State v. Ledwell , 2017 Ark. LEXIS 216 ( 2017 )

Cite as 2017 Ark. 252
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-17-94
Opinion Delivered: September 21, 2017
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 30CR-16-124]
BENJAMIN WARD LEDWELL HONORABLE CHRIS E WILLIAMS,
APPELLEE JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice
The State of Arkansas brings this interlocutory appeal from the Hot Spring County
Circuit Court’s order dismissing the misdemeanor negligent-homicide charges against
appellee Benjamin Ward Ledwell due to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations.
For reversal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of Arkansas
Code Annotated section 5-1-109(f) (Supp. 2015). We reverse and remand.
On May 12, 2016, Arkansas State Police Special Agent Jimmie Thomas II, prepared
an application for an arrest warrant for Ledwell. The affidavit alleged that, on May 19,
2015, Ledwell had committed four counts of negligent homicide, a Class A misdemeanor,
when the vehicle he was driving crossed over the center line of Arkansas Highway 7 and
hit another vehicle head-on, causing the death of all four occupants in the vehicle. The
affidavit further stated that a blood sample obtained from Ledwell shortly after the accident
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had tested positive for benzodiazepines and that Xanax and hydrocodone/acetaminophen
tablets were found inside his sock.
Based on the information contained in the affidavit, on May 13, 2016, the Hot Spring
County Circuit Court found probable cause to support the negligent homicide charges, and
the circuit court clerk issued a bench warrant for Ledwell on May 16, 2016. The warrant
was served on June 2, 2016, when Ledwell voluntarily surrendered to police custody, and
on June 6, 2016, the criminal information was filed charging him with four counts of
negligent homicide.
Ledwell filed a motion to dismiss the charges on October 14, 2016, arguing that the
prosecution was not commenced within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. At
the November 10, 2016 hearing on the motion, Ledwell specifically contended that because
the criminal information had not been filed until June 6, 2016, which was more than one
year after the accident had occurred, the statute of limitations had expired on the
misdemeanor offenses pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-109(b)(3)(A). In
response, the State asserted that the arrest warrant had been issued on May 16, 2016, within
the one-year statute of limitations. The State also presented the testimony of the Hot Spring
County Circuit Court clerk, who indicated that it was her practice to issue an arrest warrant
after the prosecutor’s office had presented a criminal information and probable-cause
affidavit. A case file with these documents would then be created once the arrest warrant
had been returned. Because the arrest warrant had been issued based on the criminal
information and affidavit, and the warrant was issued within one year of the accident, the
State argued that the prosecution had been timely commenced in accordance with Arkansas
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Code Annotated section 5-1-109(f). The State asserted that there was no requirement in
this subsection that the criminal information or other supporting documentation be filed in
order for the prosecution to have “commenced.”
Following posthearing briefing, the circuit court entered an order on November 29,
2016, granting Ledwell’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the charging documents
in this case had not been filed until June 6, 2016, and that the statute of limitations for the
prosecution of the misdemeanor charges had expired by that date. The State timely appealed
the circuit court’s order of dismissal on December 8, 2016.
As a threshold matter, we must first decide if we have jurisdiction to hear the State’s
appeal in this case. Unlike that of a criminal defendant, the State’s right to appeal is limited
to the provisions of Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Criminal. State
v. Colvin, 2013 Ark. 203, 427 S.W.3d 635. Pursuant to Rule 3(d), we will not consider an
appeal by the State unless the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law requires
review by this court. Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3(d). In addition, we review only State
appeals that are narrow in scope and that involve the interpretation, not the application, of
a criminal rule or statutory provision. State v. Jenkins, 2011 Ark. 2; State v. Pittman, 360
Ark. 273, 200 S.W.3d 893 (2005). State appeals that merely demonstrate that the circuit
court erred are not permitted. Jenkins, supra.
As the State contends, the issue presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court
erred in its interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-109(f). Because this is
an issue of first impression involving statutory interpretation, our decision will have
widespread application and is necessary for the correct and uniform administration of the
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criminal law. Accordingly, jurisdiction of this appeal is properly in this court. See, e.g.,
State v. Coble, 2016 Ark. 114, 487 S.W.3d 370 (accepting State appeal involving
interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-110(a)(4)(C)).
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to decide
the meaning of a statute. Newman v. State, 2011 Ark. 112, 380 S.W.3d 395. Criminal
statutes are construed strictly, and any doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant. Id.
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Id. We first construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
accepted meaning in common language; if the language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to
rules of statutory interpretation. Id.
Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-109(b)(3)(A), prosecution of a
misdemeanor offense must be commenced within one year of the commission of the offense.
“A prosecution is commenced when an arrest warrant or other process is issued based on an
indictment, information, or other charging instrument if the arrest warrant or other process
is sought to be executed without unreasonable delay.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-109(f). The
Original Commentary to section 5-1-109 explained that “other charging instrument” was
“intended to encompass affidavit complaints, citations, summons, and similar instruments
which are presently or may hereafter be employed in non-felony prosecutions.” Original
Commentary to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-109 (Repl. 1995).
The circuit court in this case interpreted subsection (f) to require that an indictment,
information, or other charging instrument be filed in order to commence a misdemeanor
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prosecution, regardless of whether an arrest warrant based on that charging instrument had
been issued prior to the expiration of the limitations period. In reaching this decision, the
circuit court cited Administrative Order No. 2(a), which provides that “[a]ll papers filed
with the clerk . . . . shall be noted chronologically in the dockets and filed in the folio
assigned to the action and shall be marked with its file number,” and it also cited
Administrative Order No. 2(b), which states that a judgment, decree, or order is “entered”
when stamped or otherwise marked by the date and time and the word “filed.” Ark. Sup.
Ct. Admin. Order No. 2(a), (b). In addition, the circuit court referred to our decision in
Halfacre v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 171 (per curiam), wherein we emphasized a clerk’s duty to file-
mark orders in accordance with Administrative Order No. 2(b).
As the State argues, however, this authority is not relevant to the question whether
a misdemeanor prosecution has been commenced under Arkansas Code Annotated section
5-1-109(f). The plain and unambiguous language in this subsection states that a prosecution
commences when an arrest warrant is issued based on a criminal information or other
charging instrument. There is no requirement in this statute that the charging instrument
be filed of record within the one-year-limitations period. Further, this interpretation is
consistent with the Original Commentary and the 1988 Supplemental Commentary to
section 5-1-109, both of which indicate that subsection (f) changed pre-Code law by
providing that a prosecution commences with the issuance of an arrest warrant rather than
the filing of criminal charges. Original Commentary & 1988 Supp. Commentary to Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-1-09 (Repl. 1995). See also Clark v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 496, 423 S.W.3d
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122 (holding that a prosecution for a misdemeanor offense began on the date the arrest
warrant was issued, not on the date the warrant was filed with the clerk).
Accordingly, we agree with the State that the circuit court erred in its interpretation
of section 5-1-109(f) and in concluding that the prosecution in this case had not commenced
within the applicable limitations period.1 Because the circuit court erred by granting
Ledwell’s motion to dismiss, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant.
John Wesley Hall and Sarah M. Pourhosseini; and Crisp & Freeze, by J. David Crisp, for
appellee.
1
While Ledwell argues that no documents were filed of record in this case until after
the statute of limitations had expired and that he therefore did not receive proper notice of
the prosecution, section 5-1-109(f) is concerned only with whether a prosecution has been
timely commenced. Ledwell does not dispute that the arrest warrant was issued prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations, nor does he contend that the criminal information
and other charging documents filed subsequent to his arrest were insufficient to give him
notice of the charges against him.
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