Jeffery Brown v. State of Arkansas ( 2023 )

Cite as 2023 Ark. 27SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-21-120
Opinion Delivered: March 9, 2023
JEFFERY BROWN
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 40CV-20-39]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JODI RAINES
APPELLEE DENNIS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice
Appellant Jeffery Brown appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s order dismissing
his petition for writ of habeas corpus. For reversal, Brown argues that the circuit court erred
because his sentencing order was facially invalid. We affirm.
I. Facts
In December 1981, Brown, age seventeen, was charged with the capital felony
murders of Steve and Diane Francis committed in connection with a robbery. On May 18,
1982, the Clark County Circuit Court entered a judgment and commitment order reflecting
Brown’s guilty plea to a reduced charge of first-degree murder, a Class Y felony. See Ark.
Stats. Ann. § 41-1502(3) (Supp. 1981). The circuit court sentenced him to a term of life
imprisonment to be served in the Arkansas Department of Correction. See Ark. Stats. Ann.
§ 41-901(1)(a) (Supp. 1981).
On June 24, 2013, Brown filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging
that he had been held unlawfully pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its
companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). He asserted that his sentence of life
imprisonment was illegal because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and that the
sentencing court did not consider his youth, as required by Miller and Jackson. The circuit
court dismissed Brown’s petition. We affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal in Brown v. Hobbs,
2014 Ark. 267. In Brown, we held that Miller did not apply and that Brown’s sentence was
discretionary because, at the time of his offense, the sentencing range for first-degree murder
was not less than ten years and not more than forty years, or life. Id. at 6; Ark. Stats. Ann. §
41-901(1)(a). We further opined that Brown was not mandatorily sentenced to life in prison
but to a discretionary sentence that included a range of years; therefore, unlike Miller and
Jackson, the circuit court in Brown was not precluded from considering his youth. Id. at 6–7;
see also Murry v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 64, at 4 (per curiam) (holding that “[b]ecause [Murry’s] life
sentence was not mandatory, but was instead chosen from a range of possible punishments,
he [could not] demonstrate that his sentence [was] illegal under Miller”).
On March 4, 2020, through his counsel, Brown filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus seeking to invalidate his sentence. In this petition, he again asserted that Miller
applied because he had been sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment for his first-degree
murder conviction. On May 5, 2020, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Brown’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus and found that Brown had received a sentence of life
imprisonment out of a discretionary range of ten to forty years, or life, in the Arkansas
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Department of Correction. The circuit court stated that “[l]ife was not a mandatory sentence.
Therefore, the holding in Miller does not render the petitioner’s life sentence invalid.” Brown
timely filed his notice of appeal.
II. Juvenile Sentencing
For his sole point on appeal, Brown argues that the circuit court erred because his
sentencing order was facially invalid. Specifically, he contends that his sentence of life was
the equivalent of a sentence to life without parole, thereby making his sentence facially
invalid.
The law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits a court from reconsidering issues of law or fact
that have already been decided on appeal and serves to effectuate efficiency and finality in
the judicial process to avoid reconsideration of matters once decided. Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark.
7, at 9, 591 S.W.3d 786, 792. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the decision of an appellate
court establishes the law of the case for the trial court upon remand and for the appellate
court itself upon subsequent review. Id., 591 S.W.3d at 792–93. Similarly, an issue-
preclusion analysis under res judicata is used in postconviction proceedings, and under that
analysis, a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction on matters that were at issue and
that were directly and necessarily adjudicated bars any further litigation by the plaintiff or
his privies against the defendant or his privies on the same issues. Id., 591 S.W.3d at 793.
Brown is dispositive of the case at bar. Because Brown now presents the same issue—
whether Miller invalidates his life sentence—that he did in Brown, 2014 Ark. 267, his
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argument is barred by the issue-preclusion element of res judicata. Thus, we hold that the
circuit court properly denied habeas relief, and accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
WEBB, J., concurs.
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice, concurring. I agree that the Lincoln County Circuit
Court did not err in dismissing Jeffery Brown’s habeas petition because his counsel asserted the
exact factual predicate and legal argument that Brown himself had raised in a pro se petition that he
filed in 2014. Brown v Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 267. This current filing constitutes abuse of the writ.
We have applied the abuse-of-the writ doctrine 66 times, most recently in Trammel v.
Payne, 2022 Ark. 76, an opinion handed down on April 7 of last year. We recently described
the doctrine in Jackson v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 251, at 4, 602 S.W.3d 739, 742:
The abuse-of-the-writ doctrine may apply in habeas proceedings to subsume
res judicata when the petitioner raises the same arguments addressed
previously without bringing forward additional facts that would support his or
her argument. Watts v. Kelley, 2019 Ark. 207, 575 S.W.3d 558. Jackson has
raised the same claims for relief that he had raised in this previous petition for
habeas relief, and they were found to be without merit. Jackson, 07-785 (Ark.
Dec. 4, 2008). The repetition of his previous claims represents an abuse of the
writ. For these reasons, the circuit court did not clearly err when it dismissed
Jackson’s petition on the basis that Jackson’s claims had been previously raised
and rejected.
The abuse-of-the-writ-doctrine has been a standard part of habeas corpus
jurisprudence since it was announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wong
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Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924). It specifically addresses repetitious filings of habeas
petitions. 1 I therefore respectfully concur.
Josh Q. Hurst, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
1
To the extent that res judicata is even mentioned in our habeas cases, it is associated
with the law-of-the-case doctrine. See Douglas v. State, 2014 Ark. 485 (per curium) (issue
decided in direct appeal); Loftis v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 352 (per curium) (issue previously
decided in revocation appeal); Strong v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 376 (per curium) (issue previously
decided in appeal of motion to vacate a judgment).
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