JAMES R. GRIFFIN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS , 535 S.W.3d 261 ( 2018 )

Cite as 2018 Ark. 10
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
No. CR-17-636
Opinion Delivered January 18, 2018
JAMES R. GRIFFIN
APPELLANT
PRO SE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
V. BRIEF TIME
STATE OF ARKANSAS [CRAIGHEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT
APPELLEE COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT, NO.
16JCR-15-751]
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION MOOT.
JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice
Appellant James R. Griffin, who entered a plea of guilty to rape in 2016, lodged an
appeal in this court from the denial by the trial court of his pro se petition for writ of error
coram nobis. Now before us is Griffin’s motion for extension of brief time. Because it is
clear from the record that Griffin could not prevail on appeal, the appeal is dismissed. See
Justus v. State, 2012 Ark. 91. The dismissal of the appeal renders the motion moot.
Griffin argued in his coram nobis petition that he would not have entered a guilty
plea if he had been properly advised by his attorney. He argued that he was under duress
when the plea was entered as the result of the poor advice by counsel and counsel’s failure
to effectively negotiate a plea bargain. He further asserted as grounds for the writ that no
rape had occurred. As none of the claims were cognizable as a ground for the writ, the trial
court did not err in denying the petition.
The standard of review of an order entered by the trial court on a petition for writ
of error coram nobis is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying
the writ. Newman v. State, 2014 Ark. 7. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts
arbitrarily or groundlessly. Nelson v. State, 2014 Ark. 91, 431 S.W.3d 852. There is no
abuse of discretion in the denial of error coram nobis relief when the claims in the petition
were groundless. Id.
A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State v. Larimore, 341
Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment
rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been
known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was
not brought forward before rendition of the judgment. Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539,
354 S.W.3d 61. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact
extrinsic to the record. Roberts v. State, 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to
address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is available
to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of
trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a
third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Howard
v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. Error coram nobis proceedings are attended by a
strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Nelson, 2014 Ark. 91, at 3,
431 S.W.3d at 854.
With respect to Griffin’s allegation that he was under duress when he entered his
plea of guilty by virtue of improvident advice from his attorney, the claim is essentially an
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel with the underlying claim that his plea was not
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entered intelligently and voluntarily because of the advice he received. The allegation can
only be brought pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2016), not in a
petition for writ of error coram nobis. White v. State, 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285; see
also Nelson, 2014 Ark. 91, 431 S.W.3d 852 (Error coram nobis proceedings are not a
substitute for proceeding under Rule 37.1 to challenge the validity of a guilty plea, nor are
the two proceedings interchangeable.). Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are not
cognizable in error coram nobis proceedings under our state law, and coram nobis
proceedings are not to be used as a substitute for raising such claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel under our postconviction rule. State v. Tejeda-Acosta, 2013 Ark. 217, at 8, 427
S.W.3d 673, 678.
To prevail on a claim that a writ of error coram nobis is warranted because a plea
was coerced, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the plea was the result of
fear, duress, or threats of mob violence as previously recognized by this court as grounds for
a finding of coercion. Green v. State, 2016 Ark. 386, 502 S.W.3d 524. Griffin did not meet
that burden. An allegation that a guilty plea was coerced in the sense that it was involuntarily
and unknowingly given as a result of erroneous advice does not constitute showing of a
coerced plea within the scope of a coram nobis proceeding. See White, 2015 Ark. 151, 460
S.W.3d 285.
Griffin’s claim that no rape occurred was a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the judgment. We have repeatedly held that attacks on the sufficiency
of the evidence are not within the purview of a coram nobis proceeding. Jackson v. State,
2017 Ark. 195, 520 S.W.3d 242.
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Finally, Griffin contended in his petition that a hearing should be held on his
allegations. The trial court is not required to hold a hearing on a coram nobis petition if
the petition clearly has no merit. Griffin’s petition failed to state a cause of action to support
issuance of the writ; accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying it without a hearing.
Appeal dismissed; motion moot.
HART, J., dissents.
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