Webb v. Workers' Compensation Commission ( 1987 )

Robert H. Dudley, Justice.

The Workers’ Compensation Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 81-1301 to -1367 (Repl. 1976 and Supp. 1985), provides benefits to employees killed or injured in the course of their employment. The Workers’ Compensation Commission is charged with administration of the Act and with reviewing decisions of Administrative Law Judges concerning disputed claims. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 81-1325 to -1342. The Commission acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and its awards are in the nature of judgments. The Act provides a symmetry for the composition of the tripartite commission. The Governor appoints all three Commissioners. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1342(a). One member is to represent employers’ interests, one member is to represent employees’ interests, and the third, the neutral chairman is to be an attorney with at least five years experience in the practice of law. Former Governor White appointed Melvin Farrar, an employer for 25 years, to serve as the employees’ representative on the Commission. Appellants sought to challenge the qualifications of Commissioner Farrar. The trial court dismissed the action. We reversed, reinstated the action, and remanded for trial. Webb v. Workers’ Compensation Commission, 286 Ark. 399, 692 S.W.2d 233 (1985). Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court held that the governor had the authority to determine who is qualified to serve as the representative of employees and that Commissioner Farrar was not disqualified from serving even though he was an employer. We reverse.

In order to insure the balance between employers and employees, the Act plainly requires that the employee representative on the Commission satisfy two requirements: (1) five years of past union membership and (2) classification as a representative of employees. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1342(a). These two requirements must be viewed in light of the members’ “previous vocation, employment or affiliation.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1342(a).

It is undisputed that Commissioner Farrar met the first requirement, five years of past union membership, as he was a member of a union from the early 1950’s until 1978. It is the second requirement which Commissioner Farrar fails to satisfy. In a supporting document to the motion for summary judgment, Commissioner Farrar admitted that the last time he was an employee was in 1957 and from that time until his appointment he was a small businessman who hired and fired his own employees.

The Commission does not dispute the fact that Commissioner Farrar was an employer for the 25 years preceding his appointment, but instead argues that the courts should not interfere with gubernatorial appointments unless the governor has abused his discretion. Admittedly, the gubernatorial power of appointment is vested with a reasonable latitude of discretion in classifying the persons to be appointed to the Commission, but that discretion is not without limit or restraint. The classification of appointees to the Commission must measure up to minimal legal standards in order to comply with the requirements of the Act. Whether such requirements have been met is subject to judicial review, and if they have not been met appropriate relief may be granted. Hogan v. Davis, 243 Ark. 763, 422 S.W.2d 412 (1967).

In light of his “previous vocation, employment, or affiliation,” Commissioner Farrar does not minimally meet the requirement of being “classed as a representative of employees” and, solely on that basis, is not qualified to hold that office.

Reversed.

Newbern, J., concurs.