Purper v. Cai clancy/copperpoint ( 2019 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    JOHNNY E. PURPER, Petitioner,
    v.
    THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    CAI – CLANCY & CLANCY, Respondent Employer,
    COPPERPOINT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Respondent Carrier.
    No. 1 CA-IC 18-0009
    FILED 2-21-2019
    Special Action - Industrial Commission
    ICA Claim No. 20081-020320
    Carrier Claim No. 0805638
    The Honorable Gaetano J. Testini, Administrative Law Judge (Retired)
    AWARD SET ASIDE
    APPEARANCES
    Johnny E. Purper, Phoenix
    Petitioner
    Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
    By Stacey Ann Rogan
    Counsel for Respondent, ICA
    Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Company, Phoenix
    By Sharon M. Hensley
    Counsel for Respondent Employer/Carrier
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
    C A M P B E L L, Judge:
    ¶1           This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of
    Arizona (“ICA”) award and decision upon review. Purper contends the
    insurance carrier underpaid his temporary disability benefits and
    challenges his permanent award including supportive medical
    maintenance benefits. Because insufficient evidence supports the
    administrative law judge’s (“ALJ’s”) findings and decision, we must set
    aside the award.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2              Purper fell from a ladder in March 2008 while performing
    maintenance on palm trees in the course of his employment. The fall caused
    a substantial injury to his left heel and a cut on his hand. Soon after the
    accident, Purper’s workers’ compensation claim for his injury was accepted
    by his employer’s insurance carrier. His hand healed without incident, but
    the left heel required more care. Between 2008 and 2015, Purper underwent
    at least six surgeries. He also received pain management treatment. His
    claim was closed with awards for permanent disability and reopened at
    least twice between 2008 and 2016.
    ¶3            On March 15, 2017, the carrier again issued a notice of claim
    status closing Purper’s claim, effective February 14, 2017, with an
    impairment and permanent award. The carrier also issued a notice of
    supportive medical maintenance benefits, authorizing two office visits a
    year for three years, possible injections, an MRI or CT scan, and three office
    visits over the course of two years for pain management. Later, the carrier
    issued a notice of permanent disability benefits for a scheduled impairment
    of 48 percent of the left lower extremity, paid at 75 percent of the applicant’s
    average monthly wage of $3,000. Purper requested a hearing and
    investigation under A.R.S. section 23-1061(J), claiming that the carrier had
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    PURPER v. CAI CLANCY/COPPERPOINT
    Decision of the Court
    underpaid his temporary benefits beginning in 2012, and challenging the
    termination of his claim and subsequent award amount for permanent
    disability including supportive medical maintenance benefits.
    ¶4           Purper identified four time periods during which he believed
    underpayment of temporary benefits from the carrier occurred: (1) March
    20, 2012 to May 17, 2012; (2) October 16, 2012 to February 20, 2014; (3)
    October 10, 2016 to February 14, 2017; and (4) February 15, 2017 to July 18,
    2017. Purper testified that the carrier had underpaid his benefits during all
    four time periods. The ALJ treated the fourth time period as an appeal of
    the termination of Purper’s claim, explaining that because it closed on
    February 14, 2017, he would not be eligible for temporary benefits unless
    the ALJ found he needed more active treatment.
    ¶5              To rebut Purper’s claims, a carrier insurance adjuster
    reviewed Purper’s complaint and the disability benefits paid, testifying that
    Purper received all temporary benefits owed during the third time period
    and that his case was closed for a time in 2012, though her testimony was
    vague as to specific dates within 2012. Neither the judge nor counsel asked
    her to confirm whether she believed Purper had been appropriately paid
    for the first time period that Purper identified.
    ¶6            Purper also challenged the termination of his claim and
    permanent disability award, arguing the scheduled impairment award and
    the supportive medical care award were insufficient for his needs. The ALJ
    heard testimony from Purper’s doctor, who testified that after the date
    Purper’s claim was terminated, he still needed injections for pain
    management and bracing for his foot; doctor’s visits two to three times a
    year over the next three years; MRIs or CT scans; and pain management
    visits. He gave Purper’s foot an impairment rating of 46 percent but agreed
    with other doctors’ assessments that 48 percent was also an appropriate
    rating.
    ¶7            The ALJ found that Purper did not establish by a
    preponderance of the evidence that he was owed temporary partial
    disability benefits, citing only to the insurance adjuster’s testimony. The
    ALJ also ordered a scheduled permanent partial disability award of 48
    percent of the left lower extremity and further awarded additional
    supportive medical maintenance benefits suggested by Purper’s doctor.
    Purper appealed to the ICA, who affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full.
    3
    PURPER v. CAI CLANCY/COPPERPOINT
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8             On appeal, Purper renews his argument that he has been
    underpaid benefits and challenges the scheduled award for permanent
    disability including supportive medical maintenance benefits. Our review
    of a workers’ compensation case is limited to whether the record supports
    the ALJ’s findings. Pac. Fruit Exp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    153 Ariz. 210
    , 214 (1987).
    We will affirm the award so long as it is supported by reasonable evidence,
    viewing the record in the light most favorable to the ALJ decision. Delgado
    v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    183 Ariz. 129
    , 131 (App. 1994). When no evidence of
    record supports the decision, the award will be set aside. Van Dyke v.
    Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 
    92 Ariz. 173
    , 174 (1962); Special Fund Div./No Ins.
    Section v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    172 Ariz. 319
    , 324 (App. 1992).
    ¶9              Here, the evidence is insufficient to affirm the ALJ’s decision
    regarding underpayment of Purper’s temporary benefits. The ALJ based
    the factual findings solely on the claim adjustor’s testimony. She only
    testified that Purper had been paid in full from October 10, 2016 to February
    14, 2017 (the third time period Purper identified) and that his case was
    closed at some point in 2012. While the carrier’s attorney commented
    during the hearing that Purper’s claim was closed during the second time
    period, October 16, 2012 to February 20, 2014, no testimony confirms that
    assertion. Moreover, neither the ALJ decision nor our search of the record
    yields any evidence to rebut Purper’s assertion that he was underpaid
    benefits during the first time period, March 20, 2012 to May 17, 2012.
    Accordingly, insufficient evidence supports the finding that Purper was
    provided with all benefits due.
    ¶10           We need not address whether reasonable evidence supported
    the ALJ decision on the remainder of Purper’s appeal, because to do so
    would be futile. When reviewing a workers’ compensation award, A.R.S.
    section 23-951(D) “limit[s] this court’s power to modify, affirm in part, or
    remand with directions.” Arrowhead Press, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 
    134 Ariz. 21
    , 24 (App. 1982). Thus, we may either affirm the award in its entirety or
    set the award aside. Id.; A.R.S. § 23-951(D) (“The court of appeals shall enter
    judgment either affirming or setting aside the award, order or decision.”).
    Because we have determined that insufficient evidence supports the ALJ’s
    decision on the issue of temporary benefits, we must set aside the entire
    award, regardless of whether sufficient evidence exists to resolve the
    remaining issues. See Arrowhead Press, Inc., 
    134 Ariz. at 24-25
    .
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    PURPER v. CAI CLANCY/COPPERPOINT
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11   For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the ALJ’s award.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-IC 18-0009

Filed Date: 2/21/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021