Roberts v. Unimin Corp.1 , 2016 Ark. 226 ( 2016 )


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  •                                      Cite as 
    2016 Ark. 226
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-16-375
    KATHY ROBERTS AND KAREN                             Opinion Delivered   May 26, 2016
    MCSHANE
    PLAINTIFFS                       REQUEST TO CERTIFY A
    QUESTION OF LAW FROM THE
    V.                                                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    COURT FOR THE EASTERN
    DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.
    UNIMIN CORPORATION
    DEFENDANT                          DISSENTING OPINION.
    HOWARD W. BRILL, Chief Justice
    Every first-semester first-year law student knows of the mystery and complexity of the
    Erie doctrine. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
    (1938) (establishing the Erie
    doctrine by holding that, in diversity cases, federal courts were no longer “free to exercise an
    independent judgment as to what the common law of the state is—or should be, ” 
    id. at 819,
    but must apply the state’s substantive law). Sitting in diversity, federal judges are obligated
    to apply state substantive law, whether statutory or case law, and federal procedural law.
    Accordingly, since Erie’s inception in 1938, federal judges are required to apply state law or,
    when the law is uncertain, to predict what the state law is or how the state supreme court
    would decide a particular state-law issue.
    The state law may be outdated, confusing, inconsistent, nonexistent, at variance with
    other states, or perhaps wrong. It does not matter. The federal court is required to predict
    or guess what the current state law is. If the federal judge predicts one result, and a state court
    Cite as 
    2016 Ark. 226
    the following year reaches a different conclusion and proclaims a different state law, the
    wrongly decided federal decision still stands. See Bartley v. Sweetser, 
    319 Ark. 117
    , 
    890 S.W.2d 250
    (1994) (rejecting the Erie prediction of Jackson v. Warner Holdings, Ltd., 
    617 F. Supp. 646
    (W.D. Ark. 1985)). If the question involves multiple states, the issues are compounded. See
    Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 
    276 F.2d 280
    , 281 (2nd Cir. 1960) (stating that “[o]ur principal
    task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would
    think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought”),
    judgment set aside by Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 
    365 U.S. 293
    (1961).
    This unfortunate dilemma existed from 1938 to 2001. But, with the leadership of the
    Arkansas Bar and the approval of the people of Arkansas, amendment 80 provided a solution.
    Section 2(D)(3) of amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution gives our supreme court
    “original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United
    States.” This court approved a rule to implement the certification authorized by amendment
    80. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-8 (2015) (rule adopted in 2002). Further, this court established
    its certification requirements in Longview Production Company v. Dubberly, 
    352 Ark. 207
    , 
    99 S.W.3d 427
    (2003) (per curiam).
    The benefit of this certification method has been well established over the past fifteen
    years. We have answered certified questions from federal district courts, we have invalidated
    statutes, and we have given guidance. Since 2013 alone, we have accepted and answered
    certified questions and have not refused to accept a single certified question from a federal
    district court. See Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc., 
    2016 Ark. 157
    ; Integrated Direct Mktg. v. May,
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    Cite as 
    2016 Ark. 226
    2015 Ark. 454 
    (per curiam); Columbia Ins. Grp. v. Cenark Project Mgmt. Servs., 
    2015 Ark. 396
    (per curiam); Gafford v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    2015 Ark. 110
    , 
    459 S.W.3d 277
    ; Dickinson v.
    SunTrust Nat’l Mortg. Inc., 
    2014 Ark. 513
    , 
    451 S.W.3d 576
    ; Bowerman v. Takeda Pharmals.
    U.S.A., 
    2014 Ark. 388
    , 
    442 S.W.3d 839
    ; Simpson v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 
    2014 Ark. 363
    , 
    440 S.W.3d 335
    ; Roeder v. United States, 
    2014 Ark. 156
    , 
    432 S.W.3d 627
    ; Adams v. Cameron Mut.
    Ins. Co., 
    2013 Ark. 475
    , 
    430 S.W.3d 675
    ; Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 
    2013 Ark. 502
    , 
    431 S.W.3d 200
    ; Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., LLC, 
    2013 Ark. 114
    , 
    426 S.W.3d 437
    .
    Certification avoids undue federal-court speculation by allowing important state-law
    issues to be decided by judges who are much more familiar with state law and policy. It
    ensures that the correct and lasting law will govern the parties themselves and establishes
    uniformity and predictability for litigants statewide. For further discussion of the benefits of
    certified questions, see generally Coby W. Logan, Certifying Questions to the Arkansas Supreme
    Court: A Practical Means for Federal Courts in Clarifying Arkansas State Law, 30 U. Ark. Little
    Rock L. Rev. 85 (2007) (suggesting changes to Rule 6-8).
    In this instance, Judge Holmes has certified a question of law regarding mining leases
    in Izard County. He states that “there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the
    Supreme Court of Arkansas.” Our refusal to answer this question of law will require him to
    speculate as to how we would decide the issue. This supreme court should answer the
    question. I believe it is our responsibility. For these reasons, I dissent from the refusal to
    accept the certified question.
    DANIELSON, J., joins.
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