J v. v. Hon blair/morris ( 2023 )


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  •                                     IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    J.V., Petitioner,
    v.
    THE HONORABLE MICHAEL BLAIR,
    Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
    In and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent/Judge,
    BRADFORD MORRIS,
    Real Party in Interest.
    No. 1 CA-SA 23-0075
    FILED 8-31-2023
    Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2022-144360-001
    The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge
    ACCEPT JURISDICTION; DENY RELIEF
    COUNSEL
    Legal Services for Crime Victims in Arizona, Sun City
    By Jamie Balson
    Counsel for Petitioner
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Kassandra Garcia
    Counsel for Bradford Lee Morris, Real Party in Interest
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Douglas Gerlach
    Counsel for State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the opinion of the court, in which
    Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined, and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs specially
    concurred.
    G A S S, Chief Judge:
    ¶1            J.V., a victim, seeks review of an order suspending
    prosecution for two years for criminal defendant Bradford Morris to
    complete a deferred prosecution program. J.V. asks this court to interpret
    an Arizona statute and a rule of criminal procedure to mean the superior
    court has discretion to reject a deferred prosecution agreement for a legally
    eligible defendant. J.V. contends a contrary reading violates her right to be
    heard under Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBOR). We accept
    jurisdiction but deny relief.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             Following a domestic violence event between J.V. and Morris,
    the State filed criminal charges against Morris. After investigating, the State
    offered to dismiss the charges against Morris if he agreed to participate in,
    and successfully complete, a deferred prosecution program called the
    Domestic Violence Excessive Response Diversion Program (deferred DV
    prosecution).
    ¶3            For a defendant to be legally eligible for deferred DV
    prosecution, three things must be true. First, the charges the defendant faces
    must arise under certain domestic violence offenses. Second, a defendant
    then must meet certain criteria, including not having been convicted of
    various charges. Third, the victim must have “a history of committing acts
    of domestic violence against [the defendant]. This history does not have to
    be contained in police reports but does need to be demonstrated by means
    other than mere self-reporting.” Maricopa County Attorney’s Office
    Prosecution Policies and Procedures, Domestic Violence Excessive Response
    Diversion,    Procedure      17.8,     rev.      1     (Sept.    29,   2021),
    https://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/437/Prosecution-Policies
    (select “Procedure 17.8”) (Procedure 17.8).
    2
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶4           Morris is legally eligible for deferred DV prosecution. Morris
    faces charges for a qualifying domestic violence offense. Before this case,
    Morris had no criminal history. The defense provided information showing
    eight documented instances of violence and abuse J.V. committed against
    Morris and his children, including court documents, photos, and videos.
    The defense also described “a lack of physical evidence supporting a
    conviction” and inconsistent witness statements.
    ¶5            At first, Morris refused to accept the State’s deferred DV
    prosecution offer. The parties then participated in a settlement conference.
    During the settlement conference, Morris changed his mind and agreed to
    deferred DV prosecution. Though J.V. and her attorney did not participate
    in the settlement conference, they attended it. J.V. later moved, under the
    VBOR, to be heard on the deferred prosecution offer. The superior court
    granted the motion and held a hearing, during which J.V. read her victim’s
    statement. The superior court then denied the State’s motion to suspend
    prosecution.
    ¶6            The State moved to reconsider the denial of its motion to
    suspend prosecution, arguing the superior court lacked discretion to deny
    the motion for a legally eligible defendant. Following oral argument, the
    superior court “reluctantly” signed an order suspending prosecution after
    finding it was legally obligated to do so. At the same time, the superior
    court encouraged J.V. to request special action review. J.V.’s special action
    petition followed.
    SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION
    ¶7            Though “highly discretionary,” special action jurisdiction
    may be appropriate when a party has no “equally plain, speedy, and
    adequate remedy by appeal.” Prosise v. Kottke, 
    249 Ariz. 75
    , 77 ¶ 10 (App.
    2020) (quoting Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a)). “Jurisdiction is also appropriate
    ‘in matters of statewide importance, issues of first impression, cases
    involving purely legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again.’” 
    Id.
    (quoting State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 
    203 Ariz. 46
    , 47 ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).
    ¶8              The VBOR provides victims “standing . . . to bring a special
    action . . . seeking to enforce any right or to challenge an order denying any
    right guaranteed to victims.” A.R.S. § 13-4437.A; Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act.
    2(a)(2).
    ¶9            This case involves two issues of first impression: (1) whether
    the superior court may reject a deferred prosecution agreement for a legally
    eligible defendant and (2) whether restricting the superior court from doing
    3
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    so violates a victim’s right to be heard. No Arizona authority directly
    answers those questions. Because J.V. has no right to appeal and has no
    other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, we exercise our discretion to
    accept jurisdiction.
    ANALYSIS
    I.     Allowing the superior court to reject a deferred prosecution
    agreement for a legally eligible defendant would violate the
    separation of powers clause of the Arizona Constitution.
    ¶10           J.V. argues the superior court had the discretion to deny the
    State’s motion to suspend the prosecution. In challenging the superior
    court’s ruling to the contrary, J.V. argues this court can interpret Rule 38.1,
    Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and A.R.S. § 11-365 to allow the
    superior court to reject a deferred prosecution agreement for a legally
    eligible defendant without violating the separation of powers clause. J.V.’s
    proposed interpretation runs contrary to the statute’s plain language.
    ¶11             This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de
    novo. J.L.F. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 
    208 Ariz. 159
    , 161 ¶ 10
    (App. 2004). A statute’s plain language guides its interpretation. See Ariz.
    Advoc. Network Found. v. State, 
    250 Ariz. 109
    , 114 ¶ 19 (App. 2020). If the
    statute’s plain language is unambiguous, this court “must give effect to that
    language without employing other rules of statutory construction.” Parsons
    v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 
    242 Ariz. 320
    , 323 ¶ 11 (App. 2017). This court
    also applies the principles of statutory construction to rules. State v. Aguilar,
    
    209 Ariz. 40
    , 47 ¶ 23 (2004).
    ¶12           The legislature expressly granted the county attorney “sole
    discretion to decide whether to divert or defer prosecution of an offender.”
    A.R.S. § 11-365. Exercising that discretion, the Maricopa County Attorney’s
    Office developed the deferred DV prosecution and specified the legal
    eligibility requirements for that program. To implement the county
    attorney’s statutory discretion, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted Rule
    38.1, titled “Suspension of Prosecution for a Deferred Prosecution
    Program.” Under Rule 38, the superior court, “[a]fter reviewing the motion
    and the defendant’s signed consent, and upon finding the defendant legally
    eligible for a deferred prosecution program, . . . must suspend further
    proceedings for the period specified in the motion, not exceeding two
    years.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 38.1(c) (emphasis added).
    ¶13           The legislature’s statutory grant of authority to the county
    attorney, as recognized by the Arizona Supreme Court’s Rule 38.1, tracks
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    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    the “Distribution of Powers” directive in the Arizona Constitution. See Ariz.
    Const. art. 3. As applicable here, Arizona’s “three separate departments, the
    legislative, the executive and the judicial . . . shall be separate and distinct,
    and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly
    belonging to either of the others.” Id. Executive powers “shall be as
    prescribed by law.” Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 9. The executive branch has broad
    discretion to decide whether to charge a defendant with a crime and, unless
    restricted by the legislature, whether and how to proceed. State v. Larson,
    
    159 Ariz. 14
    , 16 (App. 1988) (“[Prosecutors have] broad discretion in the
    enforcement of criminal laws and in deciding what charges, if any, will be
    filed against a defendant. That function carries with it the discretion to
    proceed or not to proceed once an action has been commenced unless the
    legislature has restricted that authority.”) (citations omitted). Read
    together, the plain language of Arizona’s constitution, statutes, and rules
    reveals the executive branch has sole discretion whether to prosecute or
    defer prosecution. See Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 9; A.R.S. § 11-365; Ariz. R. Crim.
    P. 38.1.
    ¶14            Even so, J.V. suggests the superior court’s ability to reject a
    deferred prosecution agreement lies within the “overlap among branches.”
    See State v. Montes, 
    226 Ariz. 194
    , 196 ¶ 8 (2011). True, the separation-of-
    powers lines are not always bright, and some overlap exists, sometimes
    because one branch has ceded power to the other. See Cook v. State, 
    230 Ariz. 185
    , 187 ¶ 6 (App. 2012) (explaining the legislature “may allow another
    body to fill in the details of legislation already enacted”). With deferred
    prosecutions, the superior court has such overlapping power: the superior
    court serves as a check on the executive’s power because the superior court
    must first “find[] the defendant legally eligible for a deferred prosecution
    program.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 38.1(c). But the superior court has no discretion
    to reject a deferred prosecution offer for a legally eligible defendant. See 
    id.
    (“After reviewing the motion and the defendant's signed consent, and upon
    finding the defendant legally eligible for a deferred prosecution program,
    the court must suspend further proceedings . . . .”). To do so would violate
    the separation of powers clause because the judiciary would encroach upon
    the county attorney’s “sole discretion to decide whether to divert or defer
    prosecution of an offender.” A.R.S. § 11-365; see Ariz. Const. art. 3.
    ¶15          J.V. argues the superior court may reject a deferred
    prosecution offer because such offers are like plea agreements. See Ariz. R.
    Crim. P. 17.4(d). Morris counters, arguing the Arizona Supreme Court
    “formally distinguished diversion offers and plea agreements” in State v.
    Gill, 
    242 Ariz. 1
    , 3 ¶ 2 (2017). J.V. contends Gill only distinguished
    5
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    discussions of plea agreement from discussions of deferred prosecution.
    We agree with Morris.
    ¶16            In Gill, the Arizona Supreme Court considered whether
    statements made during discussions about a deferred prosecution
    agreement were inadmissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 410. 
    242 Ariz. at
    3 ¶ 1. The Gill court said, “discussions about deferred prosecution
    are categorically different from plea discussions.” 
    Id.
     at 4 ¶ 12. But it arrived
    at that conclusion by distinguishing the agreements themselves: “[a]
    deferred prosecution agreement can result in a dismissal of all charges,
    whereas a guilty plea will not because the defendant formally admits
    committing a criminal offense.” 
    Id.
     at 4 ¶ 13 (citing DeNaples v. Office of
    Comptroller of Currency, 
    706 F.3d 481
    , 489 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“A plea bargain,
    for instance, would not be a pretrial diversion, no matter its similarity to
    pretrial diversion for other purposes.”)).
    ¶17           The difference between a plea bargain and a deferred
    prosecution agreement places them on opposite sides of the boundary
    between judicial review and executive prosecutorial discretion. The
    prosecution decides whether to offer deferred prosecution as part of its
    decision whether to prosecute—a power within its sole discretion. See id.;
    Larson, 159 Ariz. at 16. Similarly, the prosecution offers a plea agreement as
    part of the prosecution process. See Gill, 
    242 Ariz. at
    4 ¶ 13.
    ¶18           J.V. contends the superior court’s encroachment would be de
    minimis. To that end, J.V. argues the superior court “is not dictating the
    terms of the agreement or dictating how the prosecutor moves forward in
    the case.” Instead, J.V. asserts the superior court “is merely exercising a
    limited power to determine, based upon all information properly before it,
    whether the motion to suspend prosecution comports with the interests of
    justice.”
    ¶19            True enough, a court cannot “order the State to offer a plea
    agreement entirely of the court’s concoction. Such a holding would surely
    violate separation of powers.” State v. Donald, 
    198 Ariz. 406
    , 417 ¶40 (App.
    2000. But when the State chooses to offer a plea agreement, the State subjects
    itself to the superior court’s remedial authority. 
    Id.
     But that remedial
    authority does not extend to deferred prosecution programs. Instead,
    through A.R.S. § 11-365 and Rule 38.1 the Legislature and Arizona Supreme
    Court, respectively, have indicated allowing a righteous motion to defer is
    in the interests of justice. See A.R.S. § 11-365; Rule 38.1(c).
    6
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶20           Allowing the superior court to reject deferred prosecution
    agreements for legally eligible defendants would remove the county
    attorney’s power to offer deferred prosecution, which the law expressly
    provides. See A.R.S. § 11-365. Instead, the county attorney would need to
    proceed immediately to trial, offer a plea, or dismiss the charges without
    providing any option for the defendant’s remediation. At bottom, allowing
    the superior court to reject a deferred prosecution agreement for a legally
    eligible defendant would violate the separation of powers clause.
    II.    The State and the superior court complied with J.V.’s right to be
    heard under the VBOR.
    ¶21            J.V. argues this court cannot interpret Rule 38.1 and A.R.S. §
    11-365 to prohibit the superior court from rejecting a deferred prosecution
    offer for a legally eligible defendant without violating J.V.’s constitutional
    right to be heard. J.V. contends a victim’s opportunity to be heard “must be
    granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” and necessarily
    requires the superior court have discretion to reject a deferred prosecution
    agreement for a legally eligible defendant based on a victim’s statement.
    J.V.’s argument falls short.
    ¶22           “To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due
    process, a victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o be heard at any proceeding
    involving a post-arrest release decision, a negotiated plea, and sentencing.”
    Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)4; A.R.S. § 13-4422. Victims may “be present at
    and, upon request, . . . be informed of all criminal proceedings where the
    defendant has the right to be present.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)3; A.R.S.
    § 13-4420.
    ¶23           Victims also have the right “[t]o confer with the prosecution,
    after the crime against the victim has been charged, before trial or before
    any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition.” Ariz.
    Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)6; A.R.S. § 13-4419. The right to confer with the
    prosecution allows victims to voice their views about pretrial deferred
    prosecution programs but “does not include the authority to direct the
    prosecution of the case.” A.R.S. § 13-4419.A, .C.
    ¶24            J.V. does not argue that she was not afforded the right to
    confer with the prosecution about the disposition of this case. And J.V.
    attended the settlement conference when the State and Morris agreed on
    using a deferred DV prosecution approach to resolve Morris’s case. On this
    record, J.V. has not shown a denial of her express rights under the VBOR.
    See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)4, 9 (providing a right to be heard at
    7
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    proceedings involving post-arrest release decisions, negotiated pleas,
    sentencing, and post-conviction release from confinement).
    ¶25           The VBOR’s corresponding statutes also specify proceedings
    during which victims have a right to be heard, which do not include
    proceedings on deferred prosecution programs. A.R.S. §§ 13-4414
    (postconviction release from confinement), -4415 (probation modification,
    termination, or revocation disposition), -4421 (initial appearance of person
    suspected of criminal offense), -4422 (post-arrest custody decisions), -4426
    (sentencing), -4427 (probation modification, revocation disposition, or
    termination proceedings), -4440 (notice of petition of factual innocence),
    -4441 (restoration of right to possess a firearm).
    ¶26           Because the superior court did hear from J.V., this case does
    not present the issue of whether a victim has a specific right to be heard by
    the court on a deferred prosecution program. We thus proceed assuming,
    but without deciding, J.V. had a right to be heard and consider whether the
    superior court complied with that right.
    ¶27            J.V. argues the right to be heard is “merely performative” if
    the superior court cannot “consider” a victim’s input. But victims often
    have a right to be heard when the court has no discretion when deciding an
    issue. For example, victims have a right to be heard during sentencing even
    when a judge must impose a statutory mandatory sentence and the judge
    has no discretion to deviate from that mandatory sentencing. Ariz. Const.
    art. 2, § 2.1(A)4; A.R.S. § 13-4426.
    ¶28           J.V.’s reliance on State v. Wein, 
    242 Ariz. 372
     (App. 2017), is
    misplaced. Wein said “[a] victim’s ‘right to be heard’ is meaningless if it is
    not tantamount to a right to have the victim’s impact statement (including
    his/her safety concerns) be seriously considered and addressed before the
    determination of whether a defendant is bondable.” 
    242 Ariz. at
    375 ¶ 10.
    But in Wein, the superior court denied the victim the opportunity to address
    the court during a bond release hearing. 
    Id.
     at 373 ¶ 1. In that context, this
    court recognized the victim had a right to be heard and directed “the
    superior court to hold a new hearing wherein it consider[ed] the victims’
    impact statements in undertaking the determination as to whether the
    [S]tate has proven [the defendant] is not bondable . . . .” 
    Id.
     at 375 ¶ 12. Wein
    did not address what the VBOR requires in the context of this special action.
    ¶29         Here, the superior court must determine whether the State
    has shown the defendant is legally eligible for a deferred prosecution
    program. Assuming J.V. had a right to be heard on the issue, the superior
    8
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Opinion of the Court
    court could consider J.V.’s statement in relation to whether the defendant
    was legally eligible. The superior court heard J.V.’s statement, still found
    the State showed Morris was legally eligible for deferred DV prosecution,
    and properly ordered suspended prosecution. J.V. had the chance to speak,
    and the superior court considered J.V.’s statement in the scope of its
    decision, thus following the standard set in Wein. J.V. cites, and this court
    identifies, no authority supporting J.V.’s contention a victim’s “meaningful
    right to be heard” allows the superior court to expand its discretion beyond
    the scope afforded to it under Arizona’s constitution, statutes, or rules.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶30           Because the superior court did not err, we accept jurisdiction
    but deny relief.
    Jacobs, J., specially concurring:
    ¶31            J.V.’s petition proposes a sweeping change to Arizona law in
    which a victim of crime could control or direct a criminal prosecution. J.V.
    argues that: (1) A.R.S. § 11-365 can be construed to permit the superior court
    to reject deferred prosecution agreements; and (2) Arizona Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 38.1 (and by implication, A.R.S. § 11-365) are unconstitutional
    because they contradict the Victims’ Bill of Rights (VBOR) by denying the
    superior court the power to reject deferred prosecution agreements. While
    I agree with the opinion that we must affirm, I write separately to state
    different reasons why both of the petition’s arguments are incorrect,
    grounded in: (1) the plain language of A.R.S. § 11-365; (2) the substance
    A.R.S. § 13-4419 supplies to the VBOR; (3) the inconsistency of J.V.’s
    positions with Fay v. Fox, 
    251 Ariz. 537
     (2021); and (4) the Arizona Supreme
    Court’s considered enactment of Rule 38.1.
    ¶32           First, with respect to J.V.’s threshold question to this court—
    “whether A.R.S. § 11-365 divests the trial court of authority to reject a
    deferred prosecution agreement”—there is little statutory interpretation to
    conduct. The command of A.R.S. § 11-365 is crystal clear. The Legislature
    gave county attorneys the “sole discretion to decide whether to divert or
    defer prosecution of an offender.” A.R.S. § 11-365. This statute means what
    it says. See generally Ariz. Advoc. Network Found. v. State, 
    250 Ariz. 109
    , 114
    9
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Jacobs, J., specially concurred
    ¶ 19 (App. 2020) (explaining that we must apply unambiguous statutory
    language without using other tools of statutory construction); Parsons v.
    Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 
    242 Ariz. 320
    , 323 ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (similar).
    While it is true that, where possible, we construe statutes so that they are
    constitutional, that discretion does not allow us to drop a stray “not” into
    an unambiguous statute to “save” it. See Garcia v. Butler in & for Cnty. of
    Pima, 
    251 Ariz. 191
    , 195–96 ¶ 18 (2021) (“[W]hen the relevant text allows,
    we construe statutes to comply with constitutional requirements.”); Glazer
    v. State, 
    237 Ariz. 160
    , 163 ¶ 12 (2015) (“If the statute is subject to only one
    reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis.”); State v.
    Gomez, 
    212 Ariz. 55
    , 57 ¶ 11 (2006) (“When the language is clear and
    unambiguous, and thus subject to only one reasonable meaning, we . . .
    apply[] the language without using other means of statutory construction.”
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We thus are not at liberty
    to turn “sole discretion” in A.R.S. § 11-365 into a standard amounting to
    “discretion the county attorney shares with the trial court,” as J.V. urges.
    The statute’s language answers squarely and disposes fully of one of the
    two questions the petition presents—A.R.S. § 11-365 unambiguously
    divests the trial court of authority to reject a deferred prosecution
    agreement. Because it does, we need not reach the question resolved by
    Paragraphs 10 through 20 of the opinion—whether rewriting A.R.S. § 11-
    365 as J.V. requests would violate the Arizona Constitution.
    ¶33             Second, J.V.’s other argument—that Rule 38.1 and A.R.S. § 11-
    365 run afoul of the VBOR by preventing trial courts from rejecting deferred
    prosecution agreements—likewise fails because the VBOR indirectly
    authorizes the very reservation of power to county attorneys those
    provisions represent. Section 2.1(D) of the VBOR grants “[t]he legislature
    . . . the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define . . . the
    rights guaranteed to victims by this section . . . .” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(D).
    Most constitutional provisions do not contain express language giving a
    legislature the power to flesh them out. The VBOR does, however, which
    makes it analogous to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall
    have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
    article.”). When Congress enacts remedial legislation pursuant to its
    Section 5 power, the Supreme Court properly accords that legislation
    “much deference.” City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 
    521 U.S. 507
    , 536 (1997) (“It
    is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what
    legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
    Amendment,’         and     its   conclusions      are    entitled    to      much
    deference.”(alteration in original) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
    384 U.S. 641
    , 651 (1966))).
    10
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Jacobs, J., specially concurred
    ¶34             We have even more reason to defer to our Legislature’s
    elaborations of the VBOR than the U.S. Supreme Court has to defer to
    Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. After all, Section
    5 grants Congress a power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the
    Fourteenth Amendment, which begs the question of what legislation is
    appropriately remedial, as the Supreme Court explained in Boerne. But the
    VBOR directly delegated to the Legislature the power to “define . . . the rights
    guaranteed to victims.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(D). So when our
    Legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-4419(C) in 1991, just after the people made
    the Victims’ Bill of Rights part of the Arizona Constitution, and provided
    that “[t]he right of the victim to confer with the prosecuting attorney does
    not include the authority to direct the prosecution of the case,” that is an
    elaboration of the VBOR authorized and endorsed by the Victims’ Bill of Rights
    itself. For this reason, A.R.S. § 11-365 is constitutional. It simply does what
    A.R.S. § 13-4419(C) says it can—preserve the prosecutor’s power over
    whether to prosecute, without conferring on victims such as J.V. “the
    authority to direct prosecution of the case.” See A.R.S. § 11-365. Rule 38.1
    does the same thing and is thus constitutional for the same reason.
    ¶35           Third, the Arizona Supreme Court’s construction of the
    VBOR in Fay likewise supports this outcome. Our supreme court began its
    analysis in Fay by quoting Section 2.1(D) of the Victims’ Bill of Rights, which
    sets out the Legislature’s constitutional role in defining its protections. 251
    Ariz. at 540 ¶ 14. This underscores that we must construe the Victim’s Bill
    of Rights consistent with A.R.S. § 13-4419(C).
    ¶36           The Arizona Supreme Court’s resolution of the specific issue
    in Fay also reinforces why we must affirm. There, the Court allowed a
    victim, after a $562,980.45 restitution order in her favor arising from the
    murder of her son, to object to a request by her son’s murderer to take a
    delayed appeal from the restitution order. Fay, 251 Ariz. at 538-39, 542 ¶¶
    3, 7-8, 31. The Court reasoned that if the offender could “proceed with a
    delayed appeal of the restitution order [that] w[ould] directly impact [the
    victim’s] rights to due process, prompt restitution, and finality.” Id. at 541
    ¶ 23. The Court thus rejected the dissent’s suggestion that because the
    VBOR and the Victims’ Rights Implementation Act both omitted to
    expressly “authorize [victims] to object to [an offender’s] request for a
    delayed appeal of [a] criminal restitution order,” id. at 542-43 ¶ 33, victims
    lacked that right. Id. at 540-41 ¶¶ 18-20 (rejecting limitation of proceedings
    in which victims may be heard to those expressly enumerated in VBOR or
    enabling legislation); cf. id. at 542-43 ¶ 33 (Timmer, V.C.J., dissenting)
    (stating that victim does not have a right to be heard in hearings on an
    offender’s delayed appeal because delayed appeals are not proceedings in
    11
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Jacobs, J., specially concurred
    which the VBOR or its enabling legislation expressly authorize victims to
    be heard).
    ¶37           The Court also clarified the bounds of victims’ rights,
    reaffirming that while victims must be heard in a variety of proceedings
    already initiated, they are not parties entitled to initiate proceedings. Fay,
    251 Ariz. at 542 ¶ 27 (“[w]hile it is true that a major purpose of the VBR is
    to give victims the right to be heard at ‘criminal proceedings,’ we cannot
    conclude that victims are ‘parties’ with the right to file their own petitions
    for review.” (quoting State v. Lamberton, 
    183 Ariz. 47
    , 51 (1995))). In short,
    co-participation is the design of the VBOR—but not victim control and
    initiation of proceedings. Distinguishing Lamberton, the Court in Fay
    emphasized that the victim “[wa]s not seeking to initiate anything but
    merely to be heard on a matter, initiated by [the offender], that directly
    affects her constitutional rights.” Fay, 251 Ariz. at 542 ¶ 27.
    ¶38           Precisely the opposite is the case here. J.V. is attempting in
    substance to compel a prosecution where the county attorney has resolved
    not to pursue one, subject to Morris’ completion of the diversion program.
    While in Fay, the victim sought to participate in a proceeding the offender
    already began, 251 Ariz. at 539 ¶¶8-9, here J.V. wants to force the State to
    conduct a proceeding it seeks to avoid conducting under A.R.S. § 11-365.
    Finally, in Fay, no provision of law affirmatively barred the victim’s
    objection to a late appeal of a restitution award, but here, A.R.S. § 13-
    4419(C), a provision of the Victims’ Rights Implementation Act, A.R.S. §§
    13-4401 to -4443, bars precisely what J.V. requests. Fay thus instructs us that
    J.V. impermissibly seeks to exercise what amounts to the prerogatives of a
    party, and reaches further than the VBOR allows. See 251 Ariz. at 542 ¶ 27.
    ¶39            Fourth, J.V.’s argument that Rule 38.1 and A.R.S. § 11-365 are
    unconstitutional fails to persuade because we owe some deference to the
    Arizona Supreme Court’s considered promulgation of Rule 38.1. The
    Arizona Supreme Court is vested with the authority to enact procedural
    rules like Rule 38.1. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(5) (“The supreme court shall
    have . . . [p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any
    court.”)
    ¶40           The record suggests the Arizona Supreme Court considered
    the appropriateness of the very feature of Rule 38.1 J.V. challenges when it
    promulgated that rule. In 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court’s own staff
    counsel petitioned that Court to modify Rule 38.1 to remove references in
    Rule 38.1 to the superior court, so the rule would function with equal ease
    in both the superior court and the justice court. See Arizona Rule Petition
    12
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Jacobs, J., specially concurred
    No. R-12-0016, https://www.azcourts.gov/Rules-Forum/aft/348. The
    Maricopa County Attorney then filed a Comment on that Petition, and in
    his Comment suggested the Arizona Supreme Court adopt that proposal,
    critically modified to eliminate the language implying that the superior
    court retained discretion to reject deferred prosecution agreements.
    Arizona Rule Petition No. R-12-0016, May 18, 2012 Comment, at 2,
    https://www.azcourts.gov/Rules-Forum/aft/348 (last visited July 24,
    2023). The Comment pointed the Court to the very aspect of Rule 38.1 now
    at issue:
    To further facilitate the deferred prosecution process, we also
    recommend that the language of Rule 38.1(c) be modified to
    be consistent with Arizona law. Currently, the rule provides
    that after the prosecutor files a motion to suspend prosecution
    for a deferred prosecution program, “the court may order that
    further proceedings be suspended for two years.” The
    wording of this rule could be interpreted to mean that the
    court has discretion to decide whether or not to allow
    diversion in a particular case.
    Id.
    ¶41           The Maricopa County Attorney Comment then pointed the
    Arizona Supreme Court to A.R.S. § 11-365 and, citing case law, asked the
    Arizona Supreme Court to modify Rule 38.1 to exclude from possibility the
    very discretion J.V. seeks to vest in the superior court:
    To the extent that such an interpretation is possible [that the
    superior court has the power to disapprove a deferred
    prosecution agreement], it is inconsistent with Arizona law.
    A.R.S. § 11-365 clearly provides that “[t]he county attorney
    has sole discretion to decide whether to divert or defer
    prosecution of an offender.” See also Cranmer v. State, 
    204 Ariz. 299
    , 
    63 P.3d 1036
     (App. 2003) (noting that the county
    attorney’s sole discretion to resume prosecution stems from
    the county attorney’s sole discretion to divert or defer
    offenders).
    
    Id.
    ¶42           The Arizona Supreme Court then adopted the Petition of its
    staff counsel, as modified by the friendly amendment of the Maricopa
    County Attorney, bringing Rule 38.1 into congruence with A.R.S. § 11-365.
    Ariz.    Sup.     Ct.    Order     R-12-0016     (Aug.     30,     2012),
    13
    J.V. v. HON BLAIR/MORRIS
    Jacobs, J., specially concurred
    https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/20/2012Rules/R120016B.pdf. While
    enacting Rule 38.1 did not foreclose later constitutional challenges to it, and
    there is no reasoned decision explaining the Court’s thoughts in adopting
    it, we as an intermediate court of appeals owe deference to the Court’s
    determinations, both express and implied. At minimum, we can infer that
    the Court did not appreciate any constitutional infirmity at the time it
    adopted Rule 38.1. Given the three sound reasons already advanced that
    A.R.S. § 11-365 and thus Rule 38.1 are constitutional, the Court’s considered
    adoption of Rule 38.1 with stakeholders citing authority to it tend to
    confirm the Court’s apparent belief in the provision’s constitutionality.
    ¶43          For all of these reasons, I concur in the result the majority
    opinion reaches.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    14