State v. Donald ( 2019 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    TERRELL ARTIST DONALD, Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 18-0619 PRPC
    FILED 3-14-2019
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2017-103477-002
    The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    APPEARANCES
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Adena J. Astrowsky
    Counsel for Respondent
    Terrell Artist Donald, Kingman
    Petitioner
    STATE v. DONALD
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
    B E E N E, Judge:
    ¶1           Petitioner Terrell Artist Donald petitions this Court for review
    from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We have
    considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review
    and deny relief.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Donald pled guilty to one count of sexual assault and two
    counts of attempted sexual assault. As stipulated in the plea agreement, the
    superior court sentenced Donald to the slightly aggravated term of 8 years’
    imprisonment, to be followed by lifetime probation with sex offender
    terms.
    ¶3             Donald filed a timely of-right petition for post-conviction
    relief after his counsel found no colorable claims for relief. The superior
    court summarily dismissed the petition, and Donald now seeks review. We
    have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c)
    and Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-4239(C).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶4            In his petition for review, Donald argues (1) he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) he did not voluntarily enter the plea
    agreement; (3) his case should have been severed from that of his co-
    defendant; and (4) other claims incorporated only by reference.
    ¶5            We deny relief. By entering a plea agreement, Donald waived
    “all non-jurisdictional defenses, errors, and defects” which occurred prior
    to the plea. State v. Moreno, 
    134 Ariz. 199
    , 200 (App. 1982). The waiver of
    non-jurisdictional defects includes alleged constitutional rights violations,
    Tollett v. Henderson, 
    411 U.S. 258
    , 267 (1973), and claims of ineffective
    assistance of counsel not directly related to the entry of the plea, State v.
    Quick, 
    177 Ariz. 314
    , 316 (App. 1993). Thus, Donald waived any claims
    associated with the severance of his case from that of his co-defendant.
    2
    STATE v. DONALD
    Decision of the Court
    ¶6             To the extent the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
    directly related to the plea agreement, Donald failed to show that counsel’s
    performance fell below objectively reasonable standards or that counsel’s
    deficient performance caused him prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984); State v. Nash, 
    143 Ariz. 392
    , 397 (1985). Donald
    provides little detail regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    merely alleging that counsel provided deficient advice and forced him to
    enter the plea agreement. First, the record shows that Donald voluntarily
    entered a favorable, legally sound plea agreement. Second, a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by more than
    generalizations and unsubstantiated allegations. State v. Borbon, 
    146 Ariz. 392
    , 399 (1985). Donald’s assertions are not supported by the record, he
    failed to present a colorable claim for relief, and an evidentiary hearing was
    not warranted. See State v. D’Ambrosio, 
    156 Ariz. 71
    , 73 (1988).
    ¶7              Donald’s contention that he entered the plea agreement
    “under duress” similarly fails. To be valid, a plea agreement must not be
    the “result of force, threats or promises.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3(a)(1)-(2),
    17.4(c); State v. Murdaugh, 
    209 Ariz. 19
    , 27, ¶ 33 (2004). Donald provides no
    supporting facts for this claim, nor does the record show that any parties
    forced or coerced Donald to enter the plea agreement. The record does
    show, however, that at the change of plea hearing, Donald specifically
    agreed that he was not impaired in any way, he understood the terms of
    the plea agreement, and he was not forced or threatened into entering the
    plea agreement. Donald has not demonstrated that his guilty plea was the
    result of duress.
    ¶8             Lastly, Donald presented additional claims in the superior
    court not specifically raised in the petition for review. A petition for review
    may not present issues or arguments through mere incorporation by
    reference. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(B). Accordingly, we decline to
    address any claims not directly presented in the petition for review. See
    State v. Rodriguez, 
    227 Ariz. 58
    , 61, ¶ 12, n.4 (App. 2010).
    3
    STATE v. DONALD
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶9   For the reasons above, we grant review but deny relief.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4