White v. Priest , 348 Ark. 135 ( 2002 )

73 S.W.3d 572 (2002) 348 Ark. 135

Robert WHITE, et al.
v.
Sharon PRIEST, et al.

No. 02-284.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 10, 2002. Opinion on Order to Show Cause May 17, 2002. Supplemental Concurring Opinion on Recusal May 23, 2002.

Oscar Stilley, Fort Smith, for appellant.

No response.

TOM GLAZE, Justice.

On March 26, 2002, petitioner, Robert White, filed a petition captioned "An Original Action for Immediate Review and Such Other Relief to Which He May be Entitled under Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution and its Implementing Act 877 of 1999 (codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 7-9-501 -507 (Repl.2000)) and under Art. 16, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution." In his petition, White names as respondents: all Supreme Court Justices, individually and in his or her official capacity; the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the State Treasurer, in their official capacities; the Department of Finance and Administration and Revenue Commissioners, in their official capacities; and named members of the State Board of Election Commissioners. In his petition, White sets out a number of counts which we consider in the order he presents them.

In his Count I, White requests this court to immediately review the Secretary of State's Declaration issued on February 27, 2002, whereby, after consulting with the Attorney General, she concluded the popular name and ballot title contained in an initiative petition submitted by White were fair and accurate and facially valid. That initiative petition contains a proposed amendment to cap the salaries and regulate benefits of all state officers and employees who are paid in whole or in part from state or local taxes and fees, fines, penalties, tuition, or rents of state and local property. The salaries would be limited to $100,000 and the fringe benefits could not exceed the amount of 25% of the "direct salary." Before the Secretary of State issued the Declaration, the Attorney General had delivered an opinion, approving the popular name and ballot title of White's proposed amendment. The Declaration and Attorney General's opinion are marked Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. Significantly, the Attorney General added a caveat in his opinion concerning particular hazards attendant to lengthy and complex proposals, such as the one submitted. In doing so, the Attorney General pointed out that, with any proposed amendment of considerable length and complexity such as White's, the sponsor runs the risk of a challenge and a finding by the court that the ballot is unacceptable, either because it is too "complex, detailed, and lengthy," or because it has "serious omissions."

Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-506, White seeks review of the Secretary of State's Declaration and requests a declaratory judgment, finding White's ballot title and popular name sufficient. We grant review and direct this court's clerk to establish an expedited and appropriate briefing schedule for all parties, including amici curiae briefs, if any, permitted under Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4-6. See also Stilley v. Priest, 341 Ark. 329, 16 S.W.3d 251 (2000).

Before leaving this count raised by White, we note his "motion for recusal" filed on March 28, 2002, wherein he requests the recusal of all supreme court justices. White asserts that, because of his proposed amendment limiting salaries and other benefits of public servants, including those of the justices, there is an appearance of bias on the part of the justices since they have a financial interest in this matter that requires our recusal. White asks us to direct the Governor to appoint disinterested judges who have no interest in higher taxes or high salaries for public servants, and who are not employed by the state or local government. White further claims each justice is a defendant from whom money damages are sought.

White's claim is rather unclear, but he seems to be suggesting that the justices could be liable for illegal exactions in the nature of salaries received that exceed caps or limitations under the amendment he proposes. In this respect, he generally requests injunctive relief as well.

White's claim is not only premature, it is also a claim for illegal exactions under Ark. Const. art. 16, § 13, and can only be commenced in a trial court; such a suit cannot be commenced in the appellate courts. See Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988). White offers no brief, citation of authority, or argument to support his underlying argument for the justices' recusal, and we are unaware of any. Thus, this court is without original jurisdiction to hear any of the alleged claims for illegal exactions, and we dismiss Count 1.

Even if this court had original jurisdiction to initially consider a claim based on illegal exactions, the justices still would be empowered and duty bound to consider and decide these issues White strives to raise. Under Ark.Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1), while a judge must disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the "Rule of Necessity" may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute. See Commentary to Canon 3(E)(1); see also Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges § 20.2.2, at 591-592 (1996) (the Rule of Necessity is most likely to be invoked in situations where the filing of a suit whose resolution will directly affect the pecuniary well-being of judges as a whole, such as a suit seeking to increase judicial pay or retirement benefits); and Jeffery M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4.03, at 111-112 (3d ed. 2000).

In addition, we point out that Ark. Const. art. 7, § 9, in pertinent part, provides that when all or any of the justices are disqualified, the Governor must immediately commission the requisite number of men (or women) learned in the law to sit in the trial or determination of the supreme court's cases. In other words, this court does not direct who the Governor commissions to perform his duties as a justice, like White suggests in his motion. More important, it is significant to mention that in the review White seeks here, the Governor would have the same or similar conflict White asserts the justices have, since there are countless employees in the executive branch of government that are paid salaries exceeding the $100,000 cap established under White's proposal. See Acts 4, 234, 1238, 1612, 1636, 1638, 1668, 1669 of 2001. Here, each justice, individually, rejects White's motion to recuse under the "rule of necessity."

In his Count 2, White requests us to review the Secretary of State's Declaration issued on February 27, 2002, whereby, after consulting with the Attorney General, she declared the popular name and ballot title on White's Arkansas Prison System Amendment proposal to be fair and accurate and facially valid. As was the case in the "salary cap" proposal, the Attorney General's opinion issued on January 20, 2002, added a caveat that particular hazards exist because of the length and complexity of White's ballot title. We grant review, and as with the "salary cap" proposal, we direct the clerk to establish an appropriate briefing schedule for all parties, including amici curiae briefs authorized, if any, under Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4-6.

In Count 3, White's petition asks this court to enroll as law the proposed Used Car Tax of 2000 which this court, in Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000), found insufficient because of the proposed amendment's misleading popular name and ballot title and because it conflicted with the Arkansas and United States Constitutions. As a part of our holding in Kurrus, we ordered that the Used Car Tax Amendment of 2000 not be placed on that year's General Election ballot, or alternatively, that any votes cast on that amendment not be counted.

Here, White merely raises the same arguments we thoroughly considered in Kurrus. Offering no new argument or citations, and totally ignoring the holding in Kurrus, White states the following:

The [Kurrus] Supreme Court based its order denying the validity of the amendment upon two flagrantly unlawful considerations:

(1) That the ballot title was defective even though the ballot title plainly and certainly would have been sufficient if it had been approved by the General Assembly for an amendment proposed by same and

(2) that the amendment violated a substantive provision of the Constitution of Arkansas. The court also claimed that the petition violated the United States Constitution, but this claim was so clearly baseless that the court could not cite a single federal case of any kind in support of its contention. (Our emphasis.)

White further reflects his disagreement with the Kurrus decision saying, "The Arkansas Supreme Court [in Kurrus] was wholly without jurisdiction to declare a ballot title defective based upon its own created ``law' which created an extremely harsh test for citizens' initiatives, while using a test for measures referred by the Arkansas General Assembly that is so lenient that nothing has ever failed the test." He adds (again without new argument) that "any attempt to strike an initiative petition upon a claimed possible illegality of the substantive provisions of the initiative before the vote is had, canvassed, and certified, is a nullity." (Our emphasis.)

White's present counsel, Oscar Stilley, is well aware that this court dealt with these two foregoing issues in Kurrus, and that Stilley also continued his argument in a petition for rehearing in that case. His arguments were rejected on both occasions. We also point out that, even before Kurrus, this court in Thiel v. Priest, 342 Ark. 292, 28 S.W.3d 296 (2000), stated very clearly the rationale behind why initiatives by the General Assembly and by the voters are constitutionally different and permissible. See also Kurrus, at 440, 29 S.W.3d 669.

It is not this court's duty to review issues it has already considered or decided when no good reason has been shown to do so. We are, once again, troubled by Mr. Stilley's unwillingness to recognize precedent and his attempt to breathe life into decisions he previously lost. See Stilley v. Hubbs, 344 Ark. 1, 40 S.W.3d 209 (2001). We are always ready to reconsider the court's prior precedents if proper argument demonstrates that reconsideration and review are needed. See Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 151, 947 S.W.2d 349, 353 (1997). That is not the case at hand. Thus, as provided under Ark. R.App. P.— Civ. 11, we are compelled to order Mr. Stilley to show cause in writing why a sanction should not be imposed against him. Such writing shall be no later than seven days after the date of this opinion. The Attorney General and other state or constitutional parties Mr. Stilley named in this matter may have four days to respond from the date Stilley files his writing. Id. With regard to the bare and untimely allegations White attempts to assert in Count 3 of his petition, we dismiss that count in toto because those allegations, as explained above, have been previously decided by this court.

Before leaving the Count 3 matter, we note White's mention that this court is not at liberty to fault the work (opinion) of the Attorney General after the Attorney General had approved the proper name and ballot title of the Used Car Tax of 2000, but White cites no authority to support his contention. The authority, of course, is wholly contrary to such an assertion. See Arkansas Prof'l Bail Bondsman Lic. Bd. v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 69 S.W.3d 855 (2002); Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994); City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990).

Also, we note White's reference in Count 3 to his theory that, since the Used Car Tax amendment should have been enrolled by the Secretary of State in 2000, the State Finance & Administration (contrary to the text of the 2000 proposal) collected illegal taxes. White claims he and other taxpayers should be entitled to refunds from these illegal exactions. Again, even if Count 3 stated a viable cause of action, that alleged illegal exaction claim would have been required to be commenced in trial court under Ark. Const. art. 16, § 13. See Franz, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839. This court has no original jurisdiction to decide the matter, and we dismiss it.

In White's Count 4, he again questions the Kurrus decision, but limits this part of his argument to say that this court erred in invalidating the Used Car Tax of 2000 on the basis of constitutional provisions of the State and U.S. Constitutions which prohibit the impairment of contracts. Of course, this court indeed held that the proposed amendment violated such constitutional prohibitions, even though three justices did register different views on this issue. White expands his allegations in Count 3 to point out that, if his theory is correct that Ark. Const. amend. 43 cannot supersede provisions of Ark. Const. amend. 9, then any compensation the supreme court justices here received that exceeded their starting salaries would constitute illegal exactions.^[1] In turn, White uses this theory as the basis to ask all justices to recuse, alleging they have a pecuniary interest involved. As we have already stated, any illegal exaction action must be commenced in trial court, and we have no original jurisdiction over this matter. Therefore, we dismiss it. But as we have explained above, the "rule of necessity" compels that we not recuse in this case even if this court had original jurisdiction to decide this matter. See Commentary to Canon 3(E)(1).

Next, White requests in his Count 5 that "this court enjoin and prohibit all defendants from the use of any standard more restrictive that the ``manifest fraud' standard used for General Assembly ballot titles." Once again, this allegation and prayer for relief was considered in the Thiel and Kurrus cases. Thus, we dismiss this claim for the reasons already discussed above.

In Count 6, White's allegations are particularly confusing, but he refers to an Attorney General Opinion No. 2001-391, marked "exhibit 6," which, among other things, sets out the popular name and ballot title of a proposed amendment that would abolish all ad valorem taxes on personal property. The Attorney General's opinion, dated January 11, 2002, rejected the popular name and ballot title due to ambiguities in the "text" of the proposed measure. The Attorney General instructed Mr. Stilley to "redesign" the proposed measure and ballot title and resubmit it. Apparently, Stilley did not do so. Also, it appears the proposal with ballot and popular name was not sent to the Secretary of State for Declaration, as is provided under Act 877 of 1999. See Ark. Const. amend. 7, Ark.Code Ann. §§ 7-9-505 and 7-9-107(d) and (e)(2) (If the Attorney General or Secretary of State refuse to act or if the sponsors feel aggrieved by his acts, in such premises, the sponsors may, by petition, apply to the supreme court for proper relief.). Because the Secretary of State has not determined the sufficiency of this ad valorem tax proposal, this court has no jurisdiction to consider this matter and, therefore, we dismiss this count in White's petition.

In Count 7, White submits for review another proposed measure which is an amendment to abolish taxes on used goods. As was the situation with the ad valorem tax prohibition in Count 6 above, the Attorney General rejected Mr. Stilley's request to resubmit his proposal, which the Attorney General rejected as ambiguous. The Secretary of State has not made her determination as to sufficiency or issued a Declaration. We dismiss this count, since we do not have jurisdiction to review it for the reasons stated in dismissing Count 6.

In conclusion, White submits a Count 10 (sic) which lists nine paragraphs under the caption, "Petition Sponsors Have the Right to Cure, Including Cure of the Language of the Ballot Title and Popular Name."^[2] Six of the paragraphs include what only can be described as general legal principles that White claims to be true, without providing the court with citations of authority or argument. For example, after White proceeds by saying he incorporates all general allegations in the other counts, he states the following:

100. The legitimate interest of the state in the regulation of speech in the form of ballot titles, namely the prevention of fraud however denominated, is not advanced by the refusal to permit improvements, corrections, or changes to ballot titles, popular names, or the text of the measure, as to matters which do not affect the general meaning and purpose of the amendment, after suit is filed by a challenger.

101. To the extent that the state has an interest extending beyond fraud prevention, to the provision of greater detail, accuracy, completeness, or concision to the voters, that interest is best protected by a modification of the language of the ballot title, popular name, or text of the measure, as to matters that do not materially alter the purpose and effect of the measure, rather than the striking of the ballot title and popular name. This would be the alternative least restrictive of free speech rights and thus meeting constitutional muster for restrictions on core political speech.

102. Ballot titles and popular names are core political speech.

103. The text of citizen initiated measures is core political speech.

104. The ballot titles and popular names of all statewide initiatives are approved by the Arkansas Attorney General. In some cases the ballot title is a ballot title substituted by the Attorney General. The Arkansas Supreme Court is not at liberty to fault the work of the Attorney General, a member of the Executive Branch, and therefore to punish the sponsor of any amendment or the electorate, by removing the amendment on the basis of a supposed error by the Attorney General.

105. Alternatively, the Attorney General, in issuing an opinion, becomes a guarantor of the ballot title and popular name, and thus any subsequent striking of the amendment renders the officers of the State of Arkansas liable for any damages to the sponsors or the taxpayers for the failure to properly certify the rectitude of the ballot title and the matter which it describes, thus rendering the officers of the state, and especially the Treasurer of the State, Commissioner of Revenues, and Director of the Department of Finance and Administration liable to repay all damages suffered by the sponsor or by taxpayers as a result of the defective ballot title opinion.

At the end of his Count 10, White demands an oral argument.

After reading the foregoing list, we can only conclude no further consideration and reflection is needed on this court's part other than the issues we already decided in Counts 1 through 7, except to say this court will later consider granting an oral argument when a timely request is made under Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 5-1(a), and this court decides the request meets the requirements of that rule.

In sum, this court grants review of White's Counts 1 and 2, and dismisses his Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. An expedited briefing schedule shall be made regarding the counts granted and on review. The court issues a show-cause order for White's counsel, Oscar Stilley, to show in writing why a sanction under Rule 11 should not be imposed against him.

PER CURIAM.

Mr. Oscar Stilley has filed a petition for an original action wherein he asserts seven counts for relief. On April 10, 2002, this court granted his counts one and two, and denied the remaining counts. He had requested disqualification of all justices to recuse from hearing his petition because, he argues, they have demonstrated a hostility towards him and because the justices have an interest in the outcome in the case.

Mr. Stilley's arguments deal primarily with his belief that, over a ten-year period, this court ruled against him in five cases. He offers no other allegations bearing on any hostility issue, but seeks to "interrogate" the present justices "eyeball-to-eyeball" at a hearing in a discovery fashion in an attempt to find reasons why the court is hostile towards him. Instead of alleging reasons for the justices' recusing, he merely suggests he wants a hearing to "ferret out the facts" pertinent to disqualifications. Mr. Stilley also asserts the sitting justices have a pecuniary interest in this case because one of the ballot-title issues concerns a proposed amendment that could "cap" their salaries, if the proposed amendment is adopted. On April 10, 2002, this court granted Mr. Stilley's request to review that ballot title and proposed amendment.

Mr. Stilley presents no valid reasons or allegations that warrant a justice's recusal in this case. The only reason Mr. Stilley offers to show the court's hostility towards him is that he lost five prior cases before this court that he claims he should have won. Fourteen different justices served on this court during the ten-year period in which those five cases were decided. This argument is yet another disingenuous way to again show his dissatisfaction concerning earlier opinions of this court with which he disagrees. Such revisits of earlier cases offer nothing new showing that the precedential value of those opinions should be reversed. In fact, Stilley's pleadings, motion, and argument constitute a clear violation of Ark. R.App. P.—Civ. 11. In this same vein, this court, on prior occasions, has expressed its displeasure with attorneys who have directed disrespectful language towards courts and judges. See McLemore v. Elliott, 272 Ark. 306, 614 S.W.2d 226 (1981) (striking appellant's brief due to "intemperate and distasteful language" directed toward trial judge, pursuant to former Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 6); see also Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-5 (captioned "Contempt," it provides, "No argument, brief, or motion filed or made in the Court shall contain language showing disrespect for the trial court"). In view of Mr. Stilley's continued strident, disrespectful language used in his pleadings, motions, and arguments, and his repeated refusal to recognize and adhere to precedent, Mr. Stilley's 70-page brief should be stricken entirely.

Examples of Mr. Stilley's remarks follow:

It is also all too possible that the Court will simply decline to rule consistently, upholding Kurrus when that is convenient, blithely ignoring Kurrus when consistency of decision making will not bring the desired result.

* * *

Therefore, it appears that the only persons in this Act receiving more than $100,000 per year are judicial officers. Why then did the Court falsely claim that this Act supported their theory that many executive branch employees get over $100,000.

* * *

The Court's action in pretending to raise a claimed conflict on the part of the Governor, on such flimsy grounds, indicates a fear on the part of the justices that an impartial tribunal will decide the case honestly but contrary to the way that this Court would decide the case.

* * *

It grieves undersigned counsel to be forced to recount part of the many serious and apparently intentional wrongs that the members of this Court has [sic] committed, as part of their claim for recusal. However, by refusing to honestly consider a fair claim for disqualification, made as gently as possible, the Court puts undersigned counsel in the position of having to raise these issues to protect his rights and the rights of his clients.

* * *

The Court simply left its decision intact even though its reasoning is wholly irreconcilable with prior decisions of the Court. This leaves two possibilities. One, the court, in its original opinion intentionally lied about the citation of these authorities. These authorities do in fact annihilate the Court's reasoning and ruling on the parol evidence question in this case. If this is the basis for the oversight, the Court and each of its members necessarily demonstrate rank prejudice against Appellant and should recuse.

* * *

The other possibility is that the Court accidentally overlooked these authorities, although they were cited and included in the lists of authorities, and although these cases were discussed at length at pages 2-4 of the Appellant's reply brief. If this is the problem, Appellant wishes to hear the reason, if any, that Appellant should be expected to trust the competence of the Court in the decision of this cause.

* * *

By this means, any reader of this motion may examine Exhibit "1," and compare same to the opinion in Roberts v. Priest, and thus know that the Roberts Court wilfully and knowingly ignored the principal argument of the Intervenors, because the argument was irrefutable.

* * *

The decision of the Court, coupled with the Court's history of refusing to correct blatant and manifest error upon request for rehearing, requires that undersigned counsel make this fact known to the public. Publicity is the cure for government evils. Most certainly, a refusal to acknowledge and adjudicate arguments, solely because they provide irrefutable proof in favor of a position disliked by the Court, is a government evil that must be stamped out.

* * *

It seems the Court knew in advance that its ruling would not withstand any critical analysis, and wished to stifle any pleading that would expose the weakness of the Court's opinion.

* * *

This simply shows that the Court reacts in anger to despised arguments by undersigned counsel that it cannot logically refute. This behavior is exactly the sort for which the bench and bar have fallen into great disfavor and distrust with the general public in Arkansas.

* * *

What is required, in other words, is a return to stare decisis, and adherence to established legal rules even when the judge or justice prefers a result different from that required by the law. This conduct has not stopped. Rather it has intensified.

* * *

The list of cases in which the Court has acted prejudicially to undersigned counsel is by no means complete. On the contrary, this is the tip of the iceberg. This Court has repeatedly shown that it will declare the law one way on undersigned counsel's cases, and the opposite on cases by other individuals.

* * *

We cite the foregoing examples of the general tone of disrespect for the code of ethics and Mr. Stilley's breach of his oath of office as an attorney-at-law. That disrespect for the court pervades Mr. Stilley's brief. As was the situation in McLemore, we examined Mr. Stilley's brief to see if we could strike only some parts, but find Mr. Stilley's intemperate and distasteful language spread throughout all of his brief. Mr. Stilley asked to incorporate his brief as part of his petition. We conclude that Mr. Stilley's brief is an inexcusable breach of the obligation of professional conduct that this court expects of the members of the bar. Accordingly, we direct that all copies of his brief shall be stricken in their entirety from the files of this court.

Because this matter implicates a breach of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, we refer Mr. Stilley to the Professional Conduct Committee and request the Committee to take whatever action it believes his actions warrant under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

BROWN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I agree with much of the majority's opinion. However, I have decided to recuse on one of the two ballot-title matters that remain before this court to be decided. The case on which I am recusing involves a constitutional amendment to reduce the salaries of state officers and employees. If passed, it would mean a reduction of the salaries of Supreme Court Justices by almost twenty percent.

On the issues not related to recusal, I agree that Mr. Stilley is attempting to resuscitate an issue long since laid to rest in Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000), and that he has not shown sufficient reason why he should not be sanctioned for this conduct under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure—Civil 11. I also agree that he is not entitled to a fact-finding hearing under Appellate Rule 11. I further agree that an Appellate Rule 11 sanction of striking most of his brief is warranted because Mr. Stilley has filed a frivolous matter in this court. I would not, however, strike that portion of Mr. Stilley's brief which suggests recusal of this court's members due to a financial interest in the subject matter. Finally, I agree that this court lacked original jurisdiction to hear his illegal exaction cause of action brought against the members of this court. We appropriately dismissed that claim.

On recusal, Mr. Stilley has requested a declaratory judgment from this court on his proposed Ballot Title and Popular Name concerning a proposed amendment to cap the salaries of all state officers and employees at $100,000 and fringe benefits at 25% of that salary. The Ballot Title and Popular Name have been approved by both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, as required by Ark. Code. Ann. § 7-9-501 to -506 (Repl.2000). That issue has not been dismissed by this court. It is still viable and awaits this court's decision.

I first believe that while Mr. Stilley is not entitled to a fact-finding hearing regarding recusal of the members of this court under Appellate Rule 11, he is entitled to five minutes to argue his renewed motion that the members of this court recuse due to a financial interest in the subject matter of the proposed amendment. An opportunity to be heard on this matter is fundamental due process. We routinely allow movants five minutes to argue any motions prior to oral arguments at our Thursday sessions of court. We allowed Mr. Stilley the same privilege in September 2001 to argue that this court should recuse in a different matter. Stilley v. James, 346 Ark. 28, 53 S.W.3d 524 (2001) (per curiam). I would similarly grant him five minutes to be heard on this recusal motion on the Ballot Title issue involving capping our salaries.

Secondly, Mr. Stilley, in his renewed motion for recusal, counters this court's first opinion in White v. Priest, 348 Ark. 135, 73 S.W.3d 572 (2002), by pointing to the fact that the Governor of this state, who is authorized to appoint special justices under the State Constitution following recusal, does not have a direct conflict of interest in this matter because he makes less than $100,000. Thus, the argument goes, the Governor is not suffering under the same disability as the members of this court, and the Rule of Necessity, which requires otherwise disqualified judges to sit when there is no replacement judge available, does not apply. Simply stated his argument is: Because the Governor is not directly affected by the proposed initiative, but only certain employees of the Executive Branch are, the Governor does not suffer from a disabling conflict of interest, comparable to the members of this court, which prevents him from appointing special justices to replace us. Again, I believe that Mr. Stilley should have the opportunity to argue this issue before this court.

In today's opinion, the majority addresses Mr. Stilley's Rule of Necessity argument in a footnote and refers to other state officers and employees who make over $100,000 a year. At this juncture, I am not convinced that the Governor has a conflict of interest comparable to that of this court. Certainly, special justices appointed by the Governor and sitting on this case would not have the conflict of interest that this court has. The majority should also address the difference in the federal judiciary which has no mechanism for appointment of special judges. The Rule of Necessity obviously applies in federal judicial salary matters; however, our situation in Arkansas, where we do have an appointment process, is different.

Amendment 80, which recently amended our State Constitution with a new Judicial Article, reads:

No Justice or Judge shall preside or participate in any case in which he or she might be interested in the outcome, in which any party is related to him or her by consanguinity or affinity within such degree as prescribed by law, or in which he or she may have been counsel or have presided in any inferior court.

Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 12. The following section provides for appointment of special justices by the Governor of the State when a justice of our court disqualifies. Ark. Const. Amend. 80 § 13(A). My research has developed no case where the Rule of Necessity has been applied when a process exists for the appointment of a special judge to sit for the disqualifying judge. It occurs to me that the Rule of Necessity would only come into play if the Governor determined he had a conflict and could not appoint special justices.

Recusal is a matter left largely to the discretion of the individual judge. SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 341 Ark. 972, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 315 Ark. 685, 870 S.W.2d 383 (1994) (motion to recuse denied). I therefore recuse and will not participate in the Ballot Title issue on capping the salaries of all government employees at $100,000. My reason for recusal is solely based on my financial interest in the subject matter of the proposed amendment and is not due to any other reason raised by Mr. Stilley. I request Chief Justice ARNOLD to request that the Governor appoint a special justice as my replacement for this Ballot Title issue only.

SUPPLEMENTAL CONCURRING OPINION ON RECUSAL.

ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice, concurring.

On Friday, May 17, 2002, I issued an opinion in which I recused from sitting on the proposed constitutional amendment and Ballot Title which would cap the salaries of officers and employees of the state government at $100,000. My reason for doing so was that should the amendment pass, it would have a direct financial impact on me as it would reduce my salary by about twenty percent. I further disagreed with the majority that the Governor of the State has a comparable conflict of interest to mine and is foreclosed from making an appointment for a special justice in this case. My sole reason for recusal was my financial interest in the subject matter of the Ballot Title.

Mr. White has also proposed a second unrelated constitutional amendment and Ballot Title dealing with the State's penitentiary system under the same case number. It was not my intention to recuse on this discrete matter because it involved an entirely different proposed constitutional amendment.

However, there has been no motion to sever the two proposed constitutional amendments and treat them as different cases. Nor has the court decided that it will do so on its own motion. The net result of this is that because the two proposed constitutional amendments will be considered by the court at one time as one case, I must also recuse from participation in the proposed constitutional amendment that deals with the State's penitentiary system.

As I stated last week, our State Constitution provides that a justice shall not sit in a matter in which he or she is "interested." Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 12. It further provides that in the event of such disqualification, the Chief Justice shall request that the Governor of the State appoint a special justice to sit on the case involved. Ark. Const. amend. 80 § 13.

I therefore request the Chief Justice, pursuant to Amend. 80, section 13, of the State Constitution of Arkansas, to appoint a special justice to sit for me in this case to decide the sufficiency of both the proposed salary-cap amendment and the proposed penitentiary amendment.

NOTES

[1] White cites Ark. Const. amend. 9, § 2 for the proposition that the amendment prohibits supreme court justices from receiving compensation greater than that authorized at the beginning of the term to which the judge was elected. He then refers to Amendment 43 which he says permits the increase of salaries of justices of the supreme court during the term for which the justice has been elected. White concludes that, if Kurrus is the law, then Amendment 43 is plainly and facially unconstitutional as violating or conflicting with an existing substantive provision of the Arkansas Constitution. Of course, Amendments 9 and 43 are not in issue here, but we would merely observe at this point that the Publishers Notes to Amendment 43 suggest Amendment 43 probably supersedes Amendment 9.

[2] White sets out Counts 1 through 7, omits stating Counts 8 and 9, but continues with Count 10, which apparently should be numbered Count 8.