Arete v. Nguyen ( 2022 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    ARETE PHARMACY NETWORK, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    NAM Q. NGUYEN, Defendant/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 21-0672
    FILED 8-25-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2019-007421
    The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    L&G Law Group LLP, Scottdale
    By John E. Drazkowski, Sean Donlan
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
    Clark Hill PLC, Scottsdale
    By Ryan J. Lorenz, Christopher Thomas Curran
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
    ARETE v. NGUYEN
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
    F U R U Y A, Judge:
    ¶1          Nam Q. Nguyen appeals the superior court’s grant of
    summary judgment in favor of Arete Pharmacy Network, LLC (“Arete”).
    Nguyen argues that the evidence supporting the court’s award of damages
    was inadmissible and lacked foundation and that he adequately disputed
    the amount due. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             In August 2018, Silva Pharmacy, Inc. (“Silva”) contracted with
    Arete for a variety of programs and services in exchange for fees. Silva and
    Arete also entered a “Central Pay Agreement,” allowing Arete to “accept all
    payments due under all applicable Arete Third Party Contracts.” Nguyen,
    an owner of Silva at that time, signed a personal guaranty (the “Guaranty”)
    promising, as relevant, “the full and timely payment of all indebtedness,
    obligations, and liabilities of Silva owed to Arete.” In November 2018, Silva
    was sold to IDC Holdings, LLC, but Nguyen’s Guaranty remained active.
    ¶3             Beginning in April 2019, Silva initiated a series of claim
    reversals. A claim reversal occurs when a pharmacy, like Silva, reverses a
    reimbursement after finding it should not have been paid under an
    insurance plan. These reversals were then credited from Arete’s account and
    withheld from Silva to account for the reversal. However, because Silva
    allegedly initiated more than 900 reversals, Silva was left with a negative
    balance owed to Arete.
    ¶4             Arete sued Silva and Nguyen for the amount owed under
    their contracts and the Guaranty. Silva filed bankruptcy and was later
    dismissed. Following discovery, Arete moved for summary judgment, citing
    information from its database—in the form of a spreadsheet (the
    “Spreadsheet”) showing claim reversals totaling $741,841.17. It also
    submitted an affidavit from its controller, John Cailloutte, to support and
    explain the Spreadsheet. Although discovery was already closed, Nguyen
    nevertheless requested permission to depose out-of-state witnesses
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    ARETE v. NGUYEN
    Decision of the Court
    pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). The superior court
    denied Nguyen’s motion, and Nguyen filed a substantive response to
    Arete’s motion for summary judgment, supported by Nguyen’s affidavit.
    ¶5             Following oral argument, the court granted Arete’s motion
    for summary judgment, awarding damages against Nguyen in the principal
    amount of $741,841.17 plus costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees. Nguyen
    timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised
    Statutes §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6              We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. Modular
    Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw Techs., Inc., 
    221 Ariz. 515
    , 518, ¶ 9 (App. 2009). We
    view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom
    summary judgment was entered and draw all justifiable inferences in its
    favor. 
    Id. at 517, ¶ 2
    . Summary judgment is appropriate when “the moving
    party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P.
    56(a). Parties are permitted to use affidavits to support or oppose motions
    for summary judgment, but such “must be made on personal knowledge,
    set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant
    is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(5).
    ¶7               We review the superior court’s rulings regarding the
    admissibility of evidence in a summary judgment for an abuse of discretion.
    United Ins. Co. v. Lutz, 
    227 Ariz. 411
    , 415, ¶ 19 (App. 2011). “A court abuses
    its discretion if it commits legal error in reaching a discretionary conclusion,
    or if the record lacks substantial evidence to support its ruling.” Tritschler v.
    Allstate Ins. Co., 
    213 Ariz. 505
    , 518, ¶ 41 (App. 2006).
    ¶8              Citing Villas at Hidden Lakes Condos. Ass’n v. Geupel Constr. Co.,
    Inc., 
    174 Ariz. 72
    , 81 (App. 1992), Nguyen first argues Cailloutte’s affidavit
    lacked sufficient foundation to be admissible, and therefore, could not be
    considered to prove damages. However, in Villas, the affidavit in question
    did not state whether the affiant had ever reviewed the exhibits attached to
    the motion for summary judgment or that he was familiar with the person
    who prepared exhibits or the manner in which they were prepared. 
    Id.
     at 81–
    82. Moreover, that affidavit recited conclusory facts based on computer-
    generated exhibits that were inadmissible hearsay. 
    Id.
    ¶9            By contrast, Cailloutte’s affidavit established he was Arete’s
    controller at all relevant times and handled day-to-day accounting,
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    ARETE v. NGUYEN
    Decision of the Court
    including reimbursements and reversals. Cailloutte’s affidavit also
    establishes he had personal knowledge of and reviewed Arete’s business
    records—including the information contained in the Spreadsheet. Therefore,
    Villas is inapposite.
    ¶10           Next, Nguyen argues the Spreadsheet was inadmissible
    under Arizona Rules of Evidence (“Rule”) 1002 and 1006 because it was an
    unoriginal summary and Arete failed to provide originals or copies of
    underlying documentation supporting that summary. The court considered
    and rejected these arguments. Addressing Rule 1002, the court found the
    Spreadsheet was a business record, not an unoriginal summary. As such, the
    court determined the Spreadsheet was “admissible under Rule 803(6).”
    ¶11            Cailloutte’s affidavit provided adequate foundation under
    Rule 803(6) to establish the Spreadsheet as a business record. In it, Cailloutte
    affirmed that the contents of the Spreadsheet were recorded at or near the
    time of events by someone with knowledge and were kept in the regular
    course of business. The court’s finding that the Spreadsheet qualifies as a
    business record is consistent with Arizona law, and the court did not abuse
    its discretion by admitting it for purposes of summary judgment. See GM
    Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 
    165 Ariz. 1
    , 8 (App. 1990) (holding that
    an affidavit could establish damages for summary judgment when it was
    based in part on review of admissible business records). Because the
    Spreadsheet was analyzed and admitted as a business record, not an
    unoriginal summary, the provisions of Rule 1006 were likewise inapplicable,
    and the court did not err in not considering those provisions further.
    ¶12             Finally, while Nguyen does not dispute his obligations under
    the Guaranty, he argues he disputed the amount of damages sufficiently to
    defeat Arete’s motion for summary judgment. To be sure, Arete bears the
    burden of proving its damages. Gilmore v. Cohen, 
    95 Ariz. 34
    , 36 (1963). The
    mere absence of a genuine dispute of material fact does not automatically
    entitle Arete to summary judgment. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Allen, 
    231 Ariz. 209
    , 213, ¶ 16 (App. 2012). Rather, even in the face of Nguyen’s failure to
    offer opposing evidence, Arete maintained the burden of persuasion, and
    Nguyen could have shown Arete’s evidence “is susceptible to different
    assessments by a reasonable finder of fact.” Comerica Bank v. Mahmoodi, 
    224 Ariz. 289
    , 292–93, ¶ 20 (App. 2010) (citation omitted).
    ¶13            Nguyen argues his affidavit controverted Arete’s evidence of
    its damages, thereby creating a dispute as to an issue of material fact
    sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Nguyen’s affidavit states that the
    Spreadsheet “cannot possibly be correct,” as it appeared to be a
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    ARETE v. NGUYEN
    Decision of the Court
    “reproduction by someone with Arete who could insert any numbers” and
    “could just be fabricated numbers on a piece of paper, rather than actual
    documentation of reversed financial transactions.”
    ¶14             These statements are essentially arguments regarding the
    character and admissibility of the Spreadsheet. But “[w]e review whether
    summary judgment was proper based on the record made in the superior
    court.” See Zumar Indus., Inc. v. Caymus Corp., 
    244 Ariz. 163
    , 166, ¶ 7 (App.
    2017). Because we affirm the court’s evidentiary rulings and are bound by
    the record, we disregard those portions of Nguyen’s affidavit that express
    opinion as to the Spreadsheet’s character as a business record or its
    credibility. See id; supra ¶¶ 10–11.
    ¶15            Nguyen’s affidavit further states that the Spreadsheet was
    inaccurate because it contained reversals but did not show any
    reimbursements for the same period and did not provide additional
    documentation. But our review of the record reveals that, contrary to
    Nguyen’s affidavit, the Spreadsheet did contain a significant number of
    positive transactions, which were deducted from the total damages.
    ¶16             The remainder of Nguyen’s affidavit is self-serving,
    conclusory, or rests primarily on allegations of his own pleading rather than
    establishing facts that affirmatively contradict Arete’s evidence. Thus,
    Nguyen’s affidavit is inadequate to prevent entry of summary judgment. See
    Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Florez v. Sargeant, 
    185 Ariz. 521
    , 526 (1996) (“[A]ffidavits
    that only set forth ultimate facts or conclusions of law can neither support
    nor defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).
    ¶17             Faced with admissible evidence establishing damages,
    Nguyen was required to “set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for
    trial” to defeat summary judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Nguyen argues he
    did so by providing a declaration from Silva’s bankruptcy alleging that
    certain third parties owed Silva $1,000,000 “for funds reclaimed that should
    not have been reclaimed,” which could be used to offset the documented
    reversals. But this evidence does not negate Nguyen’s liability under the
    Guarantee, and therefore, does not present a genuine issue for trial. See 
    id.
    And Nguyen presents no further facts or evidence to contradict the
    Spreadsheet’s summation of money owed by Silva to Arete.
    ¶18             Because Arete’s evidence established its damages by
    admissible evidence and Nguyen’s evidence failed to raise any substantive
    dispute as to any material facts, Arete met its burden of persuasion and was
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    ARETE v. NGUYEN
    Decision of the Court
    entitled to summary judgment and its damages as a matter of law. See Ariz.
    R. Civ. P. 56(a), (e).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶19           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 21-0672

Filed Date: 8/25/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/25/2022