Troxel v. Timberline ( 2023 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    RANDALL TROXEL and MARY TROXEL husband and wife,
    Plaintiffs/Appellants,
    v.
    TIMBERLINE RV & MHP, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; CITY
    OF SHOW LOW, an Arizona municipal corporation,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 22-0677
    FILED 8-24-2023
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
    No. S0900CV202000457
    The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Nick D. Patton Attorney at Law PLLC, Phoenix
    By Nicholas D. Patton
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC, Phoenix
    By Ryan John McCarthy, Johnathan Paul Barnes, Jr.
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Timberline RV & MHP
    Doyle Hernandez Millam, Phoenix
    By William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millam, Nathan Andrews
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee City of Show Low
    TROXEL, et al. v. TIMBERLINE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
    M O R S E, Judge:
    ¶1           Randall and Mary Troxel appeal from the superior court's
    grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Timberline RV & MHP,
    LLC ("Timberline") and the City of Show Low ("the City"). For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            Timberline operates a recreational vehicle and mobile home
    park in Show Low, Arizona. Randall and Mary Troxel were, at all times
    relevant to this appeal, residents of this park.
    ¶3            In August 2019, the well that Timberline used to service
    potable water to its residents began to fail, requiring Timberline to find
    another source of water. Timberline contracted with Copper State Drilling
    to construct a new well on the property. Timberline also contracted with
    the City to purchase drinking water for residents until the new well could
    be put into use.
    ¶4           Copper State completed construction of the well on December
    1, 2019. Around this same time, Mary Troxel became infected with Heavy
    Growth Streptococcus Intermedius, leading to an abscess on her brain. She
    was admitted to the hospital for her condition on December 11, 2019.
    ¶5           The Troxels sued Timberline and the City, alleging that
    Mary's infection was introduced via drinking water provided by one or
    both defendants.
    ¶6            Timberline moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
    Troxels failed to provide sufficient evidence either (1) that contaminated
    water caused Mary's illness; or (2) that Timberline, rather than the City,
    provided that water to Mary. The City joined Timberline's motion on the
    first issue. The superior court granted the motion after determining that
    the Troxels failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to
    find that the water provided by either defendant caused Mary's injury.
    2
    TROXEL, et al. v. TIMBERLINE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶7            The Troxels timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
    A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8           We review the superior court's grant of summary judgment
    de novo. Coulter v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 
    241 Ariz. 440
    , 447, ¶ 23 (App. 2017).
    "When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the
    light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
    Allen, 
    231 Ariz. 209
    , 213, ¶ 14 (App. 2012). Summary judgment is
    appropriate when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute
    as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    ¶9           Causation is a factual issue that will ordinarily be reserved for
    the jury. Gipson v. Kasey, 
    214 Ariz. 141
    , 143, ¶ 9 (2007). Nevertheless,
    summary judgment on the issue "may be appropriate if no reasonable juror
    could conclude that . . . the damages were proximately caused by the
    defendant's conduct." 
    Id.
     at 143 n.1.
    ¶10            Accordingly, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
    present enough evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the
    defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Ritchie
    v. Krasner, 
    221 Ariz. 288
    , 298, ¶ 23 (App. 2009). "This evidence must provide
    support for the jury's 'conclusion that it is more likely than not that [the]
    defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the result.'"
    
    Id.
     (quoting Wisener v. State, 
    123 Ariz. 148
    , 150 (1979)) (alteration in original).
    ¶11            This case does not present a situation in which one of two
    parties has caused harm and the only uncertainty lies in determining the
    party at fault. E.g., Salica v. Tucson Heart Hosp.-Carondelet, L.L.C., 
    224 Ariz. 414
    , 418, ¶ 14 (App. 2010). Instead, we are faced with a case in which the
    cause of the harm is unknown. In support of their motion for summary
    judgment, Timberline provided the court with an affidavit from an expert
    in toxicology, who stated with "a reasonable degree of scientific certainty"
    that Streptococcus Intermedius is not a waterborne pathogen. Timberline's
    expert also identified several possible alternative sources for Mary's
    infection. The Troxels provided an expert affidavit in which their expert
    merely stated that Streptococcus Intermedius "has not been studied as a
    waterborne organism" and that it "may be viable in water as a medium of
    transport." But during oral argument on Timberline's motion, the Troxels
    admitted that they did not know whether Mary's infection came from
    drinking water and argued that "it's just as likely that she got it from the
    3
    TROXEL, et al. v. TIMBERLINE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    water as anywhere else." The Troxels argue that this disagreement is
    enough to defeat Timberline's motion. We disagree.
    ¶12            "The opponents of a motion for summary judgment do not
    raise a genuine issue of fact by merely stating in the record that such an
    issue exists. Rather, they must show that competent evidence is available
    which will justify a trial on the issue." Flowers v. K-Mart Corp., 
    126 Ariz. 495
    ,
    499 (App. 1980). Even assuming that Streptococcus Intermedius is "viable
    in water as a medium of transport," the Troxels must provide the court with
    some competent evidence to show that Mary Troxel's infection was more
    likely to have been caused by contaminated water than by any of the other
    possible alternative sources identified by Timberline's expert. And
    although "[p]roximate cause may be determined from circumstantial
    evidence," Mason v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 
    127 Ariz. 546
    , 553 (App. 1980), the
    circumstantial evidence must allow the jury to conclude reasonably that the
    plaintiff's injury was more likely than not caused by the defendant's
    conduct, see Ritchie, 221 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 23. Sheer speculation is not enough
    to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 
    195 Ariz. 349
    , 357, ¶ 29 (App. 1999).
    ¶13             "A party may prove proximate causation by presenting facts
    from which a causal relationship may be inferred, but the party cannot
    leave causation to the jury's speculation." Salica, 224 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 16. The
    fact that Mary got sick around the time that Timberline replaced their well
    is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mary's
    illness was caused by either defendant's drinking water. See Breidler v.
    Indus. Comm'n, 
    94 Ariz. 258
    , 262 (1963) (quoting Charlton Bros. Transp. Co. v.
    Garrettson, 
    51 A.2d 642
    , 646 (Md. App. 1947)) (noting that, absent some
    proof of a causal relation, a sequence of events is insufficient to establish
    that the first event caused the subsequent harm). Accordingly, the superior
    court correctly granted the motion for summary judgment.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14          For the above stated reasons, we affirm the superior court's
    decision granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0677

Filed Date: 8/24/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/24/2023