Kennedy v. Ark. Parole Bd. , 2017 Ark. 234 ( 2017 )


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  •                                     Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 234
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
    No.   CV-17-72
    Opinion Delivered August   3, 2017
    JEREMY KENNEDY
    APPELLANT
    PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
    JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
    V.
    COURT [NO. 35CV-16-375]
    ARKANSAS PAROLE BOARD
    APPELLEE HONORABLE JODI RAINES
    DENNIS, JUDGE
    AFFIRMED.
    KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice
    Appellant Jeremy Kennedy appeals from the dismissal of his pro se petition for judicial
    review of an adjudication made by the Arkansas Parole Board (Board) pursuant to the
    Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (APA), codified at Arkansas Code Annotated
    sections 25-15-201 to -218 (Repl. 2014). In his pro se petition for judicial review, Kennedy
    alleged that in May 2016, the Board unconstitutionally denied his transfer eligibility to the
    Department of Community Correction for one year in contravention of Arkansas’s parole
    statutes and the Board’s own regulations as set forth in the Arkansas Parole Board Policy
    Manual (Manual). However, Kennedy’s petition failed to identify the date on which he
    committed the offenses for which he is currently incarcerated, and there is no other evidence
    in the record in this appeal identifying the date those offenses were committed. Parole
    eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime is committed. Bosnick v.
    Lockhart, 
    283 Ark. 206
    , 209, 
    677 S.W.2d 292
    (1984) (supplemental opinion on denial of
    rehearing). In view of this, Kennedy’s petition failed to allege sufficient facts that would
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    2017 Ark. 234
    entitle him to review of the Board’s decision to deny transfer. We, therefore, affirm the
    circuit court’s order dismissing Kennedy’s petition.
    In the petition filed below, Kennedy contended that the Board’s decision was subject
    to judicial review because he had been convicted of residential burglary and theft by
    receiving, which are offenses that placed him within a “target group” of inmates who are
    entitled to nondiscretionary parole or transfer. 1 Kennedy further alleged that the Board
    denied him transfer without providing a course of action as prescribed by Arkansas Code
    Annotated section 16-93-615(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Repl. 2016), 2 and by the Board’s own regulations
    pursuant to its Manual.
    The Board filed a motion to dismiss and contended, among other things, that
    Kennedy’s petition should be dismissed because Kennedy failed to perfect service pursuant
    to Rule 4(d)(8) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure (2016), and otherwise had failed
    to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the provisions of the APA. Kennedy
    responded to the motion to dismiss and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted
    are governed by section 16-93-615(a)(1)(A), which provides that inmates convicted of
    certain felonies “shall” be transferred to the Department of Community Correction.
    1
    The term “target group” is defined in the Community Punishment Act codified at
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-1202(10)(A)(i) (Repl. 2016), as including offenders
    convicted of residential burglary and theft. Parole eligibility for this group is addressed by
    section 16-93-614(3) (Repl. 2016).
    2
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-615 was enacted on March 20, 2011, by
    Acts 2011, No. 570, § 100. The code sections that governed parole prior to the 2011 Act
    were codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-93-206 (Repl. 2006), 16-93-1201–
    1202 (Repl. 2006), and 16-93-1301-1302 (Repl. 2006).
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    Kennedy contended that the use of this mandatory language created a constitutionally-
    protected liberty interest in parole or transfer, which required the ADC to strictly follow
    the statutorily mandated procedure before denying his entitlement to transfer. Kennedy
    relied on this court’s holding in Whiteside v. Arkansas Parole Board, 
    2016 Ark. 217
    , 
    492 S.W.3d 489
    (per curiam), and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Board of Pardons
    v. Allen, 
    482 U.S. 369
    (1987), in support of this assertion.
    The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Kennedy did not comply with
    the service requirements under Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (2016), 3 had failed
    to state a constitutional claim and the ADC’s determination of parole eligibility is not subject
    to judicial review. On appeal, Kennedy raises the same argument that he raised below, and
    adds an allegation that he was convicted in 2013.
    When reviewing a circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss, we treat the
    facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff. Biedenharn v. Thicksten, 
    361 Ark. 438
    , 
    206 S.W.3d 837
    (2005). In viewing the
    facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts should be liberally construed in the
    3
    Whether Kennedy strictly complied with the service requirements set forth in Rule
    4 is of no moment with respect to a determination of the validity of Kennedy’s claim because
    a petitioner/plaintiff has 120 days under Rule 4(i) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
    to perfect service of process, and the dismissal based on insufficiency of process should be
    without prejudice. See Smith v. Sidney Moncrief Pontiac, Buick, GMC Co., 
    353 Ark. 701
    , 715,
    
    120 S.W.3d 525
    , 533 (2003). The record demonstrates that Kennedy filed his petition on
    June 23, 2016, the 120 days elapsed by October 21, 2016, and the circuit court dismissed
    the petition on November 1, 2016. The dismissal on this ground should have been without
    prejudice to allow Kennedy to perfect service of process and proceed with the action if he
    had stated a colorable cause of action.
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    plaintiff’s favor. 
    Id. at 441,
    206 S.W.3d at 840. Furthermore, our rules require fact pleading,
    and a complaint must state facts, not mere conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to
    relief. Ballard Grp., Inc. v. BP Lubricants USA, Inc., 
    2014 Ark. 276
    , at 6, 
    436 S.W.3d 445
    ,
    449 (citing Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2013)). Our standard of review for the granting of a
    motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Doe v. Weiss, 
    2010 Ark. 150
    , at 3.
    Applying the above-cited standards, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
    when it concluded that Kennedy failed to state a constitutional claim that triggered
    entitlement to judicial review under the APA. The administration of prisons has generally
    been held to be beyond the province of the courts. Clinton v. Bonds, 
    306 Ark. 554
    , 557–
    58, 
    816 S.W.2d 169
    , 171–72 (1991). However, an exception to the courts’ reticence to
    entertain a prisoner’s administrative complaints occurs when the petitioner asserts an
    infringement on constitutional rights. 
    Id. Treating the
    facts alleged in Kennedy’s petition as true, there is no allegation
    contained in either the petition or other pleadings identifying the date he had committed
    the offenses for which he is currently incarcerated, and there is no evidence in the record
    establishing that date. Kennedy makes an allegation in his appellant brief that he was
    convicted in 2013, but he did not present this allegation below, and the date of conviction
    is irrelevant to a determination of parole eligibility. As stated above, parole eligibility is
    determined by the law in effect at the time the crime was committed. 
    Bosnick, 283 Ark. at 209
    , 
    677 S.W.2d 292
    . The parole-eligibility statutes were substantially amended by Act
    570 of 2011, codified at sections 16-93-612 to -615, and Kennedy claims that it is these
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    statutory provisions that mandate transfer and give rise to a constitutionally-protected liberty
    interest. Because Kennedy did not raise sufficient allegations establishing which law applied
    to his entitlement to transfer, he failed to state a claim that would trigger review of the
    Board’s administrative action under our holding in 
    Clinton, 306 Ark. at 557
    –58, 816 S.W.2d
    at 171–72. In sum, there are no facts alleged by Kennedy demonstrating that a liberty
    interest was created by the provisions of the parole-eligibility statutes in effect at the time
    he committed the crimes of residential burglary and theft by receiving. Thus, Kennedy is
    not entitled to judicial review of the Board’s determination, and the circuit court’s order
    dismissing his petition was not an abuse of discretion.
    Affirmed.
    Jeremy Kennedy, pro se appellant.
    Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Nga Mahfouz, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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