State v. Williams ( 2023 )

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
KRISTI MEGAN WILLIAMS, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 22-0388
FILED 8-22-2023
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015CR202101029
The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Eric Knobloch
Counsel for Appellee
Jill L. Evans Attorney at Law, Flagstaff
By Jill L. Evans
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.
C R U Z, Judge:
¶1 Kristi Megan Williams appeals her convictions and sentences
for theft of a means of transportation, theft, and false reporting to a law
enforcement agency. For the following reasons, we affirm Williams’
convictions and sentences for theft of a means of transportation and false
reporting to a law enforcement agency, merge her conviction for theft into
her conviction for theft of a means of transportation, and vacate her
sentence for theft.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 On August 23, 2021, J.C. drove to a remote area in Lake
Havasu and committed suicide by shooting himself in the head next to his
vehicle. Later that night, J.B. called 9-1-1 and reported discovering a body.
Officers found J.C.’s body lying on the ground, but his vehicle and trailer
full of construction tools were missing.
¶3 Officers interviewed J.B., who told them he and Williams had
been driving a Dodge Challenger and gotten “stuck” in the desert.
Williams and J.B. had found J.C.’s body and vehicle. Instead of
immediately calling 9-1-1 as J.B. wanted to do, Williams took off alone with
J.C.’s vehicle and trailer. She drove to a friend’s home, and after several
hours the friend drove her, in another vehicle, back to the scene where
officers had discovered J.C.’s body.
¶4 Williams contacted officers at the scene and eventually
admitted having taken J.C.’s vehicle and trailer after finding his body.
Police located J.C.’s vehicle and trailer across the street from the friend’s
house, and the Dodge Challenger in the desert. The Dodge Challenger,
which was registered to S.O., had been reported as stolen from San
Bernardino County earlier on August 23, and when the Mohave County
officers ran the vehicle through the National Criminal Information Center
(“NCIC”) database they found the stolen vehicle notification.
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
¶5 A grand jury indicted Williams on two counts of theft of a
means of transportation, class 3 felonies (counts 1 & 2), one count of theft
(value over $4000), a class 3 felony (count 3), and one count of false
reporting to a law enforcement agency, a class 1 misdemeanor (count 4).
¶6 At trial, Williams moved for judgment of acquittal on counts
1, 2, and 3 at the close of the State’s evidence. The superior court granted
the motion as to count 2 (theft of the Dodge Challenger owned by S.O.). A
jury found Williams guilty of counts 1 and 3 but found that the value of the
property for the theft charge was between $1000 and $2000. The superior
court found Williams guilty of count 4. The court sentenced Williams to
eighteen years in prison for count 1, a concurrent sentence of four years in
prison for count 3, and time served for count 4. Williams timely appealed,
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. Testimony About the Dodge Challenger
¶7 Williams first argues the superior court violated her Sixth
Amendment right to confront S.O. by allowing testimony that S.O.’s Dodge
Challenger had been reported stolen.
¶8 As noted supra ¶ 5, Williams was charged with two counts of
theft of a means of transportation. Count 1 pertained to J.C.’s vehicle and
count 2 pertained to S.O.’s Dodge Challenger, the vehicle Williams
abandoned in the desert before taking J.C.’s vehicle. Before the superior
court acquitted Williams of count 2, Detectives Levine and Peterson both
testified about the Dodge Challenger. The State did not call S.O. as a
witness.
¶9 Detective Levine testified that Williams told him S.O. gave
her permission to use the Dodge Challenger, but that she did not know
S.O.’s last name or have his contact information. Detective Levine further
testified that the Dodge Challenger was registered to “Scott” and had come
“back as a stolen vehicle.” Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.
¶10 Detective Peterson testified that he found the Dodge
Challenger 300 yards from J.C.’s body and ran “vehicle information” on it.
Detective Peterson further testified that a NCIC stolen vehicle notification
“popped up.” When Detective Peterson began reading notes from the
NCIC notification, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds, and the
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
superior court sustained the objection. The State did not seek to introduce
the NCIC report into evidence and it is not part of the record in this case.
¶11 Generally, we review superior court rulings on the
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo
challenges to admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. State v. Tucker,
215 Ariz. 298, 314-15, ¶¶ 58, 61 (2007). Because Williams failed to object to
the testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds below, she has the burden
of establishing that fundamental, prejudicial error occurred. State v.
Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018); see also State v. Alvarez, 213 Ariz.
467, 469, ¶ 7 (App. 2006) (“A ‘hearsay’ objection does not preserve for
appellate review a claim that admission of the evidence violated the
Confrontation Clause.”). “A defendant establishes fundamental error by
showing that (1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error
took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was
so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Escalante,
245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21.
¶12 Williams repeatedly refers to “the admission of the stolen
vehicle report” in her briefs. But, as noted supra ¶ 10, the State did not seek
to introduce the NCIC report into evidence, it is not part of the record in
this case, and when Detective Peterson attempted to read the NCIC report
during his testimony, Williams objected on hearsay grounds and the
superior court sustained her objection. The question, then, is whether the
detectives’ in-court testimony about the stolen vehicle report violated
Williams’ rights under the Confrontation Clause.
¶13 The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “Before testimonial
statements of an absent witness may be admitted into evidence, the
Confrontation Clause requires a showing that the witness is unavailable
and that the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz. 296, 299, ¶ 11 (2012).
¶14 The State does not dispute that the complained-of testimony
was erroneously admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, but
instead argues Williams has not shown its admission was prejudicial. We
agree. The evidence pertained to the dismissed count and was largely
immaterial to the remaining counts. See State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 455
(App. 1996) (admission of statements in violation of Confrontation Clause
was harmless error because statements were largely immaterial and their
exclusion would not have affected the jury’s verdict); see also State v. Romero,
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
240 Ariz. 503, 509, ¶ 14 (App. 2016) (“In determining whether evidentiary
errors are harmless, courts also consider whether the error involved the
admission or exclusion of primary evidence.”). The admission of the
officers’ testimony did not rise to the level of fundamental error.
II. Right to Counsel
¶15 Williams next argues the superior court abused its discretion
and violated her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment by failing to
hold a hearing pursuant to State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340 (2004), and by failing
to appoint new counsel to remedy an irreconcilable conflict. We review this
claim for fundamental error. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21.
¶16 In May 2022, several months before trial, Williams sent the
superior court a written notification requesting a new attorney because she
had not had contact with her appointed attorney. At a hearing later that
month, the superior court asked Williams if she was still requesting a new
attorney. Williams indicated that she had spoken with her attorney and
was “uncertain about what to do.” When the court suggested continuing
the matter to give her an opportunity to speak with her attorney further,
Williams agreed, stating, “Sure, yeah. That sounds great.”
¶17 In June 2022, at the next hearing on Williams’ request for new
counsel, Williams told the court, “I don’t know what to do. I’m just waiting
[to hear from the State about a plea offer]. I don’t have problems with
[defense counsel]. I don’t have issues with anything.” The court replied,
“So as far as I understand, then, I will take that as the defendant is
withdrawing the potential request for a new attorney. And I’ll simply
expect that you and [defense counsel] will be in contact with each other and
hopefully be able to figure out any issues that you need to figure out
together.” Williams replied, “Okay.” Williams later sent the court two
additional written communications complaining about defense counsel but
did not again request new counsel, and the superior court took no further
action on the requests.1
1 The additional written communications were dated July 12, 2022,
and July 17, 2022, six days and one day before the first day of trial on July
18, 2022, respectively. In the July 12 communication Williams stated that
she had spoken with defense counsel and was “shocked” to find out that
defense counsel was not planning to call the witnesses Williams wanted to
call because it was too late to do so. Williams alleged counsel told her that
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
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¶18 Indigent criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right
to competent counsel. Torres, 208 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 6. A “defendant is not
entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her
attorney.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When a
defendant requests new counsel, the superior court “has the duty to inquire
as to the basis” of that request. Id. at 343, ¶ 7.
¶19 Here, the superior court held a hearing on Williams’ pretrial
request for new counsel. At the hearing, Williams indicated that she did
not have a problem with defense counsel’s representation and did not have
“issues with anything.” Williams does not assert that she later renewed her
request for new counsel. Instead, she argues the superior court abused its
discretion by failing to sua sponte hold another hearing after she sent the
court the July 12 and July 17 communications wherein she complained
about defense counsel.
¶20 We find no abuse of discretion. The superior court was not
required to hold a Torres hearing after Williams withdrew her request for
new counsel and did not thereafter renew the request.
III. Lesser-Included Offense
¶21 Finally, Williams argues the offense of theft of tools charged
in count 3 was a lesser-included offense of theft of means of transportation
charged in count 1, violating double jeopardy principles. The State
concedes, and we agree, that Williams’ theft conviction should be merged
with her theft of a means of transportation conviction. See State v. Fillmore,
187 Ariz. 174, 179-80 (App. 1996) (defendant committed one theft under the
“single larceny doctrine” when he stole a tractor, trailer, and the trailer’s
contents “at the same time and the same place” because “the gist of the
offense is the felonious taking of property” and the defendant’s taking was
one continuous transaction) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, we merge the two convictions and modify the
if she was unhappy about the situation, she could call the State bar.
Williams also recounted a conversation with defense counsel about court
attire. In the July 17 communication Williams again complained about
defense counsel not calling witnesses and told the court that she had a
friend bring her clothes to the jail for trial, but that the jail had refused them
and defense counsel had failed to tell her she was the only one who could
bring clothing to jail.
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STATE v. WILLIAMS
Decision of the Court
judgment to reflect a single conviction and sentence for theft of a means of
transportation. See Merlina v. Jejna, 208 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 14 n.4 (App. 2004).
CONCLUSION
¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams’ convictions
and sentences for theft of a means of transportation and false reporting to a
law enforcement agency, merge her conviction for theft into her conviction
for theft of a means of transportation, and vacate her sentence for theft.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
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