ARKANSAS STATE POLICE BILL BRYANT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, AND AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND KELLI LAPORTE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY FOR THE ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY / ARKANSAS STATE POLICE, AND AS AN INDIVIDUAL v. RUSSELL R. RACOP , 2022 Ark. 17 ( 2022 )

Cite as 2022 Ark. 17SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-21-183
Opinion Delivered: February 3, 2022
ARKANSAS STATE POLICE; BILL
BRYANT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS DIRECTOR, AND AS AN
INDIVIDUAL; AND KELLI LAPORTE, APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR THE ARKANSAS [NO. 60CV-20-1674]
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY /
ARKANSAS STATE POLICE, AND AS HONORABLE ALICE S. GRAY, JUDGE
AN INDIVIDUAL
APPELLANTS
V.
RUSSELL R. RACOP REVERSED AND DISMISSED.
APPELLEE
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
The Arkansas State Police; Bill Bryant, Director, in his official and individual
capacities; and Kelli LaPorte, attorney for the Arkansas Department of Public Safety /
Arkansas State Police, in her official and individual capacities (collectively, ASP or ASP
Defendants), appeal from an order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court in favor of appellee
Russell R. Racop in his appeal from a denial of rights under the Arkansas Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-19-101 et seq. (Repl. 2014
& Supp. 2021). For their sole point on appeal, ASP Defendants argue that the trial court
erred when it found that the documents Racop requested were not exempt from FOIA under
Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-19-105(b)(10). We reverse the trial court’s order and
dismiss.
On February 21, 2020, Racop sent an email request for public records pursuant to
FOIA to ASP. Specifically, Racop requested:
Photographs for all un[i]formed, plain clothed, non-undercover Arkansas State
Troopers hired since I made a similar request on June 11, 2019.
That same day, ASP denied the request, citing an Arkansas Attorney General opinion.
After his request was denied, Racop filed a complaint in Pulaski County Circuit
Court, which was styled “Appeal from Denial of Rights Under the Arkansas Freedom of
Information Act.”1 ASP responded asserting that the requested photographs were exempt
from FOIA pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-19-105(b)(10)(A).
On April 6, 2021, the trial court held a hearing. After hearing the parties’ arguments,
the court ruled from the bench in favor of Racop. On April 8, the court entered an order
finding that “[Racop]’s request does not fall within the exemption set forth in Arkansas Code
Annotated § 25-19-105(b)(10).” The court ordered ASP to release the requested records
within ten days from the date of the order. ASP filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion
for stay of judgment pending appeal. The trial court denied the motion. ASP Defendants
then sought and received a stay from this court.
1
In addition to the photographs, ASP had also denied Racop’s request for the
nonexempt portion of the personnel file of defendant Kelli LaPorte. At the hearing,
however, Racop informed the court that the issue was moot because that information had
been provided to him.
2
On appeal, ASP argues that the trial court erred when it found that the documents
Racop requested were not exempt from FOIA under Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-
19-105(b)(10). This court liberally interprets FOIA to accomplish its laudable purpose that
public business be performed in an open and public manner. Hopkins v. City of Brinkley, 2014
Ark. 139, 432 S.W.3d 609 (citing Thomas v. Hall, 2012 Ark. 66, at 4, 399 S.W.3d 387, 390).
Furthermore, this court broadly construes FOIA in favor of disclosure. See id.Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-19-105(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2021) provides that “[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to provide
otherwise, all public records shall be open to inspection and copying, including without
limitation copying through image capture, including still and moving photography and video
and digital recording, by any citizen of the State of Arkansas during the regular business
hours of the custodian of the records.” Subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides that “[a] citizen may
make a request to the custodian to inspect, copy, . . . or receive copies of public records.” Ark.
Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a)(2)(A). The request may be made, among other ways, by electronic
mail. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a)(2)(B).
As relevant here, the General Assembly has provided that:
[i]t is the specific intent of this section that the following shall not be deemed
to be made open to the public under the provisions of this chapter:
....
(10)(A) The identities of law enforcement officers currently working
undercover with their agencies and identified in the Arkansas Minimum
Standards Office as undercover officers.
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Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b)(10)(A). Exemptions from FOIA are to be narrowly construed
in favor of openness. See Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 484, 830 S.W.2d 869, 871 (1992).
Whether certain records should be exempt from FOIA is a public-policy decision that must
be made by the General Assembly and not the courts. Hopkins v. City of Brinkley, 2014 Ark.
139, at 12, 432 S.W.3d 609, 617.
We have held that for a record to be subject to FOIA and available to the public, it
must be (1) possessed by an entity covered by the Act, (2) fall within the Act’s definition of
a public record, and (3) not be exempted by the Act or other statutes. Nabholz Constr. Corp.
v. Contractors for Pub. Prot. Ass’n, 371 Ark. 411, 416, 266 S.W.3d 689, 692 (2007). The parties
in this case do not dispute that the requested records are public records possessed by an
entity covered by FOIA; thus, the focus of this appeal is whether the requested records are
exempt under Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-19-105(b)(10)(A) because they would
reveal the identities of law enforcement officers currently working undercover. In other
words, we are tasked with determining whether the exemption applies to Racop’s request.
In plain and unambiguous language, the General Assembly carved out a specific
exception to the disclosure rule for those records that would reveal the identities of law
enforcement officers currently working undercover. ASP asserts that the language in
subdivision (b)(10)(A) is broad enough to exempt from release any public record that would
reveal the identity of an undercover law enforcement officer. Finally, ASP relies on
nonbinding authority from an opinion by the Arkansas Attorney General, which supports
ASP’s position that the photographs are exempt from release:
4
I will note that this office has long opined that the photographs of police
officers are personnel records and that photographs of undercover police
officers are exempt from disclosure (e.g. Opinion No. 96-005). Further, if a
department currently employs undercover officers, certain kinds of FOIA
requests may render it practically impossible to refrain from effectively
identifying the department’s undercover officers. For example, if a FOIA
request seeks the photographs of officers on a specific list, and the custodian
releases only the non-undercover officers’ photos, then the requester can
determine that the officer whose photograph was not released is undercover.
That procedure would violate -105(b)(10) because it effectively discloses the
“identity” of the undercover officer. In my opinion, the more reasonable
approach is as follows: When a law enforcement agency employs officers who
fall within -105(b)(l0), the agency should not disclose the photographs of any
of its officers.
Op. Ark. Atty. Gen. No. 011, at 4 (2014).
Racop responds that the trial court correctly concluded that section 25-19-105(b)(10)
did not exempt the requested photographs from disclosure under FOIA because the FOIA
standards, outlined above, favor disclosure; ASP Defendants routinely post the same photos
of troopers on social media that they claim are exempt in this case; and applying the
exemption as ASP argues would “swallow the public records rule.” None of these arguments
are persuasive. This court must apply the language of the exemption to the undisputed facts,
and what ASP posts on social media is not determinative.
We agree with the rationale of Atty. Gen. Op. No. 011 and hold that the request for
photographs of all uniformed, plain clothed, non-undercover Arkansas State Troopers hired
since Racop made a similar request in 2019 is exempt from disclosure under Arkansas Code
Annotated section 25-19-105(b)(10)(A). Clearly, comparing information already available to
the public, from sources like the Arkansas Transparency website—which provides names,
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service dates, salaries, race, gender, and other identifying information of State employees,
including state troopers—with a list of non-undercover troopers would reveal the identities
of the undercover officers. This is because knowing who is not undercover would reveal that
the officers whose photographs were not released are undercover. Accordingly, the trial court
erred in ordering disclosure under FOIA, and the order is therefore reversed and the case
dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.
WOMACK and WEBB, JJ., concur.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: William C. Bird III, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant.
Russell R. Racop, pro se appellee.
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