Shawn Cone v. State of Arkansas , 2022 Ark. 201 ( 2022 )

Cite as 2022 Ark. 201SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-22-114
Opinion Delivered: November 10, 2022
SHAWN CONE APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLANT [NO. 16JCR-19-1622]
V. HONORABLE RANDY PHILHOURS,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
Shawn Cone appeals from a jury verdict in the Craighead County Circuit Court finding
him guilty of capital murder, abuse of a corpse, and theft of property for which he received
consecutive sentences in the Arkansas Department of Corrections of life without parole, twenty
years, and twelve years, respectively. He also was convicted of two counts of misdemeanor theft
of property, the victim’s cell phone and her 2016 Range Rover, for which he received one-year
sentences.
On appeal, Cone only challenges his felony convictions. He argues that the circuit court
(1) abused its discretion in violation of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 by admitting
into evidence a list of countries that do not have extradition treaties with the United States; (2)
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his backpack because the warrant
was not supported by probable cause, the warrant was a “General Warrant,” and the court
erroneously relied on his warrantless search waiver; (3) abused its discretion by admitting into
1
evidence photos taken by the medical examiner; and (4) erred in denying his directed-verdict
motion on the charges of capital murder, abuse of a corpse, and theft of the victim’s credit cards.
Our jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Rule 1-2(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals of Arkansas. We affirm.
I. Synopsis
This case arises from the December 2, 2019 murder of Alissa Reynolds in her Jonesboro
residence, the subsequent abuse of her corpse, and postmortem use of her cell phone, credit
cards, and automobile. Ms. Reynolds’s live-in boyfriend, appellant Shawn G. Cone, a parolee,
was charged with these crimes. Facebook messages showed that Ms. Reynolds ended the
relationship on December 2.
The victim’s body was discovered by police while conducting a second welfare check on
December 8, 2019. Earlier in the day, police knocked on Ms. Reynolds’s door but left when
there was no answer. In the second welfare check later that evening, the officers approached the
door and were greeted by the stench of decomposing flesh. There was no sign of a forced entry,
and no one answered the door. Once police breached the door, Ms. Reynolds was found on a
chaise lounge, covered in layers of bedding. It was subsequently determined that Ms. Reynolds
was dressed in the same clothing that she had worn to work, and she was still wearing her work
ID badge. Blood and other bodily fluids had soaked the towels and a blanket left beneath the
chair.
Ms. Reynolds was last seen alive at work on December 2, 2019. Security cameras at her
place of employment showed her leaving the Axis manufacturing facility in Paragould at 5:03
p.m. She was dressed in jeans and a pink pull-over top.
2
The victim’s neighbor, Byron Holt, testified that he had a surveillance system set up at
his residence during the week of December 2 through December 8, 2019. Before Ms. Reynolds
returned home from work, Cone was recorded driving his Chevrolet Tahoe from the garage.
When Ms. Reynolds arrived home at 5:38 p.m., she parked her white 2016 Range Rover in the
garage. Cone arrived on foot ten minutes later. At 7:00 p.m., the Range Rover backed out of the
garage. A short time later, Cone arrived alone at the Elks Lodge in Jonesboro. Cone returned to
Ms. Reynolds’s residence at 9:59 p.m.
Cone was shown to have been driving Ms. Reynolds’s Range Rover and using her credit
cards and cell phone, beginning shortly after what was determined to be the time of her death.
On December 2, John Wood observed Cone driving Ms. Reynolds’s Range Rover to the Elks
Lodge, just after 7:00 p.m. Jeffery Powell testified that he saw Cone on December 6, at his
residence, driving the Range Rover that day. Daniel Neal testified that Cone purchased beer at
the Country Liquor Store using Ms. Reynolds’s credit card on December 2. The manager of a
Sprint store, Stevie Ivy, likewise testified that on December 6, Cone purchased a new cell phone,
using Ms. Reynolds’s credit card to cover the activation fee. On December 3 and 4, a call was
placed on Ms. Reynolds’s cell phone to her employer by a man who identified himself as Shawn,
and claimed she was too ill to go to work. Testifying in his own defense, Cone confirmed that
he had made these calls. He also had misled the victim’s family and friends about her not being
alive.
An autopsy revealed that Ms. Reynolds had been stabbed eighteen times and that she
had also sustained numerous “cuts” caused by slashing. The medical examiner opined that the
stab wounds were the cause of her death. It was determined that some of the wounds, particularly
3
the wounds on her hands, were defensive in nature. Additionally, the proximity of some of the
stab wounds indicated to the medical examiner that they were inflicted while Ms. Reynolds was
not moving because she was either unconscious or dead. According to the medical examiner,
the state of decomposition of Ms. Reynolds’s body indicated that she had been dead for more
than a few days, which was consistent with her having died on December 2. Cone’s DNA was
found under Ms. Reynolds’s fingernails.
On December 9, Cone was apprehended in Key West, Florida. Upon traveling to Florida,
Detective Brian Arnold retrieved Cone’s personal possessions, including a backpack, and
transported the items to Jonesboro. Detective Arnold obtained a series of warrants
encompassing the property in Cone’s possession when he was detained by Florida authorities.
The contents of the backpack included a printed list entitled “Countries with no extradition
treaty with US” with a handwritten “CUBA” added and circled. Cone unsuccessfully moved
prior to trial to suppress the contents of the backpack. Jonesboro Police Detective Keri Varner,
an expert in cell phone data extraction, testified that she recovered Google searches on a phone
used by Cone that queried about countries that do not have extradition treaties with the United
States.
Prior to leaving Jonesboro, Cone had visited with friends Donny and Gina Tilton and
told them that he was moving to Key West “because there was nothing left here for him.” He
showed the Tiltons a printed list of countries that have no extradition treaties with the United
States. Cone told Gina that he wanted to leave the country because he did not want to go back
to prison. According to Gina, she did not know the victim but asked Cone about his relationship
to her. She testified, “I actually asked if Alissa was his girlfriend, and he stated that, no, she was
4
not. She actually probably hated him. She was just a very good person that knew if she kicked
him out, he would be homeless, and so she had let him have a room in her house.”
Cone also met with Stephanie Fagaley, a former girlfriend. Cone likewise talked about
nonextradition treaty countries, including Cuba, the Maldives, and maybe Morocco. He said he
was going to Key West, which Fagaley assumed meant “he was going to Cuba.” Cone told her
he wanted to leave because he did not want to go back to prison.
When Cone testified in his defense, he admitted that he could be seen on the neighbor’s
December 2, 2019 recording, approaching the home on foot and entering through the garage
that evening. He also admitted that Ms. Reynolds was murdered that night but claimed he
returned home from running errands to find the back door kicked in and Reynolds “a bloody
mess.” According to Cone, he did not call the police because he “knew what the automatic
assumption was going to be.” Instead, he covered Ms. Reynolds’s body with blankets and pillows.
On cross-examination, Cone further admitted that he and Ms. Reynolds got into an argument
on the day of the murder. He acknowledged numerous Facebook messages on December 2,
including Ms. Reynolds’s message that she was “done with him.” Cone admitted that he was the
person seen in the neighbor’s recordings, coming and going from Ms. Reynolds’s home in the
days after her murder. He admitted that he continued to stay in her home after her death until
the police arrived to conduct the first welfare check on December 8, 2019. He testified, “[A]fter
that, I thought it’s either I’m leaving or I’m going to jail, so I hurriedly pack my things. I say
goodbye [to Ms. Reynolds and their dogs] and I leave.” He left his passport behind in a vehicle
in Jonesboro. Cone also admitted using Ms. Reynolds’s phone after her death to text and to
communicate with her friends and family, pretending to be her, as well as lying about Ms.
5
Reynolds’s being in a car wreck and hospitalized. He admitted calling Ms. Reynolds’s work
supervisor, Melissa Henson, on December 3 and 4, the days directly following the murder, to
report that Ms. Reynolds had the flu, and texting updates about her absence. He admitted that
leaving the country was a “possibility of a plan at first” or “still a possibility,” when he told the
Tiltons about it. Cone admitted using Ms. Reynolds’s Range Rover after her death, and he
parked and left it, heavily damaged, at the Memphis airport. He also admitted using Ms.
Reynolds’s credit cards after her death.
Although this case was made largely with circumstantial evidence, Cone was convicted as
charged.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In accordance with our usual practice, before we take up Cone’s points on appeal
concerning evidentiary issues, we first consider Cone’s argument that the circuit court erred
when it denied his directed-verdict motion on the charges of capital murder, abuse of a corpse,
and theft of Ms. Reynolds’s credit cards. In pertinent part, at trial, Cone made the following
directed-verdict motions: As to count one, capital murder, Cone argued lack of any “direct
evidence that there has been any premeditated or deliberated purpose . . . or that he was the one
who stabbed the victim [and] [a]ny evidence that the State has put forth on Capital Murder has
been purely speculative in relation to the defendant.” As to abuse of a corpse, count two, Cone
argued that “the State has failed to meet its burden [as they have] only put on evidence allegedly
showing the defendant coming and going from the house [and] [a]t most, this amounts to failure
to report [and] [t]here has been no evidence of mistreating or concealing the corpse.” Without
making any additional substantive argument in support, Cone also moved for a directed verdict
6
on count five, theft of Ms. Reynolds’s credit cards. The circuit court denied all of these motions.
When we review the denial of a directed-verdict motion challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Holly v. State, 2017
Ark. 201, 520 S.W.3d 677. That means we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict
and determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence
is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or the other and
pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Id. To be substantial, the circumstantial evidence
must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the accused’s guilt. Kellensworth v. State,
2021 Ark. 5, 614 S.W.3d 804. The question whether circumstantial evidence excludes every
hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Id.A. Capital Murder
On appeal, Cone argues that the State only presented circumstantial evidence, and the
mere fact that he was seen coming and going from Ms. Reynolds’s house; used her car, phone,
and debit card; and was arrested in Key West does not mean he was guilty of capital murder. He
asserts that he faced unrelated theft charges pending since May 2019, which was the reason he
contemplated leaving Jonesboro. Further, Cone noted Detective Arnold’s testimony that there
were other vehicles seen at Ms. Reynolds’s house that had not been investigated. Cone argued
that the jury verdict was the result of “surmise and conjecture,” and therefore, this court should
reverse the conviction. We are not persuaded.
A defendant commits capital murder, if, with the premeditated and deliberated purpose
of causing the death of another person, he causes the death of any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-
10-101(a)(4) (Supp. 2019). Premeditated and deliberated murder occurs when the killer’s
7
conscious object is to cause death, and he forms that intention before he acts and as a result of
a weighing of the consequences of his course of conduct. Brooks v. State, 2016 Ark. 305, at 6,
498 S.W.3d 292, 296. Premeditation may be formed in an instant and is rarely capable of proof
by direct evidence. Id. Thus, a jury may infer premeditation and deliberation from the
circumstantial evidence. Keesee v. State, 2022 Ark. 68, at 3, 641 S.W.3d 628, 633.
We hold that there is substantial evidence of both the identity of the perpetrator and the
culpable mental state. By Cone’s own admissions, he and Ms. Reynolds quarreled on the day of
the murder. Ms. Reynolds’s Facebook messages indicated that her relationship with Cone had
ended on December 2. However, Cone continued to live at her residence. Contrary to Cone’s
claims, Officer Jason Chester, who participated in the December 8 welfare check on Ms.
Reynolds’s home, reported no evidence of the door having been kicked in. Officer Chester’s
testimony was corroborated by bodycam footage admitted into evidence. Further, the autopsy
revealed that many of the wounds that Ms. Reynolds sustained were defensive wounds, and
Cone’s DNA was found under her fingernails. Additionally, Ms. Reynolds was wearing the
clothing that she wore to work, and surveillance video provided by Byron Holt placed Cone at
the residence–––and no one else–––shortly after Ms. Reynolds returned from work. Further,
evidence of Cone’s flight to Key West, his desire to flee the United States to a country with
which we do not have an extradition treaty, and Cone’s lying to Ms. Reynold’s employer and
family are evidence of Cone’s consciousness of guilt. Taken together, it provides substantial
evidence of Cone’s identity as the perpetrator.
Regarding the culpable-mental-state element, premeditation and deliberation, the
medical examiner testified that Ms. Reynolds had been stabbed eighteen times and had multiple
8
other cuts, including a cluster of eight repeated stab wounds to her chest, and a fatal wound to
her neck. The number of stab wounds indicates a prolonged struggle and repeated application
of deadly force. From the nature and the extent of the wounds alone, the jury could infer the
premeditation and deliberation necessary for a conviction of capital murder. See Fudge v. State,
341 Ark. 759, 767–68, 20 S.W.3d 315, 319–20 (2000).
B. Abuse of a Corpse
Cone argues that the identity of the perpetrator for the abuse-of-a-corpse count is not
substantial for the same reason that he challenges the identity element in the capital-murder
count. We likewise find this argument unpersuasive. The offense of “Abuse of a Corpse” is
codified under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-60-101 as follows:
(a) A person commits abuse of a corpse if, except as authorized by law, he
or she knowingly:
(1) Disinters, removes, dissects, or mutilates a corpse; or
(2)(A) Physically mistreats or conceals a corpse in a manner offensive to a
person of reasonable sensibilities.
(B) A person who conceals a corpse in a manner offensive to a person of
reasonable sensibilities that results in the corpse remaining concealed is
continuing in a course of conduct under § 5-1-109(e)(1)(B).
(C)(i) As used in this section, “in a manner offensive to a person of
reasonable sensibilities” means in a manner that is outside the normal
practices of handling or disposing of a corpse.
(ii) “In a manner offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities” includes
without limitation the dismembering, submerging, or burning of a corpse.
(b) Abuse of a corpse is a Class C felony.
The evidence adduced at trial indicates that Cone not only murdered the victim, but
9
also, he alone was present when her lifeless body was concealed. Cone himself confirmed that
he was the person captured on his neighbor’s surveillance camera, proving that Cone was the
only person with access to Reynolds’s body. Accordingly, the jury could conclude that he alone
had the motive and opportunity to conceal the victim in her residence by covering her with
bedding. Likewise, Cone’s decision to leave Ms. Reynolds on the chaise lounge, decomposing,
could reasonably be found by a jury to be a course of conduct that would be offensive to a person
of reasonable sensibilities. See id. Finally, there is no evidence that anyone else was present to
conceal Reynolds’s lifeless body while he continued to live at her residence.
C. Theft of Property
Cone was charged with three counts of theft of property arising from his use of Ms.
Reynolds’s Range Rover, cell phone, and credit cards. The counts involving the Range Rover
and cell phone were reduced to misdemeanors and are not covered by Cone’s appellate brief.
Regarding Ms. Reynolds’s credit cards, Cone argued that the State failed to prove that his use of
Ms. Reynolds’s credit cards was unauthorized because he lived with her. He contended that
unauthorized use was therefore purely speculative. In denying Cone’s directed-verdict motion,
the circuit court noted that in her Facebook messages,
Ms. Reynolds made it clear that she had broken up with Cone on the day of her death. For his
argument on appeal, Cone merely recites the argument he made to the circuit court.
The crime of “Theft of Property of a Credit or Debit Card” is codified at Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-36-103(a)(1), which states in pertinent part that “[a] person commits theft
of property if he or she knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over or makes an
unauthorized transfer of an interest in the property of another person with the purpose of
10
depriving the owner of the property.” We hold that there is substantial evidence of unauthorized
use of the credit cards.
The evidence presented at trial was that Cone used Ms. Reynolds’s credit cards after her
demise. Further, Gina Tilton testified that Cone had stated that the victim “probably hated
him,” which, given its greatest probative force, provides a substantial basis for the jury to
conclude that Cone’s use of Ms. Reynolds’s credit cards was not permissive. Further, as the
circuit court noted, she had made it clear just prior to her death that she had broken up with
Cone. Evidence that Cone had used the cards after Ms. Reynolds’s death is substantial evidence
that he did not have her consent to use them.
III. Admission of the List of Countries Having No Extradition Treaties with the United States
Cone argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a list
of countries that do not have extradition treaties with the United States in violation of Arkansas
Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. The list was found in a backpack that Cone was carrying at the
time of his arrest. Cone moved in limine to exclude the list as not relevant and more prejudicial
than probative. The circuit court admitted the list subject to the State’s presenting admissible
testimony concerning what Cone told the Tiltons and Fagaley regarding his plans to flee the
country.
Cone argues that admission of the list was an abuse of discretion because there was no
evidence presented that he had any intention of going to Cuba, and that notion is purely
speculative. Arguing further, Cone asserts that the evidence showed that Cone was very open
about where he was going and that he had no intention of going to Cuba. He further notes that
he left his passport behind when he boarded his flight to Key West.
11
The State asserts that this issue is not preserved for our review. It argues that when a trial
court’s ruling is a qualified one, the defendant must renew his objection at trial,
contemporaneous with the alleged error, in order to preserve it. It contends that in the case
before us, the trial court conditioned admission of the list on the State’s representation of what
the trial testimony would be, and Cone did not raise a contemporaneous objection when Gina
Tilton was the first witness at trial to testify about the list. Cone did not object until after
Stephanie Fagaley’s testimony. Citing Ward v. State, 370 Ark. 398, 260 S.W.3d 292 (2007), the
State asserts that Gina Tilton’s testimony about the list bars review of Cone’s claim. We agree.
It is settled law under our preservation jurisprudence that when a conditional ruling is
made at trial based on the representation of what certain evidence will be, a contemporaneous
objection is required to preserve the issue for our review. Id. (citing Byrum v. State, 318 Ark. 87,
884 S.W.2d 248 (1994); Alexander v. State, 335 Ark. 131, 983 S.W.2d 110 (1998)). Accordingly,
this issue is not preserved for our review.
IV.Suppression of Evidence in Cone’s Backpack
Jonesboro Police Detective Brian Arnold testified during the hearing on Cone’s motion
to suppress the evidence contained in Cone’s backpack. Detective Arnold stated that when Cone
deplaned in Key West, he was arrested by deputies from the Monroe County Sheriff’s
Department. Cone was carrying a blue backpack as his carry-on luggage. The deputies did not
search the backpack but instead just seized it and held it in their evidence room.
Arnold prepared two warrants. The first was directed at the Monroe County Sheriff’s
Department, asking that the backpack be released to the Jonesboro police. The second was a
request to search the backpack once it was in the possession of the Jonesboro police. Detective
12
Arnold further testified that he was aware that Cone was on parole, and Cone had executed a
warrantless search waiver pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-106.
At the hearing, Cone argued that the contents of the backpack should be suppressed,
claiming that the affidavit supporting the warrant was inadequate because it did not establish
probable cause to search. In disposing of Cone’s suppression motion, the circuit court found
the warrant to be sufficient:
The affidavit supporting the application for the warrant states that on
December the 8th officers were dispatched to the pertinent address for a welfare
check. Officers discovered a deceased body of a female victim, who was later
identified, inside that residence. She had multiple cuts on her body with blood
on her body and clothing. Shawn Cone could have sustained an injury during the
attack causing blood transfer to the victim. Detectives were able to develop Shawn
Cone as a suspect. Shawn Cone fled the area by flying to Key West where he was
arrested on 12-9-19 the very next day. He had a large suitcase and a blue backpack.
By the time this search warrant was sought, the officers knew that there were cell
phones, credit cards, debit cards, and the clothing he was wearing inside those,
the backpack and the suitcase. While it could have been more detailed, I think
the dates that they use are very pertinent. I think the statement that she had cuts
on her body and clothing and because he was a suspect he could have had blood
on his clothing plus the fact that they already knew because of its inventory by
the Monroe County Florida people. I think that makes the warrant sufficient. It’s
certainly good faith because the thing is for Judge Boling when he signed this,
first, was there any false information in the affidavit? No. Did the magistrate have
to give up his neutrality or did he manifest that neutrality? Seems to me like he
did. Substantial basis must be provided enough to establish probable cause. I
think that happened.
Cone argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized from his backpack because the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the warrant
was a “General Warrant,” and it erroneously relied on his warrantless search waiver. We
disagree.
On review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct an
13
independent inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances, evaluating findings of historical
facts for clear error. Thomas v. State, 2020 Ark. 154, 598 S.W.3d 41. We give due weight to
inferences drawn by the circuit court, and we will reverse the circuit court only if the ruling is
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.The particularity requirement of a search warrant is stated in Rule 13.2 of the Arkansas
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(b) The warrant shall state, or describe with particularity:
(i) the identity of the issuing judicial officer and the date and place where
application for the warrant was made;
(ii) the judicial officer’s finding of reasonable cause for issuance of the warrant;
(iii) the identity of the person to be searched, and the location and designation of
the places to be searched;
(iv) the persons or things constituting the object of the search and authorized to
be seized; and
(v) the period of time, not to exceed five (5) days after execution of the warrant,
within which the warrant is to be returned to the issuing judicial officer.
(c) Except as hereafter provided, the search warrant shall provide that it be
executed between the hours of six a.m. and eight p.m., and within a reasonable
time, not to exceed sixty (60) days. Upon a finding by the issuing judicial officer
of reasonable cause to believe that:
(i) the place to be searched is difficult of speedy access; or
(ii) the objects to be seized are in danger of imminent removal; or
(iii) the warrant can only be safely or successfully executed at nighttime or under
circumstances the occurrence of which is difficult to predict with accuracy; the
issuing judicial officer may, by appropriate provision in the warrant, authorize its
execution at any time, day or night, and within a reasonable time not to exceed
sixty (60) days from the date of issuance.
14
(d) If the warrant authorizes the seizure of documents other than lottery tickets,
policy slips, and other nontestimonial documents used as instrumentalities of
crime, the warrant shall require that it be executed in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 13.5 and may, in the discretion of the issuing judicial officer,
direct that any files or other collections of documents, among which the
documents to be seized are reasonably believed to be located, shall be impounded
under appropriate protection where found.
Highly technical attacks on search warrants are not favored. Watson v. State, 291 Ark. 358, 724
S.W.2d 478 (1987). In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a
practical, common sense decision based on all the circumstances is sufficient if “there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Under
Gates, our duty as a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate issuing the warrant
had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id.In the case before us, the object to be searched, Cone’s backpack, was described with
particularity. Further, the magistrate issuing the warrant was apprised of the nature of the
murder, so there was probable cause to believe that blood transference was in the contents of
the backpack that Cone was carrying during his flight to Key West. Further, it had been
determined that Cone was carrying the victim’s credit cards at the time of his arrest, so the
presence of other stolen property was likely to be in the backpack that Cone carried onto the
plane. Because we conclude that the warrant was sufficient to authorize the search of Cone’s
backpack, we need not consider his argument concerning the parolee search waiver.
V. Admission of the Autopsy Photos
Cone argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence photos
taken by the medical examiner. Over Cone’s objection, the medical examiner relied on selected
photographs to assist in his testimony about Ms. Reynolds’s injuries and the abuse of her corpse.
15
An initial photograph was used to orient the jury to the upper half of Ms. Reynolds’s body,
where all the wounds were located. The other sixteen photographs demonstrated individual or
close clusters of wounds. One of the photographs depicted cuts to Ms. Reynolds’s hands and
forearms, which the medical examiner identified as “defensive-type wounds.” Another showed
eight stab wounds to Ms. Reynolds’s upper chest, as well as wounds to her neck and mouth. Due
to the proximity of the wounds, the medical examiner opined, Ms. Reynolds was stabbed
repeatedly while she could not move because she was being held down, was unconscious, or was
dead. Ms. Reynolds also had four stab wounds to her neck, and a photo depicted the damage to
her left jugular vein and left carotid artery, which was likely a fatal wound. The medical examiner
also testified about the decomposition shown in some photographs, including discolorations or
places in which the skin was slipping off with the epidermis coming away from the dermis, which
indicated that Ms. Reynolds had been dead for “more than a few days” prior to the examination
and was consistent with her death occurring on December 2, 2019.
Although the circuit court ordered the State to attempt to compromise with the defense
on a limited collection of photos, Cone objected to the admission of all autopsy photographs,
arguing that admitting them violates Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that
“evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Cone notes that prior to
the medical examiner’s testimony, the circuit court gave the following warning to those watching
the trial:
I have been involved in trying criminal cases in one form of another since
16
1985. I’ve seen a lot of bad stuff personally, and I’ve seen a lot of worse pictures.
I’m led to believe these are going to be the worst ever. . . . If you don’t think you
can handle [the pictures], I understand, and I will allow you to get up and go and
come back as soon as the pictures are over.
Cone argues that in this particular case, the autopsy photographs were especially
gruesome and that they are extremely prejudicial and have no probative value. He urges this
court to find analogous Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986), in which the Berry
court reversed a capital-murder conviction based on the admission of autopsy photos. We
disagree.
The admission of photographs is a matter left to the sound discretion of the circuit court.
Airsman v. State, 2014 Ark. 500, at 17, 451 S.W.3d 565, 575. When photographs are helpful to
explain testimony, they are ordinarily admissible, and even the most gruesome photographs may
be admissible if they assist the trier of fact. Id. at 17–18, 451 S.W.3d at 575.
The mere fact that a photograph is inflammatory or is cumulative is not, standing alone,
sufficient reason to exclude it. If a photograph serves no valid purpose and could be used only
to inflame the juror’s passion, it should be excluded; it is only when an inflammatory or
gruesome photograph is without any valid purpose that it should be excluded. Jones v. State, 336
Ark. 191, 984 S.W.2d 432 (1999).
Cone’s reliance on Berry, supra, is misplaced. In Berry, the prosecuting attorney
introduced nine graphic photographs of extensive injuries to the victim’s face––some taken to
emphasize those injuries––which were accepted by the circuit court without exception. Id. The
appellant objected that the photographs were not relevant in that the brutality of the murder,
the cause of death, and the perpetrator of the injuries were all admitted by the appellant, and it
17
was uncontradicted that the appellant never touched the victim. Id. The Berry court held that
any probative value of the photographs was outweighed by prejudice and that most were merely
cumulative. In the case before us, the photographs were carefully tied to the medical examiner’s
testimony. Furthermore, because Cone was charged with abuse of a corpse, the state of the Ms.
Reynolds’s body, postmortem, was extremely relevant. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the autopsy photos.
VI. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a) Review.
In compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(a), we have examined the record
for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that the circuit court decided
adversely to the appellant. We have found no prejudicial error warranting reversal.
Affirmed.
Special Justice GREG MAGNESS joins.
BAKER, J., concurs.
WOMACK, J., not participating.
Erin W. Lewis, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
18