Muntaqim v. Hobbs , 2017 Ark. LEXIS 86 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                                 Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 97
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-15-789
    Opinion Delivered: March   16, 2017
    MALIK MUNTAQIM, ADC #088633
    APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
    COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    V.                             [NO. 35CV-15-184]
    RAY HOBBS, Director of Arkansas             HONORABLE JODI RAINES
    Department Correction; GAYLON LAY,          DENNIS, JUDGE
    Warden of Cummins Unit; LARRY MAY,
    Chief Deputy Director; GRANT HARRIS,        DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED
    Deputy Director; WENDY KELLEY, Deputy       AND REMANDED IN PART.
    Director; RAYMOND NAYLOR, Internal
    Affairs Administrator; RANDY WATSON,
    Warden of Varner Unit; MARVIN EVANS,
    Deputy Director; EDDIE SELVEY, Deputy
    Warden ADC; CRYSTAL WOOD,
    Classification Officer Cummins Unit;
    MICHELLE WILLIAMS, Deputy Warden
    Cummins Unit; PATRICIA BAXTER,
    Mailroom Supervisor Cummins Unit;
    LEONARD BANKS, Chaplain of Cummins
    Unit; SGT S. COOK, Correctional Officer
    Cummins Unit; TIFFANYE COMPTON,
    Grievance Coordinator Central Office;
    DENNISE ALEXANDER, Publication
    Review Central Office; JAN SCUSSELL,
    Publication Review Central Office; TAMI
    AIKEN, Publication Review Central Office;
    JOHN M. WHEELER, Religious
    Administrator Central Office; APRIL
    GIBSON, Grievance Officer Cummins Unit;
    LISA R. HALL, Grievance Officer Cummins
    Unit; MUHAMMAD AMEEN, Islamic
    Chaplain Central Office
    APPELLEES
    SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
    Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 97
    Appellant, Malik Muntaqim, is an inmate in the custody of the Arkansas Department
    of Correction (“ADC”), Ouachita Unit. He claims that he was denied access to certain
    religious publications and the right to lead Nation of Islam religious services while in the
    custody of the ADC. Muntaqim claims these two restrictions violate his rights under the
    First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Religious Land
    Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc (2000), et seq., and
    the Arkansas Constitution. Muntaqim is appealing the circuit court’s denial of his motion
    for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction. We dismiss the appellant’s appeal from
    the motion for summary judgment and reverse and remand to the circuit court to hold a
    hearing on his motion for preliminary injunction.
    Facts and Procedural Background
    Muntaqim asserts that he is a member of the Nation of Islam (“NOI”), an alternative
    branch of Islam, and that the literature developed by the ministers of NOI is essential to the
    practice of his faith. The NOI publishes a weekly periodical entitled The Final Call, which,
    he alleges, is the primary means through which NOI members receive religious instruction
    and propagate their religion.
    On April 20, 2015, Muntaqim filed a complaint against twenty-two employees of
    the ADC alleging violations of his civil rights. Muntaqim attached thirteen Department of
    Correction-level grievances from the Ouachita, Cummins, and Varner Units to support his
    claims. In the various grievances, Muntaqim alleges violations of his rights from the denial
    of The Final Call, due-process violations for ADC’s failure to follow its policies regarding
    2
    Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 97
    publication reviews, retaliations based on the grievances that he filed, and violations of his
    rights for not being allowed to lead NOI religious services.
    On July 10, 2015, Muntaqim filed a pro se motion for a preliminary injunction,
    summary judgment, and default judgment, specifically seeking to enjoin the defendants from
    violating his rights. On August 10, 2015, the Jefferson County Circuit Court denied
    Muntaqim’s motion without holding a hearing on the merits. The court stated that granting
    the injunction would alter the status quo between the parties and that Muntaqim had not
    demonstrated that he could succeed on the merits. Muntaqim filed a motion to amend the
    judgment, which was denied. He then appealed the circuit court’s order.
    Denial of Summary Judgment
    Appellant argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for summary
    judgment. Our rules of appellate procedure require that an order be final to be appealable.
    Ark. R. App. P. –Civ. 2 (2016); Denney v. Denney, 
    2015 Ark. 257
    , at 4, 
    464 S.W.3d 920
    ,
    922. A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final, appealable order and does
    not fit into one of the exceptions under our rules. Denney, 
    2015 Ark. 257
    , at 
    4, 464 S.W.3d at 922
    . We therefore cannot address the circuit court’s denial of this motion on appeal.
    Denial of the Preliminary Injunction
    The appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a
    preliminary injunction because he claims to have proven that he can succeed on the merits.
    We will not reverse a circuit court’s denial of a preliminary injunction unless it is an abuse
    of discretion. AJ & K Operating Co. v. Smith, 
    355 Ark. 510
    , 517, 
    140 S.W.3d 475
    , 480
    (2004). An abuse of discretion means a decision exercised thoughtlessly and without due
    3
    Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 97
    consideration. Jones v. Double “D” Props., Inc., 
    352 Ark. 39
    , 48, 
    98 S.W.3d 405
    , 410 (2003).
    Our case law indicates that an injunction is an extraordinary right reserved for extraordinary
    circumstances. Drummond Citizens Ins. Co. v. Sergeant, 
    266 Ark. 611
    , 621, 
    588 S.W.2d 419
    ,
    424 (1979). In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction the trial court must
    consider two things: (1) whether irreparable harm will result in the absence of an injunction,
    and (2) whether the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
    AJ & K Operating 
    Co., 355 Ark. at 517
    , 140 S.W.3d at 480. The moving party bears the
    burden to prove a “reasonable probability of success” on the merits. Custom Microsystems,
    Inc. v. Blake, 
    344 Ark. 536
    , 542, 
    42 S.W.3d 453
    , 457 (2001). Lastly, “when considering an
    order which grants or denies an injunction, this court will not delve into the merits of the
    case further than is necessary to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.”
    Doe v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    357 Ark. 413
    , 417, 
    182 S.W.3d 107
    , 109 (2004).
    When the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure are “substantially identical” to the
    corresponding Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we may consider federal interpretations.
    Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 
    372 Ark. 384
    , 386, 
    277 S.W.3d 171
    , 173
    (2008); see also City of Fort Smith v. Carter, 
    364 Ark. 100
    , 107, 
    216 S.W.3d 594
    , 598 (2005);
    Smith v. Washington, 
    340 Ark. 460
    , 464, 
    10 S.W.3d 877
    , 880 (2000). Arkansas Rule of Civil
    Procedure 65 is “substantially identical” to the federal rules, as amended in 2009, and we
    therefore find federal interpretation of that rule to be instructive. Ark. R. Civ. P. 65 addition
    to reporter’s notes to 2011 Amendment.
    A federal court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction will be reviewed
    for an abuse of discretion. All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 
    887 F.2d 4
                                         Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 97
    1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989). Both this court and federal courts have stated that a hearing
    regarding a preliminary injunction is not required in all circumstances. Fort Smith Symphony
    Orchestra, Inc. v. Fort Smith Symphony Ass’n, Inc., 
    285 Ark. 284
    , 287, 
    686 S.W.2d 418
    , 420
    (1985) (noting that a temporary injunction may issue without any hearing where there are
    affidavits or a verified complaint alleging irreparable harm without relief); All Care Nursing
    Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 
    887 F.2d 1535
    , 1538 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that
    an evidentiary hearing is not always required before the court may issue a preliminary
    injunction). However, when the outcome of a preliminary injunction turns on disputed
    facts, the court should hold a hearing before resolving the motion. Forts v. Ward, 
    566 F.2d 849
    , 852 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Arrowpoint Capital Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC,
    
    793 F.3d 313
    , 324 (3d Cir. 2015); Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co.,
    
    729 F.2d 334
    , 341 (5th Cir. 1984); All Care Nursing Serv., 
    Inc., 887 F.2d, at 1538
    .
    The appellant in this case has raised allegations which, if proven correct, could
    constitute substantial violations of religious liberty rights under the First Amendment and
    RLUIPA. Specifically, the appellant has made claims that he was denied certain religious
    texts that are required for him to practice his faith and that the ADC’s policy prohibits him
    from conducting NOI religious services in conformity with his faith. The Supreme Court
    has clearly stated that the denial of First Amendment rights, even for minimal amounts of
    time, constitutes irreparable harm. Elrod v. Burns, 
    427 U.S. 347
    , 373 (1976). Both allegations
    could, after a determination of the facts, potentially rise to the level of infringements of the
    appellant’s religious liberties. The circuit court denied appellant’s motion based on the
    documents before it and did not hold a hearing on the merits. Based on the record before
    5
    Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 97
    us, we are convinced that it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to not hold a hearing on
    the appellant’s motion.
    However, our holding today is limited to the circumstances presented in this case,
    and we do not hold that a hearing must be held on every preliminary injunction. We are
    satisfied that an abuse of discretion occurred when the allegations could constitute
    irreparable harm to the appellant’s religious liberties and the allegations arise from disputed
    facts which could change the outcome of the injunction. The complexity and the rights in
    question warrant a hearing below. We therefore reverse and remand for the circuit court to
    hold a hearing on appellant’s motion for preliminary injunction.
    Dismissed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
    Malik Muntaqim, pro se appellant.
    Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Charles Lyford, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellees.
    6