Stanton v. State , 2017 Ark. LEXIS 121 ( 2017 )

Cite as 2017 Ark. 155
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-16-809
Opinion Delivered: April 27, 2017
MARVIN A. STANTON
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 46CR-15-503]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE KIRK JOHNSON,
APPELLEE JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Associate Justice
A jury found appellant, Marvin A. Stanton, guilty of first-degree murder, for which
he received a sentence of life imprisonment, and of employing a firearm as a means of
committing the murder, for which he received a sentence of fifteen years, with the sentences
to run consecutively. On appeal, he contends that the circuit court erred by allowing the
State to introduce character evidence to show that he acted in conformity with his character
when he committed the crimes. We reverse Stanton’s convictions and remand for a new
trial.1
On September 25, 2015, Stanton and the victim, Jesse Hamilton, confronted each
other at a Raceway gas station in Texarkana, Arkansas. While the testimony of the State’s
Further, Stanton contends that, although he did not object and there was no ruling
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against him, the circuit court, sua sponte, should have precluded the State from making
statements during closing argument that Stanton contends constituted improper vouching
for the credibility of the State’s witness. We need not address Stanton’s argument because
the issue is not likely to occur on retrial.
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witnesses differed significantly from Stanton’s testimony regarding the circumstances, the
parties agree that the confrontation escalated into a fight that ended when Stanton shot
Hamilton with a handgun, causing his death.
Before trial, Stanton moved to suppress any evidence regarding a 2007 incident that
resulted in Stanton’s arrest for aggravated assault. At a pretrial hearing, Eric Green, a patrol
sergeant with the Hope Police Department, testified that in 2007 he investigated an alleged
aggravated assault by Stanton. Green testified that there was a disagreement between Stanton
and another person involving an unpaid bill. The other person followed Stanton to his
home, and Stanton exited his vehicle with his firearm. Stanton denied making any
threatening gestures or pointing the weapon at the person. Green testified that, based on his
investigation, he concluded that there was no evidence that Stanton had committed a crime,
and the charge was dropped. After the hearing, the circuit court issued a letter opinion in
which it concluded that the evidence was inadmissible. Citing Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas
Rules of Evidence, the court ruled that evidence of the use of a gun eight years earlier “did
not meet any of the criteria for admission.”
At trial, Stanton took the stand in his own defense and asserted that he was justified
in using deadly physical force against Hamilton. Before testifying about the circumstances
surrounding Hamilton’s death, however, Stanton testified about his personal history. He
testified that he was born in Shaw, Mississippi, and graduated from high school in Cleveland,
Mississippi. He testified that in 1985, when he was 18 years old, he joined the United States
Marine Corps. He testified he was deployed during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
was on active duty for eight years, and after he left active duty in 1991, was on inactive
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status for three and one-half years. He further testified that he would turn 50 years old in
June 2016, that he is married to a pediatrician, and that he is the father of six and the
grandfather of four. Stanton testified about his involvement in his wife’s medical practice.
He further testified that he is an EMT, performs volunteer work for a volunteer fire
department, and runs a nonprofit, “Hope From Hope,” where they teach basic life support
to nurses and EMTs for the American Heart Association. He also testified that he is licensed
to carry a concealed handgun, is a concealed-carry-permit instructor, and is a “safety officer”
for the National Rifle Association. He further testified that he is a member of the Rotary
Club in Hope, Arkansas, and had been a member of the Juggernauts of Hope, a motorcycle
club, but is now a member of the Juggernauts of Texarkana. He testified that he had left the
Juggernauts of Hope because the national organization would not allow women in the
organization to have the same status as men. He testified that he rejoined the Juggernauts,
however, because he enjoyed nonprofit work or service work, and that it “was my way of
giving back because I didn’t have much when I was coming up.” He testified, “[T]hat’s
kind of my way of giving all the years throughout my entire career, which I provided that
to my lawyer here about all the awards, accommodations, and stuff that I’ve kind of managed
to obtain here throughout the years, and still hasn’t stopped to this day.” He testified that
he was the public-relations officer for the Juggernauts and that he participated in Toys for
Tots, an event where motorcyclists brought in toys with the goal of filling a five-ton truck
with the toys. He also testified about participating in, and raising money for, events for the
homeless, where the homeless were given packets of food and toiletries.
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On cross-examination, the State asked Stanton whether he is a peaceful and law-
abiding citizen. Stanton’s counsel objected, asserting that Stanton had not testified regarding
his peacefulness. The State advised the court that it intended to ask Stanton whether he had
ever “pull[ed]” a gun on someone. The State also informed the court that it intended to ask
Stanton whether he had ever hit anyone in the head. The court concluded that the State
could “go forward now that [Stanton’s] character has been placed into issue.”
During the State’s cross-examination, Stanton testified that eight years ago he had
pulled a gun to stop a threat. He testified that a man had approached him at his office in a
threatening manner, that he got in his vehicle and left his office, and that the man followed
him to his home and tried to drive him off the road. Stanton testified that when he arrived
home, he pulled his gun, and the man left. The State further asked Stanton if he had ever
hit a woman in the head. Stanton testified that he had slapped a woman before, which
bloodied her nose. He testified that he struck her because she had “herpes on the corner of
her mouth” and had spit in his face.
On appeal, Stanton argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the
State to cross-examine him on these two instances of prior misconduct. Stanton contends
that the evidence submitted by the State was not admissible under Rule 404(b) of the
Arkqnsas Rules of Evidence and was introduced solely to show that Stanton had a violent
character, even though Stanton had not put his character for peacefulness at issue. Citing
Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, Stanton further contends the probative value
of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Also,
Stanton asserts that his testimony regarding his background was relevant to facts in issue.
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Specifically, he noted that (1) the testimony regarding him being a Marine was relevant
because he and the victim had voiced their respective military backgrounds during the
confrontation and was also relevant to show that he believed Hamilton had physically
confronted him by stepping on his toes, which Stanton testified is a military technique used
to throw a person off balance; (2) the testimony regarding his charity work explained why
he is in a motorcycle club; (3) the testimony that he is an EMT explained why he rendered
aid to Hamilton after the shooting; (4) the testimony regarding his background with carrying
a weapon was relevant to explain why he was in possession of a handgun and to show that
he knew how to handle the handgun.
In response, the State notes that prior to trial, the circuit court ruled that the evidence
regarding Stanton’s use of a handgun eight years earlier was inadmissible, and the State asserts
that it complied with the ruling. The State, however, asserts that its compliance with the
circuit court’s pretrial ruling did not end the matter. The State concludes that “proof of bad
character in the form of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, even when inadmissible under Rule
404(b), becomes admissible when a party opens the door by eliciting evidence of good
character.” The State contends that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(a)(1) and
Rule 405(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. The State asserts that because Stanton
injected into the trial his character as a peaceful and law-abiding person, the State was
entitled to rebut the evidence through cross-examination on relevant specific instances of
Stanton’s conduct.
In reply, Stanton asserts that he did not put his character or reputation for
peacefulness at issue. He thus concludes that the State could not rebut the evidence by
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questioning him about specific instances of his conduct relating to his peacefulness. He
contends that his testimony was merely testimony about his background unrelated to his
character for peacefulness.
We agree with the circuit court’s pretrial ruling that the testimony regarding
Stanton’s prior use of a gun was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides,
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The State’s evidence that Stanton had drawn a gun after he had been followed home and
that he had slapped a woman who had spit in his face was not admitted for the purpose of
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. In Rowdean v. State, 280 Ark. 146, 655 S.W.2d 413 (1983), the State
sought to introduce evidence that the defendant had pulled a gun on another person earlier
on the same day that she had committed a murder. This court held that the evidence was
not relevant to prove motive, opportunity, intent, or preparation or plan of the murder but
was instead the use of a separate prior act to prove another charge. The case at bar is
analogous.
Moreover, the evidence presented by the State was unrelated to Stanton’s
justification defense. In Rowdean, the State also introduced evidence that the defendant had
pulled a knife on someone a month before the murder. The circuit court allowed the
evidence as being probative of who the aggressor was in the murder. This court cited Rule
405(b), which provides, “In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances
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of his conduct.” This court noted that while the defendant in that case “did plead self-
defense, or justification, we do not find that permits the State to offer evidence of specific
instances of prior misconduct to show she may have been the aggressor. It was error to do
so because her character is not an essential element of her claim of self-defense.” Id. at 149,
655 S.W.2d at 415. The same analysis applies here.
Rather than arguing that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) or Rule
405(b), the State contends that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(a)(1) and Rule
405(a). These arguments are equally unavailing. Rule 404(a)(1) provides,
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except . . . [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same.
Rule 405(a) provides,
In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is
admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific
instances of conduct.
Thus, under Rule 404(a)(1), evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not
admissible for proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except
by the accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same. Frye v. State, 2009 Ark. 110, at 9,
313 S.W.3d 10, 15–16 (1994). After the admissibility of character evidence has been
established under Rule 404, Rule 405 establishes the methods of proof that may be utilized.
Id., 313 S.W.3d at 16. Rule 405(a) provides that once character evidence is admissible, one
permissible method of proof is by reputation or opinion testimony; further, on cross-
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examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. Id., 313 S.W.3d
at 16.
Circuit courts have broad discretion in deciding evidentiary issues, and their rulings
on the admissibility of evidence are not reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Friar v. State, 2016 Ark. 245, at 17. We hold that the circuit court abused its
discretion in allowing the State to question Stanton about these specific instances. As one
authority has stated,
Ordinarily, if the defendant chooses to inject his character into the trial in this
sense, he does so by producing witnesses who testify to his good character. By relating
a personal history supportive of good character, however, the defendant may achieve
the same result. Whatever the method, once the defendant gives evidence of
pertinent character traits to show that he is not guilty, his claim of possession of these
traits—but only these traits—is open to rebuttal by cross-examination or direct
testimony of prosecution witnesses.
1 Charles Tilford, McCormick on Evidence § 191 (7th ed.) (emphasis added). Here, though
Stanton testified about his personal history, his employment, his military background, his
experience relating to handguns, and his charitable work with a motorcycle club, his
testimony did not stray into the area of his character for peacefulness or of being a law-
abiding citizen. Thus, it was improper for the circuit court to allow the State to present
testimony regarding Stanton’s character for lack of peacefulness because there was no
testimony on that characteristic for the State to rebut. Compare Hawksley v. State, 276 Ark.
504, 637 S.W.2d 573 (1982) (stating that because appellant did not testify on direct
examination about a character trait of nonviolence, rebuttal testimony was not admissible)
with Spohn v. State, 310 Ark. 500, 837 S.W.2d 873 (1992) (citing same language from
McCormick on Evidence and stating that appellant’s testimony that there was no violence in
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his relationship with the victim and that he had never been charged with a criminal offense
invited rebuttal from the State on the peacefulness of his character). Because the circuit
court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present the testimony, we reverse
Stanton’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial.
Further, because Stanton received a sentence of life imprisonment, the record has
been examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were
decided adversely to Stanton, and no other prejudicial error has been found. See Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 4-3(i) (2016).
Reversed and remanded.
Debra J. Reece, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Kent Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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