Daniel v. Arkansas Department of Human Services , 2017 Ark. LEXIS 178 ( 2017 )

Cite as 2017 Ark. 206
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-16-1038
Opinion Delivered: June 1, 2017
GLORIA DANIEL
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 60CV-11-402]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS
SERVICES FOX, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
This appeal raises the following issue: Does statutory postjudgment interest on
attorney’s fees accrue when the right thereto was first established or when the fees were
actually quantified in dollars and cents? The circuit court entered a money judgment
confirming a jury verdict; by the same order, it also ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to
attorney’s fees. However, the court specified the precise attorney’s fee amount by a separate
order entered months later. We hold that statutory postjudgment interest on the attorney’s
fees accrues from this second order, which quantified the attorney’s fee award to dollars and
cents.
I. Facts
A jury awarded Gloria Daniel $40,000 on her claim for retaliation under the Arkansas
Whistleblower Protection Act.1 On April 17, 2015, the circuit court entered judgment “plus
1
We heard an earlier appeal of this case regarding sovereign immunity in Smith v.
Daniel, 2014 Ark. 519, 452 S.W.3d 575.
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costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to be determined by the court.” On July 24, 2015, the
court entered a second order quantifying attorney’s fees at $272,878. The Arkansas
Department of Human Services, defendant below, sought to appeal the attorney’s fees;
however, the Department ultimately dismissed the appeal.2
The Department satisfied the judgment and fee award on June 10, 2016. The
Department paid postjudgment interest on the attorney’s fees from the date that the award
was entered on July 24, 2015. But Daniel took the position that interest began to accrue on
April 17, 2015, when the underlying judgment was entered and the court held she was
entitled to attorney’s fees. The dispute reached the circuit court via the Department’s
motion to compel entry of complete satisfaction. The court granted the motion. Daniel has
now filed this appeal.
II. Principles of Law and Analysis
On appeal, we consider statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Coble, 2016 Ark.
114, 487 S.W.3d 370. The relevant statute provides the following: “[I]nterest on a judgment
entered by a court shall bear interest . . . at ten percent (10%) per annum.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-65-114(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2015). “Postjudgment interest is not designed to begin accruing
prior to the entry of a final judgment.” Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 510, at 21,
431 S.W.3d 210, 222. “Public policy dictates that postjudgment interest is awarded by the
courts in order ‘to compensate the judgment creditor for the fact that he has not had the
use of a certain sum of money that has been adjudged to be his.’” S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
2
Thus, the amount of attorney’s fees awarded is not an issue before this court because
the Department elected not to contest it.
2
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Co. v. Brinker, 350 Ark. 15, 21, 84 S.W.3d 846, 849 (2002) (citing Equifax, Inc. v. Luster,
463 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1978)).
Daniel primarily relies on federal cases to support her argument that postjudgment
interest accrues from the judgment that establishes the right to recover attorney’s fees. 3 Yet
these cases involve the interpretation of a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). In any event
a circuit split exists on the issue: at least three federal circuits have found that postjudgment
interest for attorney’s fees accrues when the award is actually quantified.4
We conclude that this view is more in line with the plain language of Arkansas’s
postjudgment-interest statute. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Dachs v. Hendrix, 2009 Ark. 542, 354 S.W.3d 95. When the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the
ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we
3
See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 250 F.3d 482, 494 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“Congress intended that postjudgment interest on all damages, including
reasonable attorney fees and costs, would run from entry of judgment on the merits.”);
Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 1273, 1277 (8th Cir. 1991); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors
Co., 701 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam), (overruled in part on other
grounds by Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986));
Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1995).
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See, e.g., Eaves v. Cty. of Cape May, 239 F.3d 527, 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding
that “postjudgment interest on an attorney’s fee award runs from the date that the District
Court enters a judgment quantifying the amount of fees owed to the prevailing party rather
than the date that the Court finds that the party is entitled to recover fees, if those
determinations are made separately”); Fleming v. City of Kane, 898 F.2d 553, 565 (7th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that “[p]rior to the date that judgment on attorney’s fees was entered . .
. [the] unpaid attorney’s fees [were] unliquidated and, as such, not entitled to interest”);
MidAmerica Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 962 F.2d 1470, 1476
(10th Cir. 1992) (holding that attorney’s fees began to accrue interest when they were
“meaningfully ascertained and included in a final, appealable judgment”).
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construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in
common language. Pritchett v. City of Hot Springs, 2017 Ark. 95, ___ S.W.3d ___.
Again, the statute here provides that interest bears on a “judgment.” Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-65-114(a)(1)(B). “In all judgments or decrees rendered by any court of justice for any
debt, damages, or costs, and on all executions issued thereon, the amount shall be computed,
as near as may be, in dollars and cents, rejecting smaller fractions.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
65-103. We have held that “a judgment for money must be a final determination of the
rights of the parties in an action, must specify the amount the defendant is required to pay, and
must be capable of enforcement by execution or other appropriate means.” Lawrence v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 247 Ark. 1125, 1128, 449 S.W.2d 695, 697 (1970) (emphasis added). We
have also held that a judgment is not final for the purposes of appeal until the amount the
defendant owes is reduced to dollars and cents. Williamson v. Baptist Health Med. Ctr., 2017
Ark. 92, ___ S.W.3d ___; Ford Motor Co. v. Washington, 2013 Ark. 88. Here, the court did
not specify the amount the Department had to pay in attorney’s fees until its July 24, 2015
order. A judgement on attorney’s fees did not exist until that date. Thus, the statutory
postjudgment interest did not begin to accrue until then. To interpret the statute the other
way would allow a party to delay quantification of attorney’s fees to accrue interest at ten
percent, a significant amount.
Daniel cites two Arkansas cases in further support, yet neither case is relevant. In
Mothershead v. Douglas, we held that when a judgment is affirmed as modified on appeal, the
postjudgment interest accrues from the date of the original judgment. 221 Ark. 756, 255
S.W.2d 953 (1953). We reaffirmed this principle in Glover v. Woodhaven Homes, Inc., 346
4
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Ark. 397, 57 S.W.3d 211 (2001). But there, the original judgment had been reversed on
appeal. Id. We concluded that postjudgment interest following a reversed order accrues
“only from the date that the new judgment is entered.” Id. Neither Mothershead nor Glover
addressed the question whether interest on an attorney’s fee accrues from the underlying
judgment or from the order quantifying the fee amount. Both concerned only the effect of
a judgment that had been either reversed or modified on appeal.
Because we conclude that postjudgment interest on an attorney’s-fee award accrues
from the order setting the fee amount in dollars and cents, we affirm the circuit court’s order
confirming complete satisfaction.
Affirmed.
Sutter & Gillham, P.L.L.C., by: Luther Oneal Sutter and Lucien Gillham, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Gary L. Sullivan, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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