Clayton v. Kelley ( 2017 )

Cite as 2017 Ark. 2
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
No. CV-16-541
ROBERT PRESTON CLAYTON Opinion Delivered January 12, 2017
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN COUNTY
V. CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 40CV-16-9]
WENDY KELLEY, DIRECTOR,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE JODI RAINES
CORRECTION DENNIS, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
In 2010, appellant Robert Preston Clayton was found guilty by a jury of rape and
second-degree sexual assault of his minor daughter. He was sentenced as a habitual offender
to an aggregate term of 960 months’ imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals
affirmed. Clayton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 199. Clayton subsequently filed in the trial court
a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure
37.1 (2010). The petition was denied, and Clayton appealed to this court from the order.
We dismissed the appeal because it was clear from the record that Clayton could not prevail.
Clayton v. State, 2013 Ark. 453 (per curiam).
On February 1, 2016, Clayton, who is incarcerated in a unit of the Arkansas
Department of Correction located in Lincoln County, filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court seeking to have the judgment vacated
or to have an order entered for him to be resentenced by the trial court. The circuit court
Cite as 2017 Ark. 2
dismissed the petition on the ground that Clayton had not stated a ground for the writ.
Clayton, who remains incarcerated in Lincoln County, brings this appeal.
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless
it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, at 5, 434 S.W.3d 364, 367. A
decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate
court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. Id.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its
face or when a trial court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley, 2015 Ark. 465,
477 S.W.3d 503. Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his actual
innocence and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas must plead either the facial
invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing
by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that he is illegally detained. Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Unless the petitioner in proceedings for a
writ of habeas corpus can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the
commitment was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas
corpus should issue. Fields v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 416.
Clayton’s arguments in this appeal mirror those in the habeas petition. He contends
that he was denied due process of law because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
judgment and that the victim is now ready to “tell the truth.” He further alleges that his
Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment was violated by the
2
Cite as 2017 Ark. 2
length of his term of imprisonment. Clayton also argues in his brief that the circuit court
erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on the claims in the habeas petition.
With respect to Clayton’s claim that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction, the allegation does not state a ground for relief. Mitchell v. Kelley,
2016 Ark. 326 (per curiam). In a habeas proceeding that is not filed under Act 1780,
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, which are due-process claims, are not
cognizable. Gardner v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 346, 439 S.W.3d 663 (per curiam). Likewise, an
attack on the credibility of Clayton’s victim was not a ground for the writ. See Jones v.
Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 251, at 2–3 (per curiam) (holding that attacks on the credibility of the
witnesses at trial do not provide grounds to grant the writ). A habeas proceeding does not
afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his or her case, and it is not a substitute for direct
appeal or proceeding for postconviction relief. Philyaw, 2015 Ark. 465, 477 S.W.3d 503.
Clayton based his Eighth Amendment argument on the length of his sentence and
his allegation that there were factors, such as his history of psychological problems and
substance abuse that made his culpability questionable and mitigated against the length of
the sentence. The Eighth Amendment claim is outside the scope of a habeas proceeding
because the claim does not implicate the jurisdiction of the trial court or the facial validity
of the judgment. See Grissom v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 449, 476 S.W.3d 160 (per curiam), cert.
denied, Grissom v. Kelley, No. 16-5146, 2016 WL 3670848 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016).
Clayton did not contend that the sentences imposed on him were outside the
statutory limits for the offenses or that he was a minor when he committed the offenses; he
merely argued that mitigating factors should have been considered to result in a lesser
3
Cite as 2017 Ark. 2
sentence. Where the law does not authorize the particular sentence pronounced by a trial
court, the sentence is unauthorized and illegal. See State v. Joslin, 364 Ark. 545, 222 S.W.3d
168 (2006). However, the mere fact that a sentence, which is within the statutory range for
the offense, does not satisfy a petitioner does not entitle a petitioner to release on a writ of
habeas corpus. See Clem v. State, 2011 Ark. 311 (per curiam). Here, Clayton’s habitual-
offender sentences of 600 months’ imprisonment for rape and 360 months’ for second-
degree sexual assault were within statutory range. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(c) (Repl.
2006) (rape is a Class Y felony); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(b)(1) (second-degree sexual
assault is a Class B felony); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (a sentence for a Class Y felony
may range from 120 months to 480 months or life); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (a
sentence for a Class B felony may range from 60 months’ imprisonment to 240 months’
imprisonment). Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-403(a) , the trial court
had authority to exercise its discretion and order that the sentences imposed on Clayton be
served consecutively. This court has previously rejected the argument that imposition of
consecutive sentences is cruel and unusual punishment. See Thompson v. State, 280 Ark.
265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983) (holding that the cumulative effect of consecutive sentences
does not make punishment cruel and unusual); see also Thompson v. State, 2013 Ark. 179, at
5–6 (per curiam) (The mere fact that sentences were imposed consecutively did not serve
to offend the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.).
Finally, as to Clayton’s argument that the trial court erred by not holding a hearing
on his habeas petition, we find no error. We have held that a hearing on a petition for writ
of habeas corpus is not required if the petition does not allege either of the bases for relief
4
Cite as 2017 Ark. 2
proper in a habeas proceeding; and, even if a cognizable claim is made, the writ will not be
issued unless probable cause is shown for the writ to be issued. Philyaw, 2015 Ark. 465, at
4, 477 S.W.3d 503, 506. If a petitioner in a habeas proceeding fails to raise a claim within
the purview of a habeas action, the petitioner fails to meet his burden of demonstrating a
basis for the writ to issue. Allen v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 70, 482 S.W.3d 719 (per curiam). The
claims Clayton raised in his petition did not demonstrate that the trial court was without
jurisdiction or that the judgment was invalid on its face. The circuit court was therefore
not clearly erroneous in denying habeas relief without a hearing.
Affirmed.
Robert Preston Clayton, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
5