Alexander v. Kelley , 2017 Ark. LEXIS 105 ( 2017 )

Cite as 2017 Ark. 130
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
No. CV-16-1060
Opinion Delivered April 13, 2017
KHALID RYAHIM ALEXANDER
APPELLANT
PRO SE MOTIONS OBJECTING TO
V. SCHEDULING ORDER AND FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
WENDY KELLEY, DIRECTOR [JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF COURT, NO. 35CV-16-488]
CORRECTION
APPELLEE HONORABLE, JODI RAINES
DENNIS, JUDGE
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS
MOOT.
PER CURIAM
Appellant Khalid Ryahim Alexander, who is also known as Charles Alexander, filed
a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections
16-112-101 to -123 (Repl. 2016) in the county where he is incarcerated. The petition was
denied by the circuit court. Alexander lodged this appeal and subsequently filed two
motions. The first motion objects to the scheduling order assigning a due date for
Alexander’s brief, and the second motion appears to seek permission to file a noncompliant
brief and to have his brief duplicated at public expense.
An appeal from an order that denied a petition for postconviction relief will not be
permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Crawford v.
Cashion, 2010 Ark. 124, at 2, 361 S.W.3d 268, 270 (per curiam). Because it is clear that
Alexander cannot prevail on appeal, we dismiss the appeal, and his motions are therefore
moot.
Cite as 2017 Ark. 130
Alexander was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder in the shooting death of
Marquis Brown, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. This court affirmed. Alexander v. State, 335 Ark. 131, 983 S.W.2d 110
(1998).
Thereafter, Alexander filed multiple pro se petitions for postconviction relief,
including a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in 2004, which was the first of
three pro se habeas petitions filed prior to the one filed in the matter at hand. We affirmed
the circuit court’s denial of the first petition. Alexander/Ryahim v. Norris, CV-04-1303 (Ark.
June 25, 2005) (unpublished per curiam). In his fourth pro se petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, Alexander asked the circuit court to reconsider allegations set forth in his 2004 pro
se petition in light of a recent United States Supreme Court decision—Montgomery v.
Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).1 Alexander also maintained that he was
entitled to reconsideration of claims raised in his 2004 habeas petition based on the discovery
of new evidence.
Alexander attached to his habeas petition numerous handwritten pages that purport
to be affidavits in support of his petition. The facts and grounds alleged in these affidavits
are largely indecipherable and reference, among other things, $15 million, parole hearings,
Federal Admiralty Law, domestic and diplomatic partnerships, and Washington D.C.
1 In Montgomery, the United States Supreme Court held that the rule it had announced
in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which prohibited the mandatory imposition of
life without parole on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen, was substantive and
should be applied retroactively. ___U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
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extradition hearings. One of these affidavits purports to describe the discovery of new
evidence pertaining to an alleged bench warrant that had formed the basis of a claim for
relief asserted in Alexander’s 2004 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Alexander contended
in his 2004 petition that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a verdict convicting him
of first-degree murder because he had previously been indicted for second-degree murder
on a bench warrant that had been allegedly filed under a separate case number (40CR-97-
1299), rather than the case number under which he had been charged, tried, and convicted
(40CR-97-1450). We rejected this claim and found that any alleged prior filing of a felony
information or bench warrant under a separate case number did not invalidate the properly
filed information, or the judgment-and-commitment order entered in the case at issue.
Alexander/Ryahim, CV-04-1303, at 2. Alexander’s confusing account of the events
surrounding the alleged discovery of new evidence did not provide sufficient grounds for
reconsideration of the claim.
Alexander also submitted with his petition copies of partial trial transcripts; a copy of
the decision in Montgomery, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718; a copy of a legislative act entitled
“Arkansas Rehabilitation Act for Incarcerated Individuals;” and copies of documents related
to grievances filed by Alexander with the Arkansas Department of Correction. The circuit
court noted that the hundreds of documents submitted by Alexander in support of his
petition were “difficult to read,” and it denied relief because Alexander’s allegations and the
attached documents did not raise sufficient grounds or offer any evidence to establish
probable cause that he is being held illegally, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, or that
the commitment is invalid on its face.
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Cite as 2017 Ark. 130
A circuit court’s denial of habeas relief will not be reversed unless the court’s findings
are clearly erroneous. Gardner v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 346, at 2, 439 S.W.3d 663, 665 (per
curiam). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. Under our habeas statute, a petitioner
must plead either the facial invalidity of the order of conviction or the lack of jurisdiction
by the trial court and must additionally make a showing either by affidavit or other evidence
of probable cause to believe that he is being illegally detained. Id. at 3, 439 S.W.3d at 665–
66. In habeas proceedings, the court’s inquiry into the validity of the judgment is limited
to the face of the commitment order. Id.
The only allegation contained in Alexander’s petition that was comprehensible and
relevant as grounds for habeas relief was his allegation that the holding in Montgomery, ___
U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, had rendered his life sentence invalid. That decision of the
United States Supreme Court addressed sentencing juveniles who were under the age of
eighteen when the crime was committed. Id. at 732–33. Alexander’s judgment of
conviction demonstrated that Alexander was born on October 6, 1978, and was eighteen
on January 9, 1997, when he committed the crime for which he was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Moreover, Alexander had been convicted of first-degree murder, not capital
murder, and his sentence was not mandatorily imposed. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132
S.Ct. at 2469 (explaining that the Court was not foreclosing the imposition of a life sentence
for juvenile offenders, but that mandatorily imposed life sentences were prohibited as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment of United States Constitution).
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Cite as 2017 Ark. 130
As stated, the allegations set out in Alexander’s handwritten affidavits were
incomprehensible, or, at best, conclusory, and the documents attached to his petition were
irrelevant in habeas proceedings. Alexander did not provide sufficient allegations, evidence,
or authority to demonstrate that the judgment of conviction or the sentence is facially invalid
or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Arguments and allegations that are
incomprehensible and are lacking in authority or convincing argument will not be
considered by this court. Satterlee v. State, 289 Ark. 450, 451, 711 S.W.2d 827, 828 (1986).
This court will not research or develop the argument for an appellant. Gardner v. Hobbs,
2015 Ark. 410, at 3–4 (per curiam). The circuit court did not clearly err when it determined
that Alexander had failed to state grounds demonstrating probable cause that he is being
illegally detained.
Appeal dismissed; motions moot.
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