Medina v. Chee ( 2023 )


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  •                                   IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    CLAUDIA MEDINA, duly appointed Personal Representative of the
    Estates of Carlos Mario Pena Jaramillo; Soraida Delgado Sierra;
    Juliana Pena Delgado; and Manuela Pena Delgado,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    The Estate of JAVAS JAYSEAN CODY, The Estate of AARON CHEE;
    MARTINA GRANDSON, an unmarried woman; SENTRY INSURANCE
    COMPANY f/k/a Sentry Insurance a Mutual Company,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 22-0709
    FILED 10-5-2023
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
    No. S0300CV202000641
    No. S0300CV202100003
    The Honorable Ted Stuart Reed, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Phoenix
    By Robert B. Carey, Michella A. Kras
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Zwillinger Wulkan, PLC, Phoenix
    By Colin Bradley
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Jefferson Cody
    Appel Law Office, P.L.L.C., Fountain Hills
    By Marc Appel
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Martina Grandson
    Christian Dichter & Sluga, P.C., Phoenix
    By Gena L. Sluga
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Sentry Insurance Company
    Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Phoenix
    By Susan M. Freeman
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Sentry Insurance Company
    Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock
    By Sage G. Metoxen
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae Navajo Nation
    OPINION
    Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s opinion, in which
    Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
    W I L L I A M S, Judge:
    ¶1            The issue before us is whether a plaintiff who is not an
    enrolled tribal member may bring a civil tort case in state court against an
    enrolled tribal member for conduct occurring within tribal reservation
    boundaries but on a stretch of land for which the State has been granted a
    highway right-of-way easement. We hold that a non-tribal plaintiff
    bringing such a case cannot hale a nonconsenting enrolled tribal member
    defendant into state court for actions arising out of conduct on the
    defendant’s reservation, even when that conduct occurs on a state highway.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Early one evening in January 2019, Javas Jaysean Cody drove
    his mother’s (Martina “Grandson”) vehicle across the center line of an
    undivided highway into oncoming traffic, colliding with the Pena Delgado
    family’s car. Tragically, the head-on collision killed the occupants of both
    vehicles on impact—the four members of the Pena Delgado family (Carlos,
    Soraida, Juliana, and Manuela), and Cody and his passenger, Aaron Chee.
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    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    The collision occurred along a section of U.S. Highway 89 located on the
    Navajo Nation. Both Cody and Chee were enrolled members of the Navajo
    Tribe, as was Grandson; the Pena Delgado family was not.
    ¶3             As a surviving Pena Delgado family member, Claudia
    Medina was appointed the personal representative of the Pena Delgado
    estates. Medina filed two wrongful death cases (later consolidated), one
    (predicated on negligence) against Cody’s estate and the other (predicated
    on negligence and negligent entrustment) against Grandson and Chee’s
    estate (collectively “the Defendants”).
    ¶4            About eighteen months into the litigation, Sentry Insurance
    Company (“Sentry”), which insured Grandson and Chee at the time of the
    collision (and covered Cody as an additional insured), successfully moved
    to intervene. Sentry then moved to dismiss the consolidated cases, arguing,
    among other things, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    because the tort action arose “out of on-reservation conduct by Navajo
    tribal members.”
    ¶5              Without addressing Sentry’s other asserted bases for
    dismissal, the superior court dismissed Medina’s claims for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction based on the undisputed facts: (1) the Defendants are
    “Navajo tribal members residing on the Navajo Reservation,” (2) the Pena
    Delgado family were non-tribal members, and (3) the location of the
    accident was “on a state highway within the Navajo Reservation.” Upon
    entry of final judgment, Medina timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over
    this appeal under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and
    A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6             Medina challenges the superior court’s dismissal of her tort
    action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to the superior court’s
    implicit finding, Medina contends that tribal courts do not have exclusive
    jurisdiction over civil tort actions arising out of conduct that occurs on
    state-maintained rights-of-way running through tribal land.
    ¶7             “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and
    determine a controversy.” Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 
    222 Ariz. 588
    ,
    594, ¶ 13 (App. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). We review de novo
    whether a superior court has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action.
    Buehler v. Retzer ex rel. Indus. Comm’n, 
    227 Ariz. 520
    , 521, ¶ 4 (App. 2011).
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    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶8            “[Q]uestions of jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country
    remain a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law, which is better
    explained by history than by logic.” Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 
    434 F.3d 1127
    , 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To resolve such
    questions, courts must “inspect [the] relevant statutes, treaties, and other
    materials,” including existing caselaw. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
    520 U.S. 438
    ,
    449 (1997).
    ¶9              In 1868, after decades of conflict, the Navajo Tribe entered a
    treaty with the United States government. Arizona v. Navajo Nation, 
    143 S. Ct. 1804
    , 1809 (2023); see also Treaty Between the United States of America
    and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, June 1, 1868, 
    15 Stat. 667
     (ratified Aug. 12,
    1868) (“Treaty of 1868”). “In exchange for the Navajos’ promise not to
    engage in further war, the United States established a large reservation for
    the Navajos in their original homeland,” including a substantial section of
    northeastern Arizona. Arizona, 143 S. Ct. at 1809–10. Apart from providing
    for designated tribal land, the Treaty of 1868 established “the Navajo Tribe
    as a sovereign entity” possessing “the right of self-government” within its
    territorial boundaries. Begay v. Roberts, 
    167 Ariz. 375
    , 379 (App. 1990).
    Indeed, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court, both the federal
    government and the Navajo Tribe “[i]mplicit[ly] . . . underst[oo]d” that
    under the treaty, “the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively
    within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed.” Williams v.
    Lee, 
    358 U.S. 217
    , 221–22 (1959) (emphasis added). Consistent with this
    understanding, courts construed the Treaty of 1868 “to preclude state court
    jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation” in matters arising from
    on-reservation activity. Begay, 167 Ariz. at 379; see also McClanahan v. State
    Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 
    411 U.S. 164
    , 168–69, 175 (1973) (construing the Treaty
    of 1868 as precluding the “extension of state law . . . to Indians on the Navajo
    Reservation” and holding that under the “Indian sovereignty doctrine,”
    tribal nations “hav[e] territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
    exclusive . . . [and] state law . . . ha[s] no role to play within the reservation
    boundaries”).
    ¶10          More than forty-five years ago, in Enriquez v. Superior Court,
    this court squarely addressed the precise issue raised in this
    appeal—whether state courts may exercise jurisdiction over a civil tort
    action brought by a non-tribal member against an enrolled tribal member
    for damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on a state
    highway within the limits of the tribal reservation on which the enrolled
    member resided. 
    115 Ariz. 342
    , 342–43 (App. 1977). To resolve that
    question, this court looked to: (1) the United States Supreme Court’s
    opinion in Williams, 
    358 U.S. at 220
    , 222–23, holding that absent federal
    4
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    legislation, state courts may not exercise jurisdiction over on-reservation
    activity because doing so would undermine the authority of tribal courts
    and infringe on the right of tribal members to make their laws and govern
    themselves; and (2) a federal criminal statute, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1151
    (a), which
    defines “Indian country” to include “all land within the limits of any Indian
    reservation . . . including rights-of-way running through the reservation.”
    Enriquez, 115 Ariz. at 343. While acknowledging that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1151
    , on its
    face, “is concerned only with criminal jurisdiction,” this court construed its
    definition of “Indian country” as applying “as well to questions of civil
    jurisdiction,” concluding that the tribe’s “granting of an easement” to the
    state for the highway “did not alter the status of the highway as being
    ‘Indian country.’” 
    Id.
     Having determined that the accident occurred on
    tribal land, this court reasoned that under Williams’ infringement test, the
    state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the tort action brought
    against a tribal member: “[Tribes’] right of self-government includes the
    right to decide what conduct on the reservation will subject the Indians
    living there to civil liability in the Tribal court.” 
    Id.
    ¶11            In her briefing, Medina concedes that no Arizona case has
    overruled Enriquez, but she argues that subsequent case law calls into
    question its continuing viability. Specifically, she contends that since
    Enriquez, the jurisdictional analysis has evolved considerably under federal
    precedent—most notably, a series of United States Supreme Court cases
    —to apply much stricter limitations on the reach of tribal jurisdiction.
    Accordingly, Medina urges us to “revisit and reverse” Enriquez applying
    the current jurisdictional framework.
    ¶12            In addressing Medina’s argument, we briefly return to
    Williams. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that Arizona
    courts lacked jurisdiction over a civil collection action brought by a non-tribal
    member—who operated a general store on the Navajo reservation—against
    two enrolled tribal members—who purchased goods from the store on credit.
    
    358 U.S. at
    217–18, 223. Recounting the lengthy and complex history of
    relations between tribes and the federal government, the Supreme Court
    distilled the relevant inquiry to whether “state action” would “infringe[] on
    the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
    them.” 
    Id.
     at 218–21. Absent federal legislation expressly limiting the
    authority granted to the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, the Supreme Court
    held that Arizona state courts may not exercise authority over enrolled tribal
    members for on-reservation conduct, even when such conduct involves
    non-tribal members, because doing so would undermine tribal authority.
    
    Id. at 223
    .
    5
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶13           Without overruling Williams, the United States Supreme
    Court, in subsequent cases, outlined a separate analytic framework for
    resolving conflicts between state and tribal jurisdiction. While the Williams’
    infringement test considers the scope of state court jurisdiction over an enrolled
    tribal member, these more recent cases approach jurisdictional conflicts
    differently, exploring the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal
    members. C’Hair v. Dist. Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., 
    357 P.3d 723
    , 728, ¶ 17
    (Wyo. 2015) (contrasting the infringement test pronounced in Williams,
    “which looks to whether a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a matter will
    infringe on tribal self government,” with the analytic approach adopted in
    Montana v. United States, 
    450 U.S. 544
    , 547–48 (1981), “which looks to
    whether tribal sovereignty requires tribal jurisdiction over a non-Indian or
    non-Indian activities”).
    ¶14             In Montana, the United States Supreme Court considered a
    tribe’s authority to prohibit hunting and fishing by non-tribal members on land
    within the tribe’s territorial boundaries but held by non-tribal members in
    fee simple under an allotment act that permitted enrolled tribal members to
    “alienate [their] land to a non-Indian after holding it for 25 years.” Holding
    that a tribe has no power to regulate non-tribal members’ activities on land
    owned in fee by non-tribal members, the Supreme Court reasoned: “If
    Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands owned by
    non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1151
    ’s definition of “Indian country” into 
    18 U.S.C. § 1165
    , the statute
    governing hunting and fishing on tribal land. 
    450 U.S. at 562
    . Considering
    the scope of the “inherent powers retained by tribes and those divested,”
    the Supreme Court determined that tribes lack the authority to
    “independently [] determine their external relations” but may exercise
    “civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on
    non-Indian fee lands” within their territorial boundaries, when: (1)
    non-tribal members enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
    enrolled members, or (2) “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
    [the] reservation . . . threatens or has some direct effect on the political
    integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 
    Id.
     at
    564–66 (concluding the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary
    to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
    inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes”).
    ¶15          While Montana primarily focused on the regulatory authority
    of tribes over conduct arising on land held in fee simple by non-tribal
    members within tribal territorial boundaries, the circumstances at issue in
    Strate, 
    520 U.S. at 453
    , involved adjudicatory jurisdiction. In Strate, a
    non-tribal member (the plaintiff) driving her car along a highway on tribal
    6
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    land (but maintained by the State under a right-of-way) collided with a
    commercial vehicle owned and driven by non-tribal members. 
    Id.
     at
    442–43. The plaintiff sued the driver and the commercial vehicle owner in
    tribal court in tort for injuries sustained. 
    Id.
     at 443–44. Pointing to Montana
    as “the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over
    nonmembers,” the Supreme Court reiterated that “tribes lack civil authority
    over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation,
    subject to two exceptions”: (1) non-tribal members who enter consensual
    relationships with the tribe or its enrolled members, and (2) activity that
    directly affects the tribe’s political integrity, economic security, health, or
    welfare. 
    Id.
     at 445–47 (emphasis added).
    ¶16           Rejecting the plaintiff’s contention that the Montana analysis
    did not apply because the accident occurred on tribal land, the Supreme
    Court reasoned that a right-of-way for a state highway on tribal land is
    “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian
    land” because it “is open to the public.” 
    Id. at 454
     (emphasis added). In other
    words, because tribes must consent to such rights-of-way and receive “the
    payment of just compensation,” and state highways “[are] subject to the
    State’s control,” tort actions against non-tribal members for conduct arising
    on such highways falls within the Montana jurisdictional framework. 
    Id.
     at
    454–456 (quoting 
    25 U.S.C. §§ 324
    –25). Accordingly, a tribal court may
    exercise jurisdiction over an “action against nonmembers” arising on a state
    right-of-way only if “one of Montana’s two exceptions” applies. Id. at 456
    (emphasis added).
    ¶17             Quickly dispensing with the first exception, Strate held that
    tortious conduct does not qualify as a consensual relationship. Id. at
    456–57. Concerning the second exception, the Supreme Court
    acknowledged that “careless” driving “on a public highway running
    through a reservation endanger[s] all in the vicinity, and surely
    jeopardize[s] the safety of tribal members.” Id. at 458. But despite this
    generalized danger, the Supreme Court concluded that tribes need
    “[n]either regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over [] state highway
    accident[s] . . . to preserve” their right “to make their own laws and be ruled
    by them,” lest “the exception would severely shrink the rule.” Id. at 457–59
    (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined
    that the “Montana rule”—no tribal court jurisdiction over non-tribal
    members’ conduct on “non-Indian fee land”—applied, not its exceptions.
    Id. at 459.
    ¶18         Harmonizing Montana and Strate, the United States Supreme
    Court in Nevada v. Hicks expressly “reject[ed] tribal authority to regulate
    7
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    nonmembers’ activities on land over which [a] tribe c[an] not assert a
    landowner’s right to occupy and exclude.” 
    533 U.S. 353
    , 359 (2001)
    (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). Further distilling the scope
    of tribal authority, the Supreme Court declared: “[T]he absence of tribal
    ownership has been virtually conclusive of the absence of tribal civil
    jurisdiction; with one minor [taxing authority] exception, we have never
    upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over
    nonmembers on non-Indian land.” Id. at 360 (emphasis added). To exercise
    jurisdiction over non-tribal members, the Supreme Court explained, tribal
    authority “must be connected to th[e] right of the Indians to make their own
    laws and be governed by them.” Id. at 361. Recognizing that precedent
    historically described tribes as “sovereign entities,” the Supreme Court
    clarified that under the modern jurisdictional framework, “[s]tate
    sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border,” meaning states “may
    regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land” when the state’s
    interests “are implicated.” Id. at 361–62 (emphasis added).
    ¶19           Having reviewed these governing United States Supreme
    Court decisions, we return to the facts of this case. Because Arizona has not
    assumed general civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes and their members as
    federal law would allow, 
    Pub. L. 83-280, § 3
    , 
    67 Stat. 590
    , its authority to
    address disputes involving tribal members for on-reservation conduct is
    limited by the jurisdictional framework pronounced by the United States
    Supreme Court. See R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 
    719 F.2d 979
    , 983 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1322
    , 1360.
    ¶20            The question is whether the state court may preside over a tort
    action against enrolled tribal members predicated on conduct that occurred
    within the tribe’s territorial boundaries. To answer that question, we must
    examine the scope of state court jurisdiction, not determine the extent of
    tribal court jurisdiction. Cf. Smith Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
    
    149 Ariz. 545
    , 550 (App. 1984) (concluding that the existence of jurisdiction
    in tribal court does not preempt jurisdiction in state court). Therefore, this
    case falls squarely under Williams’ framework, which holds that a state
    court may exercise jurisdiction over a dispute brought by a non-tribal
    member against an enrolled tribal member for conduct arising on tribal
    land only if that exercise of jurisdiction does not violate federal law or
    infringe on the right of enrolled tribal members “to make their own laws
    and be ruled by them.” 
    358 U.S. at 220
    .
    ¶21            Under this infringement test, state courts lack subject matter
    jurisdiction if: (1) a non-tribal member brings a claim against an enrolled
    tribal member for conduct occurring on that member’s reservation, or (2)
    8
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    all parties are enrolled tribal members of the same tribe and the claim
    involves conduct occurring on that tribe’s reservation. Winer v. Penny Enter.,
    Inc., 
    674 N.W.2d 9
    , 12–13 (N.D. 2004) (citing Williams, 
    358 U.S. at 223
    ; Fisher
    v. District Court, 
    424 U.S. 382
    , 387–89 (1976)); see also Smith Plumbing Co.,
    Inc., 
    149 Ariz. 524
    , 529 (1986) (noting the United States Supreme Court “has
    repeatedly recognized that tribal courts have inherent power to adjudicate
    civil disputes affecting the interests of Indians and non-Indians which are
    based upon events occurring on the reservation”) (citation omitted).
    Medina does not contest that a tribal court has exclusive subject matter
    jurisdiction in such cases. Instead, she argues that under Montana and its
    progeny, a state-maintained highway—located on a right-of-way granted
    to the state from a tribal nation—is not tribal land. Stated differently,
    according to Medina, U.S. Highway 89, for jurisdictional purposes, is
    non-Indian fee land.1
    ¶22            In evaluating a state court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a
    case involving both enrolled tribal member and non-tribal member parties,
    “whether the nonmember party is a plaintiff or a defendant” is the “most
    important” factor. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d at 1131, 1135 (“The
    ownership status of the land . . . is only one factor to consider[.]”). In other
    words, “[i]t is the membership status of the unconsenting party, not the
    status of real property, that counts as the primary jurisdictional fact.” Hicks,
    533 U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Smith Plumbing Co., Inc., 
    149 Ariz. at 530
     (“A reservation Indian could not reasonably expect to be haled
    into Arizona state court because of [actions] occurring wholly on the
    reservation.”); State v. Zaman, 
    194 Ariz. 442
    , 442, ¶ 2 (1999) (“For
    on-reservation activities, the status of the defendant as an Indian or
    non-Indian is the sine qua non of federal Indian law.”); State v. Zaman, 
    190 Ariz. 208
    , 210 (1997) (explaining that “following Williams, . . . application of
    1       In her reply brief, Medina alternatively argues, for the first time, that
    the Defendants’ alleged tortious conduct occurred on state land because
    Cody began drinking—and Chee entrusted him with Grandson’s vehicle
    —long before reaching the section of U.S. Highway 89 traversing the
    Navajo Nation (as demonstrated by Cody’s blood alcohol content of .336).
    She also asserts that Cody began speeding and driving erratically at least
    one mile before Grandson’s vehicle crossed into the Navajo Nation’s
    territorial boundaries. Because Medina failed to raise these arguments in
    her opening brief—instead framing the appeal as presenting “a purely legal
    question”—we do not address them. In re Marriage of Pownall, 
    197 Ariz. 577
    ,
    583, ¶ 25 n.5 (App. 2000) (holding arguments raised for the first time in a
    reply brief are waived).
    9
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    the infringement test in the adjudicatory setting has protected Indian
    defendants from nonconsensual state court jurisdiction”).
    ¶23            Without question, the United States Supreme Court
    concluded in Strate that the state-maintained highway on which the
    accident occurred was the equivalent of non-Indian fee land. 
    520 U.S. at 454
    .
    But in reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court carefully limited its
    equivalence determination to actions against non-tribal members. Id.; see
    also Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d at 1137 (explaining that the United States
    Supreme Court framed the issue in Strate “as concerning the adjudicatory
    authority of tribal courts over personal injury actions against defendants who
    are not tribal members,” ultimately holding that “tribal courts may not
    entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state
    highways”) (quoting Strate, 
    520 U.S. at 442
    ). Thus, under Strate, the
    classification of a right-of-way located within a tribe’s territorial
    boundaries, for jurisdictional purposes, depends upon the enrolled
    member or non-tribal member status of the defendant.
    ¶24           As Medina correctly notes, the United States Supreme Court,
    since Montana, has curtailed the scope of tribal authority, and may yet hold
    that state rights-of-way within tribal territorial boundaries are the
    equivalent of non-Indian fee land for jurisdictional purposes in all cases,
    regardless of the nonconsenting party’s status. See Winer, 674 N.W.2d at 15,
    ¶ 15 (stating “[i]t is not yet clear whether Strate forecasts” a complete
    “erosion” of the Williams’ analysis for “state rights-of-way”) (quoting W.
    Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell, 175–76 (3rd ed. 1998)). But to
    date, the Supreme Court has not done so, nor do we.
    ¶25            Given its precise limiting language, we conclude that Strate
    does not supplant Williams. Applying the infringement test, we hold that
    the broad authority granted to the Navajo tribe to govern its enrolled tribal
    members under the Treaty of 1868 precludes the state court from exercising
    jurisdiction over this tort action. As federal precedent makes clear, a
    plaintiff bringing a claim against an enrolled tribal member cannot hale that
    nonconsenting defendant into state court for torts arising from conduct on
    the defendant’s reservation, even on a state highway open under an
    easement. In this case, had the superior court resolved Medina’s claims on
    the merits, it would have undermined the Navajo tribal court’s authority
    and infringed on the Navajos’ ability “to make their own laws and be ruled
    by them.” Williams, 
    358 U.S. at 220
    ; Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d at 1140–41
    (explaining a tribe’s “system of tort is an important means by which [it]
    regulate[s] the domestic and commercial relations of its members”); see also
    Holly C. v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 
    247 Ariz. 495
    , 515, ¶ 59 (App. 2019)
    10
    MEDINA v. CHEE, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    (“Arizona courts properly refuse to accept jurisdiction over a case when
    doing so ‘would undermine the authority of the tribal courts.’”) (quoting
    Williams, 
    358 U.S. at 223
    ). Therefore, the superior court properly dismissed
    the consolidated complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2
    CONCLUSION
    ¶26           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    2      In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that at least one state court,
    in grappling with a jurisdictional conflict in a tort action brought by a
    non-tribal member against enrolled tribal members, determined that under
    “the principles announced in Strate,” a state highway “is the equivalent of
    non-Indian fee land” for jurisdictional purposes. C’Hair, 357 P.3d at 725,
    738, ¶¶ 1, 49–50. This reasoning is not binding and, in our view, stops short
    of giving full effect to the precise language used by the United States
    Supreme Court in Strate limiting the application of its equivalence
    determination to cases brought against non-tribal members.
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0709

Filed Date: 10/5/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/5/2023