence “actually” demonstrated. When asked if Gooch denied traveling
back to the area near Sarah’s body, the investigator responded that “he
wasn’t being truthful during that interview” because the evidence showed
he returned to the area in February. In cross-examination, defense counsel
highlighted consistencies in Gooch’s statements and the investigator’s use
of misleading interviewing tactics. The prosecutor’s closing argument
underscored problems with Gooch’s timeline, contending that the evidence
“brought to light” the truth. Defense counsel countered that Gooch, who
maintained a polite and cooperative demeanor in the interview, had been
manipulated by the investigator’s interviewing tactics.
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¶26 We do not find these instances constituted prosecutorial
error. The prosecutor did not cross the line into improper vouching. The
prosecutor admitted Gooch’s interview and, through the lead investigator,
emphasized how the evidence already before the jury contradicted his
timeline. The prosecutor did not place the prestige of the government
behind any witness or suggest that information not presented to the jury
supported the desired verdict. See Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 217, ¶ 75.
While the prosecutor should not have suggested that the State’s evidence
revealed the truth, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the
evidence conflicted with Gooch’s evolving version of events. Moreover, the
prosecutor’s emphasis on inaccuracies in Gooch’s statements was relevant
to establish consciousness of guilt. See State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485,
494, ¶ 27 (1999) (finding a defendant’s “inconsistent statements to police”
demonstrated “consciousness of guilt”).
C. Comment on the Role of Defense Counsel
¶27 In closing argument, defense counsel asserted that Sarah’s
murder, while tragic, had been pinned on the “wrong guy.” Defense
counsel highlighted the lack of any direct evidence, arguing “the State will
emphasize their circumstantial evidence as they just did in great detail, and
they will ignore the objective evidence that creates a reasonable doubt.” In
rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that jurors cannot, as defense counsel
urged, “look at one piece of evidence under a microscope and ignore
everything else.” The prosecutor contended that it is defense counsel’s
“job” to “create some of the doubt in the case, possible doubt, and why they
want to look at things under a microscope and not the entire picture,”
asserting that the prosecution provided them with the complete version of
“what actually happened.”
¶28 We do not find this instance constituted prosecutorial error.
We disagree with Gooch that the prosecutor’s argument denigrated the
entire institutional role of defense counsel in a criminal case. Gooch’s
defense focused not only on his blanket denial, but the lack of any direct
evidence linking him to Sarah’s abduction and murder. Defense counsel’s
primary strategy was to underscore the “absence” of a proverbial smoking
gun. The prosecutor’s remarks merely criticized defense tactics, even if
they suggested defense counsel’s role is to obfuscate the truth. See State v.
Ramos, 235 Ariz. 230, 238, ¶ 25 (App. 2014) (“Although some of the
prosecutor’s comments suggested that defense counsel was attempting to
mislead the jury, we cannot say that those statements did more than
criticize defense tactics.”). The prosecutor’s criticism of such defense
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strategies, even if impassioned, did not give rise to error. See Gonzales, 105
Ariz. at 437.
¶29 We find no error by the prosecutor sufficient to rise to the
level of having “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 79, ¶ 26
(1998) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). Further,
the superior court properly instructed the jury more than once that
questions, statements, and arguments made by counsel did not constitute
evidence. The court also instructed the jury that their verdict “must not be
influenced by sympathy or prejudice.” Even if the prosecutor’s lines of
questioning and remarks were improper, we find that the court’s
“instructions negated their effect.” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 337, ¶ 55
(2007).
II. The Prosecutor’s Closing Remarks on Premeditation Did Not
Result in Fundamental Error.
¶30 Gooch contends that the prosecutor committed error by
misstating the premeditation standard in closing argument. We review a
single, unobjected-to misstatement of law to determine “(1) whether it
constitutes prosecutorial error; (2) if so, whether the error was fundamental;
and (3) if fundamental, whether the error was prejudicial.” State v. Murray,
250 Ariz. 543, 549, ¶ 17 (2021).
¶31 Although we afford wide latitude in closing argument, State
v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 466, ¶ 196 (2016), a prosecutor’s “prerogative to
argue their version of the evidence does not sanction a misstatement of
law,” Murray, 250 Ariz. at 549, ¶ 18. We consider “the context in which the
statements were made as well as the entire record and to the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Nelson, 229 Ariz. 180, 189, ¶ 39 (2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
¶32 Relying on our findings in State v. Malone, 245 Ariz. 103 (App.
2018), vacated on other grounds, 247 Ariz. 29 (2019), Gooch argues the
prosecutor impermissibly diluted the premeditation standard in closing
argument. In Malone, the prosecutor argued that the defendant “[d]ecided
to kill her, he killed her. That’s it. That’s premeditation. There’s nothing
more.” Id. at 109, ¶ 27. We found this to be a “gross misstatement” of the
premeditation standard, which required proof of both intent and reflection.
Id. at 110, ¶ 28 (citing State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 479, ¶ 32 (2003)).
Because premeditation had been a central issue at trial, the misstatement of
law could not be viewed as a “triviality.” Id. We concluded, however, that
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the prosecutor’s misstatement of law did not amount to fundamental error.
Id. ¶ 30. Any error had been cured by the superior court’s correct jury
instruction on premeditation, and the prosecutor’s clarification that
premeditation requires reflection in another portion of closing argument.
Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
¶33 Here, the prosecutor’s closing remarks focused heavily on
evidence that Gooch conducted surveillance of Mennonite communities,
harbored resentment for the church, waited to abduct Sarah, bound her
wrists, and drove a long distance to commit and conceal the murder. The
prosecutor noted, in rebuttal, that there was no “dispute” as to
premeditation because Gooch’s defense involved a blanket denial. Without
objection, the prosecutor then argued that premeditation does not require
the defendant have “some plan written down on a napkin somewhere or
that he has some kind of plan to kill [Sarah], in particular. What we do
know is that the defendant abducted her from her community and took her
to a faraway location, a remote location of his choosing, where he killed her.
And that’s premeditated murder; shooting somebody in the back of the
head with intent is premeditated murder.” In the final jury instructions, the
superior court instructed the jury that premeditation required proof that
Gooch intended to kill Sarah and he “reflected on the decision before
killing” her.
¶34 While we agree with Gooch, the prosecutor seemed to
conflate intent with reflection, he did not simply argue the decision to kill
proved premeditation. The prosecutor focused on the prolonged series of
events, including the time Gooch took to surveil, abduct, and subdue his
murder victim. In this context, the prosecutor’s closing remarks did not
dilute or grossly misstate the standard by arguing the final cause of death,
a gunshot wound to the back of the head, demonstrated premeditation. The
prosecutor’s characterization of the evidence and law, taken together with
the superior court’s accurate jury instruction, remedied any potential error.
See State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270, 276, ¶ 25 (App. 2012) (finding
prosecutor’s initial misstatement of the law cured by clarification and
accurate jury instructions). Moreover, Gooch’s defense did not rest on
whether the evidence established both intent and reflection, but on total
innocence. The prosecutor’s brief discussion of premeditation did not
prejudice Gooch ability to present his chosen defense or prevent him from
receiving a fair trial. See State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 500, ¶ 27 (2005)
(finding erroneous jury instruction on premeditation did not “take away a
right essential to the defense” when “defense was of total innocence”).
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¶35 Gooch further contends that, absent the alleged error, the jury
would not have returned eleven votes for premeditation, a fact he argues
influenced the superior court’s sentencing decision. We find nothing in the
record to support this claim. The jury reached a unanimous verdict as to
felony murder, giving the court authority to impose either natural life or
life with the possibility of release. See A.R.S. § 13-751(A)(3). Although the
State asked the court to consider the eleven votes for premeditation, the
court did not adopt this rationale at sentencing. In imposing a natural life
sentence, the court referenced only the statutorily enumerated aggravated
factors, stressing the significant harm to the victim and her family. See
A.R.S. §§ 13-701(D), -752(Q). The court did not consider improper factors
in reaching its sentencing decision.
III. The Superior Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Convict
and Sentence Gooch for Misdemeanor Theft.
¶36 Gooch argues that the superior court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the misdemeanor theft offense because the State failed to
introduce evidence that it occurred in Arizona. A defect in subject matter
jurisdiction is never waived and may be raised at any time. Bruce v. State,
126 Ariz. 271, 272 (1980). We review challenges to the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Lay v. Nelson, 246 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 8 (App. 2019).
¶37 A court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal
offense to render a valid judgment and sentence. Peterson v. Jacobson, 2 Ariz.
App. 593, 595 (1966). As set forth in A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1), subject matter
jurisdiction is established if the “[c]onduct constituting any element of the
offense or a result of such conduct occurs within this state.” The
legislature’s “enactment of A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1) is an expression of intent
to exercise jurisdiction over a crime, wherever committed, when the ‘effect’
or ‘result’ of such crime occurs in Arizona.” State v. Flores, 218 Ariz. 407,
414, ¶ 17 (App. 2008). Interpreting the language of A.R.S. § 13-108(A)(1)
broadly, we have concluded that courts retain jurisdiction over an offense
“committed in another state if the result of such criminal activity has a
substantial effect within Arizona,” even if the “result” or “effect” is not an
element of the offense. State v. Yegan, 223 Ariz. 213, 215–16, ¶¶ 8–10 (App.
2009).
¶38 As relevant here, a person commits theft if, without lawful
authority, he knowingly “[c]ontrols property of another with the intent to
deprive the other person of such property.” A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1). At trial,
the evidence established that Sarah never left the house without her head
covering, and a witness observed her wearing it the day preceding her
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abduction. Gooch drove Sarah over the Arizona border, killed her, and left
her body in the Coconino National Forest. Later that day, video footage
captured Gooch throwing out a plastic bag. When investigators found
Sarah’s body, she was fully clothed with her hair still pulled into a tight bun
and hair net. The only clothing items missing were her underwear and
head covering.
¶39 Though largely circumstantial, sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s finding that Gooch knowingly controlled Sarah’s property with
the intent to deprive her of that property. See A.R.S. § 13-1801(A) (defining
“control” and “deprive”); State v. Denson, 241 Ariz. 6, 10, ¶ 17 (App. 2016)
(“Evidence sufficient to support a conviction can be direct or
circumstantial.”). It is irrelevant to the question of subject matter
jurisdiction if Gooch removed the items from Sarah or developed the intent
to deprive her of the items while still in New Mexico. Gooch discarded
Sarah’s body and permanently deprived her of the items in Arizona. Thus,
the taking of the property, the “intended consequence of his crime,”
occurred within Arizona and subjected him to this state’s jurisdiction. See
Yegan, 223 Ariz. at 217, ¶ 12. The superior court properly exercised its
jurisdiction over Gooch’s misdemeanor theft offense.
CONCLUSION
¶40 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Gooch’s convictions and
resulting sentences.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT
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